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This thesis addresses the role of religion(s) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the wider context
of the emergent states of the former Yugoslavia. The thesis argues that although religion has
been used to promote nationalist ideologies and the cause ofwar, it also can be a positive
force for building peace. The thesis further argues that the religious dimension includes the
element ofmyth in the self-understanding of the Serbs, Bosnjaks and Croats, and seeks to
account for the influence of their myths in creating ethno-religious conflict. The thesis will
explore this hypothesis while recognising that the secular assumptions ofmost Western
scholars either preclude the religious factor altogether or demythologise it in favour of a
rationalist re-interpretation. By resisting the urge to demythologise the respective self-
understandings, the thesis demonstrates that religion is intrinsic to the identities of the
peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that religio-mythical elements are essential in the
process ofnation-building.
The thesis argues that the Western structural and materialist approach to peace-building can
be strengthened to address pressing inter-personal needs of society more effectively by
engaging the moral and ethical resources that religion - with all its known difficulties in the
region - has the potential to contribute. The thesis will offer a critical evaluation of
interventionist efforts of the international community towards peace-building, taking account
of the evidence that cessation ofmilitary hostilities is countered by modest results in
restoring civil society. In light of this, the thesis examines the role of religious sodalities as
locally-generated initiatives in peace-building that express the hopes of peoples of faith. It is
argued that religion in this capacity complements, rather than substitutes, secular initiative.
The thesis therefore makes use ofprimary research data gathered from among religious
leaders, women, and students from the Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant
communities as evidence ofwhy and how persons of religious faith contribute to peace-
building and social restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Theological reflection on the three elements of (mytho-)history, the sacred texts and the
context of Bosnia-Herzegovina enables a contextual analysis of peace-building to emerge.
The theological concept of 'restoration', which is derived from the primary research
interviews, is framed with discussion of the creation and the eschaton in the sacred texts -
the Bible and Qur'an - as a comprehensive Leitmotiv for peace-building. Social expression
of restoration transpires in the religious faith sodalities where authentic spirituality is
exercised towards forgiveness and healing, and re-creates wholeness from fragmentation.
The thesis demonstrates that in the religious faith sodalities the personal narrative of the
individual believer, together with the meta-narratives ofChristianity and Islam, effectively
counter the ideological narratives of nationalism, and, when extensively shared with others,
build peace across national boundaries.
The thesis is organised in three parts. Part One is the descriptive element focusing on the
role of religion in shaping national identities, the interventionist efforts of the international
community, and the holistic meaning of peace afforded by Christianity and Islam. Part Two
is dedicated to the analysis of the grounded research among religious leaders, women and
students from the religious communities. Part Three focuses on analysis and theological
reflection generated from the context and the grounded research interviews.
ill
Wisdom is better than weapons ofwar,
But one bungler destroys much good.
Ecclesiastes 9:18
Dedicated to the many people in Bosnia-Herzegovina
who have the courage to live in peaceful accord
with God and fellow humanity.
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CUP Committee ofUnion and Progress. Reform movement renamed from
the 1889 established Ottoman Society for Union and Progress and
known in Europe as the 'Young Turks'.
ET English Translation.
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
IDP Internally Displaced Person.
IEBL Internal Entity Boundary Line. The division between the Srpska
Republika and the Federacja established by the Dayton Accord.
IVZ Islamska Vjera Zajednica (Islamic Religious Community). Official
organ of the Muslim community. After the adoption of a secular
identity for the Bosnjaks in 1993 the organisation removed Vjera
(Religious) from the title and became simply the IZ.
JMO Jugoslavensko muslimansko organizacija (Yugoslav Muslim
Organisation). Muslim political party founded after World War I in
1919.
JNA Jugoslavenska narodna armija (Yugoslav National Anny).
LXX Septuagint.
MBO Muslimanska Bosnjacka Organizacija (Bosnian Muslim
Organisation). Political party founded by Adil Zulfikarpasic
representing a non-religious Bosnian Muslim identity.
MNO Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija (Muslim National
Organisation). First Muslim political party in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
established in 1906.
NGO Non-Government Organisation.




S/C/B Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian (language dialects).
SDA Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party ofDemocratic Action).
Predominantly Muslim political party formed after the dissolution of
the Communist Party in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alija Izetbegovic was
its leader from 1990-2000.




Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian*
c is pronounced like ts as in 'cats'
c is pronounced like a soft ch, or like tu as in British 'tune'
c is pronounced like tch as in 'watch'
dj (or d) is pronounced as in 'adjure'
h is pronounced as a guttural, as in the Scottish 'loch'
j is pronounced like y as in 'yellow'
s is pronounced like sh as in 'show'
z is pronounced as in 'leisure'
Turkish
a is pronounced lightly aspirated, sometimes preceded by a faint
y or h
c is pronounced like j in 'jam'
5 is pronounced like tch in 'watch'
1 is pronounced as an unaccented vowel as in the French 'deux'
g is unpronounced and serves to lengthen the preceding vowel
5 is pronounced like the o in the German 'horen'
§ is pronounced like sh in 'show'
ii is pronounced like ii in the German 'iiber'
v is pronounced as a soft v, between v and w
*
While linguistically considered one language with dialectic differences, recent nationalistic
developments have insisted on treating Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian as distinct languages. The
thesis will respect this newer convention and, where necessary, identify usage by the marker S/C/B
(Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian) rather than the formerly accepted S-C (signifying Serbo-Croat).
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(Croatian). Medieval Bosnian land owner and ruler.
(Ar., 'remaining' or 'existing'). A theological understanding
especially in the Malamiyya Sufi order that Allah can mystically
manifest himself in the life of the believer.
beg (Tk. 'bey'). A title meaning 'lord' of the higher of two levels of
landowning nobility.
Bektashiyya Sunnite Sufi order although manifesting beliefs in the Shi'ite
tradition. Founded by Hajji Bektash, who was born in the 13th
century.
Bogomil Followers of the 10th century Bulgarian priest, Bogomil, meaning
'loved ofGod'. The sect is believed by some to have spread
throughout the Balkans, including Serbia and Macedonia. Its
doctrines were dualist and influenced by Manicheism and gnosticism.
It was also iconoclastic and therefore opposed to Orthodox
Christianity. Additionally, many Bosnjaks believe they are the heirs
of the medieval sect.
Bosnjak Since 1993, the official and secular name of the Muslims of Bosnia-
Herzegovina apart from the religious connotations associated with the
term 'Muslim'.
bosnjastvo Bosnian 'Nationhood' marked by non-irridentism and inter-
confessionality as developed during the Habsburg occupation.
Cathari A religious sect thought to be similar to the Bogomils found in
medieval France.
Cetnik Serbian right-wing nationalist, especially during the Second World
War.
cizje or
jizja (Ar.jizya). Poll tax collected from the non-Muslims during the
Ottoman Empire in exchange for the sultan's protection.
xvi
dervish (Persian). A person initiated in the rules of a Sufi order and who has
taken a spiritual guide. In some orders, the term refers to one who
has reached a higher rank in the order.
devoirme (Tk., 'tribute in blood' or 'boy tribute'). The taking of young
Christian boys for training toward the Jannisary corps and service in
the official posts of the Ottoman Empire.
djimma (Ar. dhimma). Protection afforded by the Qur'an for 'peoples of the
book' (Jews and Christians).
hakim 'wise man', related to hikma, 'wisdom', and based in divinely
revealed knowledge and holiness.
Jannisaries (Tk. yeni-cheri, 'new troops'). Ottoman semi-religious infantry corps
serving the sultan and consisting of young men trained through the
system of dev$irme.
kmet Serf who was taxed a portion of the harvest by the landlord. They
were predominantly Christian and rarely Muslim in the Ottoman
Empire.
Malamiyya A Sufi order emphasising inward devotion, originating in Khurasan
and attributed to Hamdun al-Qassar (d. 884).
Mawlawiyya A Sufi order well-established in both Bosnia (Sarajevo) and






(Ar. madrasa). A Muslim theological school.
(Ar. maktab, 'elementary school'). A religious primary school in
which children learned to read the Qur'an and write the Arabic
alphabet.
(Tk. mesnevi; Ar. Mathnawi). An epic poem that comprised of
rhyming verse common among certain Sufi orders.
(Tk.); (Ar. milla). 'People' or 'masses'. Distinguished by religious
confession, the millet became the basis for determining a nation
within the Ottoman Empire.
Miisafirhana An inn belonging to a Sufi order where poor Muslim scholars,
military personnel and travellers were accommodated gratis for up to
three days.
XVll
Osmanli A general reference to the Muslims of Anatolia, and distinct from the
Slavic Muslims of the Balkans. The Osmanli were named after the
clan that created the Ottoman dynasty.
Patarin (Italian, Patareni or Patarini). A term used, in some instances, for
the Bogomils of the Balkans, and, in other instances, to identify a
distinct religious sect known only in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Pasa (Tk.). Territorial governor under the Ottoman Turks.
pravednik A righteous person. One who speaks prophetically into society, and is
ostracised by one's own community for upholding justice.
Sandzak (Tk. sanjaq). Originally, 'flag' or 'standard', and later applied to an
administrative district of the Ottoman Empire.
Tanzimat (Ar./Tk., 'regulation'). A series of internally generated political and
social reforms of the 19th century aimed at modernising the Ottoman
Empire.
taqwa (Ar.) Literally, 'to ward off, 'to guard against', or 'to preserve'. It
possesses the meaning of righteousness rooted in the fear and awe of
God.
tariqat (Ar. tariqa, 'way', or 'path'). Sufi order or way.
tawhid (Ar.) Unity, often used in reference to God and, by extension, the
created order. It is the foundational principle of the Islamic
worldview.
tekije (Tk. tekke); (Ar. takiyya). A lodge of a Sufi order.
Turci Originally, a term referring to Balkan Muslims and distinguishing
them from Anatolian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. Now it is
used as a derogatory term to designate the Bosnjaks of the Balkans.
Turkuse A term referring to Anatolian Muslims and distinguishing them from
Balkan Muslims in the Ottoman Empire.
ulema (Ar., 'men of learning'). Reference to the educated and clergy class
ofMuslims trained in doctrine and law.
umma
Ustasa
The Muslim socio-religious community.
Croatian right-wing nationalists during the Second World War.
xvm
vakuf (Ar. waqf, 'pious bequest'). Endowment, or religious-charitable
foundation holding religious property and using it in philanthropic
ways for the benefit of the urnma.
Velikosrpsko (Serbian, 'greater Serbia'). The nationalist idea that it was the





(Serbian). The Prince-Bishop ruler of the theocratic province of
Montenegro.
(Ar.). The mystical state of'Oneness of Being', based on the







An extended family community organised along patriarchal kinship
relationships in the Balkans.
a community, society or sodality, unofficially or loosely affiliated
with larger institutional organisations.
(Ar. zawiya). The complex of operations for a Sufi order, often
comprising a mosque for worship and a lodge for the adherents of the
order. The zavija served also as a welfare institution for the destitute
and handicapped, and as a place of refuge for fugitives.
meeting, gathering, assembly.
(Serbian) Term for a Slavic tribal chieftan.
xix
Coding Of Interviews
The coding of the interviews allows the reader to recognised salient facts about the
interviewee at a glance.
The first set of initials indicates the religious community with which the interviewee
is associated:
MU. . . = Muslim
PR. . . = Protestant
SO. . . = Serbian Orthodox
RC. . . = Roman Catholic
The second set of initials indicates the group in the qualitative data analysis with
which the interviewee is to be identified:
.RL. . = Religious Leader
.SF.
._ = Student Female
.SM. . = Student Male
.WO. . = Women
The third set of initials indicates the city in which the interviewee lives:
.BL. = Banja Luka (Republika Srpska)
_.CA. = Capljina (Federacija)
_.MO. = Mostar (Federacija)
_.OS. = Osijek (Croatia)
_.SA. = Sarajevo
_.SI. = Sipovo (Republika Srpska)
. .ZA._ = Zagreb (Croatia)
The numbers in the fourth set refer to the taped audio recordings of the interviews,
aiding audio archival retrieval.
Example of coding reference:
A footnote reference to 'Seperic [RC.SM.SA.14]: 10' refers to Entoni Seperic, a
Roman Catholic (RC) male student (SM) from Sarajevo (SA).
The number after the colon refers to the page number of the interview where the
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An uncommon insight into peace comes from a military commander. Former US
General Charles Boyd denies that the Dayton Accord stopped the fighting in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. "What it did..." he insists, "was freeze in place an uneasy cease-fire
and prevent a resumption of hostilities."1 An 'uneasy cease-fire' is an apt description
of the circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. Nearly a decade after the signing
of the Dayton Accord, which was intended to end the violence and rebuild civil
society, Bosnia-Herzegovina lives under the tension ofmany unresolved post-war
issues, and gestures of peace and reconciliation are more symbolic than effective.
1.1 Factors of Instability and Fragmentation
Bosnia-Herzegovina's welfare is inherently linked to its geography and topography.
The Balkan Peninsula has no natural protective borders, obliging it to become a
'traditional battleground of peoples, empires and cultures'.2 The flatlands of the
Transdanubian plain to the north of the Peninsula, and the seas at each of the other
compass points, facilitate outside incursions. The interior of the Peninsula presents a
contrasting picture. Steep, irregular mountains and non-navigable rivers afflict the
Peninsula with internal isolation, particularism and fragmentation.3 Historically,
these two factors have strongly influenced the security issues of the Balkans.
In his analysis Giannakos rejects the 'ancient hatreds' doctrine often peddled as the
primary cause ofBalkan conflicts, while still acknowledging long and recurring
periods of strife traceable to the classical Greek period. He demonstrates that
historical animosities are not causes, but symptoms of'enduring geopolitical
idiosyncrasies'4 related to specific geographic features of the region. In his view the
Peninsula plays host to two geopolitically incompatible triangles. The North-South
1
Boyd 1998: 43.
2 Cited in Giannakos 2002: 48.
3 Stavrianos 1963: 2.
4 Giannakos 2002: 44.
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triangle has its base points at Belgrade-Bucharest-Athens and stretches from the
Transdanubian plain to the Mediterranean. Although this triangle is generally
marked by internal solidarity and cohesion owing to common interests within the
Balkan Peninsula, the area can also fall victim to isolation and fragmentation and
manifold intra-regional squabbles.
The East-West triangle has its base points in Zagreb-Tirane-Istanbul and stretches
from the Adriatic to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. Complex and often
competing political authorities and interests mark this triangle, and cooperation is
characterised by uneasy compromises of temporary expediency. Together these















Pressure Point, while Bucharest is historically pulled away from solidarity with
Southeastern Europe by Eurasian concerns. Similarly, Tirane is influenced by the
pressure point of the Mediterranean, whereas Istanbul responds to concerns of the
Near Eastern Pressure Point.
From this schema general historical trends of tranquillity and volatility emerge. Not
infrequently the Peninsula has played host to conflicts between authoritarian powers
external to the region along the East-West triangle. Intra-regional squabbles have
historically led to intervention by an external force in the region that imposed itself
5 Giannakos 2002: 44, 45.
Figure 1. Regional and extra-regional pressure points
acting on the Balkan Peninsula. (Diagram by Giannakos
2002: 45. Altered with permission.)
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on the smaller actors of the Balkans to bring a degree of stability and unity.6
However, once the extra-regional power(s) waned, the Balkan region reverted to
particularism and fragmentation.7
As with other states - medieval or modern - in the Balkan region, the history of
Bosnia-Herzegovina is shaped by these stresses, at times enjoying relative peace and
tranquillity, and at others falling into horrific violence and fragmentation. Even
before the great migrations of the sixth to ninth centuries that would bring the Slavs
to the Balkan Peninsula, the land today known as Bosnia-Herzegovina lay on the
East-West fault line formally recognised by Roman emperor Theodosius (c. 346-395)
in the 4th century. Its location between Northern Europe and Asia Minor, and on the
periphery of competing empires, enriched medieval Bosnia and Hum (Herzegovina)
with multiple expressions of culture, religion and tradition, and prevented any single
religion or culture from laying exclusive claim to the area. It was and remains today
"a border province permanently at the crossroads of opposing worlds and
civilizations".8 These factors may be observed in the most recent outbreak ofwar.
Causes of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1990s are many and diverse,
but fall into one of two general categories. Some scholars emphasise political-
economic factors,9 arguing that a declining economy resulted in Yugoslavia's
disintegration, and the end of the Cold War meant uncomfortable exposure in the
new realignment of nations. But the large number ofmosques and churches
consciously targeted and destroyed - targets arguably of little strategic military or
economic value - suggests another layer to the conflict. This leads other scholars to
contend that the primary cause of the conflict was ethno-national,10 citing tensions
that existed before the establishment of nationalism in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Attempts to single out one cause for the conflict risk obvious
reductionism, and multiple factors may indeed be legitimately cited for the demise of
Yugoslavia."
6 Giannakos 2002: 48.
7 Giannakos 2002: 48.
8 Lovrenovic 2001: 108.
9 Malcolm 1994: xxi.
10
Mojzes 1994: 125.
" See the discussion by Ramet (2002: 392ff.) in which several causes are elaborated,
including the following: Economic factors; declining strategic importance ofYU in the post-
Cold War world; the rise of Milosevic and collaborators; the failure of the EC (now the EU)
to secure peace by holding Yugoslavia together in the face of Slovene and Croatian
3
Introduction
1.2. Factors of Stability and Restoration
However many causes for the break-up ofYugoslavia may be cited, resolution of the
conflict must in some way transcend the problems associated with competing
nationalisms in the wake of the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia. One effort
addresses the ideological challenges ofnationalism through structural reorganisation.
Enormous investment ofhuman and financial resources associated with
democratisation, market reform and open society values of the West are seen as the
panacea for the ills of the Balkans.
Another effort addresses the relational aspects of restoration and peace-building.
Gotovska-Popova suggests that the challenges ofnationalism are best addressed by
creating a sense of identity in a group larger than the nation,12 an idea embodied in
the very concept ofYugoslavism, but which ultimately failed. Gotovska-Popova
suggests that today the proper identity is in humanity in general, and in Europe
specifically. The European Union offers both an ability to shape a supra-national
identity and economic stability for the emerging nations of the former Yugoslavia.
Other scholars argue that the locus of relational change and resolution to conflict are
potentially closer to hand. Stephen Hays contends that religious communities are
able to craft an identity that transcends nationality, but that both Marxist and Western
historians too readily discount this factor.13 Marxist historiography in the Balkan
states presented the role of religion in society largely as an undesired agent of
feudalism or capitalism. Similarly, secular Western historians play down the
religious motives of rulers, preferring to interpret events in terms of political and
economic motives.14 Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, professor at Sarajevo University and
former Vice Premier of the government of Bosnian-Herzegovina in 1991-92, contests
these arguments and supports Hays, stating that "the natural remedy would be for the
various Balkan nationalisms to resolve their differences with the help of supra¬
national concepts: religion above all".15 However, he recognises that the natural
remedy, drawing foremost from religion, is hampered by the fact that religions have
independence initiatives; persistent ethnic conflict; the stirring up ofmemories from the
bloodlettings ofWorld War II; the post-World War II failure of political modernisation, and
of communist nationalities policy; ancient hatreds; clash of civilizations; cultural similarity
of Serbs and Croats; competing choices ofmilitary elites.
12 Gotovska-Popova. 1993: 183.
13 Hays 1999: 198.
14
Hays 1999: 198.
15 Mahmutcehajic 2000: 14.
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capitulated to nationalist interests. "The forms of supranationalism present in the
Balkans," states Mahmutcehajic, "are themselves in bitter conflict over issues of
national borders", and "each supports its own favoured nationalism, to which it is
linked by tradition".16 The religious communities, by virtue of their beliefs and long
historical presence in the Balkans, could be agents of supra-nationality and advocates
for peace. But the widespread support by religious actors of nationalist causes has
created a credibility gap so large that the possibility of the major religious bodies
becoming advocates towards peace-building and social restoration is virtually
precluded.
Currently Bosnia-Herzegovina is again in a period of 'imposed tranquillity' by
external forces - the international community with interests tied to the Central and
Western European Pressure Point. Nationalism remains the strongest ideological
force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it shows little sign ofwaning in the region.
2. Statement of Thesis
The thesis takes up these critical issues at this juncture. It will explore the degree to
which religious communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina are forged by and fused with
national identity, and analyse the degree to which the supra-national aspects of
religious faith are able to transcend the conflict and contribute to peace-building and
social restoration.
The thesis hypothesis argues that although religion has been used to promote
nationalist ideologies and the cause ofwar, it also can be a positive force for building
peace. The thesis further argues that the religious dimension includes the element of
myth in the self-understanding of the Serbs, Bosnjaks and Croats, and seeks to
account for the influence of their myths in creating ethno-religious conflict. The
thesis will explore this hypothesis while recognising that the secular assumptions of
most Western scholars either preclude the religious factor altogether or
demythologise it in favour of a rationalist re-interpretation. By resisting the urge to
demythologise the respective religious self-understandings, the thesis demonstrates
that religion is intrinsic to the identities of the peoples ofBosnia-Herzegovina, and
that religio-mythical elements are essential in the process of nation-building.
16 Mahmutcehajic 2000: 14.
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Further, the thesis argues that the Western structural and materialist approach to
peace-building can be strengthened to address pressing inter-personal needs of
society more effectively by engaging the moral and ethical resources that religion -
with all its known difficulties in the region - has the potential to contribute. Placing
focus on this side of the equation brings a different set of variables to the peace-
building task.
3. Relevant Literature
Many resources have aided in the research of this thesis, ofwhich the following are
of particular importance for their contributions in the field. For a general study of
the Balkans, Stavrianos17 is still of great use, as verified by the recent reprint of a
book originally published more than forty years ago. This older text is now
supplemented by that of another Greek scholar, Stoianovich,18 who is acutely aware
both of the similarities and differences ofBalkan peoples to those ofWestern
Europe. Yet another Greek scholar, Giannakos,19 provides a relatively new
contribution to understanding the nature of conflict on the Balkan Peninsula both
among the Balkan peoples, and external powers. Additionally, the two volume work
by Jelanovic,20 covering the period of the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries,
is now a standard work. These constitute useful emic resources for the general
Balkan context.
Ramet's many works encompass the whole of the European post-communist lands,21
and her multiple versions focusing on Yugoslavia22 are especially helpful because of
the comprehensive nature of the material presented. Other recent and insightful
works that focus specifically on Yugoslavia and its emergent states are Allcock23 and
Malcolm.24
Several sources are needed to gain a full appreciation of the national groups in




21 Notable among them is Ramet 1989; 1992b.





Yugoslavia. Banac25 is still indispensable for understanding national issues, and its
ante bellum publication date reveals the centrality of the national question that
ultimately led to war. Judah26 chronicles a noteworthy Serbian history, and Bremer27
has edited a work that aids understanding of the Serbian perspective. Lovrenovic28
provides a very good cultural history of Bosnia-Herzegovina from a Croatian
perspective. Two sources from Balic29 provide cultural and historical background of
the Bosnjak community, and Friedman's work30 on the Bosnjaks is indispensable.
A useful source by Silber and Little31 covers the events of the war and the dissolution
ofYugoslavia. By contrast, the peace-building literature is geographically disparate
with few sources focusing on Yugoslavia and its successor states. Nevertheless, the
wide experience in peace-building that Lederach32 brings to his work is also useful
for the post-Yugoslav context. Abu-Nimer's recent monograph33 provides essential
insight into the Islamic perspective on justice and peace-building. Two other
volumes that focus on reconciliation, rather than peace-building, are worthy of note.
Schreiter34 sees reconciliation both as a spirituality and strategy for addressing
conflict, and Volfs35 contribution arises out of the context of the early conflict in
Croatia.
As a rule, most resources overlook the importance of religion in the Yugoslav
situation. Exceptionally, two works ofMojzes36 link the role of religion and the
events leading to conflict. Velikonja37 and Perica38 are recent contributions in this




Bremer 1998. See also the other valuable edited works by Bremer (1992; 1994;
1996).
28 Lovrenovic 2001.
29 Balic 1992; 1994.
30 Friedman 1996. She uses the term 'Bosnian Muslim'.













include the Islamic community. Appleby40 gives attention to the interaction between
peace-building and religion while noting the ambiguous role that religious actors
sometimes play. He regularly references Bosnia-Herzegovina in this context.
Another publication specifically focuses on reconciliation and the religious
communities in two states that emerged from Yugoslavia. Edited by Mojzes,
Swidler and Justenhoven,41 it is a collaborative effort that explores the theology and
variety of religious resources that can be applied towards reconciliation and peace-
building in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
None of these resources undertakes grounded research using the method of
qualitative data analysis in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Additionally, none of
the works considers in any depth the growing Protestant community in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the contributions they make to peace-building and social
restoration. This thesis thus makes an original contribution to the body of academic
literature, and - it is hoped - to the social situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4. Empirical Research
The research is both library-based and empirical. Library and internet based research
provided the background material for a proper historical and contemporary
understanding of the Balkans in general, and ofBosnia-Herzegovina specifically.
The empirical study allows an understanding of religion as voiced by people.
Personal acquaintance with the context ofBosnia-Herzegovina, and foundational
discussions with individuals from the four religious communities represented in the
thesis served as the basis for the construction of the qualitative data research
questions. The questions centre on the core issues faced by religious persons living
in Bosnia-Herzegovina today.42 Each question addresses one immediate concern, yet
is sufficiently open-ended to allow the interviewee the opportunity to address related
concerns.
The thesis consciously focuses less on the conflict and more on the nature of peace-




Mojzes, Swidler, Justenhoven 2003. This book was also published in journal form
as Mojzes, Swidler, Justenhoven 2002.
42 The one exception is the issue ofmandatory religious education in the schools,
which was still largely unsettled at the time of undertaking the research.
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that a thesis focused on the religious and theological dimension needed to include
interviews with clerics. In addition, narratives from religious non-clerics engaged in
peace-building broaden the context and allows for input from a greater cross-section
of society. From preliminary observation it seemed clear that women were playing
an understated and under-recognised role in social restoration. They showed a
particular awareness of relational issues in contrast to the structural issues that
preoccupied their male counterparts. This aspect, coupled with their high degree of
voluntarism, makes a special contribution in the study.
Students were chosen as a group for study largely because they will shape the
contours of the future, guided less by the communist past and more by the encounter
of the 'other' in the university or the competitive marketplace. How institutional
religion and personal faith shape their thinking and motivate them to act is of
paramount importance for the thesis.
A different set of research questions were posed to clergy and laity. Clerics
interacted on the theological, philosophical and ideological level of discourse, while
women and students answered questions relating to their personal experience and
perceptions befitting their life circumstance. The research questions for each study
group may be found in Appendix A.
Most of the interviews were conducted in English. Two research assistants were
engaged to translate interviewees wanting to communicate in the local language(s).
In most cases a man translated male interviewees, and a woman translated female
interviewees in order to retain the gender dynamics. This was especially sensible for
the fifth chapter where women are the focus. Both translators are from Sarajevo,
which interviewees would have detected through regional dialect. However, this did
not divulge their ethnic background since Sarajevo remains multi-national.
Additionally, the translators' full names remained undisclosed in order to avoid
revealing their ethnicity, which otherwise might have influenced the discussion.
The taped interviews were subsequently reduced to an English language transcript,
edited only for grammatical corrections necessary for a readable narrative. The
transcripts were then coded into more than 120 nodes and trees using Envivo1'
Qualitative Data Analysis software, which enabled various matrix comparisons along
ethnic, religious, gender, and group affiliations. From this data the most important
issues emerged, which contributed to the formulation of thesis research questions.
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5. Thesis Research Questions
Once the Qualitative Data Analysis was available, the research questions relating to
the thesis could be developed. This set of Research Questions frames the
investigation of the thesis. These questions are of three types - foundational,
empirical, and theological - and guide the kind of investigation undertaken in the
three parts of the thesis. Each research question opens an area of investigation, and
provides a focus for analysis in a relevant chapter. The following constitute the
research questions of the thesis:
Part One: Foundational Questions
♦ What contribution has religion made to the formation ofmythic national
identities in the former Yugoslavia?
♦ What are the successes and failures of post-war initiatives by the international
community to restore civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
♦ What resources for peace-building do the religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina
have in respect to their theological and ethical teachings?
Part Two: Empirical Questions
♦ What empirical evidence is there of religious leaders engaging in peace-
building on the basis of their theological and ethical teachings?
♦ What empirical evidence is there ofwomen having a special role in peace-
building on the basis of their religious convictions?
♦ What empirical evidence is there of students engaging in peace-building on
the basis of their religious convictions?
Part Three: Theological Questions
♦ What issues emerge from the grounded research that may contribute to the
theological and ethical understanding of peace-building?
♦ Does the grounded research provide evidence ofways in which theological
and ethical concerns are being implemented in practical initiatives towards
peace-building?
6. Delimitation of the Thesis
The following points serve to set the parameters of the thesis. First, in various parts
of the world today emerging nation-states suffer from the politics of ethnic
10
Introduction
differentiation and exclusion. Each of them can potentially inform other regions of
conflict to some peace-building good. Parallels to the Balkan conflicts are found in
the ethnic violence ofRwanda, for example, and the well-established effort by the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa can inform the Commission in
Bosnia-Herzegovina of the same name. However, these and similar ethnic conflicts
are also substantively different from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and
drawing parallels to them invites reductionism and artificiality. This thesis will not
embark upon a comparison between Bosnia-Herzegovina and other parts of the
world, and thus the peace efforts of the other conflicted regions necessarily remain
outside the scope of this thesis. Further, in order to reasonably limit its size, this
study focuses on the conflict ofBosnia-Herzegovina proper. Although events in
Bosnia-Herzegovina are intrinsically linked to events and actors in the other regions
of the former Yugoslavia, the thesis engages them only insofar as they have bearing
on Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Second, this study focuses on the peace-building views and efforts of local nationals
of the former Yugoslavia and not on the many foreign humanitarian aid and peace-
building NGOs working in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although many national
bodies have direct contact with international agencies and are indirectly affected by
those bodies, the initiatives of those agencies lie outside of the parameters of the
thesis.
Third, this thesis is not intended to be comprehensive in scope, and consequently
certain limitations are placed on the research. A comprehensive study would
necessarily include the Jewish community, various Sufi organisations, and other
religious groups within Bosnia-Herzegovina. These may serve as the basis for
further study. However, this research and analysis focuses on peace-building within
the Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant communities. The first three
religious communities constitute the major faith expressions in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and the Protestants are included in the thesis for reasons explicated below.43
Fourth, it is the conviction of this researcher that the Christian scriptures are
authoritative, can speak with relevance to today's world, and can be nonnative in the
life of the believer. Moreover, the Christian scriptures can also act prophetically as a
43 See the reasons for this, and the background information for the Protestants, under
'8. Researcher's Perspective' in this Introduction.
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moral corrective to political and religious excesses that disrupt the cosmogonic
intentions of the creator God. It is with this understanding that the study employs the
use of the Christian scriptures when discussing theological issues in Part Three.
Although the researcher is neither a Muslim nor trained in Islamic Studies, he will
make appropriate reference to the Qur'an as the sacred scriptures of the Muslims.
Use ofboth texts does not ignore differences between Christianity and Islam, and no
attempt will be made here to minimise the deep and abiding theological and
historical differences between the two. The thesis allows the various voices to speak
distinctly, and accepts that each community - when properly heard - makes a
contribution to the discussion. Differing narratives offer the listener insight into the
points of continuity and discontinuity, and are the basis for enhanced understanding.
7. Editorial Remarks
Use of the term 'religion' in this thesis reflects the seven dimensions that are outlined
by Ninian Smart:44 1) the practical and ritual dimension; 2) the experiential and
emotional dimension; 3) the narrative or mythical dimension; 4) the doctrinal and
philosophical dimension; 5) the ethical and legal dimension; 6) the social and
institutional dimension; and 7) the material dimension.45 Of special importance for
peace-building are the narrative or mythical dimension, and the social and
institutional dimension. The interviews will also focus attention on the experiential
and emotional dimension of religion as persons relate their first-person narrative
accounts.
The thesis recognises different schools of thought regarding the term and concept of
'nationalism', and makes no attempt to decide for theprimordialist or modernist
view, or any moderating views between them. The thesis is interested in viewing
nationalism as a phenomenon and motivating ideology in the context. One analysis
distinguishes between ethno-cultural nationalism, which may be characterised as
insular, aggressive and intolerant, and civic nationalism, which is more open,
democratic, and pluralistic.46 Because the former predominates in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the term 'nationalism' in this thesis reflects the meaning of ethno-
44 Smart 1989. This is a refinement from an earlier work (Smart 1969: 15-25) in
which six dimensions - the ritual, mythological, doctrinal, ethical, social and experiential -
are enumerated.
45 Smart 1989: 10-21.
46 Cited in Powers 1998: 225.
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cultural nationalism. The thesis is also interested in how nationalism functions in the
capacity of ersatz religion.47 Because modem nationalism embodies many of the
same dimensions as religion, such as the ritual, emotional, narrative, ethical, social,
institutional and material dimensions, it is, as Smart relates, "reasonable to treat
modem nationalism in the same terms as religion".48 The thesis uses the term
'nationalism' from this perspective, rather than engaging in the debate about the
term's origins and definition.
The term 'restoration' has many meanings, and it is therefore imperative to clarify its
use in the thesis in order to avoid confusion. 'Restoration' is not used with reference
to temporality, as in the return to a period of time, or former regime or empire.49 A
restoration of this nature is neither possible nor desirable. It refers rather to a state of
being or becoming; of 'making whole again' that which was damaged. In terms of
structures, 'restoration' is used to mean making sound again. In terms of organisms,
'restoration' is meant to have a therapeutic aspect, as in "a returning to a normal or
healthy condition"50 or "the restoration of friendship between enemies; the
restoration of peace after war".51 The term 'restoration' in this thesis is the central
domain of the language complex that includes 'reconciliation', 'restitution',
'reparation', 'renewal', and 'revival'.52 The term will be explicated further, and a
rationale will be given for its use - especially with reference to religion - as the
empirical data of the thesis is unfolded.53
Language is part of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and is used as a tool for
marking territory and setting barriers. However, the thesis does not use language
with this intention, and spelling choices reflect linguistic consistency, not ideological
partisanship. Thus, no statement of solidarity with any particular national group
should be construed from the choice of spelling. So, for instance, the thesis will refer
to 'Kosovo' (Bosnjak/Croatian/Serbian) instead of'Kosova' or 'Kosove' (Albanian
variants); 'Bosnjak' instead of the anglicised variants 'Bosniak', 'Bosniak' or
47 Tillich uses the term "quasi-religion" indicating a "genuine similarity", and not
"pseudo-religion", which has an "intended, but deceptive similarity" (Tillich 1963: 5, 6).
48 Smart 1989:24.
49
See, for instance, the use of the term in this sense in the reference to "the Ottoman
restoration, the cherished dream ofmost Muslims" in Banac (1984: 363).
50 MWMD 2002: n.p.
51 WRUD 1998: n.p.
52 WRUD 1998: n.p.
53 See especially Chapter Seven.
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'Bosniac'. However, reflecting official English language usage, 'Bosnia' is here
used instead of 'Bosna' (B/C/S), and 'Herzegovina' instead of'Hercegovina'
(B/C/S). Similarly, the Latin equivalent of the Cyrillic will be used to facilitate
comprehension for an English language readership, and not to make a statement of
national preference.
The term 'Bosnia' in this thesis refers to a specific geographical region apart from
Herzegovina and is not a shortened reference to the political state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The thesis recognises Herzegovina as a distinct area with its own
discrete, sometimes anomalous, situations. The term 'Bosnian' is generally avoided
in the thesis because of its ethnic-laden identity in the Republika Srpska with
Bosnjak nationhood. When used, the term 'Bosnian' is restricted to the geographic
region of Bosnia proper (distinct from Herzegovina), and has no reference to the
Bosnjaks ofBosnia-Herzegovina. In most cases the thesis uses the term 'Bosnjak'
and not 'Bosnian Muslim', except when it is anachronistic to do so, particularly
during the socialist period of Yugoslavia. The terms 'Balkan' and 'Balkans' in this
study designate the peninsula in Southeastern Europe and are meant to have
denotative meaning; the terms do not carry connotative and pejorative meaning.
Although the official country name in the English language is 'Bosnia and
Herzegovina', the thesis will use a hyphen in place of a conjunction to join the two,
thereby avoiding syntactical misunderstanding. The term 'Serb' is used as a
substantive, referring to a person of Serbian ethnic extraction, and the term 'Serbian'
is used as a modifier. Neither term is used to distinguish a degree of commitment to
nationalist causes.
Explanation of specific foreign words may be found in the glossary at the beginning
of the thesis on page xvi. The coding summary following the names of interviewees
in the footnotes is intended to enable the reader to distinguish salient detail about the
person at a glance. The first two letters refer to the religious community to which the
person belongs. The second two letters, separated by a full stop from the first two,
indicate the category of Religious Leader, Women, or Students with which they
should be identified. The third two letters indicate the city of residence of the





Several years ofpersonal experience in post-communist lands ofCentral Europe54
provide the background of the researcher's interest in this topic. He worked
extensively with the Protestant communities in the Balkan region following the
implementation of the Dayton Accord in 1996. Their multi-national character and
interest in rebuilding society in Bosnia-Herzegovina created the initial impetus for
the thesis, which then was expanded to include the three major religious communities
in order to gain wider contextual understanding. Because little is known about the
Protestant community, and because they constitute a major part in the study, the
following background serves as introduction of the community for the thesis.
8.1. The Protestant Communities
Owing to their small size, the Protestant communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina are
easy to overlook or dismiss as inconsequential for social transformation.55 This study
will make a different case. The Protestant communities are making contributions
disproportionate to their size, and, because of their multi-national character, have
much to offer all of the national communities ofBosnia-Herzegovina. Some
elaboration of their identity is here presented.
8.1.1. Historical Background
Protestants have had a long and continuous presence in the area that was Yugoslavia
since the Reformation. Steele outlines their arrival in three distinct waves. The first
wave came in the sixteenth century when both Refonned and Lutheran movements
gained a foothold in Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Istria, Slavonia56 and Hungary.57
However, the Counter-Reformation largely annihilated the Protestant presence,
especially during the harsh persecution known as the 'Decade of Sorrows' (1671-
1681 ).58
54 The researcher lived in the former East Germany, Poland and Hungary from 1991.
55
Yugoslav emigre Paul Mojzes, a Protestant of the Methodist tradition, is among
those who believe the Protestants are too small to make a significant contribution (Mojzes
1994: 43). Similarly, Franciscan Marko Orsolic is aware of the Protestant presence and
work in the northern part of the former Yugoslavia, in Slavonia and Vojvodina, but claims
that there is no such presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that Protestants in general are not
"sufficiently open to Judaism and Islam" (Orsolic 1998: 263).
56
Today the regions of Croatia, Dalmatia, Istria and Slavonia are all part of the
Republic of Croatia.
57 Steele 1995: 30.
58 Steele 1995: 30.
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The second wave of Protestants came through ethnic migration. Hungarians (mostly
Reformed, some Lutherans), Germans and Slovaks (both Lutheran) settled territory
abandoned by Ottoman Turks in their retreat from northern Balkan territories. At a
time of persistent persecution,59 the Tolerance Dictum of 1781 granted by Josef II
under Habsburg hegemony permitted Protestants and Orthodox Christians to worship
freely and construct churches.60 They settled on the fertile flatlands ofVojvodina
(northern Serbia), Slovenia, and Slavonia (northern Croatia) and portions ofBosnia-
Herzegovina. These historic Protestant Churches remain part of the religious mosaic
in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro today, with the largest representation coming from
the Slovak Lutheran churches, numbering about 51,000 members.61 However, a
concerted act of'ethnic cleansing' following World War II severely reduced the
Gennan Lutheran presence, leaving a small, ethnic-oriented remnant in northern
portions of the former Yugoslavia (Slavonia and Vojvodina).62 The Lutheran
architectural legacy in Bosnia is the massive church structure built in the late
nineteenth century along the Miljecka river in Sarajevo, now housing Sarajevo
University's Faculty ofArts. German Lutherans today number approximately 550
persons with two church buildings.63 In the absence of a Pfarrer, a Baptist pastor
performs some of their religious functions.64
The third wave ofProtestants came in the mid- and late nineteenth century and
twentieth century with the arrival of the 'free churches', that is to say, congregations
not tied to any particular historic or hierarchal body or ethnic group. These churches
were the fruits ofWestern missionary efforts from the United States, Germany,
Switzerland, Britain and Sweden, representing several Protestant denominations,
including Congregational, Methodist, Nazarene, Baptist, Pentecostal, Seventh Day
Adventist and Church of the Brethren.65 Most of the free churches are pietistic in
character, hold to a high view of scripture, stress the need for personal conversion,
and cultivate a life ofprayer.
Strong opposition to the free churches came from the Orthodox community in the
59 Kovacs 2003: 16-19.
60 Steele 1995: 31.
61 Steele 1995: 31.
62 Steele 1995: 31.
63 Barrett 2001: 125.
64 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 3.
65 Steele 1995: 32.
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first part of the twentieth century. In Macedonia Protestant church buildings were
burned, pastors were imprisoned, tortured and killed.66 Of the free churches only the
Baptists, who had established a presence in Sarajevo near the Bascarsija (central
market) in the old town c.1855 and recorded their first baptism in 1869,67 were
recognised by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1939.68 This gave them the right to own
church property, but denied the same right to other free churches.69 Methodists
circumvented the property restriction by negotiating their deeds with the German
Lutherans. However, when the Germans were forcibly expelled after the Second
World War, Methodists in Vojvodina also lost their property.70
Pentecostals arrived c.1920 and founded churches in all areas of the former
Yugoslavia except Montenegro. As a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia in the
early 1990s, the Pentecostal churches are now registered within their respective
republics. In the 1980s the Pentecostal Church in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
began the process of formally changing its name to the Evangelical Church of
Croatia andBosnia andHerzegovina. The body had two churches in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, both in what is now the Federacja (Croat and Bosnjak entity). The
Evangelical Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Evandeoska Crkva u Bosna i
Hercegovina) is today independent from the Croatian body and counts ten pastors for
more than a dozen churches and preaching points in all of the major cities of the
Federacja, and one in Banja Luka in the Republika Srpska. The Pentecostal Union
of Serbia-Montenegro (Savezpentekostnich crkva) has a presence in the Republika
Srpska (Serb-dominant entity), with churches and preaching points in Brcko,
Bijeljina, Doboj, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Banja Luka and Bratunac.71
Although now organisationally independent, the two bodies in Bosnia-Herzegovina
share a similar theology and carry out comparable programmes ofministry. The
churches continue a long tradition ofpietistic theology and practice, and place a
strong emphasis on prayer, regular corporate worship, evangelism and discipleship,
and church planting. Both of these bodies maintain dynamic social programmes of
65 Steele 1995: 35.
67 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 17.
68
Bjelajac 1998: 40.
69 Steele 1995: 35.
70 Steele 1995: 35.
71 Bjelajac 1998: 43.
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outreach that respond to the needs of society without becoming directly involved in
political activity, except as is necessary to secure their rights as religious
organisations. The humanitarian aid arm of the Evangelical Church in the Federacja
is named Agape, while the Pentecostal churches in the Republika Srpska work with
Hleb Zivota (Bread ofLife), the Christian aid agency with headquarters in Belgrade.
Both aid agencies co-ordinate their reliefwork through the local governments to
reach the neediest persons in the local community irrespective of nationality or
confession, and without requiring recipients to attend religious services.72
8.1.2. Legitimisation for Inclusion in the Thesis
The thesis interacts with the Protestants of the third wave, and the term 'Protestant'
refers specifically to the Baptist, Pentecostal and Evangelical Churches in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The churches of these bodies in Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the war
in 1992 numbered no more than two or three, and regular church attendance
numbered about 150.73 Today they count approximately 1200 regular church
adherents74 in more than thirty churches and preaching points throughout the
Federacja and Republika Srpska. The Baptists and the Evangelical Church also each
operate a theological training centre.
In spite of their small size, the Protestant communities make noticeable contributions
to peace-building and restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, the many metric
tonnes ofhumanitarian aid which they distributed to the neediest at a critical hour
during and subsequent to the war was vastly disproportionate to their size. European,
British and American aid agencies channelled food, medical supplies and building
materials through the Protestant communities in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Serbia (including Kosovo) to assist in alleviating the great needs caused by the
conflicts. Some of the aid efforts continue today, although most have made a
transition to development and micro-enterprise in order to address the high
unemployment associated with the continuing refugee/IDP problem.
Second, the disproportionate size of the Protestant community vis-a-vis traditional
religious communities is no longer a factor when issues of peace-building and
restoration are considered. As this thesis makes clear, no large-scale multi-national
72 Bjelajac 1998: 42.
73 Johnstone and Mandryk 2001: 115, 116.
74 One source that includes other independent groups puts the total at ca. 3000
adherents (Johnstone and Mandryk 2001: 115, 116).
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peace-building effort is extant among the nationalised religious communities or
political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Multi-national peace-building initiatives are
found among small sodalities that counter the larger political and religious
institutions that polarise their own communities along national lines. To dismiss the
Protestants solely on the basis of size would distort the research into the nature of
their peace-building and multi-national initiatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Third, unlike other religious communities, the Protestants are multi-national in their
composition and non-nationalistic in their orientation. This warrants greater
examination in terms of their contribution to peace-building. Scholars focus on
national 'tribal gods',75 or the betrayal of an assumed tradition.76 As yet, there has
been no scientific examination of the dynamics of the multi-national Protestant
communities to see what contributions they make to peace-building and social
restoration. Perica commits a few paragraphs to the Protestants and permits a
glimpse into this under-reported area. He points to one study that makes the
following observation about the minority religious communities in Yugoslavia
during the decade of the 1980s, a period of heightened nationalistic awareness tied to
religion:
The minor Christian religious communities seem to be spared from the tensions
along ethnic lines that are growing in our society.... Their congregations are
multiethnic and believers who, although they declare their ethnic background
without hesitation, have abandoned the familial tradition of religionational
identification.... Members of the minor religious communities cannot even
imagine that their religious organization could be a progenitor or pillar of a
nation and see no reason to get involved in current disputes among the ethnic
nations and mainstream religious organizations.77
Perica singles out the work of scholar and activist Peter Kuzmic at the Evangelical
Theological Faculty in Osijek, Croatia, and former president of the Evangelical
Church in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kuzmic is well-known throughout the
Balkan and Eastern Central European scene, and travels and lectures widely. In 1994
75
See, for example, Cohen 1998.
76
See, for example, Donia and Fine 1994; Sells 1996b.
77 Cited in Perica 2002: 14, 251, n. 51. The survey reviewed the following registered
religious organisations in Croatia at the time: The Baptist Church; the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormon); the Evangelical Church; the Croatian Catholic
Church; the Jewish Community in Zagreb; the Christian Adventist Church; the Church of
Christ; the Christ Church ofBethany; the Christ Church of Brethren; the Christ Spiritual
Church; the Christ Spiritual Church of the Baptized; the Pentecostal Church ofChrist; the
Christian Reform Church; the Christian Community of Jehovah's Witnesses in the SFRY; the
Refomi Movement of Seventh-Day Adventists; the Free Catholic Church.
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Kuzmic began a course of study on 'Christian Peace-Making' at the seminary78 and
founded the relief agency, Agape. Perica notes Kuzmic's friendship with the
Catholic Church and participation in ecumenical efforts, which gave him credibility
with that community to warn against the Church's "uncritical equation of
Catholicism, national identity and patriotism".79 The seminary under Kuzmic's
leadership also plays host to a number of guest lecturers from pacifist and just war
traditions, and course instruction on themes of conflict and peace brings critical
insight to bear upon both the nature of the conflict and the peace-building process.
The seminary's graduates have roots in all parts of the former Yugoslavia,80 and
maintain fraternal relationships with other Protestants of various traditions
throughout the newly independent republics.
Other persons from outside and within the former Yugoslavia note the contributions
that Protestants can make in the reconciling process. One of those is David Steele, a
scholar and fellow with the United States Institutefor Peace, who acknowledged
"the unique role of ethnic bridging on the part of evangelical Protestants".81 A
former associate of Steele, Vjekoslav Saje, now Director of the Centarza Religijski
Dijalog (Centre for Religious Dialogue), continues to organise similar seminars
throughout the former Yugoslav republics. He finds that Protestants have a unique
role to play in peace-building because of their non-national orientation.82 Further,
Miroslav Volf, Henry B. Wright Professor of Systematic Theology at Yale
University, has influenced many on issues of violence and reconciliation with his
critically acclaimed book Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of
Identity, Otherness and Reconciliationf which has its origins in the Yugoslav
conflict.
The Protestant communities have clearly established themselves as bodies
contributing to peace and the welfare of all persons in the former Yugoslav republics.
They therefore earn a legitimate place in this thesis, and in terms of peace-building,
are treated as an equal partner with the other religious communities in the research.
78 Perica 2002: 179.
79 Perica 2002: 193.
80 The seminary also has international students from Eastern and Central Europe, and
in the socialist era had students from non-aligned states in Africa.
81 Shenk and Steele 1993: 60.
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The thesis is developed in three parts. Part One frames the descriptive element,
analysing the nature of the conflict and religion as an agent of national identity
formation. Part Two comprises the empirical element of the research, incorporating
the data gathered by qualitative data analysis into the thesis. Part Three offers the
theological analysis, engaging the narratives from Part Two with the received texts of
Christianity and Islam.
Chapter One examines the nature of the Orthodox, Muslim, and Catholic religious
communities. Specifically, the chapter examines each community's self-acclaimed
ethno-genesis and the integral relationship between religion and national identity.
The chapter makes the case that religious elites were primary actors in the conflict,
not merely co-opted victims of stronger nationalist political forces.
Chapter Two examines the approach of the Western international community to
social restoration and peace-building, focussing on military and civil initiatives
towards restoration in the country within the General Framework Agreementfor
Peace, commonly known as the Dayton Accord. The chapter argues that the military
successes enacted through the Dayton Accord are not matched in the effort to rebuild
civil society. The chapter makes the case that a relational approach, which
acknowledges the role of religion in society, is necessary to fashion long-term
stability.
Chapter Three investigates the resources that Christianity and Islam can contribute to
peace-building and social restoration, based on an analysis ofBiblical and Qur'anic
understandings of 'peace' as a place of sanctuary and hope. The chapter also
investigates the resources that these religions bring in terms of a moral framework
for human interaction, providing the basis for human rights, which increasingly is an
important area of international diplomacy.
Part Two is the core of the thesis, and reports the findings of the qualitative data
analysis conducted through interviews. Chapter Four analyses the views of
Religious Leaders from all four religious communities and probes the nature of
peace-building based on theological and ethical teachings.
Chapter Five examines the role women play in society, especially in the post-war
period of recovery, and explores the evidence ofwhether women play a special role
in peace-building on the basis of their religious convictions.
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The social situation of young people and students in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina
sets the context for Chapter Six. Students figure prominently in the study and
warrant their own chapter because they are increasingly the bridge to the future. The
chapter focuses on the views of four students, one from each of the Muslim,
Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant communities and probes the evidence for students
having a role in peace-building on the basis of their religious convictions.
Part Three moves to the element of theological reflection based on the case studies of
Part Two. Chapter Seven focuses on four theological elements that emerge from the
research: 1) The claims each religious community makes to authentic religious faith
and how it relates to peace-building; 2) power, powerlessness, and peace-building; 3)
overcoming adversity through diversity; and 4) restoration as an appropriate
Leitmotiv for multi-dimensional peace-building.
Chapter Eight builds on the analysis of Chapter Seven by examining initiatives in
which theological and ethical concerns are implemented in the context towards
building peace. The chapter specifically analyses the resources that informal, non-
institutional religious communities, or sodalities, have at their disposal and employ in
their efforts to rebuild civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The chapter is especially
concerned to address the difficult issue of the disparate and competing narratives of
previous conflicts that perpetuate the cycle of violence in the region. Drawing from
the interview data, the chapter analyses the limitations to the Western approach of
demythologisation, and offers an alternative response based on the interplay of
memory and healing to break the cycle of violence.
The thesis concludes by distilling the salient points of the chapters and their
descriptive, empirical and theological initiatives, and assesses them against the
hypothesis of the thesis as presented earlier in this introduction.
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Religion's Role in the Formation of the
Bosnjak, Serbian and Croatian National Narratives
1. Introduction
This chapter analyses the intrinsic nature of religion for the Serbian, Bosnjak, and
Croatian national identities, focusing on their respective historical narratives.
Specifically, the chapter focuses on the first Research Question, "What contribution
has religion made to the formation ofmythic national identities in the former
Yugoslavia?" The chapter takes the position that the religious dimension includes
the element ofmyth in the self-understanding of the Serbs, Bosnjaks, and Croats, and
seeks to account for the influence of their myths in creating ethno-religious conflict.
The chapter aims to demonstrate that religion is intrinsic to the identities of the
peoples ofBosnia-Herzegovina, and that religio-mythical elements are essential in
the process of nation building. In a correlative manner, the chapter demonstrates that
religious leaders were willing participants in nationalist causes and not merely co-
opted by powerful political elites. Taken together, the religious history, institutions
and leaders contributed to the collapse ofYugoslavia.
The chapter is divided into three parts, considering first the Serbian national
narrative, followed by the Bosnjak account, and concluding with the Croatian
national narrative.
2. Religion and the Serbian National Narrative
Several components comprise Serbian national identity, including language,
ethnicity, territory, religion and written history. Pre-eminent among them is religion,
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and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), which became the sole guardian of
national identity in the absence of an emperor.
The Serbian nation was birthed in and nurtured by Byzantine neo-platonic
mysticism, and its influence is evident in the formation of the Serbian national
collective conscience in both word and image. The national narrative follows a
discourse from a Golden Age to victimisation at the hands of other national powers
to a Serbian renaissance, or in mythico-religious terms, from creation to affliction,
and crucifixion to resurrection. The theme of suffering is especially dominant in the
national memory to the point where virtually any action today is justified in view of
the nation's past victimisation.
This section first describes historical events shaping the Serbian national history,
focusing on how these events are interpreted in moral and religious mythological
terms. Second, it shows how the Serbian self-understanding, formulated on the basis
of ethno-religious exclusivity, conflicts with the ethno-religious national identity of
Bosnjaks. Third, it demonstrates how modem nationalism arising in the nineteenth
century has combined with state and clerical forces to confront the ethnic animosity
of the Serbs and Bosnjaks.
2.1. Heavenly Serbia: Religion and Serbian National Identity
2.1.1. The Two Hands of God
From the time Emperor Justinian (527-565) codified ecclesiastical law, Byzantium
ordered the world according to the two divinely-ordained authorities of the
priesthood (sacerdotium) and the imperial (imperium).' The two authorities
exercised power equally in a harmonious diarchy. The 'two hands of God' working
in symphonia married church and state powers in the Byzantine Empire and its
successor nation-states.
2.1.2. St Sava and the Sacerdotium
The tribes of Slavs, which had settled in the southern Balkan peninsula in the 6th and
7th centuries, came quickly under the influence ofByzantium's Orthodoxy. Serbia's
nationhood is rooted in the Nemjanic family dynasty, beginning in the mid-twelfth
century. Originally baptised Roman Catholic, Stefan Nemanja (1132-1199 or 1200)
was re-baptised Orthodox after witnessing the splendour ofConstantinople. He built
several royal churches and monasteries in Serbia, Hum (Herzegovina) and Raska
1 Ware 1997: 41.
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(Kosovo) and unified surrounding tribes into medieval Serbia. In 1197 he took holy
orders, became a monk with his youngest son, Rastko, better known by the monastic
name of Sava, and retired to Mount Athos, leaving the administration of the family
and its holdings to his son, Stefan II.
Keenly aware of the enmity between Rome and Constantinople following the
sacking ofConstantinople by Crusaders (1204), Sava sent an emissary to Pope
Honorius III in 1217, asking for his blessing for Serbia, and "the royal wreath for his
brother, Stefan".2 Two years later Sava visited the exiled Byzantine emperor
Theodore I and the Orthodox Patriarch Manuel Saranten Hariopoulos in Nicaea.
Leveraging the recognition he received from the pope, Sava gained autocephaly for
the Serbian Church, fusing Serbian nationhood with Orthodoxy.
2.1.3. Stefan Dusan and the Imperium
The Serbian Empire reached its territorial zenith under Stefan Dusan (1331-1355)
who wrested power from his father, Stefan Decani. Dusan launched a campaign of
territorial enlargement, taking advantage ofByzantium's weakness and internal
strife. To the south he acquired territory in Macedonia, Epirus and Thessaly. In the
north he took land as far as the Belgrade, and claimed portions of Bosnia.
In 1346 he appointed his own patriarch in order to be crowned Emperor of the
Greeks and Serbs. This brought him into direct conflict with Byzantium's emperor,
Cantacuzenus VI (1347-54), whose daughter was married to Orhan I (1326-1359),
the Ottoman sultan. It also led to a schism with the Orthodox authorities in
Constantinople. Dusan's death in 1355 ended his military campaign against
Constantinople aimed to replace the Byzantine Empire with a new Serbo-Greek
empire.3 At the time of his death, the Serbian empire extended from the Danube to
Peloponnesia.4 Dusan is remembered today through the gilded veneer of history, and
his empire as the apex of Serbian dynastic glory. Owing to his suspected role in his
father's death, and the antagonism he caused with Church authorities in
Constantinople, he was never canonised. His legacy is seen in the territory he
acquired, which was canonised "Serbia".
2 Judah 2000: 20.
3 Anzulovic 1999: 37
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2.1.4. The Creation the Image
Serbian leaders began early to create an image of a nation with a heavenly destiny.
Sava's contribution went beyond autocephaly to instituting the divine right, assuring
a dynasty in the Nemjanic line. In his later writings he associated his father, Stefan
Nemjanic, with the biblical patriarch Abraham, and Serbia as the 'New Israel'.5
Serbia's belief in its divine destiny was augmented by Dusan's expansion of the
terrestrial kingdom.
In the nineteenth century Dusan's empire became archetypal for the ideology of
Velikosrpsko, or 'Greater Serbia', the divinely-ordained expansionist right for all
Serbs to live in one (great) state. The claim that wherever Serbian bones were buried
was Serbian territory and holy ground brought Serbs into direct conflict with the
Ottoman dynasty, and transformed the image of'Heavenly Serbia'.
2.1.5. The Battlefield and the Bazaar: Encounter with the Turks
The presence of the Turks on 'Serbian' soil presented a religious, ideological and
territorial challenge to the Serbs, and defeat to the Turks on the battlefield became
the basis for a new, mythicised national awareness epitomised by the Battle of
Kosovo. The Serbs rehearsed and nourished this national narrative with every
conflict from the mid-nineteenth century, and it is ofparamount importance for
understanding today's Balkan antipathies.
2.1.6. The Battle of Kosovo and its Mythological Significance
According to some historians,6 the battle that took place on the plain ofKosovo on
June 28th, 1389 was militarily indecisive. It nevertheless became the mythic
centrepiece of Serbian national identity and the primary motivational image for
Serbian national independence. The myth extracts moral victory from military
defeat, preserves a glorious Serbian past, and provides a Utopian vision of the future.
Prince Lazar, the leader of the Serbian people in the fateful battle, is the focus of
especially strong religious imagery. In the best-known epic poem of the battle, The
Downfall of the Kingdom ofSerbia, Prince Lazar receives a visitation from Saint
Elias (Elijah), the prophet, in the form of a grey falcon. Saint Elias presents Lazar
the choice of an earthly or heavenly kingdom. If he chose the earthly kingdom,
Lazar's army would defeat the Turks, but the inherited kingdom would be
5 Judah 2000: 20.
6 See, for instance, Malcolm 1999: 58ff.
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ephemeral. If he chose the heavenly kingdom, Lazar and the Serbian army would
perish at the hands of the Turks but gain an eternal and heavenly kingdom for the
Serbian nation. Lazar chose the heavenly kingdom, fating his army to defeat, and
Serbia to Turkish subjugation, but preserved the Serbian soul to rise again another
day.
2.1.7. Conversion and Djimma Under Turkish Herrschaft
Serbs and other Western Europeans have characterised the Turkish conquest on
European soil as a heinous evil. In her magnum opus, Rebecca West writes, "The
night fell for four centuries, limbo became Hell, and manifested the anarchy that is
Hell's essential character."7 Other narratives present a different picture, however.
First, the Serbian Empire had already begun to disintegrate after Dusan's death in
1355 apart from any Turkish incursions. Further, a lesser-known battle at Marica in
1371 was more decisive before the armies faced each other at Kosovo Polje. The
Turkish victory at Marica brought vassalage to some Serbian areas, requiring Serbs
to fight with the sultan's troops against fellow Serbs in the battle ofKosovo. And
before the end of the century Serbs and Turks fought together to fend off the last
significant crusade from the Catholic West in 1396.8
Second, the greater threat to Serbian national existence came from Catholic
Hungarians, not the Turks. For this reason Lazar's widow chose vassalage under the
Sultan rather than annihilation from Hungary.9
Third, Serbian national identity stabilised under Ottoman rule. The Quranic
principle of djimma (Ar. dhimma) assured protection for Christians and Jews under
Islamic law. Early Ottoman rule of the Balkans pennitted the building of churches
and monasteries, important symbols of Serbian identity. The Serbian Patriarchate
first established under Dusan was re-established in Pec in 1557, assuring a
continuation of Serbian identity. Subsequent Ottoman conquests brought migrations
ofOrthodox peoples, and expanded the territory of Serb settlement into Bosnia and
Croatia.10
7 West 1994: 840.
8 Judah 2000: 33.
9 Judah 2000: 32.
10 Malcolm 1994: 70-81.
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The Serbian Orthodox Church enjoyed significant favour with the Sultan because
Orthodox peoples were similarly threatened by Roman Catholic incursions from the
West.11 Because the Ottoman millet'2 system recognised national leadership of its
subjugated peoples by religious confession, Orthodox clergy were rewarded with
greater authority over their own people once the power of the emperor was
dismantled. As a result, Serbian identity became directly linked to the Orthodox
Church.
2.1.8. Preserving the Image
Although the Ottomans reduced to vassalage the Serbian nation already in its
twilight, historical realities do not substantiate an image of ruthless terror forced
upon an unwilling people. With the earthly kingdom lost, the Heavenly Kingdom
was now completely entrusted into the hands of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which
sought to portray the Serbian nation as morally righteous in the face ofmaterial
defeat.
The SOC also attempted to preserve the earthly kingdom by building and preserving
churches and monasteries. It then consecrated this territory, canonised its kings and
martyrs, and glorified the national image through iconography in its holy places.
These territorial claims resurfaced in the nineteenth century with the advent of
modern nation-state building and the renaissance of a Serbian national
consciousness.
2.2. Insurrection and Resurrection: The Emergence of a Modern
Serbian Identity
2.2.1. Church-Nation and Language-Nation Antipathies
German Romanticism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries inspired a
new national self-consciousness based on a shared cultural-linguistic heritage in
contrast to imperial power, religion or dynastic influences.13 The concept of the
nation-state made its way through the centres of learning in Europe, eventually
reaching the Ottoman capital. By this time abuse and incompetence from Topkapi
palace fuelled a movement for reform that called for the dismantling of the sultanate.
Nations long subjugated to the sultan began to emerge with a national self-
11 Malcolm 1998: 109
12 Tk. 'people', or 'nation'.
13 Jelavich 1983: 172, 3).
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consciousness and took advantage ofOttoman weakness to carve out their own
identity.
Cultural nationalism encouraged nation building by reinvigorating indigenous
folklore and challenged the centralised authorities of the sultanate and the
Ecumenical Patriarchate. During this period Serbian epic poetry designed to
resurrect a national consciousness focused on the person ofMarko Kraljevic (d.
1389). Kraljevic fought both for and against the Sultan and became a literary figure
ofmediation between the declining Serb nation and the powerful Turks. Serb
nationalists of the nineteenth century abandoned conciliatory depiction for a
polarised image of Lazar and the Battle of Kosovo.14
2.2.2. Christoslavism and the Heavenly Mandate
Serbian nationalism is marked by Christoslavism,15 an essentialist view that all Slavs
are racially Christian. The implication of this view is that those who speak a Slavic
tongue but are not Christian are traitors of their faith and nation; they are not true
Slavs.16 Accordingly, those who are Slavic Muslims are 'Turks', have polluted the
Slavic race and are responsible for the death of the Christ-Prince Lazar at the Serbian
Golgotha, the Battle of Kosovo.17 Because the territorium of the Slavs is holy, the
land must be cleansed of its impurity, the non-Christians and the non-Slavs. This is
accomplished by one of three methods: reconversion to Christianity, expulsion from
the land, or annihilation.
2.2.3. Prince Lazar and Serbia as Christ Figures
Christoslavism fuses Serbian national mythology and religious typology. Lazar's
death at the Battle ofKosovo is juxtaposed to the crucifixion of Christ and represents
the death of the Serbian nation.18 The Turks in the story are the Christ killers who
unwittingly fulfil the prophecy of Elias. In the narrative Vuk Brankovic (d. 14th
century) represents the Judas figure. Brankovic betrayed Prince Lazar by revealing
the battle plans to the Turks and then failed to guard Lazar's flank in the fateful
14 Sells 1996b: 37.
15 There are various expressions of Christoslavism and as a phenomenon, it is not
unique to Serbia. Sells (1996b: 92-114) also notes a Croatian expression of Christoslavism,
and Velikonja (1999: 15-32) demonstrates that there is also a Slovenian expression of
Christoslavism. Both of the Croatian and Slovenian forms link national heroes and martyrs
to Roman Catholicism.
16 Velikonja 1999: 17.
17 Sells 1996b: xv.
18 Sells 1996b: 31.
30
Chapter One
battle, bringing death to the Prince. In the 19th century nationalist revival of the
myth, Slavs who had converted to Islam were cast in the role of Judas and the Christ
killers. Their destruction is thus justified from an ethno-religious moralism steeped
in nationalist mythology. The most ardent of the nationalist poets, Prince-Bishop
Petar Njegos, inflamed a nationalistic hatred of Slavic Muslims that would sanction
racial bloodletting for generations to come.
2.2.4. The Religious Ethos of Prince-Bishop Njegos
Serbs and Montenegrins herald Prince-Bishop Petar II Petrovic-Njegos (1813-1851)
as 'Serbia's Shakespeare' for his literary genius. He would be less exaggeratedly
described as the 'Serbian Milton' for his nationalist contributions in philosophy,
theology and epic poetry.19 He was born in an area ofMontenegro controlled by the
Ottoman Empire although officially independent and unconquered. At the age of
twenty he became leader of the province that Orthodox bishops theocratically
governed since its founding in 1697. His primary task was to unite and modernise
into a civilised state the independent mountain clans obsessed and paralysed by
internal blood feuds. Although possessing only modest education and no formal
theological training, Njegos created a national identity for both Serbs and
Montenegrins through his nationalistic epic-poem Gorski Vijenac, (The Mountain
Wreath), published in 1847.20 Anzulovic assesses the importance of the poem thus:
[The Mountain Wreath's] influence is comparable to that of the Bible in
Protestant countries or the Qur'an in the Islamic world, but its message is
very different. Through the authority of its author and the appeal of its
verse, the immensely popular poem sanctioned and reinforced the endemic
violence from which it sprang.21
Serbian Archimandrite Justin Popovic (1894-1979) relates Njegos's epic poem with
Serbs in the following way:
The greatness of our people consists in the fact that they have, through Saint
Sava, adopted evangelic justice and transformed it into their own. In the
course of centuries they have developed such an affinity with this justice
that it became their everyday, customary gospel. Only this can explain why
our people have in all fateful moments of their history always preferred the
heavenly to the earthly, the immortal to the mortal, the eternal to the
transitory.22
19 Prvulovic 1984: ix.
20 The wreath refers to that small, circular area in the mountains of Montenegro that
remained unconquered either by Ottomans or Habsburgs. Montenegrin independence
remains a source of great national pride.
21 Anzulovic 1999: 61.
22 Cited in Anzulovic 1999: 13.
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Only two elements of this defining poem can here be analysed.
2.2.5. The Sacrament of Blood and Ethno-Religious Purity
The Mountain Wreath begins by decrying the oppression under the sultans. Its call
to liberation advocates tyrannicide, justifying it through reference to the legendary
hero of the 1389 Battle ofKosovo, Milos Obilic. Through cunning, Obilic is able to
gain audience with sultan Murad (1362-89), whose troops have already championed
the Serbs and killed Prince Lazar in the famous battle. Obilic draws a hidden knife
and slays the sultan, exacting retribution from the Turks. The poem at once glorifies
the act of vengeance and vilifies the Turks, and inspired a nationalistic uprising
against Ottoman domination.
The poem also weds religious symbolism and acts of vengeance. In the drama the
Vladika (Prince-Bishop) and his compatriots celebrate the Christmas holy-day by
'cleansing' (cistiti)23 the land of the stench and pollution of the 'Turks', those of
Serbian tongue but Islamic faith.24 Upon learning of the Montenegrin plan for them,
the Muslims offer ceremonial reconciliation afforded under the contract of blood
vengeance to end clan fighting.25 The Montenegrins reject reconciliation and offer in
return only baptism by water or baptism by blood.
At first the Abbot mistakes the smoke from Muslim villages as the burning of the
Yule log, symbol of good fortune for the New Year. The smoke is from 'a whole
people being sacrificed',26 announcing to the Montenegrins the massacre of the
Muslims. The Vladika, emerges from the Church with the others after the Christmas
Day service, and receives the news:
Though broad enough Cetinje's Plain,
No single seeing, no tongue of Turk,
Escap'd to tell his tale another day!
We put them all unto the sword,
All those who would not be baptiz'd.
We put to fire the Turkish houses,
2! This is the first time ethnicity and 'cleansing' are related together in Balkan
history.
24 According to the linguistic criteria established by Vuk Karadzic (1787-1864),
renowned Serbian language reformer and compiler of Serbian folk tales, those who spoke
Serbian were Serb. Nationalists contended, however, that the Bosnjaks had changed their
racial identity through conversion. They were not in any sense Turks from Turkey
(Anatolia), and the term was used with derogatory intention.
25 Sells 1996b: 42.
26 Njegos 1930: 208.
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That there might be nor stick nor trace
Of these true servants of the Devil!
From Cetinje to Tcheklitche we hied,
There in full flight the Turks espied;
A certain number were by us mow'd down,
And all their houses we did set ablaze;
Of all their mosques both great and small
We left but one accursed heap,
For passing folk to cast their glance of scorn.27
The Vladika is overjoyed with the massacre, which he relates to national liberation:
Great gladness this for me, my falcons,
Great joy for me! Heroic liberty
Has resurrection mom to-day,
From every tomb of our ancestors dear!28
Customarily, the taking of life in blood vengeance was an act of defilement,
requiring confession and absolution before partaking ofHoly Communion. But the
joyous Abbot releases the perpetrators from fasting and confession, and then serves
them the Holy Communion. With this scene Njegos indicates that those who killed
Muslims committed no sin. Instead, the shedding ofMuslim blood was itself sacred,
an act through which the killers received full forgiveness of their sins.29 The Cup of
Holy Communion served by the Abbot was a sign of their purity and worthiness in
the eyes of the Church.
2.2.6. Avenging Kosovo
Njegos's TheMountain Wreath resurrected the cult of Lazar and the Kosovo myth
and infused it with Serbian nationalism. Lazar's feast day, which never before had
been celebrated as a holy day, took on symbolic meaning of its own for the growing
nationalist cause. In the 1860s it was combined with the feast day ofVid on June 28,
thus commemorating each year the Battle ofKosovo. Serbs observed the 500th
anniversary of the Battle ofKosovo in 1889 with a huge national celebration, and in
1892 Vidovdan (June 28th) became an official Church holiday.
In the twentieth century the day would have increased significance and serve as a
barometer of the nationalistic climate. Acting in the Obilic figure in the Kosovo
mythology, Bosnian Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip, who had memorised Njegos's
The Mountain Wreath, assassinated the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo
on Vidovdan in 1914. Parliament signed the ill-fated Vidovdan Constitution in
27 Njegos 1930: 209.
28 Njegos 1930: 209,210.
29 Sells 1996b: 43.
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1921, inaugurating the first Yugoslavia. Non-Serbs viewed the constitution as a
Serbian nationalist construct, and Serbs celebrated the signing as the day the empire
was restored to them.30 The ill will it created with Croats would have genocidal
repercussions during the ethnic and nationalist infighting ofYugoslavia from 1941-
45.
The 600th anniversary of the Battle ofKosovo will be remembered as the day
Slobodan Milosevic rose to mythological stature among Serb nationalists.
Milosevic, whose father was a Serbian Orthodox priest in Montenegro, became
acquainted with the religio-historical mythology of the Serbs early in life.31 The
commemoration on June 28, 1989 took place at the famed battle site, home then to
an ethnically troubled province whose Albanian-Muslim presence constituted more
than 90% of the population. Two years prior to the anniversary, the SOC began
parading the remains of Lazar throughout Serbian areas ofYugoslavia, evoking
strong nationalist sentiment wherever the remains were displayed.32 At the event on
the historic battlefield Milosevic was portrayed as the Lazar/Christ figure with a
nationalist messianic mission, and posters ofMilosevic and Lazar together were
ubiquitous among the crowd exceeding a million people. Although he never used
the term velikosrpsko (Greater Serbia) in his speech, Milosevic clearly indicated that
it was time for Serbs to avenge Kosovo and reclaim their entitlement to the earthly
kingdom. After extolling the virtues of the Serbian people, he suggested that the
nationalist cause could become violent.33 Exactly twelve years later, after his words
had taken on a tragic bloody reality throughout the Balkans, the day of Lazar's feast
would have one more historic moment. When the Western powers whisked
Milosevic away to The Hague on Vidovdan 2001, it was the end of a ghastly
nightmare for the Bosnjaks of former Yugoslavia. But for Serbian nationalists, the
West's intervention and seizure ofMilosevic on this special day served only to
30 Judah 2000: 109.
31 Ramet 1999: 299, 300.
32 Judah 2000: 39.
33 Judah records the pertinent portion ofMilosevic's speech as follows: "Serbs in
their history have never conquered or exploited others. Through the world wars, they have
liberated themselves and, when they could, they also helped others to liberate themselves....
The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that, at one time, we were brave and
dignified and one of the few who went into battle undefeated.... Six centuries later, again we
are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, though such things should not be
excluded yet..." (2000: 163, 4).
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confirm the potency of the Battle's myth, and demonstrated the victimisation of the
righteous people.34
2.2.7. The Complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Ethnic Cleansing
SOC attempts to prevent the violence were at best perfunctory. On the one hand,
there are occasions in which leaders of the SOC have called for the end to the
violence.35 SOC leadership supported peace initiatives and generally urged political
leaders involved in the war campaigns to do the same. They also engaged with
Bosnjak leaders in an attempt to bring their clerical positions to bear upon the
warring factions.36
On the other hand, there is strong evidence of complicity with the nationalist effort.
Through Ss. Sava and Lazar they created an ideological basis for the fusion of the
heavenly and earthly, religious and political realms. The words of one bishop are
here indicative:
Prince Lazar and Kosovo Serbs primarily created a heavenly Serbia, which
by today surely grew into the greatest heavenly state. If only we count the
victims of the last war, millions upon millions of Serb men and women,
children and the infirm were killed and tortured in greatest torment or hurled
into the pits and caves by ustasa criminals, then we can imagine how large
the Serb kingdom is in heaven.37
SOC assertions of Serbian ethno-religious priority fostered ideas of racial superiority
and Serbian expectations of entitlement. At the same time they denied Bosnjak
territorial claims.38
In the open letter of the 1987 Bishops conference, the SOC was the first to use the
term 'genocide' in the post-Tito era, relating the term to the plight of Serbs in
34 Steven Erlanger also sees symbolic importance in the event transpiring on
Vidovdan. He states, "...[F]or many Serbs, Mr. Milosevic's transfer will only underline his
reputation as their defender, who is suffering martyrdom for the beleaguered nation as other
heroes have done" (2001: n.p.).
35 See, for instance, the joint statement by Patriarch Pavle of Serbia and Franjo
Cardinal Kuharic of Zagreb in their September 1992 meeting in Geneva (1992: 50-2).
36 Before the outbreak ofwar in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Patriarch Pavle met with the
Mufti ofBelgrade and a Muslim delegation headed by Haji Hamdia efendi Jusufspahic, and
a month later with Alija Izetbegovic. Together they appealed against the misuse of religion
for political purposes (Radic 1998b: 171). See also the representation of Bishop Irinej of
Backa for Patriarch Pavle at the signing of the March 1995 Vienna Declaration, Appeal of
Conscious Conflict Resolution Conference (Declaration 1995: 41-3).
37 Letter by Bishop Jovan of Sabac-Valjevo at the occasion of the entry of St Lazar's
remains into the Gracanica monastery for the 600th anniversary of the Battle ofKosovo
(cited in Radic 1998a: 189; 1998b: 167, 8).
38 Sells 1996b: 84.
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Muslim-dominant Kosovo.39 The use of the term in that context is alarmist, and
positioned the Kosovo imagery at the centre of the SOC nationalist campaign. The
slogan "CaMO Cnora CpSnHa CnamaBa"40 and its symbol of Serbian religious
nationalism, the Greek cross with the quadruple C, stress the unity and indivisibility
of the Serbian nation. The implication is that the Serbian people, now distributed
beyond Serbia proper to Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, would be
united under one territorial 'Greater Serbia' by redrawing borders and expelling
'non-Christians'.
SOC complicity extends beyond the ideological underpinnings of the nationalist
movement, however. Ample documentation records SOC denial of large-scale
atrocities,41 accompanied by clergy attempts to obfuscate the realities through
reversal ofperpetrators and victims in the conflict.42 SOC declarations and
statements generally echoed the 1986 Serbian Arts and Sciences Memorandum,^
which claims exploitation of the Serbian Republic and people by other Yugoslav
39 Radic 1998a: 187.
40 "CaMO Cnora CpSuHa CnamaBa" stands for "Only Unity Saves the Serb". The
four Cyrillic Cs represent the beginning letters of the slogan, and are integrally placed
around the Orthodox cross.
41 Anzulovic 1999: 123. Also, Sells (1996b: 84) states that the SOC denied large-
scale violence in the form ofkilling camps, organised rape and systematic destruction of
mosques. While the issues of the camps and destruction ofmosques is undisputed, the
number of rapes committed by Serb and Bosnian Serb soldiers remains a heated topic.
Verifiability of such events is difficult owing to the nature of the crime and the
unwillingness of the victims to come forward to testify. See, for instance, Allcock (2000:
402-6) for more on this topic. Evidence given at the war crimes tribunal by unnamed
victims, and the subsequent conviction of the perpetrators for rape as a war crime leaves no
doubt that concerted, ethnically motivated crimes of hatred were committed through rape.
See also the report by Amnesty International (2001: n.p.).
42 The Holy Synod of bishops claimed victimisation through genocidal initiatives in
its session ofMay 18, 1995. In part it reads, "We are witnesses that the Orthodox Serbs of
the Diocese of Slavonia, their bishop, their clergy, their churches, monasteries and villages
in Western Slavonia ...fell victim to genocide, a continuation and completion of the
genocide begun in 1941 in the same regions, inflicted upon the same population" (SOC
1995: 39-40). The statement makes a concerted effort to link this violence to the events of
the Second World War. It fails to link it to the direct conflict, however. The retaliatory
military action by the Croats in 1995 was taken to recapture Croatian territory seized by the
Serbs as part of their 1991-2 offensive to create a Greater Serbia.
43 Patriarch Pavle and four bishops of the SOC signed the April 1997 document,
Declaration Against the Genocide of the Serbian People. It overlooks the genocidal
initiatives of Serb offensives and claims victimisation in the conflict. It states in part that
"The history of the Serbian lands... is full of instances of genocide against the Serbs and of
exoduses to which they were exposed. Processes of annihilation of Serbs in the most diverse
and brutal ways have been continuous. Throughout their history they have faced the fiercest
forms of genocides and exoduses that have jeopardized their existence, yet they have always
been self-defenders of their own existence, spirituality, culture, and democratic convictions"
(cited in Andulovic 1999: 124).
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republics during the time of communism. The Memorandum calls for direct action
to amend the injustice.44 SOC leadership also offered direct support to Serb
paramilitary leaders,45 and the SOC relationship to Bosnian Serb leader Radovan
Karadzic is also exceptionally close.46 Some SOC clergy were direct participants of
ethnic cleansing,47 while others made public racist statements, suggesting acts of
genocide against the Muslims would earn spiritual favour.48 SOC support for
Milosevic waned only after he distanced himself from the Bosnian Serb leadership
and the campaign for a Greater Serbia foundered.49
Other Orthodox circles levied criticism on SOC actions. The SOC Metropolitan of
Zagreb, Ljubljana and Italy, Jovan (Pavlovic) criticised the SOC's support of the
Memorandum. The ideology ofGreater Serbia also came under their scrutiny and
criticism:
With your proposals [for territorial and border issues] you have drawn the
church even more into politics. You have made the proper work of the
church more difficult. The flirting with the [nationalist] opposition has
brought the church onto thin ice.5
Other Orthodox leaders, including Bishop Kallistos Ware of Dioklea (Oxford),
Professor Olivier Clement (France), Professor Nicholas Lossky (France) and James
Forest (USA), Secretary of the Orthodox Peace Fellowship, encouraged the SOC to
take a strong stand against the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.51 The SOC met
44 Beljo 1993: 61-80.
45 Radic 1998a: 196, 7. The notorious paramilitary leader Zeljko Raznatovic, better
known as 'Arkan', claimed that "er der groBte Liebling des Patriarchats sei und daB
Patriarch Pavle personlich sein Oberkommandant sei." SOC Bishop Lukijan in Dalj also
baptised his military troop, the 'Tigers' before going into battle against the Muslims (Radic
1998a: 196, n.l).
46 Karadzic claimed that "Unsere Priester sind in alien unseren Uberlegungen und
Entscheidungen prasent, und auf die Stimme der Kirche wird als Stimme der hochsten
Autoritat gehort" (Radic 1998a: 199).
47 In Trebinje an Orthodox priest led others in expelling a Muslim family from their
home. The 500 year old mosque was destroyed immediately following the celebrations of
the feast of St Sava. The area was then 'ethnically cleansed' and renamed Srbinje, or 'place
of the Serbs'. Bishop Atanasije, perhaps the most nationalistic of the Orthodox clergy,
condoned the expulsion ofMuslims from Trebinje and attacked anyone who criticised the
action (Sells 1996b: 80, 83).
48 Vasilje, Bishop ofZvomik-Tuzla, is cited as saying that "the more unbelievers
[Bosnian Serbs] kill, the closer they get to heaven (interview in Evropske Novosti, 4 March
1993, 10, as cited in Cigar 1995: 66).
49Anzulovic 1999: 123.
50 Cited in Andulovic 1999: 118.
51 Sells 1996b: 85.
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these critiques with simple denial in their nationalist effort to achieve a Greater
Serbia.
2.3. Conclusion to the Serbian National Identity Section
Through the inspiration of Prince-Bishop Njegos,52 incipient national sentiment,
fuelled by pseudo-Christian imagery and a Balkan ethic ofblood vengeance,
inflamed a cosmic cause of national righteousness.
Some observers suggest that ruthless and manipulative political leaders co-opted the
SOC to root out the Bosnjaks,53 much as the Catholic Church fell victim to political
leaders. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. The SOC was the guardian of
the national dream and identity, especially when there was no Serbian state. Theirs
was a conscious clericalism and willing participation in the nationalist agenda, which
clerics had defined and first articulated. Ethno-religious nationalism became a
plausibility structure for ethnic cleansing and genocide, the repercussions ofwhich
are felt still today.
3. Religion and the Bosnjak National Narrative
The Balkan conflicts have reinvigorated and internationalised the 'national question'
of the Bosnjak community in the post-communist period. Complicating the issue are
competing ethno-genetic narratives that others ascribe to them. Nationalist-minded
Serbs portray them as interloping 'Turks' whose presence in the Balkans is a
defilement of sacred Christian territory. Nationalist-minded Croats portray them as
apostate Catholics. For a time, the Western international community viewed
Bosnjaks as militant, religious 'fundamentalists' who, if armed, would only escalate
the violence in the Balkans.
52 Njegos was by no means the only writer who conjured anti-Muslim sentiment
through his writings. Bosnia's Pulitzer Prize novelist Ivo Andric demonstrates strong anti-
Muslim sentiment. In more recent times Radovan Karadzic, who is Montenegrin bom and
memorized Njegos's The Mountain Wreath, is the author of several volumes ofpoetry,
including one for children. He is wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia for war crimes. Vuk Draskovic, leader of a nationalist party in Serbia-
Montenegro, is a novelist committed to the concept ofGreater Serbia. His popular novel
Noz (The Knife) evokes images of ethnic atrocity in the same anti-Muslim genre of Andric
and Njegos. Nikola Koljevic, a high-ranking Bosnian Serb official, was a poet and an expert
on Shakespeare. The novelists Dobrica Covic and Antonije Isakovic were both authors of
the Memorandum. In 1992 Covic became the president of the third Yugoslavia (see
Andulovic 1999: 128-9).
53 Sells (1996b: 79) puts forward this idea when he says, "In Bosnia, the Serb
Orthodox Church made the same mistake the Catholic Church made in Croatia during World
War II; it became a servant of religious nationalist militancy."
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Bosnjaks also make identity claims that are far from univocal, as Ramet reveals with
the following:
Today in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are Muslims who consider themselves
primarily 'Muslim Croats', those who consider themselves 'Bosnian
Muslims' (i.e. 'Muslims in the ethnic sense'), and those who, in the spirit of
[Izetbegovic's] 'Islamic Declaration', see themselves simply as 'Muslims'.
In addition, there are those Muslims who in the 1981 census declared
themselves 'Yugoslavs'. This already complex picture is made more so by
the presence of persons like Fuad Muhic, who describe themselves as
'atheist Muslims', and who therefore completely divorce religion from
nationality.54
This mosaic reflects a diverse community in transition. It is a community with a
long history of living according to the concept ofMitmenschlichkeit characterised by
a multi-national, multi-religious co-existence. These are values many Bosnjaks
today desire to retain.
3.1. Religion's Part in the Bosnjak Ethno-Genetic Narrative
The shared history, culture, and language found among the peoples of Bosnia-
Herzegovina serve to blend identities, not distinguish them. Bosnjak identity
narratives thus benefit from both modernist and primordialist interpretive schemas.
Modernists seek to define Bosnjaks in terms of nation-state formation derived from
Western European models. Secular Bosnjaks identify with this narrative and
distance themselves from their religious history and from the foreign influence of
politicised Islam now present in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. The modern, secular
Bosnjak readily accepts the values and structures of secular Western Europe, and
nation-state building.
Primordialists discern a historically continuous ethnicity, or 'primordial ethnicity'55
both distinct from and pre-existent to other ethnoi of the Balkans. They
acknowledge an Islamic religious heritage without making it the primary factor of
identity.
Bosnjaks of both views see themselves as the 'old indigenous element'56 in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and claim a pre-Ottoman ethno-genesis distinct from Orthodoxy and
Catholicism. They also argue for the integrity of a Bosnian state and assert their
national right to the land as the legitimate heirs to the medieval kingdoms. These
54 Norris 1993: 8.
55 The term is used by Sabrina P. Ramet, as cited in Norris 1993: 7, n. 4.
56 Balic 1994a: 4.
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claims counter Serbian and Croatian historicist assertions that the Bosnjaks are
Islamicised Serbs or Croats. According to this narrative, religion is the primary
distinguishing feature among Serbs, Croats and Bosnjaks from the medieval period,57
and is a claim deserving closer examination.
3.2. The Defining Role of Religion in Medieval Bosnia and Hum
The Bosnjak ethno-genesis is a complicated issue involving disparate and competing
claims. A common view in circulation claims roots to the Bosnian Church (Crkva
Bosanska), which, according to traditional accounts, was a sectarian religious group
unrelated to Catholicism and Orthodoxy.58 But no consensus exists about the
Bosnian Church. Lovrenovic appropriately describes the current state of scholarship
on the Bosnian Church thus:
In the whole history ofmediaeval Bosnia there is nothing that has become
so entangled in various theories, romantic ideas, controversy and
mystification as the Bosnian Church and the supposed 'Bogomil' heresy of
its adherents. Ever since the middle of the nineteenth century the Bosnian
Church has been a constant preoccupation of scholars (both serious and less
serious), politicians, writers and poets. Ideological motives have lain behind
much of this interest, which has been used to support various current
political and national ideas. This, of course, has complicated any critical
approach to a complex and obscure subject."9
This account links the Bosnian Church and the Bogomils, a sect with Bulgarian
origins and Manicheist inclinations. Sonyel describes their doctrines and practices
thus:
[The Bogomils] did not believe that Jesus was crucified, and they rejected
all forms ofChristian monasticism, as well as the mediation of priests
between man and God. They allowed no idols or icons in their temples, nor
did they tolerate crosses, bells, alcohol or anything likely to distract man
from direct communion with God.60
More recently scholars depart from this classic view and show that no link between
the Bosnian Church and the Bogomils ever existed. The founder of Bosnian Church
studies, Croatian Franjo Racki (1828-94), created the link as a symbol to mark
Bosnia's sovereignty.61 The link was perpetuated by the joint finance minister
during the period of Austro-Hungarian rule, Benjamin Kallay, who was a proponent
of a Bosnian nationhood (bosnjastvo) based on non-irridentist, inter-confessional
57 Donia and Fine 1994: 9.
58 Sonyel 1994; Kostovic 2001: 18, 19.
59 Lovrenovic 2001:51.
60 Sonyel 1994: 14.
61 Velikonja 2003: 28.
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identity.62 Speculation over the nature and beliefs of this unique Church is sure to
continue in the absence of supporting documentation. What is known with certainty
is that the Bosnian Church died out under the Islamisation ofBosnia-Herzegovina.
3.3. The Islamisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Several factors contributed to the gradual islamisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. First,
the cohesion and security ofOttoman society contrasted the fragmented existence
under feuding bans and zupans. Neither Orthodoxy nor Catholicism offered strong
organisational assistance to peasants in the way that Ottoman society could.
Second, medieval Bosnia bears few marks of strong internalisation of Catholicism or
Orthodoxy, and new religious expressions were able to gain a foothold and a
following because of their weakness. Friedman describes pre-conquest Bosnia this
way:
Common people must have felt spiritually adrift without an effective
alternative church organization to guide them, thus increasing their
vulnerability to the blandishments of Islam.... Unquestionably, the general
ignorance about religion and ritual contributed to the ease with which
Bosnians accepted Islam.63
Third, Ottoman Islam was clearly more tolerant than Hungarian Catholicism that
wished to root out religious non-conformity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By contrast the
Sultan's representatives were compelled to protect the Christian and Jewish
minorities under his sovereignty. The Ottoman millet system allowed the non-
Muslim communities a high degree of autonomy, and preserved an ethno-religious
community that later served as a basis for national identity.64
62 Recent scholars disavowing a relationship between the Bosnian Church and/or the
Bogomils and neo-Manicheism are the following: Fine (1996: 7, 8); Donia and Fine 1994:
23ff.; Velikonja (2003: 27ff.); Malcolm (1994: 27-42); Lovrenovic 2001: 51-55. Other
scholars link the Bosnian Church to the Cathari of southern France or with the Patareni (or
Patarini) referred to in documents in Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and Italy. Still other scholars
suggest the Bosnian Church retained basic beliefs and practices ofRoman Catholicism
(Banac 1984: 40; Balic 1994a: 4). There is no compelling reason today to link the Bosnian
Church either with the Bogomils or neo-Manicheism. Even a cursory examination of the
more than 50,000 stecci - carved burial stones bearing reliefs ofmixed-gender dancing
framed by grape bunches, the domestication of horses (signifying land ownership), and
clothing displaying festive adornment - argues against this group being ascetic adherents of
dualistic Manicheism.
63 Friedman 1996: 19, 20.
64 The system distinguished nations by means of their religious confession and
recognised the highest ranking religious cleric as the individual chiefly responsible for the
needs of that people. Thus, the titular leader of Orthodox Christians in the Balkans, the Rum
(Rome) millet, was the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople (Poulton 1997: 17).
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Fourth, ambitious persons seeking social advancement readily converted to Islam
since the Ottoman political elite opened its doors only to Muslims.65 Istanbul
required military service only ofMuslims, who were then generously rewarded with
a land grant for meritorious service to the Empire. Military service thus became both
a means by which kmets (serfs) could become landowners, and a factor for
conversion. Other levels of society and greater civil liberties, status and influence
also came with conversion. The peasant class received tax breaks and rent benefits
when they converted to Islam since only non-Muslims paid the cizje (poll tax).
Fifth, in multi-religious Bosnia, Ottoman overlordship was welcome sanctuary from
the expansionist ambitions ofByzantium and Rome. The unchallenged hegemony of
Istanbul in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries established relative tranquillity and
permitted Islam to flourish.
3.4. The Impact of Sufism on the Bosnjak Identity
One of the primary channels of Islamisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina came through
Sufi Islam. Travelling dervishes from Persia and Central Asia melded their
teachings with ecstatic expressions of Turkic shamanism66 and spread their orders
westward through the Ottoman Empire to the valleys ofBosnia-Herzegovina, where
the Sufi orders found a permanent home. The Bektashiyya, Qadiriyya, Mawlawiyya,
Malamiyya and Naqshadbadiyya tariqat came to the Balkans from the fifteenth
through the seventeenth centuries. Each founded a zavija61 in Sarajevo, from where
their respective teachings significantly influenced the social, ethical and religious life
ofBosnia-Herzegovina.
The Sufi orders infused observance of religious duties of orthodoxy with a direct and
personal apprehension of God. This created a tension with other branches of Islam
over issues relating to theology and, in some instances, observance of Islamic law.68
65 Friedman 1996: 18. One fitting example is the third son ofHerceg Stefan ofHum
(Herzegovina) who served in the sultan's court under the principle of devoirme. Once in
Istanbul he converted to Islam, took the name of Ahmed, and married a daughter of Mehmed
II. He served three successive sultans and rose to the position of Grand vizier (Heywood
1996: 33).
66 Norris 1993: 86.
67 A zavija (Ar. zawiyah) is the complex of operations for a Sufi tariqah. Often it
comprises a mosque as a place of worship and a lodge for the adherents of the tariqah. The
zavija served also as a welfare institution for the destitute and handicapped, and as a place of
refuge for fugitives. See Kane 1995: 370-3.
68 Ofparticular note is the conflict between the Sunni ulema in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Bosnian bom Shaykh Hamza of the Malamiyya order. Shaykh Hamza's followers
disseminated his teachings through the craft guild. They maintained an inward and secretive
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Sufism took root in Bosnia-Herzegovina because it found sympathy with a people
already predisposed to pluralist religious expressions, although mainstream Sunni
leaders considered the Sufi orders to be deviant. The dervishes left a rich legacy in
Bosnia-Herzegovina through teaching and preaching, spiritual example, and
especially through written word in poetry and epic folk songs that continues even
today. Sufism's proclivity to embrace the religiously novel and avoid
institutionalisation allowed it to permeate the culture and society and adjust to
changes within Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3.5. Reforms and the Shift Towards Secular Nationalism
By the late eighteenth century the Ottoman caliphate showed unhealthy signs of
nepotism, corruption, abuse of power and administrative incompetence, signalling
the need for reform.69 The Tanzimat (Tk. 'regulation') political and social reforms
attempted to modernise the empire in order to preserve it. The reforms fall into three
identifiable periods. The first period of reform began under Hatt-i Htimayun of
Giilhane (1839), led by Ra§id Pa§a, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,70 and the rise of
the Young Ottomans marks the beginning of the second period (c. 1860-1876).71
The third reform period is marked by the formation of the Committee ofOttoman
religious expression, believing outward expressions of religiosity were susceptible to
ostentation. The ulema considered the order heretical for their belief in baqa
(remaining/existing), in the sense that God could mystically manifest himself in an
individual member of the tariqat. Hamza's opponents also accused him of theological
pantheism, teaching against work and effort, and countered his opposition to the practice of
deriving meaning from dreams. Some argue that he had a high view of Isa (Jesus) that
superseded the Prophet Muhammed. Hamza's execution at the hands of zealous Sunnis in
1561 was meant to extinguish the order and extirpate his teachings, but served only to
elevate him to martyr status and spread his message farther (Norris 1993: 115-117).
69 Shaw 1995: 273-4.
70 The charter established at this time limited the control of the sultanate by
redistributing power to a higher bureaucracy (Mardin 1995a: 183-6). The charter also
limited the influence of the ulema, whose control over civil affairs was based on Islamic law.
In 1856 the Islahat Fermam (Edict of Reforms) established equal rights and responsibilities
ofMuslims and non-Muslims throughout the empire. The reorganisation of the non-Muslim
millets attempted to consolidate power according to 'Ottomanism' (Davison 1973: 115).
The edict greatly reduced the power and authority ofChristian hierarchs who had grown
accustomed to their privileged position and autonomy within their own millet. Thus,
Muslim and non-Muslim clerics alike resisted the reforms.
71 The Young Ottomans had direct contact with Westerners and more modern ways.
They accused the ruling elite ofusing westernisation to modernise the empire at the expense
of Islamic values and sought to replace absolute with constitutional rule. They advocated
reform through constitutionalism and parliamentary forms of government (Mardin 1995b:
357), which resulted in the Constitution of 1876.
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Union (1889), which became the Ottoman Committee ofUnion and Progress (CUP),
and was known in Europe as the 'Young Turks'.72
Transfonnation at the Empire's centre had little initial effect in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
however. Muslim leadership in the Balkan Peninsula had always enjoyed a degree
of independence from the Sultan, and resisted the modernising reforms.73 External
events impacting the Sultanate brought bigger changes to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Russia's defeat of the Ottomans (1877) and the Congress of Berlin (1878) meant that
Habsburg rule supplanted Islamic law, bringing separation of religion and state to
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Catholic Croats, smallest of three nations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, now received privileged status from their co-religionist benefactors in
Vienna, much as the Muslims had enjoyed under the Sultan.
The Ottoman-Habsburg acrimony reached crisis level in 1899 when a young Muslim
woman fled her home in Mostar to avoid an arranged marriage, converted to
Catholicism and received sanctuary in a monastery on the Croatian coast. Under
Islamic law, conversion to another religion was punishable by banishment or
possibly death.74 The Muslim community appealed to Vienna for the return of the
girl and the dismissal of the priests responsible for harbouring her. The Austrians
refused, contending that, according to the Conversion Ordinance of 1891, the woman
was of legal age and had therefore left on her own accord, and claimed that church
matters were the jurisdiction ofRome, not Vienna. Angered by their refusal to
intervene, the Muslim leadership charged the Austrians with threatening the integrity
of the Muslim community.75
Some scholars regard this conversion incident as the beginning of the Bosnjak
nationalist movement.76 Even before annexation ofBosnia-Herzegovina in 1908,
72 These reformers opposed the reinstatement of autocratic rule by Sultan
Abdiilhamid II (1876-1908). In 1908 they forced the restoration of the 1876 Constitution,
which the Sultan had abandoned in 1878. The CUP had two ideological elements within it,
the Unionists and the Islamists. The Islamists saw a place for Islam as part ofOttomanism,
and the Unionists believed that religion should be a private matter of conscience. The
Unionists proposed a separation of religion and state, subordinating Islamic legal issues to
secular governance. When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, Atatiirk adopted
the Unionist position, and the state operated with a policy of secularisation (Ahmad 1995:
359).
73 McCarthy 1996: 74-78.
74 Pinson 1996: 99.
75 Pinsen 1996: 100
76 Donia 1981: xi.
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Bosnjak orientation in legal matters had effectively swung from Istanbul to Vienna,
and a new modus vivendi with the Habsburg authorities became necessary. Istanbul
could no longer protect the interests ofBosnia's Muslims, and the formation of a
political party along Western lines was the only viable alternative.
3.6. The Muslim National Question and Legislated Injustice
The appointment ofMuftis to lead both the MNO77 (1906) and JMO78 (1919)
political parties reveals the growing incongruence of competing worldviews.
Secular structures and frameworks increasingly marginalized the ulema. Party
leaders failed to negotiate sweeping land reforms of the early Serb-dominated
monarchy in 1919, resulting in a sudden reversal of land ownership that was meant
to dispossess and humiliate the Bosnjaks.79
Objectification of the Bosnjak nation continued in the inter-war period. The JMO
recognised the difficulties inherent in nationalisation, but acquiesced in order to
leverage their interests against the larger Serb and Croat legislative bodies.80
Preserving the territorial integrity ofBosnia-Herzegovina was of primary importance
since partition would mean the demise of the Bosnjak nation through a conscious
plan of 'social deislamisation', or exogamous assimilation among the Croats and
Serbs.81 The legislative body further reduced the umma by forcing the national
question. If the Bosnjaks were genuinely Slav, then they had to be either Serb or
Croat, and should therefore declare themselves as one or the other. Bosnjaks
asserted their own sui generis identity, however, and were able to avert the issue
through the interwar period.
During World War II Bosnjaks fought for both Partisan and Ustasa forces against the
Cetniks,82 which positively influenced their circumstance in the post-war period
when the national question was again taken up. Initial post-war proposals differed in
kind, but not in degree. In the first Yugoslavia, the Bosnjaks were recognised as
Slavs but not as Muslims. In the second Yugoslavia they were more commonly
77 The abbreviation stands forMuslimanska narodna organizacija (Muslim National
Organisation).
78 The abbreviation stands for Jugoslavensko muslimansko organizacija (Yugoslav
Muslim Organisation.)
79 Zulfikarpasic 1998: 14-15.
80 Banac 1984: 374.
81 Banac 1984: 372-4.
82 Friedman 1996: 124-130.
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recognised as Muslims but not as Slavs. They were instead Turks and therefore not
truly Yugo-Slav*2, or South Slav. In both manifestations ofYugoslavia, Serb- and
Croat-dominated regimes viewed the Bosnjak nmma as foreign interlopers with no
natural claim to the state as a homeland.
3.7. Religion in the Communist Period
In the initial years after World War II the communists expanded their power base by
controlling the religious communities.84 While the restrictions affected all of the
religious groups, they were not equally distributed. Persecution was most noticeable
among the Muslim umma since it still functioned as a community.85 The communists
sought to restrict the religious communities in all aspects of communal life.86 The
YoungMuslims also fell victim to the government's sweeping reforms, and several
of their outspoken members, including the Sarajevan lawyer, Alija Izetbegovic, were
put on trial in 1946. Three years later the government executed four of its members.
Simultaneously the communist state authorities aggressively rooted out Muslims
who opposed the regime and courted the formal officials of the Islamic Community,
fostering a high level of trust and co-operation between the two bodies. This was so
for two reasons. First, the office ofReis-ul-ulema was appointed by the state, which
chose to reward those loyal to the Partisan cause and who fought against the Cetniks
83 The situation was further complicated by the Muslim use of the term ' Turci',
which distinguished Balkan Muslims from Anatolian Muslims ('Osmanli' or ' Turkuse')
(Banac 1984: 41; Malcolm 1994: 54, 264). The terms served more to confuse and accuse
than clarify.
84 Balic 1968: 126.
83 The communists placed their own functionaries in positions of leadership in the
Bosnjak community. Publication of contemporary books on Islam was forbidden until 1964.
In 1946 the regime abolished Islamic law and dismantled the legal apparatus of the Shariat
judicial system. The regime severely restricted sources of revenue channelled through the
vakuf system. The government systematically took claim of properties owned by the
religious communities, including Bosnjak-owned land, and turned them into communal
properties. Especially reprehensible was the large number of exhumations undertaken in
order to erect public buildings or parks on the expropriated property. Alone in 1949, the
government forced the closure of 214 mosques and many fell victim to decay. In several
places in Herzegovina no religious practice existed (Balic 1968: 128ff).
86 Social and religious mores were proscribed, including the ritual observance of
circumcision, although it was privately carried out. The military provided no special meal
packets for Muslims. Religious festivals were forbidden in public. The communists
encouraged inter-faith marriages, the number of which was then published weekly in the
capital city newspaper, Oslobodjenje. They closed religious clubs and unions established to
provide benevolence for the poor, alcoholics, handcraft workers and youth. Only the party-
sanctioned newspaper operated and the Islamic publishing house was placed in government
ownership. As a singular concession, the government granted the freedom to build mosques.
This in turn the government used as propaganda internationally to favourably portray
Yugoslavia's policies of religious freedom and tolerance (Balic 1968: 130ff.).
46
Chapter One
and Ustase forces during World War II. Thus, in 1947 the government formalised
ties to the Islamska Zajednica Vjernika (IZV) (Islamic Religious Community) with
headquarters in Sarajevo.87 Second, officials within the IZV stood behind the
socialist "Brotherhood and Unity" ideals of Tito's Yugoslavia.88 As a diverse
minority throughout Yugoslavia, the Muslim communities had more to gain through
participation than through opposition.
The socialist Yugoslav government granted formal recognition of the Muslims as a
nation in 1968,89 which had the effect of fostering nascent nationalism directly
related to religion. National recognition in point of fact limited the autonomy of the
Muslim community.90 Status as 'Muslim in the national sense' (Muslimani u smislu
narodnosti) without the concomitant religio-social liberties required by a faith
community was a half-measure and denial of full rights. Moreover, it placed the
umma in political jeopardy in that the Muslims now competed directly with the Serbs
and Croats for the same resources and power.91
87 Velikonja 2003: 219.
88 Perica 2002: 80.
89 The term 'Muslim in the ethnic sense' first appeared in the 1961 census. The
1963 constitution recognised the Muslims in its preamble along with the Serbs and Croats,
but offered no national status. The Bosnian Central Committee officially recognised the
Muslims as a nation in May 1968, which was subsequently ratified by the Yugoslav central
government. The tenn 'Muslim in the sense of nation' (in which an upper case 'M'
designated the national term, and a lower case'm' designated the religious believer)
appeared first in the 1971 census, and was again documented in the 1974 constitution. See
Malcolm 1994: 198, 9.
90 National recognition also strengthened Tito's hand on three fronts. First, he used
national recognition to court Arab states, which strengthened his authority as leader among
the non-aligned nations during the Cold War era. Second, national recognition ofMuslims
mitigated challenges to his personal authority at home from Serbs and Croats. Third,
national recognition brought Muslim indemnification, handing Tito virtual control within
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Banac 1996: 145).
91 Co-operation with the state and minimising the efforts of 'reactionaries' that
opposed the government won the Islamic Community greater autonomy in both religious and
secular affairs. The Islamic Community experienced greater liberties in the press, which
was generally less antagonistic to the regime than the Catholic and Orthodox press
(Velikonja 2003: 219). The Islamic Community built more than 900 mosques during the
socialist period, including the controversial mosque in Zagreb, third largest in Europe, under
the management of Mustafa Ceric (Perica 2002: 81). The IZ reopened Islamic schools and
founded the Islamic Theological Faculty in Sarajevo in 1977 (Velikonja 2003:220). Tito
leveraged the openness shown to the Muslims with several Muslim-oriented nations inclined
to his non-aligned states policy. The IZ in Yugoslavia had strong ties with the Islamic
world, and received donations from Islamic countries interested in supporting the
development of Islam, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq and Sudan. Muslim
students also studied abroad in Muslim countries, including Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Morocco,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Sudan (Velikonja 2003: 220).
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By the late 1980s the leadership of the IZ92 that remained partial to the ideals ofTito
could no longer contain the anti-communist voices among their clergy. These voices
spoke not only against communism, but also raised the alarm to growing hostility
from a strong Serbian nationalism, and began to listen to those within their own
ranks promoting a religious nationalism.93
The new constitution of 1990 consolidated power in the Supreme Assembly and
lessened the power of the Reis-ul-ulema, and mandated a separation between the
Islamic Community and the state. The state's weakened hold on the IZ afforded the
Islamic Community the opportunity to reinstate public festivals and holidays,
signalling "the transfer of power from the communists into the hands of ethnic
nationalists".94 Islam was now a commodity like Orthodoxy and Catholicism in the
ideological marketplace where competition for the attention of voters was of
paramount importance for national survival.
In 1991 the Islamic Community also elected a new Reis-ul-ulema, Jakub Selimoski,
a moderate from Macedonia who was meant to both mitigate the 'hawkish' element
led by Omer Behmen and Izetbegovic - comrades together from the earlier days of
the YoungMuslims - and Mustafa Ceric,95 and to quiet increasingly strident Serbian
nationalist voices accusing the Bosnjaks of religious fundamentalism.96
By the time of the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, religio-ideological issues had
already divided the Bosnjak community.97 Izetbegovic prevailed and won the
92 In the 1969 constitution the IZV (Islamska zajednica vjernika) simplified its name
to Islamska Zajednica (IZ), leaving out the term 'religion' (literally, 'faith') from their name,
signifying a more secular and political and thus less religious emphasis to their identity. At
the same time they saw greater freedom in both religious and secular spheres.
93 The protesting ulema sought full autonomy for the Ilmija (the local term for
ulema) clerical association, and severed the ties between the Islamic Community and the
government, including the removal of the pro-government Reis-ul-ulema, Hasan Mujic.
They further pressed for an improvement of imams' living and working conditions, and
stronger application of Islamic norms in Muslim every day life. The protests culminated in
the July 1989 announcement of the early departure of the Reis-ul-ulema, and a promise to
revise the Islamic Community's constitution (Perica 2002: 83).
94 Perica 2002: 85.
95 Perica 2002: 85; Zulfikarpasic 1998: 135ff.
96 Zivomir Stankovic declared, "The Sarajevo movement of imams is dominated by
Islamic extremists and is under the influence of the international Islamic factor." Cited in
Perica 2002: 84.
97 Initially Izetbegovic and Zulfikarpasic campaigned together for the newly-created
Party of Democratic Action (SDA). Once a communist and part ofTito's inner circle,
Zulfikarpasic left socialist Yugoslavia and became a successful businessman and
philanthropist who had lived several decades in Western Europe. As a secular Muslim he
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presidency, and the SDA took the majority of seats in the parliament on a ticket
emphasising Bosnjak nationalism with a strong Islamic religious dimension.
In his inaugural speech as new party chairman, Izetbegovic emphasised full religious
freedom. The SDA also released a declaration in which religious pluralism and
tolerance were seen as "fundamental pre-conditions for the success of the new
democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina".98 However, the presidency of Izetbegovic is
marked by controversy and conflict that followed him to the grave. He did little to
shake his image shaped by his past political activism and his controversial tractatus,
the Islamska Deklaracija {Islamic DeclarationAssessments of Izetbegovic would
always be coloured by the Deklaracija and it had far-reaching personal and political
consequences for him.100
As President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic steered a course favouring the
Bosnjak community, and politicised Islam to make it the primary feature ofnational
identity differentiation. Already high tensions with Serbs and Croats were only
exacerbated, and the war served to polarise factions and strengthen the hand of
hardliners. Muslim freedom fighters from stricter Islamic countries appeared in
Bosnia-Herzegovina to train Bosnjaks both in the art ofwarfare and in more rigid
Islamic religious practice.101 On the day ofhis funeral in October 2003 the
reinvigorated the term Bosnjak as a national term for Slavic Muslims, believing that religion
is not an appropriate basis for nationhood. He and Sarajevan professor Muhammed
Filipovic were the voices ofmoderation in a party increasingly polarised by nationalist
clerics driving a politicised Islamic agenda. As chairman of the SDA, Izetbegovic sought to
be a moderator between the religio-nationalist and moderate wings. Eventually the
ideological cleavage was too great for a single party. Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic split from
the SDA and hastily cobbled together their own moderate party, the MBO {Muslimanska
Bosnjacka Organizacija) shortly before the election. The MBO saw little public exposure
and failed to create meaningful symbols to capture the imagination of an electorate
galvanised by nationalism. At the polls the MBO garnered only two seats in parliament.
98 Perica 2002: 87.
99 Written in the socialist period of openness to the Muslim Community in 1970, the
Deklaracija called for an Islamic renaissance focused on "a two-fold revolution - moral and
social, but where religious renewal has clear priority" (Izetbegovic 1990: 51). The
Deklaracija did not see wide distribution at the time and was published first in 1990, after
the collapse of communism.
100 His larger and more moderate work, Islam Between East and West (1993), in
which he presents Islam as the ideological fulcrum between East and West and the Religious
and Materialist worldviews, received little attention and achieved virtually no popular
appeal.
101 The 7th Bosnian Muslim Brigade, headquartered in Zenica and loyal to
Izetbegovic, consisted of both foreign and local Muslim fighters and attained a similar level
of notoriety for ruthlessness and reverse-ethnic cleansing as Arkan's paramilitary Tigers.
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International Court revealed that Izetbegovic had been under investigation for war
crimes.
The Izetbegovic government also saw transition in Muslim clerical leadership during
the war. In 1993 the moderate Reis-ul-ulema, Selimoski, was removed from office
and replaced by the more outspoken Mustafa Ceric, who displays in the reception
room of the Reis headquarters a portrait of Izetbegovic during his period of arrest.
Ceric intones a less strident and more co-operative tenor now in the post-war period.
He is quick to defend Bosnjaks as Western leaning, indigenous Europeans.102 At the
same time he utilises an Islamic worldview to portray the relationship of Bosnjaks to
the European international community. In 2000 he described the relationship thus:
Let me say, also, as an European that I believe that Europe is not ddr al-
Islam, (the House of Islam), but is not ddr al-harb (the House ofWar)
either. I believe that Europe is ddr al-sulh (the House ofContract). It is not
ddr al-Islam because Muslim Law cannot be fully implemented. And it is
not ddr al-harb because some aspects of the Muslim Law can be
implemented. Therefore, the land ofEurope is ddr al-sulh because it is
possible to live in accordance to Islam in the context of the Social
Contract.103
Ceric contrasts the concepts of sulh (peace, [reconciliation, settlement) and harb
(war, warfare, fight, etc.) and suggests that Islam embodies the idea of "peace with
God, with His messenger, and with the rule of law".104 Accepting the theory of
Contract as Islamic doctrine and substantiated from history, he then admits the
challenge of applying the concept of ddr al-sulh in the European context:
Our difficulty lies, nevertheless, in the lack of a genuine concept of ddr al-
sulh that could be applied in the context of an European environment that
would guarantee the decent status of Islam as a way of life and ofMuslims
as citizens of Europe.105
Distance and misunderstanding originate with both Muslims and Europeans, or the
West in general, he insists, but have different manifestations. Europeans have more
knowledge ofMuslims, but less willingness to accept them, while Muslims have a
willingness to accept Europe without understanding the political, social and cultural
environment of Europe that would effect them and change their status in European
society.106 Viewing Europe as the House ofContract opens the way for sincere
102 See the interview with Ceric in Appendix B.
103 Ceric 2001: 183.
104 Ceric 2001: 184.
105 Ceric 2001: 184.
106 Ceric, 2001: 183,4.
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dialogue (hiwar), both with Christians and with Europe (or Western) society.107
Finally, Ceric likens the common space shared by humanity to Noah's Ark and asks
more than forty questions, some ofwhich provocatively reference direct (in)action of
the European community to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some of the questions
find resonance with the thesis and are repeated in the interview with Ceric, and bear
out both the nature of the conflict and the need for resolution and social restoration:
Can the argument of the Might ofbig nations be replaced by the Right of
small nations? Can the argument of historical Myth be replaced by the
argument of historical responsibility?
(...)
Can the argument of sinful behaviour be replaced by the argument of
Adam's humble repentance? Can the argument of falsehood be replaced by
the argument ofAbraham's truth? Can the argument of revenge be replaced
by the argument of Jesus' love?... Can the argument of injustice be replaced
by the argument ofMuhammed's justice?
(...)
Do we not agree that the crime in the name of religion is the crime against
the same religion?... Do we not know that politics is too important to be left
to the politicians alone, and do we not want to know that faith in God is too
significant for all of us to be left to the theologians alone?
(...)
Is it not time that we all share the responsibility for our common future with
sincere faith in God and with honest commitment to good deeds?108
3.8. Conclusion to the Bosnjak National Identity Section
The Bosnjak community today seeks to find a means of living among Serbs and
Croats without becoming assimilated by them or isolated from them. To maintain
this position as their own nation, religion will continue to be the key determinant of
identity, even as it has served this purpose for them in the past. It is an inescapable
factor without which they could no longer exist as a nation. Their success at survival
is dependent upon shaping the Social Contract referred to by Ceric in the context of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Western Europe.
4. Religion and the Croatian National Narratives
Croatian national narratives since the middle of the nineteenth century follow two
competing trajectories. The first supports the ethos of a shared history and political
unity of the Balkan South Slavs. The second supports a Croatian identity discrete
from both Slav and non-Slav peoples, and distinct especially from the Serbs. Each
of these national ideologies relies upon religious intellectuals and religious figures in
support of their positions.
107 Ceric, 2001: 183.
108 Ceric 2001: 185, 6.
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4.1. Language as a Basis of National Identity
The first national narrative, known as the Tllyrian' movement, gained currency as a
cultural expression in the 1830s and 1840s from the Croatian poet Ljudevit Gaj.
Educated as a law student in Habsburg and Hungarian centres ofGraz and Budapest,
Gaj proposed diacritical markings to the Latin alphabet to correspond with the
phonetic requirements of the Slavic languages, and attempted to bring together the
peoples of the Stokavian, Cakavian and Kajkavian dialects of the southern Slavs.
He asserted that the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes were descendants of the ancient
Illyrians, and claimed a linguistic and historical bond that transcended other ethnic
distinctions. He also proposed that those peoples who could identify with these
linguistic markers had a right to national sovereignty and statehood, thereby placing
lingo-statist distance between the South Slavs, and the Austrians and Hungarians
who dominated the political scene.109
Illyrianism evolved into a predominantly political and national movement after 1841
under the guidance of two Catholic clergymen, Bishop Josip Strossmayer (1815-
1905) and Franjo Racki (1828-1894). Strossmayer rejected the term Tllyrian' as
foreign and proposed instead the term 'Yugoslav', meaning 'south Slav'.
Strossmayer founded the Yugoslav Academy ofArts and Sciences in Zagreb with
the aim of bringing Serbs and Croats to a new national intellectual consciousness by
mirroring the well-established intellectual bodies ofAustria, Hungary and Italy.110
Racki saw Yugoslavism as a supra-national ideology that transcended all ethnic,
religious and political differences of the South Slavs, and sought to build upon their
shared origins and cultural ties. Racki attempted to address in both romanticised and
pragmatic ways the differences the South Slav peoples faced living as peoples under
the dominion of stronger powers - the Austrians and Hungarians for the Croats, and
the Ottomans for the Serbs.
However, both the Catholic and Orthodox clergy rejected the initiatives of
Strossmayer and Racki. Croat nationalists of the time were more interested in
carving out their own identity apart from Vienna and Budapest than in building
bonds with Serbs. Catholic clerics regarded Strossmayer as too progressive for their
109 Bellamy 2003: 44.
110 Bellamy 2003: 44.
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company,111 and the Orthodox clergy saw Strossmayer as an articulate but partisan
spokesperson for the Vatican. Serb ambitions sought to wrest control of their future
from Ottoman hands, which from the early nineteenth century appeared achievable.
The Serbs also conceived of a different state, laying stress on a 'Greater Serbia', not
a confederation of South Slav peoples envisioned by Strossmayer. Further,
Strossmayer would not rule out the future possibility and right to statehood for
Croatia. Ultimately no Yugoslav state was born in Strossmayer's lifetime, but his
movement was able to catalyse a common vision across Croatian regions then under
Habsburg hegemony112 of a 'Greater Croatia'. Only after the cataclysmic changes of
the First World War would Strossmayer's vision become the premier narrative for
the Slavs of Southeastern Europe.
4.2. The Historical Statehood Narrative
The second narrative ofCroatian nationhood envisions a state separate from
neighbouring non-Slavic nations that once controlled Croatian regions, and from the
Serbian nation. This view gained prominence in reaction to the Vidovdan
Constitution (1929), seen by Croats to favour Serbs, and the creation of Serbian
hegemony in the first Yugoslavia. The ideological and cultural rift was a source of
deep internal division during the Second World War in which ultra-nationalist Croats
were able to create an independent and fascist Croatian state. More recently it is the
prevailing nationalist sentiment arising out of a weakened socialism after the death
ofTito (1980) and the collapse of the Socialist Federation ofYugoslavia in 1991.
The inspiration and visionary for the new nationalism was Franjo Tudjman. He
achieved fame fighting for the Partisans during the World War II, and was a central
figure in the Croatian Spring nationalist movement of 1970-71 that Tito quelled only
by threat of force. In 1990 Tudjman founded the HDZ (Croatian Democratic
Community), a nationalist-oriented political party, and became the president of
111
Strossmayer conducted the liturgy in the vernacular rather than Latin, installed no
iron partition between the clergy and the laity in the cathedral he built, and celebrated the
mass facing the people. Strossmayer also addressed the cleavage between the Eastern and
Western Churches that separated Serbs and Croats. The hallmark of these efforts is the
cathedral he designed in Djakovo. The exterior of the cathedral is marked by Western neo-
Gothic and Eastern Byzantine architectural elements, while the interior is decorated with
frescoes depicting scenes from both Eastern and Western Church history. The unique
edifice is a celebrated testimonial to Strossmayer and his life-long ambition to create a
common identity of South Slavs.




Croatia in the first elections following the collapse of Yugoslavia. Tudjman
effectively achieved a personality of cult status in Croatia fed by an uncritical press.
His megalomania in Croatia paralleled that of early Milosevic in Serbia, and he
assessed his own achievements by stating "History shall place me abreast ofFranco
as a savior ofWestern civilization.'"13
This national narrative under Tudjman is Croatia-centred, and claims an
uninterrupted existence of a Croatian state for more than a millennium, a myth which
is now enshrined in the current Croatian constitution since 1991.114 The narratives
complained of great suffering of the Croatian people under 'Serboslavia', and
"servitude under both monarchist and socialist Yugoslavia".115 The homogenisation
ofpopular opinion was critical to the consolidation of power, and is typified by the
following statement by a Tudjman sympathiser:
The Croatian individual must be liberated from communist totalitarianism,
the fallacy ofYugoslavism, the practice of Serbian pillage, and venality and
corruption inherited from an Ottoman way of thinking in the sense of'don't
worry, we'll do it tomorrow,' as well as our new slavery to Western
European currency.116
Tudjman had clear plans to annex the portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina that were
predominantly or partially settled by Croats. He asserted in 1995 that Bosnia-
Herzegovina was a "creation ofOttoman invasion ofEurope" and that "Croatia
accepts the task of Europeanizing Bosnian Muslims" whom he considered of
Croatian ethnicity.117 Past military and religious symbols were re-employed for the
113 Velikonja 2003: 251.
114 Specifically, the Constitution claims "the millennial national identity of the
Croatian nation and the continuity of its statehood, confirmed by the course of its entire
historical experience in various statal forms and by the perpetuation and growth of the idea
of one's own state, based on the Croatian nation's historical right to full sovereignty"
(Bellamy 2003: 32).
115 Velikonja 2003: 250.
116 Nikica Mihalhevic, cited in Velikonja 2003: 250.
117 Already in July 1993 a break-away Croatian ethnic faction proclaimed the
formation of a separatist Croatian state of Herzeg-Bosna within the borders ofHerzegovina,
electing their own president, Mate Boban. At the same time the military offensive of the
Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatsko vijece obrane - HVO) mounted against the Bosnjaks of
Mostar and the surrounding area was meant to drive out the Bosnjaks, secure the borders of
the newly created state, and anticipate the influx of ethnic Croats from Central Bosnia who
had been forced out by Serbian offences. Military campaigns attacked non-combatants of
non-Croat ethnicity and carried out an iconoclastic campaign to destroy religious and
cultural symbols of non-Croats, including the four hundred year old Stari Most (Old Bridge)
in Mostar, iconic symbol of ethnic tolerance and co-existence (Velikonja 2003: 250ff.).
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campaign for Croatian national sovereignty in Bosnia-Herzegovina, awaking the
dormant past by invoking the memories ofprevious conflicts.
4.3. The Church's Role Through the Communist Period
While Tudjman was the central figure ofCroatian nationalism, he would not have
been successful without the support, activity and moral advocacy of the Catholic
clergy. The Church's nationalist-oriented activities before Tudjman's presidential
bid are well established, and run a parallel course with other political activists. The
new openness afforded religious bodies by the socialist Yugoslav state in the 1960s
gradually reawakened national consciences that reached its apex in the socialist
period with the Croatian Spring from 1967-1972. When Tito put a halt to the
political side of the movement and turned the 'Croatian Spring' into the 'Croatian
Silence', the Church effectively bore the weight of the nationalist movement. The
Church officially and shrewdly distanced itself from the political movement while
simultaneously drawing a link between Catholicism and Croatian identity.118
The Church took its effort to the people through a Catholic lay movement that
sparked growth in religious life. Spiritual panels, catechism for adults and worship
services attracted students and intellectuals. Sunday sermons engaged people with
the social issues that touched them.
The Catholic Church also utilised representative and symbolic imagery to establish
the links between Catholicism and nationalism. From 1937-1941 the Croatian
Catholic episcopate commemorated the Grand Jubilee of 1300 years of the
evangelisation of the Croats (641), a certain sign of resistance to Serbian domination
in the first Yugoslav state. The jubilee was inaugurated by a "Croatian pilgrimage"
to Jerusalem by Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, who would become identified with
Croat nationalism during the Second World War and early socialist period of
persecution.119 Stepinac (1898-1960) is the typological antithesis of Strossmayer and
118 Perica 2002: 56-8.
119 The complicated history of Second World War, and the collusion between
religious clerics from the Orthodox, Muslim and Catholic communities lies beyond the
scope of this work. The level of the unresolved dispute is evident in the wide variance in the
separate charges in which Serbs contend that 300,000 to 700,000 Serbs were slaughtered at
Jasenovac and by the Ustase regime, with one source citing the absurd figure ofmore than
one million (See Ramet 2002: 53). Croat revisionism maintains a figure around 28,000 to
40,000, and virtually reverses these figures for atrocities committed by Serbs at Bleiburg.
For further information, see the following sources: Mojzes 1995: 47; Judah 2000: 126; Sells
1996b: 61; Perica 2002: 150, 151.
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the controversial icon ofCroatian national identity. Serbs and socialists identify him
with the fascist Ustasa regime and link him to some of the worst atrocities of the
NDH during this particularly dark period of Yugoslav history.120 But Stepinac
refused to comply with the regime's demands to break ties with the Vatican and form
a Croatian Catholic Church, which would have given Belgrade more leverage and
control. Consequently, the socialist regime arrested and tried Stepinac in 1946,121
and sentenced him to sixteen years ofhard labour.122
The inability of the socialists to co-opt Stepinac ultimately served to increase ties
between nationalists and the Catholic Church, as Perica indicates:
.. .[T]he myth of Stepinac's martyrdom was created in the West during the
anticommunist momentum of the 1950s. Pope Pius XII contributed to this
myth by making Stepinac a cardinal in 1953, after which Belgrade broke off
diplomatic ties with the Vatican.123
Diplomatic ties with the Vatican were restored during the 1960s when Church-State
relationships improved under the less acerbic period of rapprochement, provided that
the religious communities exercised their duties without "support of nationalism and
chauvinism, and was not overtly antisocialist".124 In 1970 and during the time of the
'Croatian Spring' Cardinal Kuharic of Zagreb inaugurated the public
commemoration ofArchbishop Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac, which in the next decade
witnessed a wide following, and was recognised as an unofficial Croatian holiday, or
Cardinal Stepinac Day.125
120 These accusations include the killing of 217 priests and 3 bishops, and another
334 priests expelled from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia. The regime destroyed
between 350-400 Orthodox churches, and forcibly baptised into Catholicism thousands of
Orthodox Serbs. However, Croats accuse the socialists ofmanipulating the Catholic Church
and using Stepinac as the scapegoat for NDH crimes. Many of the Catholic clergy were
indeed strong supporters of the Ustasa regime who saw the NDH as a legitimate Croatian
nation-state. The archbishop of Sarajevo, Ivan Saric, was an outspoken proponent of the
fusion ofRoman Catholicism and the ideology of the NDH, and the bishop ofBanja Luka,
Josip Garic, was a member of the Ustasa organisation. See Perica 2002: 24, 5; Ramet 2002:
83.
121 The prosecution acting on behalf of the socialist state in the show trial ignored
evidence that Stepinac had actually condemned some of the worst atrocities of the NDH
during the war, spoken out against racism, and worked for the release of Orthodox believers
from prison (Ramet 2002: 83, 84).
122 Stepinac actually served five years in prison and was not forced to do hard labour.
His cell was double-sized and customised to accommodate a small chapel for him (Ramet
2002: 88, 89).
123 Perica 2002: 27.
124 Perica 2002: 36.
125 Perica 2002: 59. In a highly publicised and controversial move, Pope John Paul
II beatified Stepinac on October 3, 1998, at the National Marian Center in Marija Bistrica.
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The Church also reinvigorated the cult ofVirgin Mary as the major religious and
national symbol ofCatholic Croatia.126 When Franciscan Karlo Balic proposed that
the Marian shrine be recognised as the 'national' shrine ofCroatia, he invoked an
idea already proposed by Stepinac in 1939 in consultation with the newly established
Independent State of Croatia under the Pavelic government.127 The support for the
initiative from the Bishops' Conference in Yugoslavia was organised under the
theme of'The Virgin Mary, Queen of the Croats'.128 At the commemoration services
coordinated with the day ofAssumption ofMary on August 15, 1971, Archbishop
Kuharic remarked that "the Marian congress reasserted Croatian Catholic identity
and unity". These commemorations were impetus to other celebrations on this day
in the Croatian cities ofRijeka, Nin and Sinj, the last ofwhich was convened under
theparole of "Let Our People Not Lose Their Identity".
The following year (1972) Catholic theologian Tomislav Janko Sagi-Bunic wrote a
series of articles in Glas koncila addressing the role of the Catholic Church in the
formation of the nation ofCroatia, stating the following:
The Church and the Croatian nation are inseparable, and nothing can sever
that connection. Catholicism cannot be deleted from the people's collective
memory or the Croatian national identity, either by theoretical persuasion
and propaganda or by a revolutionary act. The Catholic Church in our
country has done nothing bad or harmful in recent years, no moves or
gestures that could have possibly hampered the development of the Croatian
people or that have been at the expense of any other nationality in
Yugoslavia.129
In the same year the Croatian Spring escalated into violence, requiring the direct
intervention ofTito, who rounded up and imprisoned leading Croatian nationalists,
The Pope came to Croatia with a message of reconciliation, but the central place he gave to
Stepinac provoked only more antipathy. According to Cardinal Bozanic, Kuharic's
successor and a recognised moderate in favour ofmulti-nationalism, Stepinac's beatification
was an "acknowledgment of the Croat nation" (Velikonja 2003: 276).
126 The "Mariological and Marian Congress" was inaugurated in Zagreb and
highlighted the nearby shrine ofMary in Marija Bistrica. The opening homily of Kuharic
entitled "The Tribulations of Croatia and the Virgin Mary" struck a chord for Croatian
nationalism by stating that "small, oppressed nations worship the cult ofMary with an
extraordinary piety" (Perica 2002: 59, 60).
127 Perica 2002: 60.
128 Croatia chose the Black Madonna similar to the one in Cz^stechowa, Poland,
which is believed to have exercised special powers to fend off attack by Muslims in
Constantinople, and later to have saved the Polish people from attack by Tartars and
Russians. The Croatian Black Madonna was named 'Queen of the Croats' and the 'advocata
fidelissima Croatiae" and was believed to have saved Croatia from Turkish raids (Perica
2002: 60ff.).
129 Cited in Perica 2002: 62.
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and further outbreaks of violence were avoided only with the threat ofmilitary
intervention. In this volatile political situation the Catholic Church took up the
Croatian nationalist cause. The 'Great Novena', a nine year jubilee conceived for
both liturgical and pastoral renewal under the direction of Archbishop Franic of
Split, now also included a course in national and Church history.130 The Catholic
clergy consistently reinterpreted historical figures, events and places from the past as
symbols for their cause and asserted an unbroken Croatian and Catholic heritage of
1300 years. In 1978 the Church celebrated the nine hundredth anniversary of the
founding of the basilica ofKing Zvonimir in Biskupija.131 In anticipation of the
celebration, Sagi-Bunic wrote about the historic consequences of Zvonimir's choice
ofRoman Catholicism and rejection ofByzantium, moulding Croatia as a
distinctivelyWestern nation.132 These statements and the ceremonies, attended by
over 30,000 pilgrims, were particularly provocative in what was now the Serbian
Orthodox stronghold in Croatia. In a symbolic statement, the interior of the basilica
was draped in the national flag ofCroatia without the red star of the socialist state.133
The Catholic Church's commemoration ofPrince Branimir the following year was
also contentious. Sagi-Bunic heralded Branimir (reigned 879-887) as the ruler who
brought the Croatian Church and the Croatian people back into the West.134 This
inflamed the civic and religious pride of the Orthodox because Branimir executed his
rival, Duke Sedeslav (reigned 878-879), who favoured Byzantium and the Orthodox
Church. Sedeslav is thus recognised by the Serbs as a martyr at the hands of the
murderous Branimir.135
The regime in Belgrade took careful notice of the growing power of the Catholic
Church as the main event of the Great Novena concluded with the National
Eucharistic Congress in 1984. The estimated crowd of over 400,000 pilgrims
witnessed the events broadcast in both Zagreb and at the shrine ofMary in Marija
Bistrica. A broadcast through Radio Vatican brought a special message from the
130 Perica 2002: 64.
131 During Zvonimir's reign (1075-1089) Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) became the
protector and patron of Croatia, and the king swore allegiance and obedience to the Pope,
moved the seat of the bishopric to Knin and built the basilica dedicated to Mary (Velikonja
2002: 43).
132 Perica 2002: 65.
133 Perica 2002: 65.
134 Perica 2002: 65.
135 Perica 2002: 67.
58
Chapter One
Pope to the audience. The Church used the occasion to release "a new history of the
Croatian Church and people from 641 to 1984'"36 written by the Catholic historian,
Josip Turcinovic. This historiography portrays Croatian achievements positively,
and those of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Bosnjaks negatively.137 At the
commemoration Archbishop Franic drew a direct parallel between Poland - then
undermilitary law in response to the strong Catholic-led movement, Solidarnosc -
and Croatia. Fie noted that Catholic Slavic peoples stood in the first line of defence
of the Catholic West against the Orthodox East, and then stated, "God rendered to us
Catholic Croats this land in which we have lived for a thousand and three hundred
years, and we will not let anyone else rule over us in our own land."138 The parallel
with Poland, and the excitement that the Novena's finale generated, was not lost on
the state press. The Komunist recorded the following about the events of nearly a
decade:
[The Great Novena was] carefully designed to make a synthesis of the
nationalist and religious agendas through the manipulation of symbols,
themes, and dates from Church and national history, in order to penetrate
popular consciousness with both of two themes, religion and ethnic
nationalism, fused and merged into a single whole.... The Great Novena
simply means the clerical exploitation of ethnicity, folklore, history, and
Croatian cultural heritage, coupled with the transformation of national
history and myth. The Church's objective is to reinvigorate the reactionary
consciousness, which, in this multinational country, may produce
destructive outcomes.139
4.4. The Church's Role in the Post-Communist Period
The new freedom after the collapse of socialism in the early 1990s presented the
religious bodies with even greater opportunity and power. Although Kuharic in
1990 denounced any form of'caesaro-papism' and consciously placed distance
between the Church and the state,140 Catholic bishops, lower level clergy and laity
regularly drew links between national and religious identity.141 One Catholic
136 Perica 2002: 68.
137 There is no account of the atrocities during the Second World War at the hands of
the Ustase, and Stepinac is presented as a saint and martyr, while the Great Migration (1691)
of Serbs to the Krajina is portrayed as an invasion ofCroatian territory. In actual fact, the
Great Migration resulted from a failed Serb uprising against Turkish rule, sending the Serbs
into exile. They migrated to the Krajina at the invitation of the Habsburgs, and effectively
created a new military frontier (vojna krajina) and buffer zone for the Habsburg Empire as
the first line of defence against Turkish forces (Perica 2002: 69).
138 Perica 2002: 69, 70.
139 Cited in Perica 2002: 67, 68.
140 Velikonja 2003: 269.
141 Mojzes 1995: 131.
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publication, Veritas, published in 1992 the following paragraph indicating an
intentional connexion between the Catholic Church and the state:
The cross ofChrist stands next to the Croatian flag, [and the] Croatian
bishop next to the Croatian minister of state. Croatian priests and teachers
are together again in the schools.... The Church is glad for the return of its
people 'from the twofold' slavery: Serbian and Communist.142
Once the task ofbringing the HDZ into power was accomplished in Croatia, the
Catholic bishops turned their attention to Bosnia-Herzegovina where a party by the
same name and ideology vied for votes among the Croat minority. Although law in
Bosnia-Herzegovina explicitly forbad the formation ofpolitical parties along
national or confessional lines, each of the nations did precisely this. The Catholic
Church suggested this stipulation be abolished, and the bishops were the first to
initiate the process of forming a national party, and the other ethno-religious groups
followed suit.143 Petar Andelovic, the superior of the Franciscan province ofBosna
Srebrena and located in Sarajevo, notes that the Catholic Church initially supported
the HDZ. Once its chauvinist tendencies and militarism became apparent, the
Church removed its support. Indeed, several high ranking official Church leaders
spoke out against strong association with the HDZ, condemned crimes committed in
the name of religious nationalism and supported a multi-cultural, multi-religious
state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Andelovic is joined by Cardinal Puljic,144 Bishop
Franjo Komarica, who ultimately spent eight months under house arrest in Banja
Luka, and Friars Ivo Markovic and Marko Orsolic, in standing against Catholic
nationalists. Regretfully they were the exception. Other lower level clergy were
fully engaged in the violence, and added their moral support to the nationalist cause.
This was particularly the case in Herzegovina where Croat separatists represented a
majority, and were intent on carving out their own self-declared independent
territory ofHerzeg-Bosna, free of Serbs and Bosnjaks. Some hardline Catholic
clergy and Franciscans alike were intent on making the 'Shrine of the Queen of
Peace' at Medugorje and the veneration ofMary the defining symbol of the region
and of the nationalist ideology. The area has a long and rich religious tradition, and
142 Cited in Velikonja 2003: 270.
143 Mojzes 1995: 132.
144 Puljic changed his multi-national stance in the latter half of the 1990s largely as a
result of the failure of the international community to secure the rights of Bosnia's Catholic
Croats (Perica 2002: caption facing page 89). By the time this research was conducted,
Puljic represented a separatist position. His official representative for inter-religious affairs,
Mato Zovkic, who was interviewed for this research, maintains a moderate position.
60
Chapter One
historically attracted pre-Christian residents, Turks, Serbs and Bosnjaks, as well as
pious Catholics. The apparitions of the Virgin Mary in 1981 saw a growth of
pilgrims to the area to around 70,000, a number that by 1991 would swell to more
than 18 million per year.145 Now Medugorje was to become the definitive symbol of
Catholic Croat nationalism.146
4.5. Conclusion to the Croatian National Identity Section
It is clear from the foregoing that the Catholic Church played a central role in
shaping the Croatian nation, especially as an expression of opposition to stronger
regimes and ideological forces. Tudjman stated that the Croatian (!) Catholic
Church was the only institution to consistently resist the communist authorities, and
that by doing so, "the Church was responsible for nurturing Croatian national
identity during the dark period of communist rule".147 Some Western sources
overlook the role of the Catholic Church while others misinterpret sociological
phenomena because of a lack of awareness of the religious dynamics. Thus, for
instance, in comparing the Croatian and Serbian nationalist movements, Silber and
Little state the following:
Years after Serb nationalism had taken hold in Belgrade and propelled
Milosevic to power, the behaviour of Croat nationalists was still muted,
manifesting how effective the suppression of Croatian nationalism had been.
The vast Serb processions and mass rallies, teeming with Serbian imagery
and symbolism of domination, were often to be seen, but, as late as 1990,
the Croatian counterpart was cowed and furtive.148
This statement recognises the suppression that Croatian nationalists underwent from
the regime following the 'Croatian Spring' uprisings, but it fails to grasp how the
nationalist movement tactically shifted its energies under the aegis of the Catholic
Church. It also misses the socio-political importance of de-secularisation and
increase in church attendance of the 1980s in Yugoslavia as a whole and in Croatia
particularly. The increase cannot legitimately be construed in terms of spiritual
awakening, and had manifestly political implications, as Perica makes clear:
,..[T]his mobilization was in its essence nationalistic and religious only in
form. The spiritual impact was definitely weaker than the political.
Fighting modernization, secularization, communism, the Yugoslav
multinational state, and the rival faiths, the Church worshiped itself and
145 Velikonja 2003: 211.
146 Velikonja 2003: 272.
147 Cited in Bellamy 2003: 156.
148 Silber and Little 1995: 83.
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consecrated new ethnic and ecclesiastical histories as part of the making of
the new Croatian nation.149
Historians Eric Hobsbawm and Peter Sugar recognise the central role of religion in
nation building in Yugoslavia and suggest that unpopular native fascist regimes, such
as that in Croatia, would not have been able to establish and legitimise their
government without the decisive role of the local Catholic churches.150
The natural antipathies inherent in the nationalist cause are certain to sustain tensions
with other national communities in the complicated ethnic composition of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The ideological position ofmany clerics in the Catholic Church is
patently anti-catholic and a denial of the Church's true self. Whether and how
members within that Church can transcend the current situation to promote social
restoration and peace-building is the topic of succeeding chapters.
5. Conclusion
During periods of fluid power structures, 'cumulative tradition'151 provided the
crucial interpretative framework for ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Religion is both a
defining and driving force in tradition and plays an intrinsic role in shaping ethnic
identity and nationhood in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is most evident in the Serbian
national narrative, and recognised by Ramet, who writes, "The Serbian Church views
itself as identical with the Serbian Nation, since it considers that religion is the
foundation of nationality.'"52 The Serbs are not alone in using religion in this
capacity, however. The Bosnjak nation also has shaped an identity based pre¬
eminently on religion. Both in its ethno-genesis related to the Bosnian Church, and
in more recent history in which the Bosnian Muslims received national recognition
under Tito's Yugoslavia, religion has served as the central feature of national
identification. Croatian clergymen and the Catholic Church have been instrumental
in defining both the 'Yugoslav' narrative and the 'Croatian' national narrative in
different eras of nation-state development. Two figures respectively, Strossmayer
and Stepinac, are today iconically linked to the movements that they influenced.
Moreover, the Catholic Church served as a platform and voice for Croatian national
149 Perica 2002: 73.
150 Perica 2002: 24.
151 W. C. Smith defines 'cumulative tradition' as "the entire mass of overt objective
data that constitute the historical deposit... of the past religious life of the community in
question" (1964: 141).
152 Ramet 2002: 114.
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development at a time when the socialist regime effectively silenced political
factions promoting the Croatian cause. In each case, religion and religious figures
contributed to the formation ofmythic national identities that shaped discrete
narratives in Yugoslavia. Moreover, because religion served as the pre-eminent tool
of ethnic differentiation, the clergy were well positioned to manipulate the religious
element to nationalistic advantage, and their conscious involvement abetted the
conflict that eventually led to war. Nationalism, strengthened by religio-mythical
accretions, shaped distinct historical narratives, and created authoritative worldviews
that motivated whole communities. To varying degrees, each of the religious
communities shaped a narrative that defended their cause and legitimised their
actions. Because the religious dimension is intrinsic to the identities of the peoples
ofBosnia-Herzegovina, it is an important element contributing to the ideological
conflict that remains in the land. If interventionist efforts are to meaningfully
address the ideological dimension of the conflict, they must engage with the
religious dimension that is central to the national narratives. The nature of the




The Limitations ofWestern Intervention
Towards Peace-Building and Social Restoration
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the international community's efforts to bring stability and
recovery to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Specifically, it directs its inquiry to the research
question, "What are the successes and failures ofpost-war initiatives by the
international community to restore civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina?" It first
traces the events that brought international involvement to the Balkans, and then
examines specific initiatives of the peace effort for their effectiveness on the ground.
To this end focus is placed on the General FrameworkAgreementfor Peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (GFAP) because it is the primary means of establishing long-
term stability in the country.
Several arguments will be tested during the course of the chapter. It first will be
argued that an external force alone cannot resolve the difficulties intrinsic to the
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that instead of fostering peace, some efforts of
the international community effectively do the opposite. It then will be argued that
social harmony has not been restored through mechanistic political and economic
overtures alone, and that these structural efforts need to be complemented with
informal social and cultural initiatives.
Further, although the international community recognises the need for a values-based
recovery effort that includes social and psychological elements, their ability to
effectively address ths area is limited. Lastly, it will be argued that the values-based
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social realm of peace-building falls within sphere of religion and the religious
communities, and suggests that they can make significant contributions to peace-
building and social restoration.
2. Contextual Background to International Intervention
Western intervention came reluctantly and belatedly to Bosnia-Herzegovina and only
after the media spotlight forced the hand ofpolicy makers to end the conflagration.
Initial efforts employing UN peacekeepers to halt the conflict proved a debacle of
grand proportions and an international embarassment. Warring factions on the
ground casually ignored more than a score of cease-fire agreements signed outside
the theatre of conflict. Only the deployment ofNATO forces created sufficient
diplomatic leverage to initiate lasting peace negotiations with all three parties at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.
The presence of the international community invited derision during the war, and
remained contentious in the post-war period on both sides of the Inter Entity
Boundary Line (IEBL).1 Promised aid for rebuilding was contingent upon
compliance with Western demands as outlined in the Dayton Accord. Non¬
compliance by leadership in the Republika Srpska meant that ninety-eight percent of
aid from the international community went to the Federacija in the initial post-war
recovery period. Consequently the two entities now bear a rich and poor disparity
that will not easily be erased.3 The failure of the West's carrot and stick approach to
bring reform in the Republika Srpska has served to heighten tensions and to cast the
West as the scapegoat for the ills of the Republika Srpska. Residents in the
Republika Srpska no longer view the poor standard of living as direct consequences
of the Serbian and Croatian military campaigns that destroyed most of the
infrastructure, but as the result of the West's refusal to come through with the
promised funding for rebuilding.
1 The Dayton Accord created the Inter Entity Boundary Line effectively separating
the warring factions into two near-equal parts. The Republika Srpska is home to Serbs of




3 The minimum monthly wage in the Federacija is three times higher
(KM200=US$100) than in the Republika Srpska (KM65= US$32). Neither of these wages
represents a sufficient standard of living, however (USDoS 2001: np).
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Criticism of the international community has been no less vocal in the Croat-Bosnjak
entity, although the Federacija has received vastly the greater preportion of
governmental and NGO resources. When initial expectations for a prosperous,
rebuilt Bosnia-Herzegovina did not materialise, local actors blamed the international
community. Some of their criticism was justly lodged. The High Representative in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, is also critical of excessive spending on
duplicate structures and administrations.4 NGOs employing their own people and
imposing their own methods in Bosnia-Herzegovina produced predictably irrelevant
outcomes, and the host peoples increasingly received their efforts with cynicism.5
The extraordinary and sweeping powers of the High Representative are necessary to
contain residual nationalism in the land, but they have fostered dependence6 and a
correspondent entitlement mentality. Once victims ofpowerful local warlords,
immobilised citizens ofBosnia-Herzegovina now feel fated to live by the dictates of
the Western powers. However, the authority vested in the High Representative has
thus far failed to interdict rampant corruption on either side of the IEBL. Well-
connected individuals steering a parallel economic structure through patron-client
networks take advantage of the absence of law and inability to prosecute to prosper
in the grey economy. Corruption is so pervasive that legitimate civil society cannot
be built without significant changes that will necessarily involve the High
Representative. However, the entitlement mentality expects the High Representative
alone to put an end to the corruption. Recovery from its current malaise requires
nothing less than a comprehensive overhaul ofBosnia-Herzegovina society, the
provision for which is laid out in the Dayton Accord.
3. The Dayton Accord and its Implementation
The centrepiece for recovery and renewal in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the
comprehensive General Framework Agreementfor Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
commonly referred to as the Dayton Accord, initialed by the parties of dispute in
Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December of the same year.
From the outset the Dayton Accord was meant to be more than a peace document.
Seeking to avoid another Cyprus situation in which a nation remained divided with
4 Ashdown 2002: np.
5 Belloni 2001: 169.
6 Belloni 2001: 178.
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UN troops serving as guaranteurs of the peace, Richard Holbrooke, the chief
architect of the Dayton Accord, crafted an agreement that was comprehensive in
nature and powers. Dayton thus addresses the military aspects of the conflict and
endeavours to rebuild civil society.7 Because the Accord is so central to the recovery
scheme in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it must also constitute the framework from which
any valid assessment can be given. Six of the eleven annexes are analysed, namely,
Annex 1: Military Aspects; Annex 2: Inter-Entity Boundary; Annex 4: Constitution;
Annex 3: Elections; Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons; and Annex 6:
o
Human Rights.
3.1. Annex 1: Military Aspects
The primary achievement of the Dayton Accord is, in its own words, the "durable
cessation of hostilities".9 A week following the signing of the Dayton Accord in
Paris, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1035, creating the UN
Mission on Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The UN Mission's mandate was to
implement the Dayton Accord on the ground, effectively separating the warring
factions. This in turn brought sufficient stability for governmental agencies ofwar
recovery and NGOs to set up operations. The initial phase of implementation under
IFOR (Implementation FORce) became a phase of stabilisation under SFOR
(Stabilisation FORce) and completed its mandate on 31December 2002. On 1
January 2003 the European Union Police Mission (EUPM), strongly aided by the
International Police Task Force provided for by Annex 11 of the Dayton Accord,
assumed the duties ofmonitoring the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The military aspect remains the singular outstanding achievement of the negotiations
in Dayton. Implementation of the civil aspects of the Accord reveals a less
promising achievement. Now, nine years after the signing of the Dayton Accord, it
is difficult to claim achievement ofwidespread peace and reconciliation in Bosnia-
7 Holbrooke 1999: 133,233.
8 The remaining annexes include Annex 5: Arbitration; Annex 8: Commission to
Preserve National Monuments; Annex 9: Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations;
Annex 10: Civilian Implimentation; Annex 11: International Police Task Force. The
Annexes are presented here in a different order for the purpose of logical discussion and
analysis.
9
GFAP, Article I, 2, a.
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Herzegovina. A closer look at the civilian implementation10 of the Dayton Accord
reveals a society deeply divided by ideology and in constant turmoil.
3.2. Annex 2: Inter-Entity Boundary
The Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) is a delicately negotiated demarcation of
territory meant to assure some parity between the warring nations of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Serbs, who once controlled seventy percent of the territory in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, retain forty nine percent after the negotiations. The Croat-Bosnjak
contingent share the remaining fifty one percent of the territory ofBosnia-
Herzegovina. The creation of the internal border separated the warring parties and
forced the removal of artillery from forward positions still threatening to the
opposing sides.
The IEBL was meant to be a temporary measure but has subsequently ossified into
semi-permanent status, allowing the Republika Srpska to develop into a para-state
orientated towards Belgrade. The Dayton-created IEBL permitted a homogenous
Serb entity virtually free of Bosnjaks and Croats, which was the explicit goal of the
Serb forces during the war. What the Serb contingent failed to accomplish on the
battlefield they effectively achieved with the peace settlement.
The Bosnjak negotiating team recognised this potential pitfall during the Dayton
negotiations." The international military coalition would be overseeing a divided
land rather than protecting the integrity of a united multi-national Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Within weeks ofDayton's implementation, the Republika Srpska had
adopted the Yugoslav (Serbian) Dinar as its street currency, and restructured its
telephone system using Serbia's dialling codes.
The signatories of the Dayton Accord agreed to a unified state, but with those leaders
now out of the positions of power,12 there is little political muscle to effect the
necessary changes. Furthermore, while many in the Federacija consider a multi¬
cultural, multi-national state necessary for political viability, few in the Republika
Srpska agree. The Serbs of the Republika Srpska prefer to retain the partition, and
10 "Civilian Implementation" is an official term from Annex 10 of the Dayton
Accord in which the position of High Representative was created to oversee all of the non-
military aspects of the Accord. It is also a general term commonly used with reference to the
Dayton Accord's mandate towards rebuilding society.
11 Holbrooke 1999: 131.
12




foster a 'one state, two entities' policy. Thus, the IEBL contributed to the ethnic
differentiation and permitted a clefacto 'Greater Serbia' to remain intact, two
objectives Dayton intended to dismantle.
3.3. Annex 4: Constitution
The Constitution ofBosnia-Herzegovina created by the Dayton Accord gives
deference to many conventions of international law guaranteeing individual human
rights. Article II specifically cites the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols and applies this
convention and its protocols "directly to Bosnia and Herzegovina", giving it "priority
over all other law".13 This entry contrasts with the general references to other
international conventions recognised in the Preamble to the Constitution14 and
specifically sanctions individual citizenship as the foundation for a legal and political
framework.
At the same time the Constitution enshrines in subsequent articles the two divided
entities and their respective national identities as the operative legal and political
framework in the land. The Constitution outlines a framework whereby the Croat,
Bosnjak and Serb nations form the bicameral parliament (Article IV), the three-
member Presidency (Article V) and the Constitutional Court (Article VI).15
By legitimising two standards, the Constitution embraces a contradiction. On the
one hand the Constitution sets the hallmark ofprimary identity and rights on
individual citizens. On the other, it places the primacy of decision-making with the
three national bodies. As a result the Constitution vacillates between two ideological
forces, one which seeks to integrate Bosnia-Herzegovina into Western Europe and its
standards, and another which facilitates nationalist partisanship. By allowing the
Constitution to be part of the peace negotiations, the Dayton Accord retained the
essence and structure of the conflict in the republic's most foundational document,
assuring the arena of conflict would continue on an internal, political plane.
The Constitution is a by-product of compromise between parties in conflict seeking
to protect their own national self-interests, the result ofwhich is the continuation of
13
GFAP, Annex 4, Article II, 11. International Standards.
14 See below under Annex 6: Human Rights.
15 The addition of "others" was added later to include citizens of non-Bosnjak, non-
Croat and non-Serb origin in the political process.
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ethnic hostilities. It is impossible to promote the international, and specifically
European, standards of citizenship when the idiosyncratic expressions ofnationalist
partisanship prevails in the course of affairs. As one scholar notes:
The most pronounced trend in governmental bodies in the 1990s... is the
exponential increase in functionaries with loyalty to a particular national
political formation. On any given day, many of these officials probably
spend more time obstructing the functioning of central institutions than in
strengthening them.... The Dayton Constitution has left Bosnia and
Hercegovina with a surfeit of governments but no real state.16
These difficulties are evident in the election results where political parties are
established along national lines.
3.4. Annex 3: Elections
Each of the elections since 1996 has demonstrated the strength of ethno-religious
partisanship, and no party - nationalist or moderate - enjoys support in both the
Federacjia and Republika Srpska. The Serbian SDS17 party sees no real opposition
in the Republika Srpska. Partisanship is prevalent in the Federacija as well. The
SDA18 and HDZ,19 the Bosnjak and Croat nationalist parties respectively, also
endeavour to secure the interests of their own ethno-religious group.
The "Alliance for Change", a coalition made up ofmembers from ten smaller parties
and established after the November 2000 general elections, ultimately failed in their
goal to mount a challenge to nationalist-based parties. Despite substantial funding
assistance from the international community and technical training through the
OSCE, optimistic predictions of significant gains towards multi-national politics
proved disappointing. Election results in October 2002 reversed any positive gains
achieved in the 2000 elections, and no substantive shifts from previous ethno-
religious partisanship are noticeable. Politicians focused on their own entity
continually invoke Dayton's "vital interests" clause in order to defeat legislation
16 Donia 2000: np.
17 SDS stands for Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serbian Democratic Party).
18 SDA stands for Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party for Democratic Action).
19 FIDZ stands for Hi~vatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union).
It is a party with a filial relationship to the party of the same name in Croatia, but remains




aimed at unifying Bosnia-Herzegovina. Consequently, the weak central
government frequently fails to agree to and pass legislation.
Partisan politics steered by nationalists is not a new development resulting from the
war, however. During the socialist era national considerations were frequently at the
heart of politics, and nations were played off against other nations. In this way the
Bosnjaks ofBosnia-Herzegovina played a key role. The trend continued following
the collapse of socialism, as the first multi-party election in 1990 revealed. Further,
each of the parties constructed elaborate extra-constitutional patronage systems in
order to circumvent ineffective institutions still encumbered by vestigial socialist
practices. The SDS patronage network had strong cultural and commercial links
beyond Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia, as did the HDZ network to Croatia.21
Beginning in 1991 nationalist agendas became increasingly one-sided and
confrontational. Governmental bodies were paralysed, and the patronage networks
became critical in protecting the national interests of their constituent peoples.
Additionally, after the elections in 1990, an "Inter-Party" Agreement22 between
nationalist parties came into force, achieving two significant things. First, it kept the
socialists - rebranded as Social Democrats - from governmental positions and power
sharing. Second, the Inter-Party Agreement reinforced the arbitration of disputes in
such ways as to maintain the balance of power. Eventually the Agreement worked
well enough that it became a nationality formula implemented throughout all levels
of the government.
Party politics continue today in a similar nationalist framework, although with one
significant change. In pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina the nationalist parties worked
together to defeat the socialists, but in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina the national
parties work to defeat each other. By protecting only their own interests, they have
managed to defeat efforts to build a constructive central government or unified state.
20
Originally intended as a measure of checks and balances protecting any single
nation from the "destructive" (as the Accord has it) intentions of the other two, the vital
interests clause has been used regularly to stalemate legislation.
21 Donia 2000: np.
22 The Inter-Party Agreement provided the party with the most votes to designate the
President of the Presidency. The party with second most votes named the President of the
Assembly, and the party with the third most votes chose the President of the Government.
The Agreement proportionately divided appointments according to a 5-4-3 formula and was
applied at the level of each municipality. It provided term limits for some offices and an
order of succession on a rotating basis (Donia 2000: np).
23 Donia 2000: np.
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High Representatives have intervened to remove nationalists from office and support
moderate candidates. Over the long term, this approach has demonstrated two
negative effects. First, without much experience in a democratic environment,
moderates showed similar proclivities of those of ultra-nationalists. Even with the
extraordinary favour and tutelage from the international community, moderates
failed to bring the kind of reform necessary to change the profile of politics. "Sloga"
Party24 representatives under international community favourite Milorad Dodik, had
a similar voting record to the (ultra)nationalist Serb SDS party.25 A critical issue for
this fledgling party was the return of ethnic minorities to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Despite increases, minority returns did not correspond with the Sloga party areas of
control, and Dodik's minister responsible for refugee returns was forced to resign for
26
obstructing the return process.
Second, continual intervention by the international community retarded the ability of
locally elected officials to take on the responsibility necessary to resolve their own
conflicts. Regularly the High Representatives unilaterally passed laws, removed
persons from power or otherwise contravened basic democratic principles in order to
interdict developments deemed contrary to the intentions of the Dayton Accord.27
One assessment reports favourable advance in the elimination of single-party
28
patronage networks operating through extra-constitutional channels. The character
of the patronage groups has indeed changed, owing to regime changes in both
Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro. However, the patronage networks metamorphosed
and became part of the bloated political system supporting 1200 judges and
prosecutors, 760 legislators, 180 ministers, four separate levels of government and
three armies for fewer than four million people. The cost of supporting this unwieldy
24 The moderate Sloga (or Unity) Party was formed from representatives of smaller
political parties soon after the signing of the Dayton Accord, and was multi-national. The
international community gave a great deal ofmedia attention and financial support to the
party, which ultimately was viewed as the West's party, and its leadership as lackeys of the
West's multi-cultural agenda.
25 ESI 2001: 11.
26 ESI 2001: 11.
27 The Dayton Accord forbids persons indicted by the ICTY from standing or
holding office. The Accord also allows the High Representative to remove from office
nationalist leaders inhibiting the integration process of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1996 the
High Representative removed SDS leader, Radovan Karadzic. In 1998, Nikola Poplasin, the
elected successor to convicted war crimes offender Biljana Plavsic, was removed from office
by the High Representative for promoting nationalist activities.
28 ESI 2001: 5, 6.
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government is €920 million, and does not include the governmental services such as
health, education and pensions.29 The Dayton Accord contributed to this trend by
creating more municipalities in the Republika Srpska. In the April 2000 elections
voting was held in 185 municipalities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, an increase of
70% over the 1990 elections.30
In other instances reform drove the patronage networks underground where they are
now part of the growing crisis of corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To assert that
the patronage system has largely disappeared or has been significantly weakened31
fails to recognise its transformation and integration into the structures created by the
international community. A truer picture comes by viewing the people movements
through the lens of a different Dayton Accord annex, the Agreement on Refugees
and Displaced Persons.
3.5. Annex 7: The Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons
The Dayton Accord established the free right of return to the homes of origin for all
refugees and displaced persons, and for the restoration or compensation for
deprivation of property/2 The Accord states that "the early return of refugees and
displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina".33
Successful resettlement is encumbered with enormous technical problems, including
inadequate housing, lack of community infrastructure, high unemployment, and lack
of appropriate schooling opportunities for children. The most obvious hurdle for
returnees is the need to rebuild after whole towns and villages were reduced to rubble
in the calculated military campaigns. Refugees returning to vote in the first post-war
election in September 1996 found their homes completely uninhabitable and returned
29 Ashdown 2002: np.
30 Donia 2000: np.
31 ESI 2001: 18.
32
Specifically, the Accord reads as follows: "All refugees and displaced persons
have the right freely to return to their home of origin. They shall have the right to have
restored to them property ofwhich they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991
and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of
refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parties confirm that they will accept the return of such
persons who have left their territory, including those who have been accorded temporary
protection by third countries." (GFAP, Annex 7, Art. I: Rights ofRefugees andDisplaced
Persons, 28).
33 Annex 7, Art. 1.
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to their temporary residences in host countries rather than resettle in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. But while the international community addressed the issues of
infrastructure, most refugees refused to return for fear of their safety.34 Rebuilding
of homes would take place only when the prerequisites for a community
infrastructure were in place, and this was clearly predicated on there being sufficient
security to sustain the minority community. In the initial years following the
Dayton Accord international donorship for returning refugees and rebuilding homes
was high, but the collapsed infrastructure hindered return and resettlement. When
the pace of refugee returns later accelerated and demand for financial support for
rebuilding was high, donorship funds shifted to Kosovo and other crisis areas that
demanded urgent attention ofboth government and non-government organisations.35
Many refugees return now only to sell or exchange their property, and then move to a
location where they are among the majority,36 continuing the segregation process
throughout the land. Also, the elderly constitute a disproportionate number of
returnees. They return to die and be buried on native soil, too old to rebuild a new
life in unfamiliar surroundings.J7
Resettlement of refugees and displaced persons as minorities in both entities remains
a major obstacle to reintegration in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. Returns to
these areas were particularly slow until 2000, when the then UN High
Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, implemented the property law which sought to
evict occupants from homes not their own. Additionally, international organisations
such as OHR, UNHCR and OSCE combined efforts to put in place the Property Law
Implementation Programme (PLIP).38 Returns to minority areas were over 67,000 in
2000 and exceeded 90,000 both in 2001 and 2002.39
The greater difficulty is with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). At the end of
2001 the UNHCR estimated that there remained a greater number of IDPs than
refugees.40 Statistics from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Refugees and
34 HCHR 2002: np.
35 Kovac 2000: np.
36 HCHR 2002: np.
37 HCHR 2002: np.
38 Kevo 2001: np.
39 UNHCR 2002a: np.
40 UNHCR 2002b: 5. The source cites estimates of 426,000 unreturned refugees
compared with 438,000 IDPs.
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Displaced Persons show that about 650,000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina are
settled in foreign countries as refugees and that about 700,000 remain as displaced
persons within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.41 The issue of refugees and
IDPs remains one of the greatest challenges for social restoration and, according to
one human rights source, is "the main destabilizing factor in Bosnia and
Herzegovina".42
3.6. Annex 6: Human Rights
The Dayton Accord guarantees international standards for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina and lists no fewer than
sixteen Human Rights agreements in the appendix to Annex 6. Notable among these
is the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime ofGenocide,
the 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV on the Protection of the Victims ofWar, and the
1977 Geneva Protocols I-II thereto, the 1965 International Convention on the
Elimination ofAll fonns of Racial Discrimination, and the 1994 Framework
Convention for the protection ofNational Minorities.43 The Accord makes provision
for the investigation, hearing and judgment of abuse claims through the Commission
on Human Rights, composed of a Human Rights Ombudsman and a Human Rights
Chamber (court). The inclusion of so many human rights accords is meant to stress
the importance of the right to protection and security for all peoples in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Despite these provisions and the presence ofUN and OSCE inspectors, Bosnia-
Herzegovina demonstrates alarming and continuing human rights abuses, completely
overwhelming the Human Rights Commission. The limited number of persons to
deal responsibly with the case load coupled with the lengthy process necessary to
41 HCHR 2002: np.
42 HCHR 2002: np.
43 The other human rights agreements include the 1950 Euopean Convention for the
Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Protocols thereto; the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1966 Protocol thereto; the 1957
Convention on the Nationality ofMarried Women; the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness; the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1966
and 1989 Optional Protocols thereto; the 1979 Convention on the Elimination ofAll forms
of Discrimination against Women; the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the 1987 European Convention on the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the 1989
Convention on the Rights of the Child; the 1990 Convention on the Protection of the Rights
ofAll Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; the 1992 European Charter for




bring a decision conspire to hinder the Commission's effectiveness. However, this is
not the primary source of the problem. The overload is indicative of the magnitude of
the tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were carried over from the battlefield to the
neighbourhood.
The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a reputable
independent monitor of activities in the Balkans, concluded that in 2002, "no
progress was made in the area of protection of human rights and freedoms in Bosnia
and Herzegovina" and cited several factors that contributed to a "worsening of the
overall social climate".44 Human rights abuses were documented in almost all areas.
The US Department of State reported some progress in human rights in four areas,45
but stated that much more needed to be done to come up to the international standard
ofhuman rights.46
Regular and flagrant attacks on returning minority refugees occured in both the
Republika Srpska and Federacija, although twice as many cases were reported in the
Republika Srpska,47 especially the eastern portion. Also, more severe instances of
abuse occurred in the Republika Srpska. Reported instances of abuse in the
Federacija amounted to verbal attack and property damage while physical attacks,
shootings, use of explosives and violent demonstrations were common in the
Republika Srpska.48 Attacks against officials aiding the return of refugees also took
place. Public ceremonies commemorating the rebuilding of destroyed religious
places ofworship became scenes ofmob violence. Most notable among these was
the attempt to lay the cornerstone of the historic religious and cultural monument, the
Ferhadija mosque in the Banja Luka city centre in May 2001. The ensuing violence
halted the ceremonies and resulted in one Bosnjak death.49 Similarly, in the Croatian
stronghold ofHerzegovina, Catholic officials opposed the reconstruction of the
mosque in Stolac. Even sporting events meant to show increasing national harmony
44 HCHR 2002: np.
45 These areas were the freedom ofmovement, instances ofpolice brutality, arbitrary
arrest and detention, facilitation of refugee returns.
46 USDoS 2002: np.
47 USDoS 2002: np.
48 USDoS 2002: np.
49 HCHR 2002: np.
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demonstrated the opposite, becoming venues for continued provocation and violence
off the pitch.50
The reports also cite regular complicity ofofficials in the racist discrimination and
violence. One report states that the Bosnian government's record in this area
remained poor and was a serious problem.51 The record shows officials involved in
various kinds of abuse, including inter alia: obstruction of the Hague-based
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY); harassment of
returning minorities and failure of the police to secure their safety; restriction of
religious practice; unlawful beating and prolonged detention of suspects during
arrest; obstruction of justice by means of a judicial system that is strongly influenced
by political parties; non-cooperation with NGOs vested with the task of investigating
cases ofhuman rights abuse,52 and discrimination in employment and bribe taking to
accelerate the return and resettlement ofminority refugees. Officials involved in
corruption and organised crime is a growing problem, especially in the trafficking of
women. One report states that "some police and judicial authorities tacitly accept or
actively facilitate trafficking...." and that "trafficking is tolerated, if not accepted, at
all levels of society and is regarded as a Victimless crime' or as a phenomenon that
only effects foreign nationals".54 In at least one instance police took advantage of the
services of prostitutes in exchange for warnings of impending raids.55 In an effort to
clean up the policing body specifically commissioned to uphold the mandate of the
Dayton Accord as provided in Annex 11, sixty-nine police officers were removed
from the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in the year 2001 for serious breaches
of conduct. Many of them were dismissed for pledging allegiance to the Croat HDZ
self-government effort, a clear breach of the Dayton Accord. Others were removed
50 Sectarian provocation and violence was evident on all sides. During a match
between the Sarajevan Zeljeznicar football club, supported mostly by Bosnjaks, and the
Borac (tr. 'fighter' or 'soldier') club in Banja Luka, a huge banner hung over the stadium
with the words, "Knife, Wire, Srebrenica." Fighting broke out between Croats and Bosnjaks
at a football match in Orasje with some players taking part. In a separate incident, Croat fans
displayed swastikas and a poster ofWorld War II Croatian pro-nazi fascist leader Ante
Pavelic, provoking stone and lighted torch throwing during a game between the Mostar first
division, Croat-supported team Zrinjski and the Bosnjak-supported Velez team (HCHR 2002:
np).
51 USDoS 2002: np.
52 USDoS 2002: np.
53 HCHR 2002: np.
54 USDoS 2002: np.
55 USDoS 2002: np.
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for direct involvement in criminal offences. Still others were removed for serving in
paramilitary organisations during the war and were subsequently tried for war
crimes.7,6 However, removal from the IPTF did not end the duty of an officer.
Unless the local police brought charges against the offending officer, he was
generally shifted to a job in which he exercised no policing responsibilities. Only in
rn
rare instances was he charged or removed without pressure from the IPTF.
3.7. Assessing the Dayton Accord and its Implementation
An assessment of the Dayton Accord highlights two main issues. First, the Accord
recognises and attempts to make provision for anticipated injustices that linger in the
post-war recovery period. Although the laws and provisions are in place to address
these injustices, there is inadequate provision for implementation of the laws. This
points out the intractable and residual nature of the animosities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and is not a difficulty with the Accord itself.
Second, the Accord comes into more direct criticism for the difficulties it creates and
the means used for implementation. One analyst, Robert Belloni, finds the building
programmes under the auspices of the Accord and the U.N. High Representative
ineffective. The international community views civil society largely as a technical
task, which "differs dramatically from the actual conditions in which Bosnian civic
CO
groups and organizations function". "Bosnian citizens..." says Belloni, "often
perceive civil society building programs... as bizarre and alien efforts that do not
take into account Bosnian history and society."59 Belloni argues that the intervention
of the international community fosters dependence and rewards the strongly partisan
ethnic elite running Bosnia-Herzegovina through patron-client relationships. This,
combined with an idealistic understanding of civil society building which side-steps
deeply embedded ethno-political issues, casts real doubt on the prospects of
achieving "peace based on a genuine reconciliation".60
Further difficulties focus on the convoluted structure of the government and
Constitution that virtually preclude success in overcoming the difficulties on the
ground. These inherent difficulties in the Accord are directly attributable to the fact
56 USDoS 2002: np.
57 USDoS 2002: np.
58 Belloni 2001: 163.
59 Belloni 2001: 169.
60 Belloni 2001: 178.
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that the Dayton negotiations involved the chief parties of dispute equally, without
first declaring a victor or loser in the war, as is convention in peace agreements.
Consequently the Accord shows signs of compromise that serve only to perpetuate
the conflict without real hope or empowerment for resolution.
Ultimately, the rebuilding process languishes not only because the Dayton Accord
uses a technical and institutional approach to rebuilding civil society. Nor can it be
assumed that local actors have little ability to shape a democratic state without
significant external assistance. While it is the case that the post-communist lands are
inexperienced at practicing democracy, this factor alone cannot fully account for the
whole situation. A significant cause for slow progress lies not with internal persons,
but with the assumptions of the external actors implementing the Dayton Accord. As
one analyst indicates, "Democracy assistance providers operate as though it is
possible to change the basic functioning of key institutions... without grappling with
the deep-seated interests of the actors involved."61 Rebuilding civil society must
entail the agencies of society already in place not because they can better implement
the Dayton Accord. Rather, including them brings to the rebuilding process
necessary dimensions that the craftcrs of the Dayton Accord, operating from a
rationalist, secularist approach, have failed to recognise. Crucially, religion - and its
potential contribution in morals and ethics - is one of those necessary dimensions
they overlook. This is so even as the international community realises a need for
greater emphasis on shaping the values of society that contribute to the
democratisation process. This process - and the failures encountered in it - has led to
a re-evaluation of the way international intervention is carried out, and an ideological
shift.
4. The Ideological Shift in International Intervention
Despite its flaws, the Dayton Accord remains an extraordinary document because it
reflects a substantive ideological shift in diplomatic initiatives. Before the Balkan
conflicts, Western analysts foresaw the gradual demise of religion and its moral
influence in world matters. Their rationalist views led them to believe that the
vestigial remains of religion would be tolerant, ecumenical, and concessive, "capable
of breeding little more than indifference".62 American foreign policy specialist,
61 Cited in Chandler 1999: 163.
62
Marty and Appleby 1997: 7.
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Edward Luttwak, found the Enlightenment prejudice to be "astonishingly persistent"
in foreign affairs:
Policy makers, diplomats, journalists, and scholars who are ready to
overinterpret economic causality, who are apt to dissect social
differentiations most finely, and who will minutely categorize political
affiliations are still in the habit of disregarding the role of religion, religious
institutions, and religious motivations in explaining politics and conflict.63
Instead of the gradual disappearance of religion, the twentieth century witnessed the
demise of totalitarian regimes hostile to religion in the Eastern Bloc and a global
resurgence of religion, demonstrating that it remains a powerful force in world
politics. Cold War diplomacy based on Realpolitik sought both to contain
communism and establish democracy, measured by relatively straightforward
elements. These included regular and free elections, equality under the rule of law,
and promotion of a sense of citizenship.64 The post-Cold War situation required a
reassessment of these simple standards by which analysts measured democracy. By
these standards the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe are as equally
democratic as Western European nations65 in that they operate with new
constitutions, have restructured governments, have established the rule of law and
hold free and fair elections. However, because these new democracies are immature,
they remain relatively unstable. Thus, democratisation, with focus on the process of
developing the values and culture of society, has replaced democracy, with its focus
on institutional level of elections and government processes, as the key political
initiative of post-Cold War politics. The sustainability of democratic institutions,
rather than the event and measure of free and fair elections, is now the focus of
international efforts in post-communist lands.66 The primary framer of the Dayton
Accord, Richard Holbrooke, realised the effort to end the animosities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina had to embrace the security and societal elements as a comprehensive
whole. As a result, Dayton consciously moves beyond the terms of a traditional
peace treaty to lay out a far-reaching plan for rebuilding civil society, incorporating a
strong sense of'oughtness' and morality in political discourse supported by
contemporary human rights conventions. This conscious shift to values-based
63 Luttwak 1994: 9.
64 Chandler 1999: 15.
65 Cited in Chandler 1999: 14.
66 See Chandler (1999) for a detailed assessment of these efforts, the ideological
struggles they engender, and the mechanisms in place in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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diplomacy demonstrates an important but largely overlooked transformation in
international policy.
Democratisation and peace-building are now global enterprises through which policy
makers disseminate an expected norm in morals and ethics. The Balkan analyst
David Chandler asserts that this is "a remarkable, but fairly unquestioned, shift in
approach to international security" concerned less with nuclear and conventional
arsenals and more with the treatment ofminorities in civil society.67 "Democracy,"
says Chandler, "has become a moral as opposed to a political category and
democratisation now concerns societal values and attitudes rather than political
processes".68 While this is a global process engaging the international organisations
to which many non-Western nations belong, the views, values and policies remain
quintessentially Western and are promulgated by Westerners and non-Western
political elites educated in Western universities throughout Europe and the United
States. By all appearances liberal democracy and the democratisation process are
becoming a new quasi-religion with its own prescribed dogmas, rules of conduct,
judicial body and global mission. The effort to democratise transitioning societies -
including Bosnia-Herzegovina - is a confirmation of this development, and warrants
closer examination.
4.1. Democratisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
The international community entrusted much of the recovery and transformation of
civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Organisation for Security and
Communication in Europe (OSCE), a large, regional security agency active in early
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.
OSCE employs more than 800 staffmembers in Bosnia-Herzegovina "to facilitate
political processes, prevent or settle conflicts, and promote civil society and the rule
of law".69 Early in its effort the OSCE recognised deficiencies found in the
traumatised post-war environment that would preclude the establishment of a
functioning democracy. They subsequently set up a Democratisation Branch (DB) to
address the social-psychological elements of the deficiencies. However, OSCE-DB
soon found that they were ill-equipped to address the social and psychological
deficiencies and restructured to favour more orthodox roles relating to politics and
67 Chandler 1999: 23.
58 Chandler 1999: 28.
69 OSCEBiH 2004a: np
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democratisation. The effort now continues under the Democratisation Department,
working with institutions and structures.70
4.2. Limitations of International Intervention
The OSCE recognised the limitations of an external interventionist organisation in
addressing the social and psychological needs in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina.
These difficulties in the OSCE effort are elaborated by Dr. Ralph Roloff, who holds
the position of WissenschaftlerAssistent am Forschungsinstitutfur Politische
Wissenschaft undEuropdische Fragen at the University of Cologne and has worked
extensively in the Balkans with the OSCE. At a special meeting of scholars and
clergymen examining the role of religion and nation in the war, Roloff provided a
startling insight regarding the work of the OSCE in the Balkans. Roloffbelieves the
experience of the last years has demonstrated the difficulties - even impossibilities -
ofmultilateral conflict resolution, leading him to conclude that "the OSCE offers no
possibilities for conflict resolution".71 He places the fault not with the lack of
instruments and mechanisms available for the task, but with failures in the 'human
dimension', citing especially the disunity, power politics and non-cooperation of
member states. This is a sobering self-critique of the flagship organisation entrusted
by the United Nations and the High Representative with overseeing peace initiatives
in the Balkans. Roloff then addressed the Orthodox and Catholic religious leaders
present72 and asserted that they have important roles to play in conflict resolution.
The religious leaders are capable of creating the necessary conditions for social
restoration, namely, a climate of tolerance and fairness, especially with regard to
minorities living within the territory of a hostile host nation. Only in such a climate,
says Roloff, is it possible to establish the norms of the everyday life of the pluralistic
society.73
70 The following description of their enterprise is taken from the OSCE website: "A
key priority of the OSCE Democratization Department is to transform institutions from
formal to fimctioning democratic structures, to develop a participatory culture and promote
citizen engagement." (OSCEBiH 2004b: np).
71The statement reads as follows: „Dieser Zusammenhang fuhrte mich auch zu
meiner provokanten Eingangsbemerkung, daB die OSZE keine Moglichkeiten zur
Konfliktlosung habe" (Roloff 1996: 182).
72 Muslim delegates had been invited but could not attend owing to the siege on
Sarajevo at the time.
73 Roloff 1996: 186.
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Roloffs voice is important, both in its forthright critique of the OSCE and in its
challenge to religious leaders. In addition to monitoring, reporting and arbitrating
conflicts at the international level, the OSCE also recognised the need for engaging
the parties of conflict at the societal level, called 'Citizen Diplomacy' by the OSCE.
'Citizen Diplomacy' refers to "an entire class of informal and unofficial procedures
for application at the international or inter-communal level where there are different
cultures and an apparent need for better understanding than can be achieved through
more formal contacts and interactions."74 The goal ofCitizen Diplomacy is "to
break through the barriers of distrust that characterise relations based on mutual
threat"75 and functions as a parallel track of negotiation to international diplomacy
between heads of state and their chosen representatives. It moves forward important
- though often unseen - negotiations in the societal dimension of conflict prevention
and resolution.76
Roloff s assessment provides insight into several aspects of conflict resolution
related to Bosnia-Herzegovina. First is the admission that peace-making at the
highest levels, that of diplomats and their chosen representatives, is quite limited in
its capacity for social restoration on the ground. These negotiations are necessary to
initiate the peace-building process, but cannot govern the overall effort.
Second, Roloff believes the effort on the ground must include local actors. Effective
peace-building is impossible by using external sources alone. Local persons are a
key aspect of'Citizen Diplomacy', even if the concept of'citizenship' is still
relatively unclear.
Third, Roloff asserts in no uncertain terms that the religious element, so endemic to
the Balkan conflict but often overlooked by Western analysts, can play a
foundational role in peace-building by providing the moral framework for tolerance
and understanding. Religion can serve as an appropriate plausibility structure for
peace-building and social restoration. This assertion is deserving of further
exploration.
74 Roloff 1996: 175.
75 Roloff 1996: 175,6
76 Roloff 1996: 176.
83
Chapter Two
4.3. The Case for Religion in Peace-Building and Social Restoration
To suggest that religious leaders have a fundamental role to play in social restoration
is groundbreaking because of the uneasy tension between politics and religion in the
secularist West that carries over into diplomacy and policy making. But as Roloff
points out, religion offers a framework for discussion of social issues that military
and political-economic schemes have difficulty addressing. A religious framework
moves the discussion from a mechanistic to an ethical and moral realm that the
Realpolitik school of international relations - so dominant in twentieth century
politics - long ago chose to disregard.77
Further, the involvement of religious leaders and communities moves peace-building
discussions from the closed door sessions of power politics to the public space of
ordinary citizens. Involving religious leaders and communities enhances
democratisation by distributing the peace-building processes beyond the elitism of
the diplomatic corps. This is an important step for post-communist lands in which
decision-making rested with a centralised authority. Inclusion of the religious
communities in the decision-making process recognises how traditions of faith work
within existing frameworks for positive societal transformation, and thereby offers a
degree of contextual sensitivity to culture-specific norms and mores.
Moreover, the religious dimension appropriately addresses the human element absent
in structuralist approaches that focus primarily on institutions. The prophetic
dimension of religion condemns wrongdoing and injustice, and brings the necessary
resources for conflict resolution and healing by extending forgiveness and
reconciliation. Religion offers a perspective for properly addressing the 'other', even
one who is potentially or previously an enemy. The religious dimension in peace-
building seeks to find the balance between the need for just restitution and the burden
that retributive demands have on perpetuating the cycle of violence. The great
economic resources of the international community and the specially created courts
and tribunals cannot begin to address the common loss of so many. Precisely where
the mechanisms of peace-making and reconstruction are weak, religious faith is
strong. Its proximity to the human element provides help to the traumatised and
creates a new vision of a community living in peaceful co-existence
77 Burnett 1994: 292-3.
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(Mitmenschlichkeit). The intangible aspects of human volition are not easily
quantified, yet are the necessary complements to structuralist efforts of peace-
building and social restoration.
5. Conclusion
The foregoing analysis confirms four main arguments set forth in the introduction.
First, the international community acting as an external force has not resolved the
conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and military success in ending the war did not
translate into established peace. Despite the many resources put towards the
implementation of the civil aspects of the Dayton Accord, a "climate of violence and
discrimination prevails"78 and few positive steps towards social integration are
observable.
Second, this chapter has demonstrated that some efforts in the civil implementation
of the Dayton Accord towards social restoration have been counter-productive.
Specifically, the creation of two entities through the IEBL, the Constitution that
retains the nationalist structures, and the sweeping powers exercised by the High
Representative all serve to preserve the fractured and disintegrated state ofBosnia-
Herzegovina.
Third, the chapter has demonstrated that significant problems in the society exist that
are resistant to change through restructuring political and economic institutions.
Although the international community recognises that a values-based approach is
needed to address the human dimension, they concede that this effort is beyond what
an external body can provide.
Fourth, the chapter provides expert testimony of a policy-maker intimately familiar
with the limitations ofWestern intervention in the Balkans that makes the case for
the involvement of religious actors. Religion offers the moral framework and
foundation for tolerance and peace-building that materialist, structural apporaches
have failed to establish.
This chapter also exposes two myths assumed by the Western international
community. First, the West either tacitly or explicitly assumes that liberal
democratic values and methods of operating are shared, and that nations in transition
will naturally and automatically aspire to these ideals. This assumption is sorely
78 HCHR 2002: np.
85
Chapter Two
mistaken. The ease with which ultra-nationalists casually dismissed peace-keeping
missions was a startling awakening to Western interventionist policy-makers.
The second myth exposed in this chapter is the belief that military might together
with political and economic incentive is sufficient to transfonn transitioning societies
and build peace. However, the means by which the West implemented economic
incentives served only to further entrench the factions already splintered by ethnic
strife. Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a deeply divided society characterised by
continuing fragmentation, and the peace-building effort within the nexus of a
political apparatus and maintained byforce majeure is a dubious foundation for
enduring peace.
The realm of peace-building and restoration arguably lies beyond the secular
institutions embodying a materialist worldview. The act of reconciliation is most
naturally situated in the locus of the personal and relational, not the structural and
institutional. Peace-building and restoration are pre-eminently human endeavours
involving the moral and ethical will of individuals and communities alike. It is for
this reason that religion - with all of its known difficulties in the Balkans - can play
an integrally positive role. To this aspect the thesis now turns.
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The Contributions of Religion
to Peace-Building
1. Introduction
The previous chapter revealed the limited capacity of external organisations to fully
address the social needs through secular means alone, and pointed to the need for a
more comprehensive, values-based approach to peace-building in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This chapter will explore the Research Question, "What resources for
peace-building do the religions ofBosnia-Herzegovina have in respect to their
theological and ethical teachings?" Thus, the chapter moves the discourse farther,
and will investigate the possibility that religion, while ambiguous in relation to
violence and peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, embodies the potential for peace-building
and social restoration in both individual and social dimensions that demonstratively
eludes the secular, modernist approach of the international community. Further, the
chapter will explore ways in which the potential for peace-building in Christianity
and Islam finds convergence with John Paul Lederach's paradigm of conflict
resolution through a three-dimensional diplomacy. The chapter thus anticipates the
hypothesis that will be tested empirically in subsequent chapters: that the religious
potential for peace-building and social restoration is found in religious persons and
religious faith sodalities, rather than in the institutions and official leaderships of the
religious communities.
This chapter will examine five critical areas in which religion and the values of
religious faith positively contribute to the peace-building process. These areas are: 1)




2. The Role of Religion in Identity Formation
The link between religion and communal identity is acutely felt in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This was especially the case for the Bosnjaks who in 1968 received
official recognition in the ethnic taxonomies ofYugoslavia, as noted in Chapter One.
Recognition afforded them equal status with other national groups in the socialist era,
but became a perilous liability in the post-communist era dominated by militant
nationalists. When the formal state collapsed, a crisis of identity ensued, and new
identities had to be forged from ethno-national and religious nomenclatures, the two
strongest lines of identity outside of the political-state identity. Allegiances were
torn between an identity shaped by the changeable aspects of statehood and
citizenship, and the unchangeable properties of nationhood.
The dissonance is also seen in trying to define the nature of the conflict and address
the related security issues involved. Those who viewed Yugoslavia primarily as a
political entity saw its break-up as a civil war and its disintegration as a challenge to
the state. Others saw the conflict primarily as an ethno-national conflict and the
threat from a nation external to their own ethno-religious community. The Yugoslav
military apparatus was trained to address state security matters and defend against
aggression outside the political state of Yugoslavia, but Bosnia-Herzegovina
presented a different kind of security issue that came from the distinct nations within
the new state. In this perspective the challenges were not to the state, but to the
society within the state. The issues of societal security1 differ greatly from those of
state security. Societal security draws less on military power and more from the
power constructs formed from cultural and national identity. Addressing the societal
security threats solely with the military, which is the state's security apparatus, is
unsuitable and destined for failure. Thus the peace-building objectives must address
both state and societal security threats, and for this reason societal instruments are
just as critical as the military in establishing peace and stability.
In the case ofBosnia-Herzegovina where the usual linguistic detenninants of identity
are largely absent, religious confession is the primary tool of differentiation and
therefore intrinsic to identity formation. Consequently, peace-building actors trying
to address societal security issues need to have an adequate understanding of the role
that religion and religious leaders play in their communities. To a degree, this is
1 Buzan 1991: 20.
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where the international community has engaged the religious hierarchs through the
World Conference on Religions and Peace (WCRP). This vehicle encouraged inter-
religious dialogue between top religious leaders soon after the ending of the military
campaigns. These leaders also have been active in drafting the Law on Freedom of
Religion and the Legal Status ofReligious Communities and Churches in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. WCRP is thus working with important legislation that will determine
the religious laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their contributions will affect a wide
portion of the population.
The way forward has been difficult, however, in that many of the issues left
unresolved by Dayton are matters of concern for religious leaders as the primary
spokesmen for their national groups. Although the effort through WCRP is meant to
bring better understanding and reconciliation, it has often served to maintain barriers
between the larger national communities and carve out advantages to protect partisan
power bases. Smaller religious groups are also concerned that the religious laws
ostensibly crafted to grant freedom do not disenfranchise non-national religious
communities. It is important for the peace-building effort to include the religious
leaders so that they can address the issues of societal security. It is insufficient,
however, to end the effort at this juncture because some of the religious leaders are
themselves too engaged in the nationalist causes of their own community to achieve
supranational social restoration. A certain degree ofparity between these larger
organisations is to be expected, but, as will be argued in subsequent chapters,
substantive reconciliation and social restoration transpires at a more grass-roots level
where institutional power and control are not factors in the process.
3. The Concept of Peace in Religious Discourse
3.1. The Conceptual Domain and Expanded Definition of'Peace'
The task of peace-maker differs from that of the peace-builder. In the conflict
resolution literature peace-makers are those within the diplomatic elite who negotiate
terms to end the military conflict and implement a sustainable ceasefire. While there
is clearly a process involved, the task of the peace-maker is defined by the event of a
signed accord, and is usually undertaken outside the arena of conflict. Peace-builders
are those who are not party to the diplomatic negotiations, but to whom the task of
carrying out the terms of the peace are entrusted. Peace-builders are actors
representing both governmental and non-governmental organisations whose task is
an ongoing process within the theatre of conflict subsequent to the signing of the
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ceasefire agreement. Not infrequently disagreements arise between these two types
of peace workers over implementation. Terms agreed to on paper sometimes bear
little resemblance to realities in the field, making implementation of the peace terms
difficult to carry out. Occasionally the chasm between the diplomatic elite who
crafted the peace accord (peace-makers) and the field operators (peace-builders)
working within the complexities and chaos of the post-war situation is too wide to
bridge. These difficulties lead some peace activists now to call for a broader
approach to the peace-making effort to ensure greater continuity and stability in the
peace-building enterprise.
One expert in peace-building and reconciliation, John Paul Lederach, has called for a
fundamental change and an entirely new paradigm of conflict resolution. His wide
experience in more than twenty countries leads him to argue that contemporary
conflicts require different "concepts and approaches that go beyond traditional statist
diplomacy".2 The new paradigm requires long-tenn commitment in order to build an
infrastructure across the various levels of society while simultaneously drawing its
resources from that society.3 Lederach's model does not exclude high level
diplomacy - what he calls 'first-track diplomacy' - but focuses more of the effort at
sustaining peace at other levels within society, or 'second-track diplomacy'. "'Peace'
in the early stages," says Lederach, "hinges on achieving a cease-fire, and in the later
stages on broadening and including more sectors of society."4 'Second-track' or
'Track Two' diplomacy urges respected society leaders - such as ethnic and religious
leaders, academics and intellectuals, and leaders ofhumanitarian aid organisations
and NGOs - in problem-solving workshops, training in conflict resolution and peace
commissions.5 'Level three', or 'Track Three' diplomacy, engages local leaders, that
is to say, leaders of local NGOs, community developers, health officials and refugee
camp leaders in local peace commissions, prejudice reduction, psycho-social work
and post-war trauma.6
Lederach's model is important for four reasons. First, his model recognises that the
nature ofmany contemporary conflicts has changed. Today conflicts are more
2 Lederach 1997: xvi
3 Lederach 1997: xvi
4 Lederach 1997: 45.
5 Lederach 1997: 39.
6 Lederach 1977: 39.
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commonly intra-state rather than international in nature, which requires a re-
evaluation ofhow peace-keeping organisations and forces are to be engaged in the
conflict. The failure ofUN peace-keeping troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina serves to
highlight the need for a different kind of deployment in order to avoid repeating past
mistakes in the future. Second, the model recognises both the necessity for, but
limitations of, first level diplomatic peace initiatives. Stilling the weapons ofwar is
a significant first step towards peace that is achieved only with subsequent steps by
local actors. It recognises that the conflict is not primarily military, but ideological,
political and social. Third, the model recognises the long-term dimension of post¬
war societal rebuilding at the second and third levels of involvement. Failure to
acquire co-operation at these levels draws into question the sustainability of the
peace process. Fourth, Lederach's model recognises that sustainable peace is found
not in external agencies, but in internal resources among the persons most affected by
the conflict. Ultimately local actors will determine the nature of the peace and how
enduring it will be. The international community must see the people in the theatre
of conflict "as resources, not recipients".7 Citizen-based peace-building in this
model is "instrumental and integral, not peripheral"8 to the peace process.
Lederach demonstrates that the key element to building sustainable peace in
contemporary conflicts is the middle range of society. Those who have contact both
with persons ofhigh level authority and leaders of grassroots initiatives have the
most flexibility for affecting change.9 Track Two diplomacy clearly involves higher
level religious clerics who are able to influence political leaders at the first level of
power, and who also influence ordinary persons within their own communities of
faith. Lederach believes that persons in the second level, such as higher level clerics,
have the potential to reach in both directions of society, which therefore positions
them strategically for sustainable peace-building.10
3.2. The Contribution of Religion to a Wider Concept of Peace
The holistic approach to peace-building that diplomats and secular peace-builders
now promote is inherent in the meaning of the term 'peace' of the texts of the
monotheistic religions. The Semitic linguistic domain for the term 'peace' affords a
7 Lederach 1997: 94. The italics are in the original.
8 Lederach 1977: 94.
9 Lederach 1977: 94.
10 Lederach 1977: 94, 95.
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comprehensive understanding that is defined both by the absence ofwar and the
expectation of social harmony. These values go beyond defining peace in positive
and negative values to include "a set of relations characterised by harmony,
wholeness and lack of fracture" and a sense of justice.11 The characteristics of peace
sought by secular peace-builders in post-war conflicts find a significant level of
convergence with the understanding of the term salom in the richly shared Semitic
1 9
tradition of the monotheistic religions. A closer analysis of these terms used in the
received religious texts will bear out the holistic meaning of the term 'peace'.
3.2.1. The Meaning of 'Peace' in Hebrew OT and Greek NT Usage
First, the root slm (ob©), from which salom (nib©) derives, conveys fundamentally the
meaning of'totality' and 'completeness', 'sufficiency', and 'to have enough'. The
1 9
root and its derivations convey a positive sense of'satisfaction'.
Second, nib© has reference to 'desire' or 'pleasure', especially in speaking with or
about someone, and in the showing of kindness.14 Commonly nib© is used in a
similar capacity in respect of a person's state of satisfaction. It can express both
internal and external happiness with reference to a person's well-being, success, or
good fortune,15 and can directly refer to material goods in a concrete sense.16 This,
by way of extension, was often used as a form of greeting (e.g., Judges 18:15; 1 Sam.
10:4), or of hospitable welcome in the form of a wish (e.g., Judges 19:20).17
Third, nib© has the secondary meaning of 'friendliness', especially in contrast to
animosity and war.'s Sometimes it conveys the concept of contractual peace, as in a
peace agreement, or terms of peace (e.g., Deuteronomy 20:10, 12).19 Thus, the word
can convey an enduring state, or a one off contractual agreement securing that
state.20
11 Dower 1998: 132.
12 The shared linguistic domain includes Hebrew, Akkadian, Ugaritic, Phoenician,
Aramaic, Syriac, Arabic and Ethiopian (Gerleman 1997: 1337).
13 Gerleman 1997: 1337-43.
14 See the use of the term in this context in the following references: Gen. 37:4;
Jeremiah 9:7 MT [9:8 ET]; Ps. 35:20; Esth. 10:3.
15 Gerleman 1997: 1344.
16 Stendenbach 1995: 46.
17 Gerleman 1997: 1344.
18 Gerleman 1997: 1339.
19 Gerleman 1997: 1344.
20 Gerleman 1997: 1344.
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Fourth, in this contractual sense, Dibtp can also mean 'payment', 'repayment', or
21
'bring satisfaction of a debt'. It conveys the strong sense of 'restitution',
'restoration', 'obligation', 'compensation' and 'requital'. Frequently YHWH (HTTP)
is the subject of the action (Joel 2:25; Joel 4:4 MT [3:4 ET]; Isaiah 57:18). This
usage shows the prerogative ofYFIWH to repay, but a person cannot repay
YHWH.22
Fifth, although no sharp distinction between secular and theological usage of the
term Dibai may be drawn,23 it is often understood from the context that God is behind
the action, by blessing, ensuring health, and providing heavenly protection, security
and welfare.24
Finally, the breadth of the term Dibai translates into Greek only with difficulty. The
LXX uses several words to communicate the intent, including elpquri, but also
(dvx)a7ro8i56vai, 'to make restitution for damages'.25 According to Stendebach,
"Salom ist zusammenfassender Ausdruck all dessen, was der alte Orientale als Inhalt
des Segens begehrt."26
3.2.2. The Meaning of 'Peace' in the Qur'an and Islam
The meaning and use of the word 'peace' in the Qur'an and in Islam reveal a shared
conceptual and etymological foundation with Hebrew. The word 'Islam' derives
from the verb salima meaning 'to be safe, uninjured', and is directly related to the
noun salam, 'peace'. Islam is the verbal noun of the causative form of the verb
(.aslama) that denotes the active striving 'to make peace'. In Qur'anic teaching,
peace is achieved through active obedience to God, the Source of Peace, or al-Salam,
one of the "Beautiful Names" of God cited in the Qur'an (59:23). It is in this sense
that Islam is often interpreted in English as 'submission' or 'surrender', but more
accurately it denotes 'making peace through active obedience to God as the source of
all Peace'.
21 Gerleman 1997: 1345.
22 Gerleman 1997: 1347.
23 Gerleman 1997:1347; Stendebach 1995: 26.
24 Stendebach 1995: 26.
25 Gerleman 1997:1348.
26 Stendebach 1995: 18.
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The Arabic cognate salm/silm has similar meanings of'Peace', 'Reconciliation',
27
'yielded', 'submission', and 'as one living in accord or agreement with others'.
The word salam has the further meaning of 'undamaged' (whole), 'welfare', 'good
health', and 'security'.28 Salam means 'to be safe or uninjured' and used as a
substantive has the meaning of 'safety', as in 97:5 "Peace! ... until the rise ofMorn."
It is in this sense of the word that the term 'dar al salam'' 'the abode (house) of
peace' is the place to which God summons people on this earth. The dar al-salam
9q /-»
also has reference to Paradise in 10:25 and 6:127, and is the eternal abode of peace,
which is reached by obeying God in this present life (10:25, 26).
Salam is used extensively as a salutation, as in the greeting of the devout to one
another al-salam 'alaykum, ('Peace be upon you'). The prescribed salutation of
peace upon a home before entry (24:27, 61) is comparable to examples from other
Semitic traditions, such as that in the OT example of Judges 19:20 "Peace be to you.
I will care for all your wants." In this example hospitality is extended to a stranger
outside of the ethno-religious community. The foreigner is provided with a place to
sleep, security from the potential dangers of remaining in the public square
overnight, food for the beasts of burden, has his feet washed, and is nourished with
food and drink. Similar practice is also found in Semitic tradition in the NT in which
Jesus instructs his disciples to pronounce peace (elpqvri) upon a house(hold) that
receives them:
Whatever town or village you enter, find out who in it is worthy, and stay
there until you leave. As you enter the house, greet it. If the house is
worthy, let your peace come upon it; but if it is not worthy, let your peace
[elpfinri] return to you (Matthew 10:11-13, cf. Luke 5:5, 6).
Salam is also used as a benediction upon the departed dead, especially after eulogy in
remembrance of the prophets, as found repeatedly in 37:75ff.
Yusuf Ali gives six related definitions of the word salam, translated as peace:
'Salam'... includes
1) a sense of security and permanence;
2) soundness, freedom from defects, perfection as in the word 'sallm';
3) preservation, salvation, deliverance, as in the word 'sallama';
4) salutation, accord with those around us;
27 Stendebach 1995: 16.
28 Stendebach 1995: 16.
29 Van Arendonk 1994: 8: 915.
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Ali explains that "all these shades ofmeaning are implied in the word Islam," and
that "Heaven therefore is the perfection of Islam."30
Abu-Nimer expands on this description and claims that peace in Islam is a state,
namely, one of "physical mental, spiritual, and social harmony, in which a person is
living at peace with God through submission, and living at peace with one's fellow
human beings by avoiding wrongdoing".31 Peace is an outcome that is achieved
conditionally, after full submission to the will ofGod and to Islam.32 Muslims are
obligated to seek peace in all spheres of life. Peace therefore has internal, personal
and social applications.33 God is the source and sustainer of peace and therefore
Muslims are to shun violence and aggression. The best way to insure peace is to be
totally submitted to God's will and to Islam.34
3.2.3. Three Directions of Islamic Studies of Peace
Mohammed Abu-Nimer, a scholar in the field of International Peace and Conflict
Resolution, delineates three main directions of studies ofpeace and non-violence in
Islam. The first direction is that ofwar and jihad. Scholars in this area support the
premise that Islam is fundamentally a religion ofwar and that war and violence are
therefore legitimate means of settling disputes. These scholars35 lay stress on the
nature and use of violent jihad and exclude the Qur'anic passages counselling the
pursuit of peace for dispute resolution.36 They view the writings of Islamic groups
and organisations through the lens of violent jihad and focus on the emergence of
radical and extreme Islamist movements. Most of these scholars are Western and
their views amount to what some see as a 'neo-orientalism' that essentialises the
character of Islam and questions the compatibility of the Islamic and modern
worlds.37
The second direction of study is that of Just War and Peace. Scholars in this area
view Islam as a religion that upholds peace and justice, and limited use of force in
jihad is justified as one ofmany ways of achieving the ends ofpeace and justice in
30 Ali 1938: 19:62 n. 2512.
31 Abu-Nimer. 2003: 60.
32 Abu-Nimer 2003: 60.
33 Abu-Nimer 2003: 60.
34 Cited in Abu-Nimer 2003: 60.





society.38 The starting point for these scholars is situated in the Quran and has the
following guiding principles: 1) Humanity's fundamental nature is one ofmoral
innocence; 2) Humanity's nature is to live on earth in harmony with other living
beings. In this context peace means not merely the elimination ofwar, but also the
elimination of the grounds for conflict, waste and corruption (fasad) it creates. Peace
is God's true purpose for humanity; 3) Individual humans will choose to contravene
God's purposes and transgress the commands, and choose the path of violence; 4)
Prophets will encounter opposition by the majority who choose various forms of self-
delusion by kufr (rejection of God) and zulm (oppression); 5) Peace is attainable only
through surrender to God's will and laws; 6) The unlikelihood of full conformity to
God's will and precepts make it necessary for Muslims to fight to preserve the
integrity of the Muslim faith and principles.39 In this analysis, force is permitted but
aggression is not, and the main objectives remain peace, justice, and the preservation
of the faith and its values.40
Scholars in the Just War and Peace category41 examine closely both the violent and
non-violent nature ofjihad1,2 and its application in the dar al-harb (territory ofwar).
They acknowledge that the Qur'an permits the use of force but lay stress on the non¬
violent application ofjihad for today.43 Their use of the Quranic passages about
jihad focuses primarily on the moral restrictions guiding the application ofjihad.44
Abu-Nimer suggests that a consensus is emerging from this group that acknowledges
the use of violence but with stringent guidelines. Fighting and violence must be in
the defence of Islam or the oppressed so that they can be released from tyranny.45
This group of scholars focuses discussion less on peace and choose rather to move
quickly to conditions under which violence may be used, guided by the Islamic goal
of establishing a more just society.46
38 Abu-Nimer 2003: 26. Abu-Nimer gives reference to Ahmad 1993; Ayoub 1997;
Hashmi 1996; Kelsay 1993; Khadduri 1984; Rahman 1996; Sachedina 1996; Saiyidain
1994.
39 Cited in Abu-Nimer 2003: 26, 27.
40 Abu-Nimer 2003: 27.
41 Abu-Nimer gives reference to Abu-Nimer 1996a, b; D. Crow 1998; Kishtainy;
Sai'd 1997; Satha-anand 1993a, b; Wahiduddin Khan 1998.
42 The four levels ofjihad ('struggle') are the ear, tongue, hand, and sword.
43 Abu-Nimer 2003:29, 30.
44 Abu-Nimer 2003:30,31.
45 Abu-Nimer 2003: 35.
46 Abu-Nimer 2003: 35.
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The third direction of study is that of Peace-Building and Non-violence. This group
of scholars focus on core values from within Islam for the basis of their analysis, and
build from a premise of active non-violence. Thus, values such as 'adl (justice),
ihsan (benevolence), rahmah (compassion), and hikmah (wisdom) form the
foundation for their analysis, rendering it conceptually antithetical to violence and
war.47 These scholars also acknowledge that the Qur'an gives justification for
limited violence, but emphasise the potential of non-violence to achieve the goals of
Islam.48 The centrality of non-violence in their position distinguishes this set of
scholars from those of the second trajectory. At the heart of their effort is the
understanding that human lives, like all parts ofGod's creation, are sacred. Related
to this is their commitment to the unity of the umma and the oneness of humanity.49
This group of scholars cite passages from the Qur'an and the Hadith to emphasise
social justice, brotherhood, and the equality of humanity. In their peace-building
initiatives, they extol the virtues of forgiveness and mercy, tolerance, submission to
God, right means, and recognition of the rights of others.50
This model at once moves away from the emphasis on just war to peace-building,
and serves as a framework to interpret the pluralist world in terms of the recognition
and protection of human rights in contemporary society. A segment of the Muslim
religious establishment has pressurised these refonnists, issuing afatwah to stop
Muslim audiences in pluralist societies like North America from hearing this new
perspective.51 However, the message continues to resonate with Muslims living in
pluralist societies who are committed to the same social-ethical worldview expressed
by this model.
3.2.4. Conclusion to the Section on Peace and Religious Discourse
From the foregoing it can be concluded that the related Semitic terms for peace,
saldm/salam, reveal certain holistic expectations of social harmony that are found in
the Qur'anic and Biblical sources, but are achieved only conditionally. Dependence
upon God for his intervention in human affairs is a pre-condition for peace.
Similarly, human effort alone cannot achieve this kind of peace, but is available to
47 Abu-Nimer 2003: 37.
48 Abu-Nimer 2003: 37.
49 Abu-Nimer 2003: 38,39.




those who are submitted to the will ofGod. 'Societal security' in another vernacular
is salom/salam, the achievement ofwhich requires a level of peace beyond the
cessation ofmilitary activity. Salom/salam does not deny the need for military or
police intervention to secure peace, but fills the lacunae the state apparatus cannot
address and is the complement to these efforts. Peace-building is only aprima facie
military exercise. Thoroughgoing peace-building is an inter-personal and spiritual
discipline. Thus, religious persons empowered and guided by God have both a
contribution to make and an obligation to uphold towards societal security and peace-
building.
4. Religion and Global Ethics
As Sarajevo was under siege in the 1990s, an initiative was underway to create a
global peace ethic grounded on religious principles. Spearheaded by Hans Kiing, the
effort gained enthusiastic support from recognised religious leaders, scholars and
political leaders from all over the world and culminated in the 1993 Declaration
Toward a Global Ethic.
The effort to develop a Global Ethic is marked by several significant concepts. First,
the Declaration recognises the shortcomings of religious persons in living up to their
own tenets. It confesses that many atrocities have been committed in the name of
religion and that "leaders and members of religions incite aggression, fanaticism
hate, and xenophobia - even inspire and legitimate violent and bloody conflicts.
Religion often is misused for purely power-political goals, including war. We are
filled with disgust."52
Second, the subscribers to the Declaration are under no illusion that religion and
ethics alone can adequately address and "solve the environmental, economic,
political, and social problems of Earth". The Declaration views the efforts of
religions as complementary to secular efforts, providing "what obviously cannot be
attained by economic plans, political programmes or legal regulations alone".53
Third, as the original subtitle suggests,54 many societies have lost perspective and
orientation in the modern - and now post-modern - world. Institutions and structures
in society entrusted with the security and welfare of the people have brought greater
52
Kiing 1996: 12.
53 Kiing 1996: 16.
54 The German subtitle is: Perspektiven fur die Suche nach Orientierung.
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anxiety for the future. The Declaration states that the world is "experiencing a
'fundamental crisis'" and that a "new global order" with a "new global ethic" is
needed.55
Fourth, the Global Ethic affirms that there is still hope today, but not in those modern
structures and political realities. Rather, the hope for a more secure and peaceful
future draws its strength from the religions of the world that encourage their
adherents in self-control and communal existence.
Fifth, the Declaration seeks not to impose one religion or conviction on another. It
encourages the expression and contribution that each religion makes towards
affirming human solidarity and life in all its forms, while deploring violence,
oppression and injustice throughout the world.
Sixth, the Declaration fundamentally counters the ideology and practice of
Realpolitik in that it affirms the right of security and prosperity not only for those
over whom a government is responsible, but for all.
Finally, it recognises that people of religious and spiritual conviction draw upon a
power greater than themselves,56 and that adherents of the monotheistic religions are
answerable to that power for their actions. Religion, drawing upon the wisdom of the
centuries, offers orientation in a troubled world. Thus, the Declaration puts forward
"four irrevocable directives" for a global ethic:
1) Commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life.
2) Commitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order.
3) Commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness.
4) Commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men
and women.37
These four statements may be contemporary in expression, but find their source in
the ancient religions in the following corresponding imperative expressions:
1) You shall not kill! Positively expressed: Have respect for life!
2) You shall not steal! Positively expressed: Deal honestly and fairly!
3) You shall not lie! Positively expressed: Speak and act truthfully!
4) You shall not commit sexual immorality! Positively expressed: Respect
and love one another.
55 Kiing 1996: 12, 13. The italics are in the original.
56 Kiing 1996: 13.
57 Kiing 1996: 17-25.
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Rung states that "The Declaration Toward a Global Ethic seeks to emphasise the
minimal ethic which is absolutely necessary for human survival."58 The Declaration
seeks neither to establish a new religion and single ethical ideology, nor to
contravene the ethical requirements of the world's religions. Rather, the Declaration
seeks to disseminate "a fundamental consensus on binding values, irrevocable
standards, andpersonal attitudes ".59
A global ethic with universal appeal is a well-intended effort strong on idealism.
Therein lies its greatest weakness in that the document has no particularised
instrumentation for implementation. The signers of the Declaration agreed in
principle with a need for developing a global ethic, especially in the face of
contemporary conflicts throughout the world. However, some also expressed
reservations and placed qualifications on the project. For example, Egyptian Hassan
Hanafi is concerned less with generalities and more with specifics of implementation,
and with addressing the issues preventing "religious dialogue, such as oppression,
exploration, domination, acculturation, dependence and so on".60 He goes so far as to
challenge Kiing's well-known dictum, "No human coexistence without a world ethic
shared by the nations. No peace among nations without peace among the religions"61
with one ofhis own: "No new global order without a global ethic. No new global
ethic without a new socio-political reality."62 Moreover, Hanafi claims that the
globality of the Declaration reflects rather the sentiments and perspective of the
West:
It may be that the Declaration is too Western, given the concentration on
ecology, not on development; on human rights more than people's rights; on
individual ethics more than on social groups; on ethics more than politics;
on the inside more than on the outside. In Asia, Africa and Latin America
the major challenges come from the real world, not from good will; from
social structure, not from individual moral consciousnesses.63
Objections of a different nature come from other corners. Mahmoud Zakzoud states
that surrender to the guidance of the Transcendent is what enables one to believe and
act rightly. This orientation provides a destiny to life full of dignity and joy in
58 Kiing 1996: 2.
59 Rung 1996: 15. The italics are in the original.
60 Cited in Kiing 1996: 187.
61 See Rung, et al. 1993: xiii.
62 Cited in Rung 1996: 187.
63 Cited in Rung 1996: 187.
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creation, and keeps us from being "lost by fighting against one another and
destroying one another in a senseless way".64 Similarly, Muhammed El-Ghazali
finds objectionable any ethic that places the belief in God as a secondary or side
issue.65 This finds resonance with conscientious Christians. Joseph Cardinal
Bernadin invites an "articulation of the sources ofmorality"66 and suggests that the
source for success in ethics is the inalienability of the practice of religious faith. A
careful reading of the essays ostensibly in support of a global ethic reveals a tenuous
consensus that is marked by an understated scepticism about the possibility of a
global ethic beyond a formal document.
The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is indicative of a different imperative for today's
sectarian violence. Any ethic developed must address two opposite but related
phenomena: conflicts today are less frequently international and increasingly
sectarian, while peace-building is increasingly international and global. An ethic
developed on the bias of the latter phenomenon would fail to address the problematic
nature of the former.
Needed today is not a "minimal ethic"67 marginally related to a wide but shallow base
of religious beliefs, but a 'maximal ethic' deeply anchored in the positive values of
the belief-system with which a person or community identifies. Western, non-
religious democratisers and religious pluralists alike espouse an ethic severed from
its belief system, structures and institutions. This approach is strikingly similar to the
vague and homogenised ethic practised during forty years ofYugoslav socialism that
ultimately resulted in the corruption ofpolitics and religion alike. The outbreak of
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a monumental challenge for the Western
international community, forcing the latter to adopt a new, post-Cold War paradigm
for engaging the changing nature of conflicts. In parallel fashion, an ethic addressing
today's sectarian conflicts must be localised if it is to have any significant impact.
Non-Western and non-Christian participants of the Global Ethic maintain a strong
link between ethics, religion and the local culture with which they identify. Thus,
when provided with a global platform to make a statement about a universal ethic,
64 Cited in Kiing 1996: 192.
65 Cited in Kting 1996: 182.
66 Cited inKung 1996: 143.
67 Kiing 1996: 2.
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they choose instead to make a particularised statement about regional ethical
realities.68
Ensuing chapters will explore in greater detail the impact ofparticularised ethics
practiced by individuals of faith in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These persons have had to
counter not only communist ideology of the non-religious, but also of the nationalist
ideology of their co-religionists. It may be the case that a particularised religious
ethic is better able to address those specific issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina than a
global ethic. The balance of this issue is to be weighed in subsequent chapters.
What is clear is that religious ethics offer a strong frame of reference for sustaining
peace both at the particularised and global levels. Where the impact of global ethics
is most evident and observable is in the area of human rights.
5. Religion and Human Rights
The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina exposed a larger struggle in the political West
between disaffected realists advocating Realpolitik and idealists on the frontlines
urging intervention of the international community based on their avowed
commitment to human rights.69 Policy makers educated in the Realpolitik school of
international relations only reluctantly advised involvement in the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina because it ultimately threatened to destabilise Western Europe and the
vital interests of the United States.70 Some political advisors viewed the conflict as
an internal civil war, requiring neutrality,71 and found therefore no compelling
argument for intervention. Local leaders in the war theatre accused the international
community ofmoral cowardice for their inaction while the bloody malaise threatened
to engulf the entire Balkan Peninsula. The international community first ignored and
then denied claims of genocide and ethnic cleansing. They preferred to use the
circumlocution 'crimes against humanity' which above all signalled the reluctance of
the international community to become directly involved. War correspondents
eventually confirmed the scope of the atrocities and, because of their commitment to
human rights accords, the international community had no morally defensible
alternative but to intervene.
68 See the example of Hanafi above.
69 Davis 1996: 116.
70 Allin 2002: 9; Holbrooke 1998: 366-371




5.1. Religion and Human Rights: Towards Convergence
The uneasy historical tension between religion and human rights is adequately
addressed elsewhere,72 so that the following serves as a brief overview of a large and
growing discipline of study. Some scholars demonstrate a clear and self-evident link
between human rights and religion.73 Other scholars disavow a philosophical or
historically antecedent relationship between religion and human rights,74 and prefer
to establish the basis for human rights alone on reason and natural law. Some
political secularists claim that human rights need now to be permanently separated
from religion. If religion once played an important role towards shaping human
rights in an earlier age, this age has outlived religion's usefulness. This may be seen
in the developments since World War Two in which human rights are now a moral
belief system of its own. A "new civic faith"75 has replaced the old trinity of liberte,
egalite, etfraternite of the French Revolution with the new trinity of "three
generations of rights" for all humanity.76
The uneasy tension continues today. Henley notes that political philosophers of the
Enlightemnent, despite their confidence in human reason, were more inclined to
acknowledge the work of God in support of the "rights ofman" than modern
Christian Western theologians who, constrained by modernist epistemological
categories, hesitate to ascribe a theological basis to human rights.77 Thus, some
Western theologians, strongly influenced by naturalism and liberal democracy,
attempt to contribute to human rights discussions today without direct reference to
either God or revelation.
However, other theologians today start with the a priori assertion that "human rights
spring from human dignity and not vice versa".78 The similar development of the
League ofNations and the United Nations with the ecumenical movement
demonstrates regular convergence on human rights topics. The resultant position
72 See, for instance, Tiemy 1996; Huber 1979; Swidler 1990.
73 See, for instance, Kaplan 1980; Henle 1980; Nasr 1980.
74 Perelmann 1980: 45-52.
75 Maritain (1951: 110-1), as cited in Witte 2001: 85.
16 The first generation of civil and political rights expounds the idea of liberte; the social,
cultural, and economic rights constitute the second generation and stand for egalite; the third
generation of rights to development, peace, health and the environment and open communication
stands forfraternite (Witte 2001: 88-9).
77 Henley 1986: 361.
78 Meeks 1984: xi.
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documents79 from both Protestant and Roman Catholic circles have made substantive
contributions to theology and human rights.
5.2. Contributions of Diverse Churches to Human Rights
Ecclesiastical contributions from diverse circles have brought a significant element
of depth, especially in the area ofhuman dignity and the right to life. As Moltmarm
has put it:
The dignity of the human being is not itself a human right but a source and
ground for all human rights, and all human rights promote respect for the
singular worth of human beings.80
The Roman Catholic contribution, following Aquinas, rests on the balance between
nature and grace:
All human beings are distinguished with the same dignity of nature, but it is
only in the mystery of the Word ofGod become flesh that the mystery of
the human being truly becomes clear.81
The Synod ofRoman Catholic Bishops, in Pacem in Terris, affirmed the need for
human rights from a basis grounded in theology. They also affirm the Universal
Declaration ofHuman Rights, which asserts that the "international order is rooted in
the inalienable rights and dignity of the human being".82 The Roman Catholic
Church affirms the role of the UN in averting large-scale conflagrations and
instituting human rights towards world peace:
[The UN] are the beginning of a system capable of restraining the
armaments race, discouraging trade in weapons, securing disarmament and
settling conflicts by peaceful methods of legal action, arbitration and
international police action.83
The Reformed tradition grounds the basis for the dignity of the human in his or her
being in God's image:
1) The image of God is the human being who co-responds to God.
2) Insofar as human beings co-respond to God, their Creator, they come
into God's truth.
79 See, for instance, such documents as Human Rights and Christian Responsibility,
1974; Theological Basis for Human Rights, 1977; the German Lutheran Theologische
Perspektiven der Menschenrechte, 1977; the 1974 Roman Catholic Synod of Bishops,
Message Concerning Human Rights and Reconciliation', the Papal Commission 1976,
Justitia et Pax, all in Moltmann 1984: 3-7.
80 Moltmann 1984: 9.
81 Justitia etPax, as cited by Moltmann 1984: 13.
82 Vatican Council II, 1984: 707.
83 Vatican Council II, 1984: 707-8.
104
Chapter Three
3) The human being co-responding to God is the beginning and the end of
the history ofGod with human beings in creation, reconciliation, and
salvation.
4) The human being should co-respond to God in his or her relationship to
himself or herself. The human being is in this respect a person, and thus
he or she has essential rights to freedom.
5) The human being should co-respond to God in his or her relationship to
other human beings. Persons are in this respect human beings and thus
have essential community rights.
6) The human being should co-respond to God in his or her relationship to
nonhuman creation. The human being is destined for jurisdiction over
and oneness with the earth and thus has essential economic rights and
ecological duties.
7) Finally, the human being should co-respond to God in the succession of
generations. The human being is in this respect a historical being and
has corresponding temporal rights and duties in the succession of
generations.84
5.3. Contribution of Islam to Human Rights
Certain leaders within the Islamic community also recognise the need to support
human rights, and drafted accordingly the Universal Islamic Declaration ofHuman
Rights. The document reflects generally the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights,
but regards Islam as the foundation for the declaration, stating, "This is a declaration
for mankind, a guidance and instruction for those who fear God (A1 Qur'an, Al-Imran
3:138)." The Foreword of the Declaration grounds human rights in God as the
source of all human rights:
Islam gave mankind an ideal code of human rights fourteen centuries ago.
These rights aim at conferring honour and dignity upon mankind and
eliminating exploitation, oppression and injustice.
Human rights in Islam are firmly rooted in the belief that God, and God
alone, is the Law Giver and the Source of all human rights. Due to their
Divine origin, no ruler, government, assembly or authority can curtail or
violate in any way the human rights conferred by God, nor can they be
surrendered.
The document admits that many countries, including Muslim countries, do not today
uphold human rights, and indicates that this is a serious breech of Islamic ideals.86
The Declaration then addresses many of the same issues of human rights that are of
importance to peace-building in areas of conflict. These include: 1) Right to Life; 2)
84 Moltmann 1984: 11, 12.




Right To Freedom; 3) Right to Equality; 4) Right to Justice; 5) Right to Fair Trial; 6)
Right to Protection Against Power; 7) Rights to Minorities; 8) Right to Freedom of
Belief, Thought and Speech; 9) Right to Freedom ofReligion; and 10) Right to
Freedom ofMovement and Residence.87
These rights, and several others not listed here, present a basis from which Muslims
can interact both with other Muslims and others not of their religious community.
They especially afford insight for areas that see regular conflict.
It is clear from the foregoing that at the international level substantial convergence
exists between the human rights agenda of secular agencies and religious bodies.
Over time and with some degree of trust, a symbiotic relationship between the two
has even developed. Flowever, there remains a wide gap between the legislation and
monitoring of human rights and the enforcement of the same in local conflicts. As
Chandler notes, the people ofBosnia-Herzegovina may have the highest level of
human rights freedoms without experiencing a secure environment.88 In instances
where a real threat exists, the policing and enforcement ofhuman rights sometimes
provokes a belligerent and violent effect. Enforcing human rights effectively brings
some measure of help to the weaker party while separating the parties of conflict.
Better still is the peace that results through the reconciliation of those parties.
6. Religion and Reconciliation
Theologian Colin Gunton remarked, "Reconciliation is one of the few words deriving
from the Christian theological tradition to remain in vogue in the secularised
vocabulary ofmodern politics."89 Undoubtedly this is so not because of the success
of peace-making and reconciliation in the world, but because of the continuing need
for conflict resolution. A closer examination of the secular and theological meaning
of reconciliation will serve to illuminate how it may contribute to conflict resolution.
Non-religious efforts of reconciliation seek to restore broken relationships through
immanent processes, most frequently through economic and political incentives. The
prospect for reconciliation is dependent upon the parties of dispute, and can be
mediated by non-partisan, third-party involvement. Mediators seek to leverage
87 UIDHR 1981: np. Other rights not listed above constitute the remainder of the
Declaration.
88 Chandler 1999: 94.
89 Gunton 2003: 2.
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aspects of common need against aspects of dispute, with the hope that mutuality will
overcome animosity. The success of the effort rests on a combination ofhuman
volition and external mechanisms. A mediator can often be the bridge builder to a
new relationship based on mutual need. However, mutual need may not be strong
enough for enduring peace. The balance ofpeace is consequently relativised by the
circumstances of the moment. Economic incentives re-establish trade links and bring
parties into contact again, but lack substantive depth to overcome deep-seated
animosities, and cannot therefore qualify as reconciliation. As in the case in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, political incentives meant to encourage cooperation succeed mostly in
keeping one national group from disadvantaging another. External mechanisms often
either do not address the causes of the enmity, or minimise them. Consequently, root
causes of animosity are trivialised and remain unresolved. Buried in one generation,
they are left to resurface in a later generation, perpetuating the cycle of violence.
A Christian view of reconciliation presupposes a different framework. Trans¬
cendental estrangement between Creator and created requires in the first order a
reconciliation between God and humanity. It asserts the fundamental incapacity of
humans to negotiate reconciliation with God. Reconciliation is wholly the action and
gift ofGod to humanity through the mediating work of Jesus Christ:
[T]hrough him [Christ] God was pleased to dwell, and through him God was
pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, by
making peace through the blood of his cross. And you who were once
estranged and hostile in mind, doing evil deeds, he has now reconciled in
his fleshly body through death, so as to present you holy and blameless and
irreproachable before him... (Col. 1:20-22 NRSV).
Further, a Christian perspective recognises the capacity for evil within all humans
and cannot therefore share the unabashed optimism ofmoral positivists. A Christian
framework anticipates enmity rather than mutuality in human endeavours. Because
Christianity is neither surprised by the human capacity for evil nor expects
redemptive moral good through human agency, it points to a need for unilateral,
supernatural agency from God to humanity.
The implications are far-reaching at the human level. Because God recognises the
universality of humanity's sinfulness, the gift of reconciliation is offered unilaterally
and pervasively to all humanity. Claims of superiority based on ethnicity, gender,
class or culture are dispossessed of importance in view of God's mercy universally
extended. By relegating race and nationhood to a lesser level of importance, the
prospect for conflict resolution and reconciliation is raised. Moreover, the act of
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redemption overcomes the essential and existential estrangement from the Creator,
and redefines identity primarily in relationship to God, not against others. For this
reason, the apostle Paul urges believers to recognise their newly created self,
regenerated by the redemptive act of unilateral reconciliation:
,..[Y]ou have stripped off the old self with its practices and have clothed
yourselves with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge
according to the image of the creator. In that renewal there is no longer
Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave
and free; but Christ is all and in all! (Col. 3:9-11 NRSV).
In contrast to a naturalist process of reconciliation dependent upon the volitional
goodwill of human agency, Christianity offers the possibility of reconciliation
between persons that is enabled through the power ofGod that exceeds human
agency and volition. Christian Schwobel highlights this critical point with a caution:
There is no direct analogy between God reconciling the world to himself
and reconciliation between humans so that in our attempts at achieving
reconciliation in the political realm we could somehow continue and make
effective God's work in politics.... Rather, God's reconciliation of the world
in Christ qualifies human relationships in a way that is in accordance with
this promise of reconciliation and thus opens up new possibilities of
achieving reconciliation between humans. The analogy is strictly an
analogia transcendentalism
The Christian believer is distinctly advantaged over the materialist because both the
possibility and the enabling for reconciliation are available from a transcendent
source. S/he is not constrained by resources available only from within her/himself,
but may draw from those available in the Creator.
Moreover, God's reconciling act is ethically motivational. In his cogent analysis,
which consciously moves beyond the theological to the pastoral and meditative,
Robert Schreiter asserts that reconciliation has both spiritual and strategic
dimensions. As a human endeavour, reconciliation must be a way of living,91 but it
also must be employed strategically if it is to see any degree of success. Schreiter
believes "a balance between spirituality and strategy" must be maintained, but he
clearly places the emphasis on the spiritual dimension and is tacitly critical of efforts
that place a primary emphasis on techniques to be learned.92 Westerners with many
resources at their disposal often rely on strategies that place most of the
responsibility and control in human hands. According to Schreiter, reconciliation is
90 Schwobel 2003: 36.
91 Schreiter 1998: vi.
92 Schreiter 1998: 17.
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in the first order a work of God who initiates and completes the process through
Christ.93 Drawing upon the classic biblical texts of 2 Corinthians 5:17-22 and
Romans 5:6-11, Schreiter places both victim and wrongdoer in the centre of the
reconciliation process. The reconciliation found and envisioned is the restoration of
humanity, which is the very heart of reconciliation.94
Schreiter makes a distinction between individual and social reconciliation.
"Individual reconciliation occurs," says Schreiter, "when the victim's damaged
humanity is restored", which often happens through a supportive community.95
Social reconciliation is different from individual reconciliation, but necessarily
includes and draws upon the latter for the former. It involves the human element of
those individuals that have experienced reconciliation firsthand. In contrast to
materialist efforts of reconciliation, which focus on rebuilding civil society and
sustaining its ability to function, social reconciliation is "a process of reconstructing
the moral order",96 the chief ingredient of which is justice.97 Social reconciliation
works in two directions simultaneously. As it corrects and restitutes past offences,
social reconciliation must also act in public ways to secure the future from similar
atrocities.98
Social reconciliation will necessarily have a communal expression, addressing the
common needs of public truth telling and justice.99 The appropriate vehicle through
which this social and communal act finds expression is the church, the community of
believers. Reconciliation is both a responsibility for the church (2 Cor. 5: 17ff.) and
a challenge to it, as the following passage indicates:
All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ, and has
given us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was
reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them,
and entrusting the message of reconciliation to us. So we are ambassadors
for Christ, since God is making his appeal through us; we entreat you on
behalf ofChrist, be reconciled to God (2 Cor. 5:18-20 NRSV).
93 Schreiter 1998: 14.
94 Schreiter 1998: 15-17.
95 Schreiter 1998: 111.
96 Jose Zalaquett, as cited in Schreiter 1998: 112.
97 Schreiter 1998: 113.
98 Schreiter 1998: 113.
99 Schreiter 1998: 117-123.
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Schreiter claims that the Church offers a different approach and dimension to
reconciliation through its message and its capacity for creating communities of
reconciliation.100 This in turn may be a way of defining mission in the world today.101
Reconciliation is the place of common ground in two ways. It is first the place where
parties in dispute come together and resolve their conflict. It is also the place where
secular and religious peace-builders can find common ground, if perhaps not in the
means and source of their efforts, then certainly in the result.
7. Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated the potential of religion - specifically Christianity and
Islam - to contribute to peace-building in several critical domains. First, religion
offers a strong contribution to peace-building through identity and values-
clarification. Especially during periods of ideological, political and economic
transition, religion offers stability in identity (re)formation that is rooted in historic
cultural communities and institutions. Religion offers a framework for defining self
in a historical-cultural community, and in relationship to others outside of the
community. Additionally, the received texts of the Christian and Muslim religious
communities contribute to values-clarification defining the domain of peace, both in
the sense of contractual agreements of disarmament and in the realm of societal
security and wholeness ofbeing.
Second, the chapter points to the capacity of religion and the religious communities
to offer local resources for social restoration. The religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina
already offer the basis for social ethics and human rights. When they are not
compromised and relegated to sectarian practices ofpoliticised nationalism or
pietistic isolationism, the religious communities can serve as a dynamic presence for
peace-building. Religions offer principles for the treatment of others who are outside
one's own community. Here, in the impassioned areas of ethics and human rights,
the objectives of the international community's peace-building initiatives find
convergence with the religious communities. Precisely where first level diplomacy
and secular initiatives are weak, the religious communities demonstrate strong
potential for social transformation. The contributions of the religious communities
100 Schreiter also includes the power of the Church's rituals in the Roman Catholic
Church.
101 Schreiter 1998: 127-130.
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are confirmation of Lederach's model advocating dimensions of peace-building from
second and third level diplomacy that incorporates resources from within the society
and theatre of conflict.
Finally, the chapter has demonstrated how religious actors have the potential to
extend the peace-building factors of ethics and human rights to reconciliation.
Religion's contribution to reconciliation in its conceptual, personal, communal and
political expressions fosters peace-building by shifting the social situation from
fragmentation and division towards wholeness and unity. In the next three chapters
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Views of Religious Leaders on
Peace-Building and Social Restoration
1. Introduction
This chapter probes whether religious faith can contribute to peace-building and
social restoration by analysing the views of religious leaders from the Muslim,
Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant communities. Specifically, the chapter will
explore the Research Question, "What empirical evidence is there of religious
leaders engaging in peace-building on the basis of their theological and ethical
teachings?" Thus, the aim of the chapter is to assess the degree to which their
commitment to peace-building reflects their faith convictions.
The chapter is also interested to examine what the religious leaders perceive as the
barriers to peace-building and social restoration, and from what theological,
philosophical and sociological basis they address these difficulties. Of
approximately twenty aspects ofpeace-building that emerge from the data analysis,1
the findings of four of the most prominent are here presented for examination. These
four related areas are: 1) Identity Formation and Transfonnation; 2) Religion and
Politics; 3) Ethics and Morality; and 4) Justice and Forgiveness. In handling these
1 Some of the issues that emerge from the data are the Dayton Accord, the Hague,
nationalism, ethnic dissonance and exclusion, religion and national differentiation, religion
and politics, djimma and security ofminorities, the historical/mythological past, 'faith' and
'religion', perceptions of 'true' vs. 'false' religion, justice, peace and hope, reconciliation,
values-clarification, forgiveness, ethnic harmony/dissonance, healing, peace-making vs.




four issues some general parity and continuity with previous chapters is maintained,
adding now the particular and contextual dimension to the discourse.
Biographical and narrative accounts punctuate the discussion at appropriate points
and serve to highlight the important dimension of context. To further distinguish the
personalities, each person is assigned a code beside their name in the footnote
reference, indicating religious affiliation, their profile as religious leaders, and the
city in which they live. This coding is elaborated on page xx.
2. Identity Formation and Transformation
In the absence of a confederate Yugoslavia, the question of identity is framed largely
by communal parameters. Community leaders clamber to retain 'their' people and
protect their rights in the new free market of ideologies represented in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Only exceptionally have religious leaders opposed the sectarian use of
religion, and those who do incur the paroxysm of their co-religionists, often
becoming targets of violence in the process.
2.1. Identity and Barrier Setting
Monsignor Mato Zovkic, who is the representative for Vinko Cardinal Puljic on
Inter-Religious Affairs, articulates clearly the dilemma faced by religious leaders in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a democratic, pluralist society, he is a citizen with full
rights, but he is also part of an ethnic and religious minority group within a multi¬
ethnic country.2 He also finds the "coincidence of religious and ethnic identity" to be
•?
# #
"a terrible problem" which challenges all religious leaders. Zovkic considers
himself to be a pluralist in the spirit ofVatican II,4 but his Catholic co-religionists
expect him to support the Croatian national cause, and speak a Croatian dialect.5
Speaking for all of the nations in general, Zovkic relates the following:
[It is difficult] to cherish your true faith and to neglect [y]our ethnic cause.
By cherishing primarily your ethnic cause, you develop into a nationalist. It
takes a lot of internal self-education to respect your ethnic identity, to study
your poems, your writers, your history and at the same time to get infomied
about the poetry and history of others, and live together in one nation.6
2 Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 2.
3 Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 12.
4 Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 1.
5 Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 2.
6 Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 12.
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Persons in rural areas are especially oriented to a collective identity rather than
individual expressions of citizenship, which is necessary in the "developed Western
n
countries with stable democracies". For many, national mythologies and ideologies
are stronger than living faith, and because persons respond according to community
mores and expectations, "it is hard to be a dissident or a rejected prophet in your
o
community - suspected by your own and not trusted by others".
One well-known community leader known throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina is
Franciscan Ivo Markovic of Sarajevo. Markovic has been recognised for his
reconciling work with the Peace Activist Award of the Tannenbaum Center of
Interreligious Understanding (New York), and is the founder of Oci u Oci (Face to
Face) Inter-Religious Service. In 1993 Markovic lost his father, nine relatives, thirty
two neighbours and eighty four parishioners at the hands of Bosnjak forces moving
through Central Bosnia.9 Markovic emphasises language as a marker of identity that
can affirm or offend. Language carries the markers of identity, and language in
Bosnia-Herzegovina today is a tool of exclusion. He asserts that the language
spoken in Bosnia-Herzegovina "is one language, but as cultures, as civilisations, as a
spirit of one nation, it can be distinguished. Certain kinds of language are content-
laden and meant to divide. This misuse of language constitutes an evil, and 'the
violence of language.'"10 All the national communities now try to create discrete
terms so that the dialects eventually become mutually unintelligible.11 Markovic
continues:
The issue of language here in our environment in the Balkans is very
important, because nationalists used the language for misunderstanding, but
we reconcilers would like to revive good relations that we had before the
war. We look for one language of understanding. I will not use, for
example, new words that were created in Croatia.... I look for language of
understanding. I have to use the words that you understand. Sometimes I
am reproached because my language is not Croatian enough. I think I speak
very fine Croatian, but my language is different because I insist that Muslims
and Serbs understand my language. That's it. I want to have a language of
understanding, not misunderstanding.12
7 Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 15.
8 Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 15.
9
Pope 2000: np.
10 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 5.
11 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 4.
12 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 5.
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2.2. Identity Historically and Politically Determined
Several religious leaders strive to clarify their identity through historical and
traditional elements. A recent study traces the development ofBosnjak identity from
the time ofMuslim encounter with the West under Austro-Hungarian hegemony over
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the late nineteenth century to modernity. Bosnjak
intellectuals were challenged by Western concepts of the nation-state and the
attendant questions of the public role of Islam in society, Muslim unity, the
relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, Shari 'a, legal reforms and court
systems, economic transactions, endowments (wak)), the status ofwomen in society
1 "5
and family laws, and external symbols of the adherence to Islam (attire). Muslim
leaders interviewed in this research continue to be concerned with similar questions
of identity, especially as it relates to the past.
The Reisu-l-ulema, Mustafa Ceric, is seen as the political leader of the Bosnjaks in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. He makes a territorial claim to Europe through spiritual roots
to the soil of Bosnia determined by birth.14 It is his home and, by extension, the
home of other Bosnjaks bom in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is therefore no question
of being uprooted and leaving to another land. Ceric believes the umma ofBosnia-
Herzegovina must be vigilant in guarding its identity or it will be lost through
assimilation. At the same time the umma must guard against becoming isolated and
alienated from other peoples around them, and steer a course towards co-operation.15
Co-operation strikes a balance between assimilation and isolation while retaining the
richness of one's own cultural and religious identity. Ceric openly rejects the
Islamists who advocate an Islamic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Shari 'a,
and keeps a marked distance from sectarian Wahhabi16 followers now proselytising
in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina.17 But, he wishes that the international community
would recognise the Bosnjaks as European, and is critical of the West for not coming
18
to the aid of their own people when the Bosnjaks struggled for their existence.
13 Karcic 1999: 31.
14 Ceric [MU.RL.SA.01]: 12, 13.
15 Ceric [MU.RL.SA.01]: 4.
16 For the origins and views of the WahhabTs, see Al-Yassini 1995.
17
Saje [RC.RL.SA.03]: 13.
18 Ceric [MU.RL.SA.01]: 12.
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The International Relations Director for the Reisu-l-ulema, Ifet Mustafic, bristles at
any suggestion that Bosnjaks are not Western.19 Speaking from the office of the
Reisu-l-ulema, he acknowledges a strong regional identity between the Bosnjaks of
Bosnia and those in Herzegovina, but rejects any notion that Bosnjaks are Turks,20 a
common reference used by non-Bosnjaks with derogatory intention. Mustafic thus
assigns identity partly by apophatic means, that is to say, Bosnjaks are not Turks,
Serbs, nationalists, secularists, and, in the case of those living regionally in Bosnia,
are not Hercegovciks. Professor Nedzad Grabus of the Faculty ofIslamic Studies in
Sarajevo also affirms strong regional ties through historical connections that link
persons of Bosnia-Herzegovina across confession. Each week Grabus co-hosts an
inter-religious radio programme with a Serbian Orthodox priest and a Roman
Catholic priest where contemporary issues are looked at from the different religious
perspectives. Grabus believes that Bosnjaks can be culturally closer to some
Catholics and Orthodox in Bosnia-Herzegovina than to Muslims from other
nations.21 He sees no comparison between Bosnia-Herzegovina and other
predominantly Muslim states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Iran because Bosnia-
Herzegovina is European, and a pluralist, democratic society.22 Bosnjaks today see
themselves as Western and European and are clearly setting a course towards
integration.
In Banja Luka, Orthodox deacon Vladislav Radujkovic makes a distinction between
"traditional believers" and "true Orthodox believers", the former being those who
■yj
claim Orthodox identity through birth and heritage, "a title and nothing else". He
notes that this phenomenon is also observable in other religions, having personally
witnessed it in Islam,24 which Mustafic confirms.25 Correspondingly, this has
significant consequences for how persons conduct their lives and especially how they
relate to others. Radujkovic cannot understand how someone who sincerely believes
in God could commit the atrocities so common in the war, whether they are
19 Mustafic [MU.RL.SA.03]: 1, 2.
20 Mustafic [MU.RL.SA.03]: 1-3.
21 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 3.





25 Mustafic draws a distinction between those who are Muslim by heritage and
culture and those who are Muslim out of a "sense of religion" (Mustafic [MU.RL.SA.03]: 5).
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Orthodox or from other religious communities. His assessment is that "people who
were hiding behind religion led this war and didn't know the basic things about their
26
religion". Such persons of all nationalities and faiths call themselves believers, but
"are not what they think they are" and are rather "people of the lie who live in a
constant lie to themselves and others".27 Radujkovic thus raises the issue of national
identity defined by religious tradition.
2.3. National Identity Defined by Religious Tradition
Radujkovic addresses identity issues of inclination and disinclination for Serbs. The
community, says Radujkovic, is Serbian nationally and Orthodox religiously, and
together these two elements have preserved the community's knowledge and
tradition. Throughout the centuries 'Serbian' and 'Orthodox' were virtually
synonymous terms, but in the last sixty years there has been a division in meaning.
Today there are also 'non-Orthodox Serbs' who have separated themselves from the
faith and who Radujkovic likens to trees without roots.28 As a seminarian in
Belgrade, Radujkovic marched the streets with other Orthodox clergy in opposition
to the nationalist regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Today he heads a restoration and
renewal movement in Banja Luka named after the venerated founder of the Serbian
Orthodox Church, St Sava Youth Fellowship (Svetosavska Omladinska Zajednica). It
aims to introduce young persons who grew up under socialist atheism with no
religious faith to the history and tenets of Serbian Orthodoxy through attractive and
contemporary media and means, and revive the positive elements of Serbian national
identity without denigrating those of other national origins. Identification with St
Sava is a difficult concept to translate, but is as much a way of life as the true
spirituality of Serbian Orthodoxy that allows the follower to enter into the heavenly
Serbia. Bremer explains the principle thus:
Nach ihm ist das „Svetosavlje" benannt, ein Ausdruck, der nur schwer zu
iibersetzen ist. Man konnte ihn etwa mit „Lebensprinzip nach dem hi. Sava"
umschreiben. Damit ist nicht so sehr der Kult des Heiligen gemeint, obwohl
der auch eine groBe Rolle spielt, sondern vor allem die These, daB die
Serben, wenn sie nach dem Svetosavlje leben, ihre wahre Religiositat
verwirklichen und so in das himmlische Serbien eingehen konnen. Es ist
interessant, daB die Prinzipien des Svetosavlje dabei oft gar nicht
konkretisiert werden. Sava hat auch nicht etwa eine Schrift hinterlassen, in
der er seine Spiritualitat besonders darstellen wiirde. Vielmehr wird
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Anerkennung ihrer Lehre und ihrer Frommigkeit das zentrale Element des
Svetosavlje sind.29
Bosko Toskovic is a young Orthodox priest from Lukavica, a Serbian suburb of
Sarajevo. He is eager to share the Serbian perspective on historical and
contemporary events, and is an articulate co-host on the weekly radio programme
with Muslim professor Nedzad Grabus. Toskovic understands national identity as
something inherited and internal.30 This is the true self, which he contrasts to
artificial external sources that lead to prejudice and hatred.31 As Toskovic says, "I
am not a Serb because I am a non-Muslim or a non-Croat but because, in a true way,
^9 •
I inherited my own culture. But that must not push me to hate others." Toskovic
insists on the right of others to their own identity expressed in their own terms and
therefore believes that the Bosnjaks have a right to exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina
without assimiliation.33 This view carries strong implications for rights in a political
state, but these issues Toskovic sees as secondary and subordinate to the foundational
issues ofnational identity.
Toskovic believes the Serbian Orthodox Church has a defining role in shaping
identity. Because humanity is both material and spiritual, the SOC helps to define
the essential self. Religious communities provide a locus of identity for their people
through their institutions that are living, functioning organisms that endure through
time.34 Toskovic cites the Jews as the best case of his point. Despite losing a
homeland and language, their religion allowed them to retain a conscious identity
traceable to their ancestral forefathers, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.35 So it is,
according to Toskovic, with every nation. A genetic and organic connection works
together over time to form a nation. Additionally, the moral values of a nation laid
down in seasons past contribute to defining a nation today.36 Nationhood, then, is a






















Toskovic defends the Orthodox principle of organising the Church on the principle
of nationhood, and supports it by use of scripture. He reads the Galatian (3:26-29)
and Colossian (3:1 Iff.) passages that abolish ethnic distinctions between believers as
TO
a reference to a future, heavenly existence. He also claims the Matthean passage
(28:16ff.) supports the embodiment of a national Church:
We testify to that which is very important for our nation. The Orthodox
Church is organised by a national principle referring to the Gospel, which
says, 'Go and teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father,
Son and the Holy Spirit.' So, in this life, we have our own ministries. We
are children of our parents, we should be the best children as possible. Then
we became parents and we should behave ourselves as good parents. We are
members of our Church and we put our efforts in that to be as good as
possible.... Then I can say that we are also sons of our nation and we should
not be afraid of that feeling because that's a positive feeling. Every man of
sound mind will admit the importance of that feeling and he will allow
others to be proud of their own nation, and that he has love for his nation.
That doesn't mean that he negates me as a member of another nation. It's
the same as when someone loves his family. These are complementary
loves. Somebody can love his wife and children and still love me as a
friend. And this is what you said, that 'there is no Greek or Jew' speaks
about general human principles, and that still at the end, we are sons of
God.3
This explicates the Orthodox understanding of the relationship between nationhood
and the Church, but several religious leaders from all of the confessions want to
ground identity in something deeper.
2.4. Identity Defined by God in Creation
Like Toskovic, Orthodox priest Vanja Jovanovic sees identity organically related to
nationhood. Jovanovic is one of only two remaining priests in Sarajevo, where
worship services at the cathedral rarely see any followers in attendance. Most Serbs
have left for newly fonned enclaves where Serbs are a majority, such as Lukovica,
where Toskovic serves, and where a new Serbian Orthodox church was built to
accommodate the growing Serb community. Speaking from the office of
Metropolitan Nikolaj in central Sarajevo, Jovanovic argues that the suppression of
both religion and national expression during the communist period resulted in the
emergence of a false identity.40 Jovanovic holds that the essential elements of
personhood are indivisible from God because "every man and woman is created by
God, whether... an Orthodox Christian or not".41 He believes that human beings "are
38 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 15.
39 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 15, 16.
40 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 12.
41 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 5.
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homo religiosus by nature"; individuals may be anti-theistic, in the sense of standing
against God, but there is no such condition as atheism in the strict sense of the
word.42 Moral responsibility and individual acts of the will are expressions of
personal autonomy, and each individual may choose to accept or deny his or her
theological and moral foundations of identity. God's presence is in each individual
and the relationship the individual has to God is personal and therefore the "concept
of repentance is accessible to everyone".43 Those who affirm their theological and
moral nature constitute the laos, or 'people', specifically, the people of the Church.
Individual acts can be positive or negative, and are dependent upon the will of the
individual.44 Because each individual has the potential to do good or evil, and may
have a personal relationship to God through the repentance of sins, it follows that no
one has a right to condemn.45
Jovanovic illustrates this position with references to the majority of people who
stood against Christ, and those early Christians who stood against Saul, who became
the eloquent apologist for Christianity.46 "The transformation of the interior of the
soul"47 is a personal matter between the individual and God, and it is therefore not
the role of the priest to condemn but to encounter people in the Church and engage
40
them over matters of their soul. The problems from the war and the issues of social
justice must take a secondary role to the matter of the salvation of souls.49 Jovanovic
therefore does not want to spend his energies condemning acts ofwrongdoing;
rather, he wants to extend love to others, which enables transformation and brings
salvation.50
Muslim professor Nedzad Grabus grounds identity first in relationship to God, and
then in shared relationship with other humanity. As creations of God, Muslims and
Christians alike have a responsibility to show love and respect, which he feels is a
duty often forgotten in Bosnia-Herzegovina.51 Grabus believes that it is a bigger sin
42 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 5.
43 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 6.
44 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 6.
45 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 6.
46 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 6.
47 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 6, 7.
48 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 6.
49 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 6, 7.
50 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 6.
51 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 13.
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to hurt another human being than to destroy the Ka'ba, because human hands created
the Ka'ba, but God alone creates originals.52 Grabus therefore identifies inter-
religious tolerance as one of the key characteristics of the new expression of religious
identity. Remaining true to one's own religious identity while also recognising the
validity of other religious groups can be done through a return to the holy books "in
order to understand what God wants to say to people".53 Those who perpetuate the
bloodshed ofhistorical conflicts belong to the past, whereas people of the future will
discover through the holy books the true intentions ofGod.54 For the Muslims of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, Bosnjaks who are also religious, religion both defines
them and creates a bond with other religious people who work together for the good
of Bosnia-Herzegovina.55
Franciscan Marko Orsolic argues a similar case. Orsolic is a tireless worker for
peace and the restoration of a multi-religious, multi-cultural civil society in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Before the war started in Bosnia-Herzegovina he founded the
International Multireligious Interculture Center (IMIC), also known as Zajedno
('Together'), a faith-based NGO that aims to help overcome division between
persons through inter-religious dialogue and social activism. During the war he
assisted thousands ofMuslims to fleeing Bosnia-Herzegovina to escape certain
death. He also was forced to live as a refugee for a time in Germany, where he
continued to be an outspoken critic of injustice and intolerance, whether in the
political or religious sphere. Not infrequently he challenges leadership within all
three religious traditions, and believes they must all change, as is related with the
following:
I must admit that the churches, because of traditionalism and unwillingness
to accept change, belatedly realised what was in question. All three
churches [sic]. The Catholic church is burdened by traditionalism. The
deliberations of the Second Vatican Council, with the exception of the most
learned and highest members of the hierarchy, have not yet permeated the
feelings and views of the believers at large. The Orthodox church is also
burdened by traditionalism and anachronism, the sediments of newer
political history. Our Islam, on the other side, does not realise that it is a
kind ofEuropean Islam very specific as compared to Saudi-Arabian and
other Islams. If it wants a dialogue with Christianity it must embrace the
principles of enlightenment, human rights and humanism. Only when
52 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 22. Islamic tradition believes that God created the
original, primordial Ka'ba that exists in heaven.
53 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 4.
54 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 4.
55 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 12.
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monotheistic communities succeed in emancipating themselves along these
lines, will they be able to contribute the establishment of civilized relations
among nations. I am convinced that a dialogue among the nations in our
country cannot be established without a dialogue among religions, because
religions so fatally correspond to nations here. '6
Orsolic explains the basis for understanding and co-existence by that which is
common to all persons. He holds that the key to the reconciliation process and
human rights is the understanding that all ofhumanity belongs to God as his
en
children. He draws a clear distinction between the essential identity ofhumans and
artificially constructed identities. His point of reference is the creation account in
which God made humankind (covjek), both male and female, and that humankind's
true identity (pravi identitet covjeka) is found in this primordial event. "Other kinds
of identities, including the national one," says Orsolic, "are historical products."58
Finding one's true identity requires the (re)cognition that "we are all God's children"
which will have significant meaning for how we treat one another, and in human
rights.59 While Orsolic defines humanity's essential nature by a religious and
spiritual source, he believes the role of agnostics in the process of social restoration
is also important, provided that they take religion seriously. He accepts that we
cannot know who is a believer and who is not "because the line between the believer
and unbeliever goes through people and not between people",60 and so people must
refrain from practices which exclude others.
2.5. Identity Shaped by the Imago Dei in Created Humanity
Christians find still a further source of identity that at once binds them together with
all of humanity. Protestant leader Kuzmic says that "All of us share Imago Dei, and
all of us have a common original parent in God."61 Similarly, Radujkovic finds the
locus of humanity's true self in the divine image that God invests in every human
62
creature. This image is completed in Christ, the second Adam, who rectified the
failure of the first Adam. Thus, all Christians, whether Orthodox, Catholic, or
Protestant, have the task to demonstrate by personal example the reason for Christ's
56 AIM 1993: np.
57 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 3.
58 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 3.
59 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 3.
60 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 1.
61 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 5.
62 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 5.
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coming. This is accomplished by personal union (theosis) with Christ through
communion. Baptism, which qualifies the believer to be a carrier of the Holy Spirit,
and theosis, or union with Christ, then become fundamental to the way in which
Christians relate to other persons. So long as we are united with Christ, we may also
be united with all who also have the image of Christ, regardless of gender or race.64
Liturgical renewal is important, then, to bring Christians back to a proper
understanding of themselves in relationship to God and his ordered cosmology, and
to unity through communion with Christ and all who bear the divine image.
Guarding against the possibility of becoming a lightning rod for chauvinistic
nationalists, Radujkovic also teaches in the youth fellowship that he leads about how
the essential self can relate to God in theosis, based on the theology of St Athanasius
(c.296-373), and Gregory Palamas (c. 1296-1359), which the Byzantine Council of
1351 received into general practice as affirming the Sixth Ecumenical Council (680).
Thus, local exploration and discovery of self goes well beyond exclusivist Serb
references to that which is universally Orthodox, and is ultimately related to God.
2.6 Identity Defined through New Creation
Others still find renewal and transformation available in identity with Christ.
Bernard Mikulic pastors a Protestant church in the Croat stronghold of Capljina in
Herzegovina, where he spent his childhood. There he has begun an outreach
ministry to Trebinje, a Serbian stronghold of the Republika Srpska. He observes
many different groups organised around political views, ethnic groups, and religious
creeds. These groups provide an identity, but in so doing also divide people. All of
these groups demonstrate the human desire to belong somewhere or to something.
The division itself is an attempt to explain one's circumstances and make sense of a
chaotic situation. But Mikulic cannot justify the hatred on any grounds, and
identifies it as sin.65 The centre of the hatred lies not in historical antecedent or in
political ideology, but in the heart of the person.66
Mikulic relates the identity change autobiographically, and senses that what he now





65 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 7.
66 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 2.
67 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 7, 8.
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belong to one of these groups is lost when a person belongs to heaven, and affords
/:o
greater value than the group. Although he is no longer a Catholic, he remains a
Croat, and this will not change. But his primary identity is now defined by belonging
to God, and as a child of God. The new identity also has given him a fresh
perspective and orientation, and is the antithesis of that given by society. As Mikulic
puts it:
Your whole perspective has changed when you meet Christ. This was also a
big surprise for me. Everything I valued, those things which I thought were
moral and good, you know, how to live, when I met Christ, everything was
opposite.69
Similarly, Protestant leader Nikola Skrinjaric speaks about the development of "a
new identity in Christ" which allowed him to recognise the artificiality of
70nationalism. He subsequently became "dead to [his] national feelings". He
deplores the notion that one national group is better than another and believes that
whether people act for good or evil is an individual matter of the will.71
Skrinjaric believes religious leaders have an especially important role in the
rebuilding of society, which is predicated on his own experience and on the witness
of transformed lives. He believes there must be change in society, but knows the
72limitation ofpolitical efforts. Peace held together by external means is weak, and
laws may regulate society, but the kind of change society needs is internal. Peace
with one's enemy derives first from peace with God, and then in re-envisioning one's
73 v • • • •
neighbour no longer as enemy, but as a brother created by God. Skrinjaric views
the Protestant churches as a multi-national model of this kind of transformation and
peace potentiality. Transformation is foundational for the churches:
[I]n Mostar, when the war was going on in the streets, we had different
ethnic groups together and they were really having peace with one another.
Of course, some of them had personal problems, you know, within the
groups sometimes, but they really had this peace that comes from above.
And they had been in peace worshipping the Lord together.... And some of
them of course, they had their own bitterness, their own problems in their
lives. But they saw this model in the church, they accept that this is a
possibility for their life as well. And little by little they experienced love
68 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 7.











and help from someone from another ethnic group, and people... didn't look
at them through... national glasses.74
Skrinjaric also emphasises the responsibility of individuals. He believes that people
of Bosnia-Herzegovina undervalue their own self-worth, and believes that if this
were corrected, they "would go around to cities and villages and bring good news of
reconciliation and forgiveness".75 The basis for forgiveness and living in peace with
one's once-considered enemy, however, is the transformation effected in the
individual by God in Christ Jesus. Skrinjaric points to the biblical idea of becoming
a "new creation" which is not, in his conviction, available in Islam or the traditional
churches.76 It is a supernatural experience of true love, which casts out all fear. True
faith, which can overcome fear and hatred, is not comprehensible by those who don't
have the same experience.77 Skrinjaric is sure to point out, however, that although
this is a strong power, it is not one that is generated from oneself. It is a spiritual
70
phenomenon and the "power of the Gospel" which bears fruit.
The current president of the Evangelical Church sabor (governing council) and
pastor of the West Mostar church, Karmelo Kresonja, links the identity crisis after
the demise of socialist Yugoslavia with those who "found trust in the Lord in a
completely different way".79 They retain their cultural heritage, but it is no longer
the defining element of identity. Kresonja describes the situation thus:
I believe that nobody in the Church looks at another to identify who is from
a national group. They are trying to help each other. They are visiting each
other. Many times when we do evangelism, for example, we mix three ladies
from three different groups, so people are shocked. If they come to a
Croatian, they say, how can Serbians and Muslims and Croatians be
together? Or how is it that a Muslim is now sharing the gospel of Jesus
Christ to me, or such things. So, it is a challenge really for the people to
start thinking. Because people are surprised when the Muslim knows more
about the Bible than the Croatian does, or the Serbian does! So they start to
think, you know. There must be something deeper there to change those
people, because in their mindset, for so many Croatians, for so many
Serbians or for Muslims, there are certain areas that people just cannot cross
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lose their barriers, and we see people are crossing them and actually
changing.80
Kresonja relates the new identity to the biblical concept of'new citizenship'81 and
the transitions the republics of former Yugoslavia are now undergoing. Citizenship
provides both identity and freedoms. "Our people in the church," says Kresonja,
"look at their identity as new creatures in Christ."82 This identity has both
transcendent and immanent manifestations. A new creation identity shapes an entire
worldview that relates the local church to ethno-political realities of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Kresonja puts it this way:
We believe that we should have a new identity here on earth but also we
should think of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina, but we think globally. So I
would also express that I believe that one day the Republika Srpska will
disappear, because we believe it is the will of God that Bosnia-Herzegovina
is united and that all people can come to faith and that we will not see the
barriers between the people and that we will not be looking on their social
income or something like that, but we will be looking at their identity in
what they really are.
Kresonja is sober about the social realities of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the
war and the needed transition to a healthy situation. He participates in inter-religious
meetings to actively encourage change in the divided city. However, the religious
communities in Mostar rarely effect positive change for the community, and inter-
communal efforts are frequently rebuffed. Kresonja believes that an improved
situation will not happen by becoming religious or through a traditional church, but
by transformation which "is bringing light and his [Christ's] kingdom to Bosnia-
84
Herzegovina". Kresonja would like to see the influence of the churches grow and
even become politically engaged in order that a healthy situation might result in
Of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. This will happen with the transformation of a mindset and
80
Kresonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 6.
81 The reference is to Philippians 3:20, 21: "But our citizenship is in heaven, and it is
from there that we are expecting a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ. He will transform the
body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the body of his glory, by the power that
also enables him to make all things subject to himself."
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"standards ofbelieving and behaving towards other people",86 which must go beyond
the social and cultural protocols of politeness and hospitality for which Bosnia-
Herzegovina is known. It is an internal transformation accomplished by the Spirit of
God.87
2.7. Conclusion to the Identity Formation Section
From the foregoing discussion on Identity Formation and Transformation some
commonalities from the religious leaders may be discerned. First, several religious
leaders from both Muslim and Christian perspectives point out that the factors of
identity as defined by nationhood are artificial and human constructs. While these
are important in forming a communal identity, they remain secondary to a deeper,
primordial identity. Second, primary identity is found in relation to God, especially
in his creative act that establishes parity between all peoples. Third, proper
relationship to God and his precepts gives new understanding and orientation that is
supranational. It motivates persons to self-examination, the first necessary dynamic
for individual and communal change. Fourth, rightly relating to God is a sufficient
cause for properly relating to others in ways that lead to social restoration and peace-
building.
3. Religion and Politics
The ambivalence about the relationship of religion and politics is analysed in this
section. Some religious leaders believe they can and should make positive
contributions to society through engagement in the political sphere. However, most
find that strong ties between religion and politics failed to act as a corrective to
political abuse, and succeeded in co-opting key religious figures for nationalist
objectives. Insofar as the religious leadership became involved in nationalist causes,
they lost their independent and prophetic voice for leading people. At the same time,
they felt an obligation to remain politically engaged in order to protect the rights of
their ethno-religious community at a time when no one else would. Fundamental
security issues required that leaders in all segments of society remain vigilant and








3.1. The Nature of Politics and Religion during the Socialist Period
Markovic makes an important distinction both about atheism in Europe and
socialism's atheistic practice in Yugoslavia. The various expressions of atheism in
Europe were forms of social protest specifically addressed against the repressive
power of the (medieval) Church.88 Social philosophers sought to weaken the power
base of the Church by redefining the personal God of revealed Scripture as the
impersonal philosophical abstraction of deus and offering deism as an alternative to
theism. The god of rationalism undermined the power that was traditionally believed
to reside in the Church. Anti-religionists in socialist Yugoslavia were concerned less
to attack the existence of God in philosophical terms than to subvert the basis of
ecclesiastical power and its hold over society. Communism in its Yugoslav context
OQ
was not atheisticper se, but rather anti-theistic and anti-Church. The communist
political elite sought to substitute politics for religion, and, insofar as politics has its
own belief system, it became a quasi-religious ideology. Thus, in his endeavours of
reconciliation and mediation, Markovic wants to convert people away from ideology
and rediscover religious faith.90
Protestant leader Kuzmic is of a similar mind as Markovic regarding the dynamics of
politics and religion in the political realm from the communist past. He is a well-
connected religious leader who had significant influence in the political sphere
through his testimony in US Senate hearings on Balkan affairs.91 He also addressed
the issues of rising nationalism after the death ofTito and before the collapse of
Yugoslavia.92 Kuzmic is the founder of the Evangelical Theological Faculty in
Osijek, Croatia where in 1992 critical peace negotiations between Serbs and Croats
took place when no other neutral meeting place could be found. His efforts during
the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina brought thousands of tonnes of aid to the Balkans
over several years, and kept the flow of aid coming to destitute IDPs when most
agencies pulled out. Kuzmic also participated in reconciliation meetings with high
level religious leaders in the Balkans over the Kosovo crisis in 1999. With this level
of involvement from a non-national Church body, Kuzmic is vigilant to warn against
88 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 6.
89 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 7.
90 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 7.
91 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 13, 14
92 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 13.
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the fusion of religion and politics, assessing this dynamic in the wider context of
post-communist Europe as follows:
.. .1 would come back to my interview done back in 1989... to point out the
danger of religion or faith instrumentalised by nationalistic ideologies and
therefore reduced and stripped of its universal truth claims. And we have
seen it all across Eastern Europe in the immediate aftermath of the collapse
of communist totalitarian states. So you have communist ideologies
similarly replaced by conflicting nationalistic ideologies supported by the
nationally employed religion and faith communities. That, of course, is a
betrayal of faith. 3
Many of these religious leaders see a similar danger as Kuzmic, and view political
engagement with some wariness. At the same time politics plays differently for each
religio-national community, and leaves each community with a perception of
vulnerability, as is explored in the following segment.
3.2 Religion and National Politics
The umma in Bosnia-Herzegovina finds itself precariously situated between
expansionist Croat nationalists in the southwestern stronghold ofHerzegovina94 and
Serb expansionists in the east and north of Bosnia. Muslim leaders thus take great
care to place the umma within a European framework that embraces Western
political ideals.95 Grand Mufti Ceric affirms that a secular state is an acceptable
political structure, but not in a philosophical or ideological sense. He accepts a
separation between religion and politics, but that each must be able to influence the
other. '"Politics is," according to Ceric, "too important to be left to the politicians
alone, in the same way that theology is too important today to be left to the
theologians alone."96 Security is understandably a high priority for the umma of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and despite recent interventionist failures in this area, they
clearly see their future with the West and democratic ideals.
Mustafic is exercised over the political failures of'Christian' Europe to protect the
Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He points out that protection of non-Muslims was
guaranteed under Islamic law during the Ottoman period.97 Although the principle of
djimma is reserved for predominantly Muslim states and is anachronistic for Bosnia-
Herzegovina today, Mustafic relates the principle rights of citizens stemming from
93 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: pl3.
94 This is the so-called region of Herzeg-Bosna.
95 Mustafic [MU.RL.SA.03]:10, 11.
96 Ceric [MU.RL.SA.01]: 6.
97 Mustafic [MU.RL.SA.03]: 10, 11.
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djimma for today, as often expounded by Grand Mufti Ceric: the right to life,
property, religion, freedom, and dignity.98 Speaking from the office of the Reisu-l-
ulema, Mustafic draws upon recent Balkan history as a guide to a future model of
interaction between religion and politics. Consistent with the teachings of the
Quran," he is adamant that no political regime should force citizens into religion, as
was the case during the Second World War in Yugoslavia.100 Neither should
citizens be forced into no religion, as was tacitly attempted during the socialist
period. Mustafic affirms the secular state but rejects a secular ideology.101 He thus
believes that there ought to be no compulsion in politics, just as there should be no
compulsion in religion.
Grabus asserts that democratic processes must take precedent in a pluralistic society
like Bosnia-Herzegovina. Djimma worked well for its time in Muslim-dominant
societies, but there is no application of such means ofprotection in Bosnia-
i r\j
Herzegovina today, because the government protects the individual. Grabus is
interested in the platforms ofpolitical parties as a citizen ofBosnia-Herzegovina, and
as a Muslim believer, he is keen to discuss social issues from a religious perspective,
as he does in the radio programme each week.
Orthodox priest Toskovic is critical of the West's interventionist policies and wants
to see the international community take more responsibility for the wrongdoing at
Srebrenica. At the same time he onlymildly acknowledges the mass murder that
occurred at the hands of Serbs.103 Toskovic views his priestly role as an intermediary
to help people make sense of the war. Family members want to be assured that their
loved ones sacrificed their lives for a noble cause, such as the freedom of the nation,
98 Mustafic [MU.RL.SA.03]: 10.
99 2: 256, "Let there be no compulsion in religion."
100 Mustafic no doubt has in mind here the forced baptisms ofOrthodox believers to
Catholicism under state policies of the Ustase in the Independent State ofCroatia (Nezavisna
Drzava Hrvatska) between 1941-45. The policy was part of the campaign to create a
homogenous Croatian state through the expulsion, killing and conversion of Serbs.
Supporters of the Ustase often conducted Baptisms under compulsion of threat of torture or
death. The regime considered the (re)baptised to be converts and officially Croat. The
scheme was instigated by the Ustasa regime and expedited through the 'Ministry of Justice
and Religious Affairs'. Although the Roman Catholic Church did not officially sanction the
effort, Catholic clergy loyal to the regime frequently participated. See Velikonja 2003: 164-
74.
101 Mustafic [MU.RL.SA.03]: 11,12.
102 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 1, 14.
103 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8.
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when in fact they were little more than instruments in the hands of ruthless
politicians.104 Nevertheless, there is still an aspect of sacredness to the sacrifice that
a priest must honour, without being caught up in the media frenzy. As Toskovic
relates it:
The role of religion is to avoid polemics or convincing who is guilty, or
listing the number of victims, who gave more victims, and, in some other but
harder process, to build a platform from which the situation in Bosnia will
be seen.... I think that every step of goodwill, which maybe is not seen
immediately, is still important and needed, and that it has its own power,
which is against the antagonism.105
Thus Toskovic wants to avoid naming offences, judging and accusing, because this
only perpetuates the animosities. He prefers rather, through sincere dialogue, to
move in the direction of peace.106
Orthodox priest Vanja Jovanovic in Sarajevo prefers to leave politics to the
politicians, as it is not a topic of discussion for members of the clergy. Nevertheless,
he was willing to discuss the relationship of the national church to nationalism, and
holds an uncommon view:
The question ofnation and nationalism is not a question for me to say that
this and that are not good. My part as a priest is to teach them, if they want,
what the faith is and that the Church is not a guardian of the nation. That
means my part is to educate them in what they are, to understand Orthodoxy
as it is and not as what they think it is. It's the same with Roman
Catholicism and Islam. When you give them a healthy concept about
something, all of these other concepts, that go with each other, are lost.107
In each of the interviews the religious leaders were concerned to move away from
politicised religion and extreme forms of nationalism, and some prefer to stay away
from politics altogether.
3.3. Separation of Religion and Politics
Jovanovic sees all ideologies in opposition to the principles of the Orthodox Church.
More importantly, he does not see nationalism as the real problem. Rather than
addressing external effects of the problem, he wants to focus on its root cause that
108resides in the consciousness and psyche of the people. He contrasts the political
and the spiritual, the temporal and the eternal, by stating that nationalism is a reality
with a relatively recent appearance when compared to the presence of the Church.
104 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 10.
105 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 10.
106 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 10.
107 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 9.
108 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 9.
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He therefore does not want to give over his energies to that which is ephemeral.
Instead, he wants to focus his efforts on addressing the essential problem of fear,
which is a spiritual reality connected to God. The role of true faith is to overcome
fear and hatred through love, which is the essence of Orthodox Christianity.109 He
wants to communicate this expression of religious faith above all others. Thus, by an
interesting twist of logic, the interdictory and prophetic role of the Church or priest is
minimised. Matters ofmorality are individual, not political or national. If a person
inclines himself or herself to God, then it is needless to speak about the violence, as
they are not implicated. "If the [person] is in faith, then there is no circle of violence;
there is a circle of goodness".110 But the person who has turned against God has also
turned against the Church, and therefore any condemnation ofwrongdoing by a
priest is pointless.
Most of the Protestant leaders are disengaged from the political sphere as a matter of
conviction, believing that this is where expressions of religious faith become
corrupted. Skrinjaric has observed that when religious clerics openly talk about
politics, they try to manipulate their people into the nationalist causes. By so doing
they forfeit their authority to talk about moral virtues:
As a Croat, if I put my national identity above moral or God's commands, I
cannot be authentic or I can't have authority. And somewhere deep within
there is some kind of red light saying, "This is not really true."111
At the same time Kuzmic regrets the lack of a comprehensive worldview found
among pietists who withdraw from social and political involvement, and argues
instead for a 'spirituality of engagement'.112 Kuzmic believes that the three religious
groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina have developed a spirituality of aggression and
militarism, which must be countered by engaged Protestants. The development of a
spirituality of engagement is a "major theological task that will be constructive and
peace-building", says Kuzmic.113 Thus Kuzmic desires to address the militarism in
the nationalist expressions and the reductionistic escapism within his own religious
109 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 10, 11.
110 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 10.
111
Skrinjaric [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 10.
112 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 13.
113 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 13.
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expression by developing religious communities that live as transforming agents in
the world.114
The Protestant communities enjoy a measure of political neutrality owing to their
small size and multi-national character. But they sometimes find that religious laws
strongly influenced by the larger religious groups disadvantage religious minorities.
How this dynamic will affect the current leaders of the Protestant community
remains an open question. Their existence and profile demonstrates, however, that
religion and nationality need not necessarily be fused, and that multi-national unity
can be achieved even in the most nationally divided regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3.4. Conclusion to the Religion and Politics Section
Several noticeable characteristics emerge from the interviews with religious leaders
on the difficult subject of religion and politics. First, they all deplored the use of
religion to advance political agendas, believing that collusion between religion and
politics strains the credibility of the faith communities. This in turn remains a
continuing barrier to social restoration. Second, the Muslim, Catholic and Protestant
religious communities are clearly oriented to the West and to the European Union,
while Orthodox leaders are guarded about the West and its ideals, and find grounds
for discord with the Western-oriented international community. This orientation
comes as no surprise, given the events ofKosovo in the late 1990s. Third,
expectations across religious communities vary widely. The dialectical approach
employed by the Western-oriented {i.e., Muslim, Catholic and Protestant) religious
communities seeks to correct perceived moral and ethical failures through direct
confrontation. They also expect the Orthodox clergy to respond in the same way.
However, Orthodox leaders are more disposed to hierarchal structures, and choose to
work with leadership for resolution. They see their effort in a spiritual sense, in
righting or correcting false understanding, as in a return to 'ortho-doxy'. They do
not accept that this can be accomplished through confrontation. Confronting error is
not part of their remit, but it is rather the role of the courts, or, spiritually expressed,
the work ofGod to convict an individual ofwrongdoing. A priest cannot confront a
member of the Church ofwrongdoing without himself participating in and
perpetuating the wrong. This positivist approach of Orthodox leaders emphasises
only the right path that people should follow in order to bring correction. The
114 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 15.
134
Chapter Four
methodological differences the religious communities employ to address political
wrongdoing has led to wide scale misunderstanding, unfulfilled expectations, and
continuing tensions. Each community is addressing wrongs in their own way and
time. Thus, it is necessary to investigate in greater detail the basis for Ethics and
Morality that contributes to peace-building and social restoration.
4. Ethics and Morality
The interviewees generally agree that religiously-based ethics, where properly
understood and applied, can make important contributions to peace-building, and are
essential ingredients of social restoration. Grabus asserts that together the religions
can address the post-war societal ills common to all. He attributes the war to a
minority who disdain morality and prefer power, and argues that it is the
responsibility of those who stand by the traditions of Bosnia-Herzegovina to promote
good deeds and inter-communal respect for each other.113
4.1. The Ethic of 'Life Dialogue'
Zovkic speaks of a first and important level of "life dialogue,"116 or "dialogue of
good neighbourhood" which in times ofpeace has its own set of social guidelines in
Bosnian society, expressed by shared holidays and family celebrations. Although
this level of interaction failed to secure lives in a time of crisis, it is the starting point
of rebuilding social cohesion. He explains it as follows:
We have an experience of living here as different for centuries. And we
respect the laws of good neighbourhood in normal peaceful times. So this is
the first and very important level of our life dialogue. We need the others
who are nearby. When in a neighbouring family somebody dies or marries
or is being bom, there is a way of expressing your good wishes or sympathy
or condolence to your neighbours who are different. And when somebody's
family or son or daughter finishes his or her education, there is a public
celebration about it. 7
4.2. Religious Ethics and Secular Society
While pointing out the doctrinal differences between Islam and Christianity,
Kresonja finds ethical similarities in their respective teachings about a loving God,
obedience to God and concern for others.118 Religious ethics, he argues, can have a
115 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 29.
116 Zovkic is here bridging the concept of'dialogue of life', the Vatican's
recommended starting point for inter-religious relations, and an often repeated phrase of
Pope John Paul II, with the context of'good neighbourhood' in multi-national, multi-
religious Bosnia-Herzegovina. For more information, see USCCB 2003: n.p.





constructive role in mitigating the effect of extremists in each of the ethno-religious
communities, and he emphasises that non-religious persons also see value in the
ethical codes of the Ten Commandments:
...[E]ven in the midst of all circumstances [people] can have peace, they can
have blessing and they can have everything sufficient for their lives.... My
grandfather's brother was a very well-known Communist leader in
Yugoslavia, and he always said that if he were in charge of something even
bigger, he would put the Ten Commandments from the Bible as the law for
the whole country and that would be sufficient for every case that you would
encounter."9
He regrets, however, that many religious leaders are consumed by other issues and
are not prepared to address the social ills of drug addiction, prostitution and child
abuse. In divided Mostar, religionists are challenged by the moral platform of the
SDP, that is, fonner communists who raised the issues of correcting social ills.120
Kresonja believes that it is important for religious bodies to take up this challenge,
and demonstrate that religiously-based ethics can provide a platform for co-operation
by addressing the social ills plaguing their city.
Other leaders recognise commonality between religious ethics and the ideals of
communism and atheism. Protestant Branko Erceg pastors a church in Banja Luka
where among Serbs anything other than Orthodoxy is disdained. He is nonetheless
relentless to reach beyond the cliches of Serbian sectarianism to find commonalities
with other faith expressions. In the religions of Islam, Judaism and both Western and
Eastern Christianity he finds common aspects that promote peace. He believes that
an appeal to a wide audience is necessary because the population ofBosnia-
Herzegovina includes so many who are consciously non-religiolis. While favouring
a religiously-based ethic, he emphasises the importance of appealing to those citizens
who seek to live a moral life guided by principles not directly associated with
religion.121 Non-religious socialist-era ethics promoted good relationships with its
"Brotherhood and Unity" slogan, which is a point of commonality between religious
and non-religious persons.
Franciscan Orsolic sees the restoration of post-communist society as an important
opportunity for persons of Bosnia-Herzegovina to become theologically and ethically









restoration of society. Zajedno ('together'), the peace-building and reconciliation
organisation that Orsolic founded in conjunction with IMIC, chiefly uses the vehicles
of ethics and dialogue to build understanding across national barriers and combat
political and religious ideology.122 Similarly, Markovic affirms the high moral ideals
of the agnostics in the multi-national, multi-confessional choir he founded in
Sarajevo that performs religious music from the three religious traditions. As a sign
ofmulti-ethnic, multi-religious solidarity, an orchestra from Banja Luka joins the
choir, Pantonima, when they perform internationally. Pantonima invites persons of
all religious confessions to be enriched through the encounter with others and seeks
to create a vision of the future in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Insofar as they stand against
the injustice ofpowerful and repressive religious systems, agnostics too are welcome
123because they exercise a kind ofhonest faith of a true seeker after God.
4.3. Religious Ethics and its Contribution to Social Restoration
However, Radujkovic cautions against drawing a close parallel between religious and
secular ethics. He believes that morality divorced from its supernatural source is
illusory and weak, inauthentic and easily counterfeited. He points to religious groups
that fell victim to persons hiding their real intentions behind a smokescreen of ethics
and morality. Immorality and war crimes, he argues, resulted from a basic
godlessness stemming from religious ignorance.124
Orthodox priest Toskovic is representative of several religious leaders who
consciously employ religious ethics grounded in a supernatural worldview. As a
participant of a weekly radio programme co-hosted with a Muslim professor and a
Catholic priest, Toskovic works from the "ethical foundation for the restoration of
trust and dialogue" to put forward the case for restoring a multi-cultural, multi-
religious society.125 Respect for human dignity is the foundation for morality, which
cannot be divorced from the understanding that all of humanity is created by the
hand ofGod.126 For Toskovic Christians are constrained and compelled by a moral
imperative to help one another and to build peace by loving their neighbours. He
holds this to be the mark ofChristian authenticity.127 Because God stretched forth
122 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 4.
123 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 6.
124
Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 2
125 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8.
126 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 11.
127 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8.
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his eternal hand to a fallen humanity, so too the Christian is obliged towards ethical
excellence, responding "with love on love".128
Franciscan Mato Topic, who is now warden of the reconstructed House ofPeace
(Dom Mira), also indicates that a moral imperative based on religious ideals
compelled him to continue non-partisan humanitarian aid efforts throughout the war.
He faced death threats from co-nationalist Croats in Central Bosnia during a
particularly violent period and earned the label "Muslim priest" for helping non-
Catholics.129 He drew his strength from the model of St Francis130 and the Bible
during the war and now seeks to create a space of spirituality as an essential
ingredient of peace-building.131 The House ofPeace in the once hotly contested
Rama Valley ofCentral Bosnia stands for these ideals and is open to people of all
1 ^9
faiths who wish to be in communication with God.
Similarly, Protestant leader Nikola Skrinjaric faced death threats during the war for
delivering humanitarian aid across front lines to needy persons of all nationalities.
Skrinjaric is unusual in that he lived and worked on both sides of the IEBL, in the
Croat-Muslim predominant Federacija (Mostar), and in the Republika Srpska (Banja
Luka). While most persons living in Mostar tried to escape the city during the war,
Skrinjaric moved to Mostar from Croatia to better co-ordinate humanitarian aid
distribution, pastor a church, and help people in need regardless of ethnic or religious
background. Once settled, he brought his fiance, Sandra, and together they
celebrated a highly visible public wedding during the war with the wedding party
processing through the streets. Skrinjaric points to a low level of trust currently in
society, and reflects the common belief that the conflict would re-ignite were the
peace-keeping troops removed. He believes that only a countrywide change with
new moral criteria would adequately secure the future.133 He sees this as the most
urgent area for religious leadership to take up in the current societal malaise.
128 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 11.
129
Topic [RC.RL.RA.04]: 2, 6.
130 St Francis of Asissi (c.l 181-1226) gave up a life of luxury and dispossessed
himself of material wealth in order to help the disenfranchised and powerless that he
encountered in the world. The impetus for doing this was a spiritual vision that awakened









Grand Mufti Ceric also calls for a high level of integrity from religious leaders, both
on a country-wide and global scale. Ceric believes that both the Western and
Muslim worlds are in a critical state of transition, finding the current world order
inadequate to address the pressing needs of the contemporary global community.
Tracing a sweeping history ofhumanity, he illustrates how the Hakim, or 'Holy
Man'134 ofMuslim culture, has been replaced by the 'Renaissance Man' of the West.
The latter, he argues, has today consumed himself and has nothing more to offer. A
new model of humanity is needed, which Ceric identifies in terms of the 'Moral
Man' who will combine the spiritual wisdom of religion and the reason of the
Renaissance. Religious leaders and politicians have the vital role of defining this
new morality. However, Ceric is sceptical that the religious leaders - be they Muslim
or Christian - have the will or fortitude to take on the risk of defining the new world
order, and thus wonders from what source this morality will arise.135
4.4. Conclusion to the Ethics and Morals Section
These religious leaders demonstrate that religious ethics and standards ofmorality
can make a contribution to peace-building. The theological frameworks of the
religions motivate persons to act, which is demonstrated by non-partisan assistance
offered to the needy at great personal risk. The ethic applied in these circumstances
is one of particularity. That is to say, the basis for the ethic is in a specific text and
context in order to be relevant. The framework for the ethic is based on selective
texts either from the Qur'an or the Bible, which provide worldviews that depict
humanity in relation to God, and serve as a basis for application into the
contemporary context. The specificity of the ethic affords credibility. At the same
time the particularised ethic makes a wider appeal and serves as a bridge across
sectarian boundaries to those outside of its own community. In this capacity
religious ethics finds a modicum of convergence with secular ethics, and is able to
include others from another community, even when there is substantive disagreement
between communities. How this expression of religious ethic engages others in the
face of injustice and disparate power structures is the topic of the next section.
154 Hakim literally means 'wise man' where wisdom (hikma) is based in divinely-
revealed knowledge and holiness.
135 Ceric [MU.RL.SA.01]: 2-5.
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5. Justice and Forgiveness
Although virtually all the religious leaders interviewed agree that justice and
forgiveness are key ingredients of peace-building, no unanimity exists on the nature
of these issues, or the procedures needed to deal with them. The first part of this
section focuses on justice externally administered through the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), at the Hague. The particulars of this
Court's origins were already addressed in Chapter Two and will not be reviewed
here. Focus is placed instead on the specific views of interviewees to the court, and
to the processes involved. Then the focus shifts to local needs for justice and
forgiveness in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two aspects need to be addressed in
anticipation of this section. First, the remit of the Hague Court addresses only the
worst war crimes and therefore seeks to bring to trial only the alleged worst
offenders. A need for local courts and mechanisms ofjustice was therefore always
implicitly understood. Second, at the time of these interviews in 2002-03, local
courts were not yet in full operation and many questions about their nature,
legitimacy, impartiality and authority were in discussion. These issues still remain
today. An October 2004 report acknowledged that the domestic courts were riddled
with serious problems, including "ethnic bias on the part ofjudges and prosecutors,
poor case preparation by prosecutors, inadequate cooperation by the police with
investigations, poor cooperation between states on judicial matters, a lack of witness
protection mechanisms, and uncertainty on prosecuting command responsibility".136
5.1. Justice Externally Administered: The Hague Tribunal
Interviewees assess the Hague Court differently, and generally reflect national
opinions within the theatre of conflict. Several of the leaders support the Court and
find its processes and decisions legitimate and fair.
Orsolic believes there is a need for leaders and the media alike to recognise their
collective responsibility for the condition ofBosnia-Herzegovina. Only by accepting
their responsibility will they recognise the value of the Tribunal, through which "the
137
ground for real reconciliation and forgiveness" can be realised.
Professor Nedzad Grabus from the Faculty ofIslamic Studies in Sarajevo supports
the activities of the international court because it attempts to clarify issues ofjustice
136 Human Rights News. 2004a.
137 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.
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for all of the nations ofBosnia-Herzegovina. In his view the ICTY overcomes the
paralysis of the local courts caused by partisanship.lj8 Support for the Hague by
political and religious leaders, intellectuals and the media demonstrates a recognition
of collective responsibility for the reforms necessary to rebuild society.
Kuzmic supports the Hague processes because it properly places the blame on those
most responsible:
... [W]ar criminals, the leaders, the chief engineers, have to go to the Hague
so that we stop the collective blaming.... All three sides have sinned... but
not all of them have sinned equally. And the leaders are the most
responsible, and they must be made responsible for their atrocities.... The
process of reconciliation and inter-ethnic bridge-building and confidence
building... becomes much easier once the blame is shifted from the
collective of the nation or religious group and is transferred to those who are
really most guilty, to the leaders.139
However, dissent may be heard from other religious leaders. Orthodox priest Basko
Toskovic echoes the widespread sentiment among Serbs that the Hague Court is pre¬
disposed to the Western-oriented nations, will disfavour the Serbs in its judgments,
and therefore can neither fairly arbitrate nor administer justice. For him a clear
indication of the Court's bias is that it accuses only political leadership from the
Serbian nation. Other political leaders, such as the Muslim SDA party leader and
former President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, were never accused of
war crimes although, Toskovic contends, Izetbegovic was implicated in military
actions considered to be war crimes.140 He therefore finds the international
community partisan in their motives and guilty of criminal intent by consciously
refusing to issue an indictment for non-Serb political leaders. This, he contends, is
neither a true search for justice nor an effective way ofbuilding peace.141 Toskovic
adds that this is yet another indication of how the Serbian nation suffers at the hands
of the international community. He believes this only serves to strengthen the
resolve of the Serbs in that they find a kind of nobility in suffering injustice, and
solidarity with the martyrs ofChristianity.142
138 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 25.
139 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 6, 7.
140 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 14. On the day of his burial the ICTY announced that
Izetbegovic was being investigated for possible war crimes activity.
141 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 12.
142 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 13.
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Orthodox priest Radujkovic takes a more conciliatory tone. He admits that the
general perception of the ICTY in the Republika Srpska is negative, but attributes
this less to the Tribunal itself, and more to the media's portrayal of the hearings.143
Mostly, however, he perceives the lengthy court processes of the Hague to be
foreign. Justice in this part of the Balkans is historically disposed to swifter
procedures summarily administered from an authoritarian figure. He points to
absolutist regimes under the Serbian monarchy, Ottoman Empire and Tito's
communism as the legacy in which justice was swiftly administered, and for certain
crimes, summarily executed through decapitation.144 Serbia's long break with
Western Europe created many discontinuities. He believes more education is
necessary.145 These remarks notwithstanding, Radujkovic supports fair trials so that
truth may prevail, wherever the cases are held. He recognises that for now the Hague
"serves to bring to justice the top criminal offenders but there will have to be one day
a tribunal that will deal with 'small' crimes."146
It is clear from the foregoing that no agreement is at hand regarding the fundamental
aspect ofjustice handled externally at the Hague. The disagreement between the
Serbs and others exposes a pro-Western versus anti-Western cleavage dividing the
different nations. Muslim, Catholic and Protestant leaders strongly support the
efforts of the international community and do not seem to question the legitimacy of
the court or its processes. Leaders from the Serbian nation view the effort as foreign,
and as support for the conspiracy theory that the international community is
determined to disenfranchise the Serbian nation, and that they therefore cannot find
justice in the international arena. It raises the question ofwhether justice locally
administered can fair any better.
5.2. Justice Locally Administered: Two Barriers
Two issues frame the discussion ofjustice beyond the Hague at the local level,
namely, the partisan nature of the courts, and the large number of cases to be tried.
143
Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 11. The prominent court case of Slobodan
Milosevic is telecast live and in its entirety in the Federacija, whereas in the Republika
Srpska and Serbia-Montenegro it is selectively broadcast and generally seeks to favourably
depict Serbs. Accordingly, the hearing airs in prime time in the Republika Srpska and
Serbia-Montenegro and gamers a large percentage of the viewing audience. In the










Regarding the first issue, Zovkic points to an inherent distrust of the legal system in
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a corrupt vestige of the communist era in which judges
handed out decisions in accordance with the guidelines of the party secretary. He
therefore welcomes Western judges into the judicial system in order that trust may be
established.147 Current evaluations by independent agencies confirm the partisan
nature of the local courts, calling into question the ability of the courts to carry out
justice.
The second issue addresses the number of cases to be tried. Because the ICTY was
not meant to rectify all of the injustices created by war criminals, local courts in
Bosnia-Herzegovina will need to pursue perpetrators of smaller war crimes. This
translates into normal citizens coming to terms with the realisation that personal
injustices will endure. The General Amnesty already clears lower ranked soldiers
and citizens not accused ofwar crimes. Were all of the guilty to be tried at the local
level, the judicial system would be overwhelmed, and society would be fixated on
the issues of the past when it needs to focus on building the future. Orsolic contends
that punishment and prosecution of those who constitute a stumbling block to the
rebuilding of society is necessary, just as the General Amnesty is necessary for those
who would conceivably contribute to the rebuilding of society.148 The General
Amnesty is an acknowledged compromise,149 allowing many of the smaller crimes to
go unprosecuted in the interest ofmoving society beyond the issues of the war. But
by leaving unaddressed significant and enduring injustices at the local and personal
level, hope and expectation for restitution is extinguished. War weariness has set in
characterised by what Vjekoslav Saje describes as an indifference to continuing
injustice.150 Saje, a Catholic married to a Muslim, is the Director of the Centerfor
Religious Dialogue and regularly conducts inter-religious seminars throughout
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo aimed at fostering reconciliation. He is a resident
of Sarajevo and knows firsthand the mood of the city. Saje cites the example of
former JNA officers who once commandeered the shelling of residential areas of
Sarajevo now returning to purchase flats and live in the city. The absence ofmoral
outrage at such action demonstrates the desire ofmost people to put the dark cloud of
147 Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 13.







the war behind them.151 The situation throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina is more
characteristic of resignation than reconciliation, and may yet prove the seedbed for
future violence.
5.3. Varieties of Justice from Different Traditions
The religious leaders draw upon their own religious traditions to define justice and
how it should shape the ethical-theological framework for their society while
recognising that other religious traditions also hold a high place in their societies for
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justice. In his frequent encounters with members of the Muslim community,
Markovic sees a notable distinction between the Christian and the Muslim emphases:
[The Muslims] use more the utterances of justice. We Christians are more
idealistic with the image ofGod in Jesus, who is a God of love. It is
contrasted to a God who forbids, which is more often stressed in Islam.
Very often I say Islam is more practical, especially related to their tradition.
They organise society along these levels. Our Christianity is often more
idealistic. It is poetry sometimes, such as prayer.153
Grabus confirms this general distinction made by Markovic above:
"You have so many different approaches in the Bosnian situation. If you
talk from the Catholic perspective or the Orthodox perspective, they're
trying to talk about forgiveness, and the Muslim insists on 'adel [justice].154
Grabus believes that justice is a difficult concept for people to grasp, but is an
essential ingredient to the reconstruction of society.155 Mustafic concurs and
elaborates for the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mustafic sees truth as
foundational to justice, and the suppression of truth regarding war crimes as
fundamentally unjust. It is indicative of worldly values, and ultimately
communicates the wrong message in Bosnia-Herzegovina, namely, that criminality is
not only profitable, but honourable.156 Further, to leave personal injustices
unaddressed is asking too much of the victims who require some form of restitution
and seek justice through formal recognition of the grievance. This is necessary in




See, for example, Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 2-4.
153 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 87.
154 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 2.
155 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 25.
156 Mustafic [MU.RL.SA.03]: 21.
157 Mustafic [MU.RL.SA.03]: 21, 22.
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Grabus argues that God is very concerned with justice, for he is the one who will
hear and judge each one at the end of their lives.158 He understands justice through a
relationship to God by means of personal prayer, concluding that those who pray
understand the meaning ofjustice because they are asking for justice from God.159
Justice and restitution are necessarily prior to forgiveness, but if a way to achieve
justice cannot be found, then forgiveness is the only way forward. This takes the
believer to the level of taqwa (piety, or God-fearingness).160 Mikulic echoes the
sentiments ofMuslim professor Grabus161 and Franciscan Orsolic162 when he relates
that earthly judgment is a reminder that one day God will judge all, and that God
alone can fairly judge all persons.
5.4. The Role of the Courts Versus the Role of the Religious Bodies
While they support a fair judicial system, several leaders view justice as an issue of
the courts, and forgiveness the domain of the Church. Correspondingly they lay
more stress on forgiveness than justice. The chief question for Radujkovic is not
whether justice should be carried out, but by whom. The courts have the
responsibility to carry out justice, but this is distinctly not the task of the religious
communities. Radujkovic separates the legal task according to sharply delineated
realms, and wants to emphasise that Christ's Kingdom "is not of this world".164
Similarly, Jovanovic maintains a strong demarcation between the sacred and secular,
between the heavenly and earthly. It is therefore not the role of the priest to
condemn anyone, for all have within them the possibility to be transformed.165 The
courts and the Hague must be concerned with 'secular justice,' but a priest must be
concerned with the person's soul and salvation.166 Moreover, even the impossible
prospect of trying and punishing all of the guilty through penal institutions would not
solve the problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for it only addresses the effects and not
the causes. The real issues are "deep and entangled constructions of the human soul"
158 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 26.
159 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 25.
160 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 26.
161 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 25, 26.
162 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.
163 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 8.
164 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 12.
165 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 6.
166 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 8.
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and until the conscience of the people is affected, then the problems will persist.167
Justice must therefore move beyond punitive measures to be "exclusively connected
with God and his love that transforms".168 Protestant leader Mikulic acknowledges
the limitations of the courts and knows many must live with injustice. Earthly courts
will not bring peace or reconciliation,169 and therefore he works to see forgiveness
transpire in the church. Forgiveness goes beyond justice in rebuilding peace, and has
a restorative dimension of its own.
5.5. Forgiveness Overcomes The Legacy Of The Past
Forgiveness can address the wrongs of the past and make lasting contributions to the
resolution of conflicts. Zovkic speaks to the issues of the 1990s war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina by referencing the legacy ofWorld War II. He was personally
disappointed that the Bishops' Letter marking the fiftieth anniversary of the end of
that war did not use stronger language to acknowledge wrongs committed. Although
the letter admitted that Croat members of the Catholic Church were complicit in
killing innocent persons, Zovkic believes the apology was too vague in addressing
those wrongs, which adversely affected efforts towards reconciliation. In this regard
he believes the religious leaders must address the issues of this war, pursuing
simultaneously justice and reconciliation.170 Erceg concurs with this view and
asserts that unforgiven events from past conflicts become the seedbeds for future
conflicts.171 However, the act of forgiving arrests the cycle of revenge and
violence.172 Further, he sees the usual approach of conflict management through use
of power as a short-term remedy, but forgiveness is a long-term solution.173 Several
leaders share this opinion and believe that forgiveness makes significant
contributions to peace-building.
5.6. The Contribution of Forgiveness to Peace-Building
Kresonja acknowledges that a sense of wrongdoing, or contrition, is necessary for
forgiveness to become effective,174 but that if people in Bosnia-Herzegovina were
167 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 10.
168 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 11.
169 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 9.








Kresonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 7. On this point see also Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 1.
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willing to reflect on their own misdeeds, the country would be at a turning point in
social restoration.175
Radujkovic sees the reconciling work of the Church both in contrast to the court
system and in relation to other religious communities:
The court should do its job and convict the criminal. But the responsibility
of every religious community is to alleviate, by way of forgiveness, his
crime over his victim or alleviate pain for the victim of that crime. If the
Serbs oppressed the Muslims or the Muslims oppressed the Serbs, some
tribunal, the Hague or some other, will convict the criminals on both sides.
But the task of both the Orthodox Church and the Islamic religious
community is to work on reconciliation of these two peoples through sincere
forgiveness.176
Orsolic recognises a legitimate place for religious faith in the largely secular
enviromnent of peace-building because "only faith has the categories of forgiveness
and reconciliation" and "every other kind of forgiveness will be tactics or fake
compromises".177 In contrast to philosophy or politics, "only faith can penetrate a
man's heart because eventually God is the one who forgives".178 As he says,
Politics has to have this general amnesty as well as punishing war criminals.
But the rest of us also have to deal with the process of forgiveness and
reconciliation because all justice cannot be done in court. Without
forgiveness there cannot be real reconciliation.179
Dubatovic believes that the religious communities can make a substantial
contribution to peace-building by communicating forgiveness.180 Dubatovic, whose
formal theological education included a challenging class on the theology of
forgiveness taught by Croat Miroslav Volf, now the Henry B. Wright Professor of
Systematic Theology at Yale Divinity School, links the necessity of forgiveness in
the face ofpersonal suffering to being a committed Christian.181 Forgiveness flows
from the nature of God himself182 and is manifest in Christ. He is the example of
forgiveness of others, and the one through whom forgiveness is possible. The
imperative for change is both internal and personal, beginning with one's own





177 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.
178 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.
179 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.
180 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 14.
181 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 20.
182 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 15.
183 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 21.
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professor Grabus, wanting first to see forgiveness from all sides, and then justice.184
This prevents revenge or retribution from creeping into the process. Forgiveness can
be taught and practiced, and the Baptist Church has a process of leading willing
1 rs
people from hatred to forgiveness. He emphasises that forgiving is a process that
involves different dimensions, and, although a person can extend a genuine act of
1 Rfr
forgiveness, emotional healing may take longer.
5.7. Conclusion to the Justice and Forgiveness Section
Several significant points emerge from this element on justice and forgiveness. First,
among the religious leaders interviewed a general consensus exists that justice is
foundational to the restoration of civil society. This is especially the case for the
Muslims for whom justice is central to the Islamic worldview. Second, the religious
leaders recognise in principle the sovereignty of the courts to undertake the legal task
of carrying out justice. However, there is no unanimity about the nature of those
courts or the procedures necessary to secure justice. This is especially evident over
the role and legitimacy of the Hague court. To date, it has had the most far-reaching
effect on addressing perceived wrongs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but perhaps without
the desired affect ofmoving the country towards social restoration. Third, religious
leaders generally concede that complete justice - either through external or local
judicial mechanisms - cannot be accomplished, leaving many persons to deal with
private and personal injustices. Left unaddressed, residual fears and insecurities will
remain, and will contribute to enduring animosity. Fourth, the resources of the
religious faith communities can adequately address the injustice and fear left
unresolved by the court systems so that animosities dissolve and social restoration
may result. This is demonstrably so in and through the lives of the religious leaders
interviewed in the research.
6. Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of the thoughts, motives and efforts of religious leaders has
demonstrated that religious faith can contribute to peace-building and social
restoration in several ways. First, all religious leaders function with a strong sense of
Transcendence that shapes and informs their worldviews. This is expressed in their
view of God and creation, which is definitive for humanity and society. The sense of
184 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 15.
185 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 18.
186 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 18.
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the Transcendence enables forgiveness and transformation, and moves persons and
communities from fragmentation to wholeness.
Second, this affects their approach to peace-building in the following ways. The
'enemy' is not people or communities, but ideology, especially the ideology of
nationalism. Identity is defined in terms of self and community without
disenfranchising others. Consequently, there is a readiness to deal with root causes
of the conflict, which demonstrates promising results for sustainability of the peace-
building initiative.
Finally, the evidence of the interviewees confirms in concrete terms the validity of
John Paul Lederach's conceptualisation to sustainable peace-building through
inclusion of a wider spectrum of civil society. Some of the interviewees represent
Lederach's second-level of'civilian diplomacy' wherein religious leaders influence
both high level political elites and the masses. Insofar as these leaders have access to
all levels of society through formal and informal mechanisms, they are key figures
for sustainable peace-building and social restoration. However, the analysis of the
interviews also reveals that at times these leaders are encumbered by their position.
They have to address simultaneously the freedoms a multi-national, multi-religious
democratic society brings, and at the same time confront the real and present security
issues of protecting their own community. Their power to bring effective change is
also dependent on support from the third level of society, the masses. For this
reason, the thesis now turns its attention to the roles that Women (Chapter Five) and
Students (Chapter Six) play in peace-building and social restoration.
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Views of Religious Women on
Peace-Building and Social Restoration
1. Introduction
With over forty women's groups organised throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina,' women
constitute a strong foundation for rebuilding society. The 1998 UNHCR Regional
Strategy Report also names women as "essential participants" in the process of
peace-building.2 This chapter therefore makes inquiry into the nature of peace-
building and social restoration by religions women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
inquiry makes use of interviews carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina and asks, "What
empirical evidence is there ofwomen having a special role in peace-building on their
religious convictions?" It probes the question of how religious faith informs and
instructs women, and asks whether women of religious faith make distinctive
contributions towards peace-building. The chapter is thus an exploration of
Lederach's Level Three, or grassroots, peace-building initiatives.
The chapter proceeds along the following line. First, it describes the social context
ofwomen in socialist Yugoslavia, noting the general trends resulting from
urbanisation and modernisation. Second, the chapter will look at ideologically-
motivated narratives ofwomen in relation to the war. This section examines the
mythological imagery created by nationalists to win the support ofwomen, and
reviews two competing feminist images ofwomen and war from the West. Third,
1 ODZO: np.
2 Cited by Hart 2001: 296.
150
Chapter Five
the chapter examines in detail the basis from which women of religious faith engage
in peace-building and social restoration. This section is especially interested to know
if these women believe that they have a special contribution to make in a male-
dominant society, and what power sources and mechanisms are present in the
process. The chapter concludes by assessing the critical role women of religious
faith play towards peace-building and social restoration.
2. Women in Yugoslav Society
Women's roles in socialist Yugoslavia varied in accordance with the significant
cultural differences within the state. These were most striking in a North-South
polarity in which the richer, better-educated and more Westernised areas of Slavonia
(Croatia) and Voyvodina (Serbia) sometimes clashed with the poorer, less
Westernised southern provinces of Crna Gora, Kosovo and Macedonia. This
influence was also felt in Bosnia-Herzegovina where its mountainous topography
contributed to its isolation and rural character.
2.1. Women in Rural Bosnia, and the Zadruga
Anthropologist Tone Bringa has made an insightful study ofwomen in rural central
Bosnia.3 The focus of the study is Muslim women, but is also well informed about
Catholic women in an undisclosed pre-war village of Central Bosnia. It examines the
Bosnian zadruga, or extended family community, which can sometimes exceed
seventy five members.4 The zadruga is the definitive pre-modern feature of society5
through which roles and expectations of family members are assigned. Although still
largely patriarchal, the zadruga is technically distinct from a strictly patriarchal
arrangement. One of the expected roles ofwomen in the zadruga is that ofmoral
guardian. Although they have no particular religious function either in the mosque or
the church, women are the moral adjudicators in the zadruga and ultimately the
community.6 Peccadilos ofboth sexes do not escape the scrutiny of the women of
the zadruga, and a person quickly earns a reputation within the community. Women
of the community might have more to say about an extra-marital affair or a man's
drunkenness than the local imam or priest, who may not know about the situation.
3 Bringa 1995.
4 Cited in Allcock 2000: 353-4.
5 Allcock 2000: 353.
6 Bringa 1995: 86ff.
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The zadruga still functions in rural areas, but urban women live in a different
context.
2.2. Modernisation, Urbanisation and the Changing Role of Women
Urbanisation and modernisation contributed to the decline of the zadruga, and
brought change to the mores of the extended family. Some village codes migrated to
the urban setting with an older, more traditional generation. However, the roles of
women in urban areas reflect patterns of change consistent with those throughout the
rest of Europe as it transitioned from traditional to modem society.7
Notable during the communist period was the general acceptance ofwomen in public
life. Women attained this recognition while maintaining their primary responsibility
in the home, creating a 'double day' for many urban women.8 Even those who did
not officially constitute part of the work force were gainfully employed in the
'parallel markets', or underground economy, ofYugoslavia.9 And statistics do not
bear out the commonly held notion that socialism afforded equal opportunity for
employment and pay in Bosnia-Herzegovina.10
In the current post-war situation ofBosnia-Herzegovina women are especially
affected. Gender equality regulation is a new concept and poorly observed. A glass
ceiling is noticeable in political appointments and executive managerial positions."
Women suffer more from the destruction of the industrial sector since they were
over-represented in factory work, especially textiles.12 According to one report
7 Allcock points to a general improvement for women during the inter-war years, in
the advent of a women's movement in Yugoslavia. The decline in birth rate allowed women
to enter into gainful employment outside of the home; by 1921 they constituted 41.0% of
the work force, a statistic that remained stable for the next sixty years. During the war years
in the 1940s women took on increasingly non-traditional (i.e., non-domestic) roles as part of
the war effort, necessitated by the absence ofmen. Illiteracy for women was reduced from
60% (40% for men) in 1921 to 15% (4% for men) in 1981 (Allcock 2000: 354ff).
8 Allcock 2000: 356.
9 Cited in NGO Report 1999: 155.
10 As late as 1986 a woman's average earnings were 86.9% of a man's, and
concentrated largely in the manufacturing industry (Allcock 2000: 356). Because
occupations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were gender-typed, equal access to certain jobs for
women was precluded. Women were vastly under-represented in managerial positions and
infrequently achieved the ranks of upper management in medicine or education (NGO
Report 1999: 155-7).
11 NGO Report 1999: 156, 7.
12
Many of these industries were state owned during the communist period, and now
face long delays while they seek investment and move towards privatisation. Back pay,
benefits and pensions for women in these sectors are unlikely to be recovered (Cited in
NGO Report 1999: 156).
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commissioned for the World Bank, women headed up twenty percent of the post-war
households in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In these male-absent households women have
lower employment rates, and were paid wages 20-50% lower than men.13 Only in
two non-industrial areas were women over-represented, namely, in the schools, and
centres for social work. These areas are considered to be 'female occupations',
demonstrating that if an organisation had profits to be earned, the positions ofpower
generally went to men.14
2.3. Women and the Legacy of Violation During the War
A significant factor in understanding the place ofwomen in society today is
recognition of the long-term effects of their victimisation in the war, especially
through inter-ethnic rape. Always a tragic accompaniment to war,15 rape took on a
strategic dimension in this conflict, being used as part of the concerted plan of ethnic
cleansing by reproducing the enemy in the womb of the raped woman.16
Statistics on rape in the conflict are difficult to assess because of the use made of
them for propaganda purposes. During the war statistics given by the government of
Bosnia-Herzegovina about the number of rapes ofBosnjak women were generally
accepted and widely disseminated. The fact that Serbian women were also raped was
ignored.17 As a result there is little certainty about the accuracy of any single
statistical representation.18
13 Cited inNGO Report 1999: 156.
14 NGO Report 1999: 157.
15 See, for instance, Elizabeth Neuffer's historical survey of rape as a violent
accompaniment ofwar, and the meagre attempts to make rape a war crime (Neuffer 2000:
271-277). Significantly, rape was subsequently recognised as a 'war crime against
humanity' in February of 2001 by the ICTY for the systematic rape, forceful detention and
sale ofBosnjak women (HCHR-BH 2001: np).
16 Because nationhood is determined patrilineally, rape had the twofold effect of
increasing the absolute numbers of the rapist's ethnic group and making the woman
undesirable to the men of her own ethnic group, thus limiting her future reproductive
capacity.
17 Nikolic-Ristanovic. 2000: 44.
18 Initial reports in the summer of 1992 spoke of 'rape camps' in which Bosnjak
women were singled out and sexually abused before their expulsion from Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Neuffer 2000: 47). A UNHCR briefing document, citing a report originating
with the government ofBosnia-Herzegovina, claimed that as many as 35,000 women were
held in these rape camps (cited in Allcock 2000: 403). While it is commonly agreed that
rape was part of the violence committed within the camps, no 'rape camps' per se were ever
found by independent human rights groups. The difficulty of quantifying instances ofwar¬
time rape is complicated by the inability to verify the crime at the time of the act. Reports
thus vary, citing from 16,000 to 50,000 instances of rape (cited in Allcock 2000: 402-3).
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Underreporting by women is also common in that public knowledge of the act carried
its own social stigmatization, shame19 and rejection. Many women from all
nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina live with this legacy today. It is now realised
that such acts committed in the lawless situation ofwar were extensions of power
imbalances in the society between men and women, and between different national
peoples.20
2.4. Women and Empowerment
Although women have been recognised for their work in peace-building at high level
places outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they remain largely unrecognised and
unempowered in the country.21 Interviewees expressed the sentiment that women
continue to be under-empowered in the post-war period in the male-dominant Balkan
societies.22 Despite the many efforts ofwomen's groups to educate women about
their rights, roles and responsibilities in the new society of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a
sense of resignation remains. Thus, women interviewed for this research do not
expect that the male-dominated political apparatus will provide a voice or
opportunity for women. Women consequently have low expectations that genuine
and long-lasting peace can be achieved through the political process, because they
observe the same inability to resolve conflicts in the political realm as they regularly
observe in the private sphere. While they believe the state would be better offwith
women in decision-making positions of government, most women are unwilling to
battle the chauvinistic attitudes ofmen that impede their efforts. This - coupled with
the unwillingness ofmen to work together - discourages women from taking any
significant part.
While it is at least theoretically possible for women to attain leadership in the
political sphere, and indeed was the case in the Serbian community with Biljana
Plavsic and Mirjana Markovic, leadership in the religious institutions is altogether
precluded. For this reason it is interesting to compare attitudes of the women
interviewed towards the respective authorities of politics and religion.
Women from various religious traditions expressed considerable criticism of the
religious authorities for the way they use their positions to manipulate and defend,
19 HCHR-BH: np.
20 See Nikolic-Ristanovic 2000: 41-77.
21 See OSF 2001: np.
22 This theme is explored in a subsequent section of this chapter.
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but not reconcile or rebuild. They are specifically critical of the politicisation of
religion, which Katrina Kovac from the Orthodox community identified as one of the
direct causes of the war:
Even today, when I look at TV and those religious gatherings, it doesn't
matter which religion they are, what I don't like with these priests and imams
is that they also take part and they enter into politics. And politics actually
brought us the war. And that's why I say there are just a few true believers.23
Similarly, Mojce Leban from the Catholic community argues that religious leaders
place too much emphasis on national identity at the expense of spiritual nourishment:
Now, in this situation six years later, a lot of people in the society are
confused in this process of radical secularisation. It is true, we have a large
number of Croats who are Catholic, but who really practices their religion?
[People] are disappointed in one way. The religious communities don't offer
them food for the soul. They are simply saying, come here and you will be
saved.24
At the same time, the interviewees acknowledged the positive role that religious
leaders can play when they address spiritual concerns. Kovac sees the really spiritual
as those who have sacrificed much in life for the spiritual disciplines, such as monks
who live alone, study and pray, and those who dedicate their lives to God, including
imams. But other religious leaders simply abuse their positions for political or
national gain.25
Zilka Siljak's own work with women brought her into contact and involvement with
the inter-religious movement, IMIC, or Zajedno, founded by Franciscan Marko
Orsolic in Sarajevo. She is also critical of the politicisation of religion, citing
especially the open support of religious leaders from all religious communities for
nationalist political parties:
Of course, abuse could be found on all sides. One ofmy professors
(Bianchini) wrote an article about Political Culture in the Balkan area, and
explained that the biggest abuse was on the Serbian side, their Church
supported openly Karadzic and Mladic. You know about that. Then, the
Catholic Church in Sarajevo also openly supported the HDZ, and the Islamic
community supported the SDA. So they supported openly the nationalistic
parties and nationalistic ideas. And even during the elections I saw some
imams saying to people, 'You know, you have to vote for the SDA party
because they defend your interests and your nation,' etc.26
23 Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 5.
24 Leban [RC.WO.SA.Ol]: 8.
25 Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 5.
26 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 5.
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After the fall of communism religious leaders became embroiled in the nationalist
issues, which did nothing to forestall the conflicts that eventually led to war. But
Siljak is also critical of the Inter-Religious Council, represented by the highest leader
of each of the religious communities. She believes that reconciliation must engage
people at the grassroots level throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the leaders
demonstrate little willingness to become involved at this level:
[0]ur official faith communities don't work much on it, or work very little...
[T]he [members of the] Inter-Religious Council... meet each other, shake
hands, drink coffee and make statements to the media and that's all. They
are doing nothing, I can say simply, because they don't want to go among the
people in BH and to talk with them and to tell them openly that they support
multi-religious dialogue and each believer is obliged to contribute to these
processes. But this centre [IMIC] is trying to go among the people, to talk
with people, to give lectures, to do workshops. You know, you can't speak
about reconciliation or about life, a multi-cultural, multi-religious life here, if
you do not go to Livno or to Banja Luka. You have to go there and to see
people and to talk to them and to find out what they think and what they
want. That is the best way but that is the hardest way. We have a lot of
experience. We travel around and talk to people but it is very hard. Some
people fear, or some people don't want to talk. Some people don't want to
forget, or others don't want to forgive. But our duty is to try again and again
and again.27
Despite sometimes harsh criticism of the religious leadership, and lack of
empowerment within the hierarchies of the religious institutions, women interviewed
remained positive about their own religion and religious community as a whole. This
contrasts sharply with their own views of the political parties and organs, and is in
part attributable to the fact that the political system and parties disdain women, while
religious bodies honour and protect them. In the Roman Catholic and Orthodox
Churches women hold honourable positions vicariously symbolised through Mary as
the theotokos. In the Orthodox Church she is always represented on the iconostasis
holding the infant Jesus opposite the icon of Christ. The position of prominence
afforded Mary in the Church is due to her role as mother, and it is in this role that
women are most esteemed. According to SOC deacon Vladislav Radujkovic, there is
no person closer to God than Mary, and a woman's position is higher than that of a
priest. While the priest is honoured with the task of representing the people before
27 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 8.
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God - and unofficially the man plays this role in the family - a woman is a life giver
and nurturer. This role, he asserts, is more important than a priest's.28
In the Roman Catholic tradition women are similarly honoured through Mary, but in
Herzegovina this takes on an added dimension owing to the claimed appearances of
Mary at Medugorje in 1981. Many millions of pilgrims have visited this remote
village, including Pope John Paul II. Some come to pay homage and pray to Mary,
or pray through the stations of the cross. Others hope to witness another of her
appearances. Still others hope for healing of a physical ailment. Mary represents
both protection for and honour ofwomen that are wholly absent in the political
sphere. For this reason it is not unusual to see women fully engaged in the religious
communities in service to God, nation and family. In contrast to their social situation
elsewhere, women find sanctuary in the churches, which in turn become natural
outlets for nurturing others.
3. Constructed Narratives of Women and War
3.1. Depictions of Women from Nationalist Constructions
Women are depicted emblematically in nurturing roles in the mythology of the
Serbian nation. Among the most recognised motifs of Serbian art is the painting by
Uros Predic entitled Kosovo Girl, which dates from the resurgent nationalist period
of the early twentieth century. The painting was inspired by one of the many epic
poems celebrating the Battle ofKosovo, and contains a pieta-like depiction of
Serbian womanhood. Surrounded by fallen Turkish warriors at the battle site, a
Serbian maiden is kneeling at the side of a mortally wounded soldier propped up on
the fallen body of his Turkish foe. She lifts the soldier's head in order to give him
wine from a golden jug to ease his pain as he dies from his wounds.29 This
mythological depiction ofwomen supporting the heroic Serbian warrior fighting for
the fatherland was successfully employed by the Serbian media to enlist the support
ofwomen for the nationalist cause in the recent Balkan wars.
The nationalist regimes in both Serbia and Croatia consciously rebuffed challenges to
this image-making. In the autumn of 1991, Serbs and Croats were fighting in
Croatia, but the conflict had not yet come to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Women in
28 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 13, 14.
29 Judah 2000: 69.
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Sarajevo protested against the war and began to march towards Belgrade. Croatian
and Serbian women protestors joined them en route. They brandished no weapons
and carried only pictures of their conscripted sons. The intended destination of the
march was the headquarters of the Yugoslav national army in Belgrade, but soldiers
turned them back before they could reach their goal. The next day the Serbian media
countered the women's anti-war march with a televised spot depicting weeping
Serbian mothers heroically sending their sons to the military to do battle for the
fatherland. Two days later the Croatian media placed their own images on the
screen. Croatian mothers were shown holding oversized pictures of Croatian
president Franjo Tudjman, who would later hand out medals to the widows and
mothers of "brave Croatian knights who had laid down their lives on the altar of the
homeland".30 The media campaigns were effective, especially in rural and less
educated areas, and many women adopted the position that it was their "sacred duty"
to play out the sacrificial role for the greater good of the fatherland.31
Womanhood, and especially motherhood, were thus co-opted into the nationalist
causes by both sides. They lost their ability to counter the nationalist rhetoric and
thereby lost control of their choices about their own lives and of their loved ones.
Nationalist image-makers honoured women as the life givers who represented the
"biological salvation of the Serb nation".32 Serbian leaders drew upon the
mythological mediaeval figure ofmother Yugovitch who reproduced in order to send
sons off to fight for the fatherland and salvation of Serbia against infidels.33
Women and their bodies were used for the war cause in other ways. Abortion was
common in socialist Yugoslavia, yet new restrictions were placed on the practice
during the war period in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia.34 Although the laws regarding
abortion remained unchanged, social pressure was put on women to reproduce in the
interest ofpreserving the national identity. At the same time the availability of
contraceptives decreased. The churches and clergy found new material for their pro-
life campaigns, combining them with nationalist rhetoric. In his 1995 Christmas
message, the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church called upon women to "stop
30 Nikolic-Ristanovic 1998: 234.
31 Nikolic-Ristanovic 1998: 235.
32 Allcock 2000: 358.
33 Allcock 2000: 358.
34 Nikolic-Ristanovic 1998: 235.
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'killing' their unborn children, to bear more children despite economic hardship, and
to learn from mothers who lost their only sons in the war and who now regret not
bearing more sons who could bring them consolation".35 Similarly, in Croat
strongholds of Bosnia-Herzegovina, nuns assisted in obstetric examinations and
encouraged the women to carry each developing child to birth in the national
interest.36 The narratives constructed by nationalist leaders reached to every aspect of
women's lives. Competing narratives arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the war
with intervention from the international community.
3.2 Two Depictions of Women from Western Constructions
Western constructions of the relationship women have to war can be expressed
within the framework of two competing narratives. A segment of the feminist-
pacificist view suggests that men are life takers, women are life givers.37 The
assumptions of this view are rooted in the literature of traditional Western thinking,
and related in the following by one scholar on feminist roles related to war:
We in the West are the heirs of a tradition that assumes an affinity between
women and peace, between men and war, a tradition that consists of
culturally constructed and transmitted myths and memories. Thus, in time of
war, men and women - locked in a dense symbiosis, perceived as beings who
have complementary needs and exemplify gender-specific virtues - take on,
in cultural memory and narrative, the personas of Just Warriors and Beautiful
Souls. Man construed as violent, whether eagerly and inevitably or
reluctantly and tragically; woman as nonviolent, offering succor and
compassion: these tropes on the social identities ofmen and women, past and
present, do not denote what men and women really are in time ofwar, but
function instead to re-create and secure women's location as noncombatants
and men's as warriors.38
This view holds that women are by nature the peace-makers, the arbiters of conflict
who will settle the disputes ofmen. Women are thus the victims ofmen's wars,
helpless as the 'weaker sex' to stop the conflict. Subsequently they become the
moral architects in the post-war society who nurture and 'take care of the victimised,
especially children.39
35 Cited in Nikolic-Ristanovic 1998: 235.
36 Nikolic-Ristanovic 1998: 236.
37 Elshtain 1987: 161ff.
38 Elshtain 1987: 3, 4.
39 The contemporary feminist-pacifist construction is tempered by ideals of modem
society. Women too may support a war effort as engaged non-combatants, and may even be
employed by the military complex in support capacities and still retain the role of peace¬
maker. See the interesting historical account by Elshtain who traces the development of
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In contrast to the pacifist-feminist view, the competing equal rights view sharply
redefines the roles ofwomen, and demonstrates a cleavage in the Western feminist
positions. The equal rights construction seeks parity with men and downplays the
differences ofmasculinity and femininity.40 For equal rights feminists, access to
combat roles in the military affords women legal and social equality, which are the
sign and seal of equal citizenship.
3.3. Assessment of the Narratives
These three constructions - the nationalist view as a construct from within the
Balkans, and the two Western views - compete for the attention and commitment of
women in Bosnia-Herzegovina today and constitute an ideological battlefield of a
different kind. In the post-war situation the militancy of the equal rights feminist
position has few followers, but the other positions are well represented. The
Nationalist view is stronger in the Republika Srpska and the Western feminist-
pacifist view is stronger in the Federacija. The latter is especially visible from the
influence of Swanee Hunt, former US Ambassador to Vienna and director of the
Women in Public Policy Program at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School
ofGovernment. A book she wrote was published only in the local language(s) of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and carries the title in English, This Was Not Our War: Bosnian
Women Reclaiming the Peace. Telling the stories of twenty six women of various
nationalities, it "aims to give Bosnian women a voice in the 'man's world' ofwar
and post-war politics that make up Bosnia today".41 In the book and the organisation
she founded, called Women Waging Peace, Hunt looks beyond the war to the
creation of a sustainable peace through "inclusive security".42 Women, she notes,
"are often the most powerful voices for moderation in times of conflict", and
contribute to peace negotiations because they are directly involved in both civil
women's involvement in war from the Crimean War through to the late twentieth century
(1987: 180ff.).
40 In Western societies, especially the United States, women are increasingly
integrated into the military complex, not only in time of war, but as a normal course of
employment. As a result, it has been increasingly difficult to maintain the myth that women
are the antithesis ofmasculine militancy. In the more traditional view, women's roles in the
military were seen as temporary and necessary in times ofwar, after which they would
return to domestic roles. But now women constitute approximately 15% of the US military,
with 85% of jobs open to them (Feinman 1998: 133), including combat pilots. The equal
rights position views integration into the armed forces, and especially combat roles, as "the
'last bastion' for women to conquer" (Klein 1998: 148).
41 Kampschror 2002: np.
42 Hunt and Posa 2001: np.
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activism and family care.43 Furthermore, she claims that although women are
traditionally overlooked for peacemaking roles, they have a special contribution to
make.44 Her apologia for women begins not from a position of "gender fairness" but
from efficiency in that women are "crucial to inclusive security since they are often
at the centre ofNGOs, popular protests, electoral referendums, and other citizen-
empowered movements."45 Structural and psychological barriers prevent women
from being included at the circle of negotiations, but she claims their presence there
ought to be a matter of "common sense" because "everyone recognizes just how
good women are at forging peace".46
While Hunt's analysis contains some accurate insights, it errs in its uncritical
acceptance of feminist-pacifist presuppositions that lack empirical evidence. For
Hunt, male peace-makers and female warriors are "exceptions".47 The war situation
was not this simple or tidy, however. There is ample evidence that men too
disagreed with the war and did what they could to avoid fighting.48 Many men fled
the country in order to avoid conscription into a war that had no winners. Other men
fought in their own capacities against the war, and were victims of someone else's
ideology. All varieties of atrocities occurred in the camps and were not limited to
women. Male prisoners also were raped, tortured and genitally mutilated, rendering
43 Hunt and Posa 2001: np.
44 Hunt and Posa 2001: np.
45 Hunt and Posa 2001: np.
46 Hunt and Posa 2001: np.
47 Hunt and Posa 2001: np.
48 This researcher is personally acquainted with men of conscription age who fled
the country rather than fight in a war conducted by nationalists. Additionally, two persons
interviewed for this research indicated that they opposed the fighting although they were
conscripted and served. One, Dragan Nedic, a Protestant now overseeing the countiy-wide
humanitarian aid and development effort of the Evangelical Church known as Agape, gives
thanks to God that each time there was major fighting in Sarajevo he was off duty and did
not have to kill anyone. The other, Sasa Nikolinovic, pastor of the Evangelical Church in
Sarajevo, also was an unwilling conscript. On more than one occasion while on duty he
encountered enemy forces fleeing, and refused to fire at them. Kovac's husband, a physical
education teacher by profession, found himself an unwilling conscript forced to fight on the
side of the Serbs in order that his family was guaranteed safety. On his honeymoon after a
celebrated wedding in Mostar (see Chapter Four), Nikola and Sandra Skrinjaric
unexpectedly found themselves surrounded and on the front lines of a military offensive
through Central Bosnia. Even in this circumstance where many on both sides were killed
and their own lives were in danger, Skrinjaric refused to shoot. Skrinjaric attributes their




them incapable of reproducing.4'' Insofar as rape is used as a power mechanism it is
as much addressed against the woman as men. In a more balanced feminist
approach, Nikolic-Ristanovic relates:
[W]omen had to 'pay' for real or alleged, previous or actual ideas and acts of
their husbands, sons, brothers, fathers. Or, more precisely, rape was used as
a means to punish a woman's male relatives. This is a way to explain the
abduction, rape, torture and murder of the women whose men were absent
and presumed to be fighting on the opposite side.50
The crime was directly carried out against the woman, but had larger intentions and
implications ofpower, control and victimisation. The woman was not the end; she
was the means to victimise the men of the other nation. Men too, even in the heat of
the confrontation, took stands to be people of peace. For these men, this was not
their war either.
Furthermore, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina presents examples ofmilitant women in
positions ofpower; leading politicians who fought in their own capacities and sent
powerless men into battle. Some women, such as ideologue Mirjana Markovic, wife
if Slobodan Milosevic, are now in hiding, wanted by the Hague. Markovic remains
unrepentant of her activities or views, and denies any wrongdoing. Ultra-nationalist
Biljana Plavsic became SDS party leader when the High Representative prevented
Radovan Karadzic from holding the position in the post-war period. Plavsic gave
herself up to the Hague and pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity. Ultimately
Plavsic accepted responsibility for her part in the war and in inflicting violence on
innocent victims, and was subsequently sentenced to eleven year of imprisonment.
These women are exceptional because of their rise to power in a man's world, but not
for their views. Too much evidence exists that women can use nurture as a weapon
to instil hatred and racism in their children. Drina Nikolinovic is especially sober
about this factor:
Still there is a lot of hatred among women, also. I can see it. I can see my
neighbours, for example, who would say, 'I would kill the child in a cradle of
Serbian nation'. And she is a wife and a mother and, speaking secularly now,
because I am a mother, I would never kill anyone's child. No way.... And I
know that there are many who think that way. And maybe they would not
49 See, for instance, the testimony of B-1461 at the Hague Tribunal who witnessed
sexual abuse of male Bosnjak prisoners in one camp. Genitalia were torn from the body.
Male prisoners were serially raped. Others were ordered to perform oral sex on each other,
and then were commanded to bite off and swallow the penises of others. That this happened
on the Muslim day ofBajram was of particular degradation (CIJ 2003: np.).
50 Nikolic-Ristanovic 2000: 61.
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actually kill a child, but sometimes it is enough just to hear her saying [such
things], and those words will feed hatred in the hearts of people.51
Nikolinovic offers her own personal experience, which also is supported in the
literature. Seka Kundacina encounters embittered women determined to kill in order
to avenge a lost child, and offers counsel to address their hatred, loss and intentions
to take revenge.52
The literature on the topic also demonstrates how women can be active agents in the
conflict. Barry Hart, a peace worker in Bosnia-Herzegovina, relates the difficult
questions of a Bosnjak grandmother from Srebrenica, whose own father and brother
were killed by a Serb military unit in World War Two. After their deaths her own
mother taught her to 'forgive the enemy', but she now believes that advice to be
wrong. She is raising her grandchildren because their father and mother were killed
in the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995. She asks, "What should I tell my
grandchildren about this war - who is going to tell what happened to their parents
and why?" 53 In a separate incident, Volf refers to an account by Serbian journalist
Zelko Vukovic in which a Bosnjak mother names her new born child 'Jihad' so that
he will never forget the torture she underwent at the hands of Serbs during this
conflict. Vukovic writes, "How many mothers in Bosnia have sworn to teach their
children hate and revenge! How many little Muslims, Serbs, and Croats will grow up
listening to such stories and learning such lessons!"54
Men may seem dangerous because they project a brutish, warmongering image, and
women may appear benign in the conflict, but prove just as dangerous with a subtle
and latent effect on a new generation. Correspondingly, Nikolinovic does not
automatically regard women as reconcilers. She is sceptical that some of the
women's associations will bring reconciliation because they make no effort to reach
beyond their own national group:
[Y]ou have, for example, now all those gatherings of women, Mothers and
Wives of Srebrenica or Serbian Sisters.... [A]ll these gatherings are again
very limited by nation.... They are sharing their pain but they just share it
within their nation.... [W]hen I hear of Serbian Sisters or such kind of
gatherings, [it] just makes me sick, because I don't think that that's a step
toward bringing some peaceful ideas, actually. Women could, really, if they
51 Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 6.
52 Kundacina [PR.WO.MO.Ol]: 9.
53 Hart 2001: 304.
54 Vukovic 1993: 134, as cited in Volf 1996b: 111.
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wanted to.... [E]specially for the future, you know, because they are the ones
who influence their children most. And they are ones who are bringing up
the next generation. But I'm afraid in the situation that we have now, this
generation brought up in this era [is] going to get a lot of poisonous ideas
from their mothers. I'm sad to say this, but it is true.55
Set against this body of empirical evidence, it has to be concluded that women too
make choices to be active participants in the conflict. Without essentialising women,
men, or the conflict, a more realistic path forward must be found.
4. Women, Religious Faith, and Social Restoration
It is clear from the interviews that religious women believe that they have a special
role to play in peace-building and restoration.56 Krishna Kovac knows this from her
own experiences in Sipovo in the Republika Srpska near the IEBL border. She offers
the following from her experiences there:
Right away after people came back [women] started to hang out together.
And I think that women were the first ones to take part in humanitarian
organisations and they crossed the lines while the men were afraid to do
that.57
Catholic Vesna Liermann's experience is similar in recovery efforts among women
in Vukovar, a heavily destroyed border city to Serbia in Croatia. She also quickly
recognised the common needs women had in the city, and began to organise Serbian
and Croatian women to support each other. Her work grew to other cities, such as
Osijek where she is the Director of the Centar zaMir (Centrefor Peace), and
eventually aided efforts throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina when the war moved there.
Liermann witnessed that women were more open to reconciling than men, and that
women approached each other more easily than men:
I think they do [have a special role to play]. For a period of time I worked in
this island of Brae especially with women from Srebrenica and their kids. I
was pleasantly surprised to discover that these victimised women were more
tolerant and they were ready to be a part of these peace efforts, reconciliation
efforts. I saw that also in Tenje with these women. They were ready to make
the first step always. We also worked with their husbands but as men, of
course, they weren't as open as women. It was as if they withdrew
themselves for some reason. I believe there's a desire to make such efforts
55 Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 7.
56 Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 6, Ilic [SO.WO.BL.Ol]: 4, Kundacina [PR.WO.MO.Ol]:
16, Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 12, Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 3 are all of this persuasion.
Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 6, 7 believes women could play this role, if they so chose.
57 Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 6.
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but just showing emotions, to make also that first step is difficult for men. I
just noticed that women were more ready to make those first steps.58
Women's perceptions of those special roles take on various dimensions ranging from
private and domestic to public and political. Three of the women suggest that if
more women had been in positions of authority and were decision makers in
Yugoslavia during its break-up, the war might have been averted altogether because
women are more able to resolve conflict without resorting to violence. Kovac
expresses it thus:
I think that [women's way of] thinking is quite different than men's. They
are more flexible. There are also nice men but [most of them] are stubborn
and they need time to put that in their head, to settle that in their head and
then come to the conclusion that we women are right. Even today I say that
ifwomen were more in the positions of authority and power that the war
wouldn't have happened.59
Jelena Ilic works in the archdiocese offices of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Banja
Luka, and is a volunteer with the St Sava Youth Organisation (Sventosavska
Omladinska Zajednica) organised and directed by deacon Vladislav Radujkovic. Ilic
agrees with Kovac about the possible outcomes of the war ifwomen had been better
placed in positions of authority:
[A woman] would have to be present in these official positions so that maybe
these things that happened would have been prevented; in different ministries
and the police so she could spread her positive energy.60
Protestant Seka Kundacina from Mostar is a grandmother in her seventies and lost
her son in the war. She is also of this sentiment, and sees that women are
marginalised in these affairs by men in society:
And if you would ask the women, they would never have started the war.
But the Bosnian woman is still left on the side. There are a few of them that
are sitting and deciding about big things. And I think if they would give the
possibility to women so that they could also be involved in great decisions in
one state, then it would be more efficient and much better for us today.61
Women assessed their ability to be reconcilers higher than that ofmen, largely based
on their superior verbal communication skills, as Siljak indicates:
58 Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 3.
59 Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 7.
60 Ilic [SO.WO.BL.01]: 4.
61 Kundacina [PR.WO.MO.Ol]: 11.
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[WJomen communicate easier in daily life. I communicate with other
mothers in school easier than my husband and also in the market and in
stores. Everywhere. So it is easier for them to make some connection than
for men. Men are more interested in political issues, or in political
representatives here but, as I told you, through the women's associations,
they can do a lot. Perhaps even more than our politicians.52
A man's temperament is sometimes described as stubborn63 or emotionally
withdrawn64 and their disagreements more often led to fighting, as Kovac relates:
In general, in life if [men] don't agree they fight. And they solve problems
with fighting. And women are those who will solve problems with dialogue.
There are a thousand ways to solve a problem without a fight.65
Ilic attributed this disposition to a male-centred 'Balkan mentality' that refused to
recognise the opinion of a woman to any significant degree:
This is the Balkans and it's this mentality. Women were not seen in politics
before the war and women are just not..., you don't think about women, you
don't ask her anything.66
Kovac and Nikolinovic67 sense that women are 'more religious' than men, citing
greater regularity and participation in the church or mosque to substantiate their
observations. However, Liermann and Siljak68 could not make such an assessment
based on personal experience. These women also sensed that factors more
substantive than attendance in the church or mosque were more important for peace-
building. These factors are explored in the following sections.
4.1. Distinguishing 'Religion' and 'Faith'
One of the questions that the research was interested to examine was whether
religious women made a distinction between the terms 'religion' and 'faith' and, if
so, how might this effect their peace-building efforts. The local language has a word
for each of these, religija, and v/era. The latter term is usually translated as 'faith',
but with the additional meaning of'belief, 'religion', 'creed', or even 'credit'. Also,
these terms are often used interchangeably.
62 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 15.
63 Kovac [SO.WO.S1.03]: 7, Ilic [SO.WO.BL.Ol]: 5.
64 Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 3.
65 Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 7.
66 Ilic [SO.WO.BL.Ol]: 4.
67 Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 8; Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 8.
68 Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 5; Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 15.
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Zilka Siljak, a graduate of the Faculty ofIslamic Studies in Sarajevo, acknowledges a
sociological distinction between the words 'religion' and 'faith', but otherwise she
finds it difficult to draw a distinction between the two terms and uses them
interchangeably:
[AJccording to my opinion, religion is a view of believers, attitudes towards
life and it is my own way through life. Also, through religion I see the world
in which I live and everything around me. It is my view through which I live
my own life. And also, it is some kind ofmeeting the sacred, to God. This is
what it is to me, and accordingly, my whole life has a religious dimension. I
am not religious only in the mosque. I am religious now when I am sitting
here and talking to you. It is a whole way of life for me.... [T]here are two
terms, but to me there is no difference. It is the same for me. You can make
a distinction sociologically, but for me my own faith is everything. It is my
life.... Because my faith determines all things in my life. All things.69
She expresses the concepts of religion and faith in terms that are both definitional
and personal. Although she does not draw a distinction between 'religion' and
'faith', she draws a marked difference between a superficial and deeper
understanding of religion. Her own childhood was marked by the former, her family
practising "some kind of traditional way of religion, mainly worship and customs".70
Only when she was afforded the opportunity to study Islam more deeply and
formally at the Gazi-Husref-Begova Medresa and the Faculty ofIslamic Studies in
Sarajevo did her faith became determinate in her life.71 She also indicates that her
own early experience is not exceptional. Now engaged in working with women and
youth, she sees the same variables at play. Most young people have inherited from
their parents a traditional understanding of their religion, which is very superficial.
There is, consequentially, great ignorance about one's own religion, in which most
persons cannot articulate its basic tenets.72 Nevertheless, Siljak is seeing an interest
by young people to know more about their religion and the religion of others:
I know that in a women's centre we had a project of gender studies, and
young people were interested in religion very much, but they didn't know
about their own religion, or very little. It was traditional heritage inherited
from their parents or their family. Nothing more. But they really wanted to
leam about other religions. I was surprised when half of them decided to
write essays about religion. So it was a sign to me that they're really
interested, even after all these things, they're really interested to know about
69 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 4.
70 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 3.
71 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 3.
72 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 7.
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others, about ourselves and about others and to understand how to live our
future. So we have to deal with young people and to talk to them.73
The phenomenon of resurgent religion is an indication to Siljak that young people
want to understand themselves and their community better. They also want to
understand more about others, and how to create a future together in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Other women interviewed do make a difference in the tenns 'religion' and 'faith'.
Vesna Liermannn from the Catholic community makes two kinds of distinctions
between 'religion' and 'faith'. The first is an expression of superficiality and depth:
Religion for me is when you belong to some church as an institution. But
faith is something much deeper and is about spirituality.74
Her experience as a negotiator for reconciliation among women leads her to believe
that people often mix the two terms. "I think that they live on this level of religion,
they don't go any deeper into faith," says Liermannn. Second, she differentiates
'religion' and 'faith' in relation to her work as a peace activist at the Centre:
Religion is some kind of theory, but faith would be a way in which to engage
in some kind of practice.75
Linking these two sets of distinctions, she draws out their implications for peace-
building:
It would help if representatives of different religions would go deeper in their
faith and read their Qur'an or Bible where they can find a source, helpful
source how they can build peace. And if they believe in that sincerely and
start to put it into practice then the result would be this kind of reconciliation
and peace. If faith stays just in this religious level, superficial faith, then
nothing will be changed.76
Like Liermann, Mojca Leban is also Roman Catholic. At the time of the interview
she was the director ofAbraham/Ibrahim, a religiously-based NGO headquartered in
Sarajevo. It works especially among young people throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina
and emphasises common aspects of the monotheistic religions and the pluralist
religious history of Bosnia-Herzegovina to foster understanding between youth. The
organisation especially addresses the needs of the next generation, and sponsors
seminars, dialogues, exchange trips and youth events to bring youth of the different
73 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 7, 8.
74 Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 2.
75 Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 2.
76 Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 5.
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nations together. Leban is educated as a theologian, which lends expertise to her
insights into the religious nature of reconciliation and peace-building. She suggests
that a large part of the problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the ignorance of religion
across all of the national groups. Religion, she emphasises, is often identified with a
national expression at the expense of the spiritual dimension.77 The repercussions are
significant for peace-building and restoration:
[T]hat segment of reconciliation, that segment of forgiveness, that segment of
love, all of those things are just slipping away, perhaps into the future. But
nobody is talking about it today.78
Jelena Ilic from the Orthodox tradition differentiates between 'religion' and 'faith'
thus:
Faith is something personal that is between me and God. I'm not a
theologian, that's how I see it. Religion is church as an institution, priests,
then customs and habits and everything. Tradition.79
This personal and relational understanding of faith, in contrast to the institutional
character of religion, is also drawn out by Protestant Drina Nikolinovic:
I don't have any good opinion about religion, you know. And I would never
consider myself religious. Religion is set of rules.... And it doesn't have to
do a lot with real faith, with what you really believe.... In my opinion [faith
is] a relationship to the Lord. Yes. And it's knowing God. It's something
that I'm growing in during this period. But very often when I speak about
my God it's [pause], I know him. I mean I know him as I know my friend or
something. And still God can surprise me, you know, but it's relationship.80
Similarly, Protestant Sandra Rakic from the Protestant community in Sarajevo was
seventeen when she lost her best friend and father in the daily shelling of her city.
She also sees a difference between religion and faith and defines the latter
relationally:
I was not religious. I was a bad believer because every time I needed
something, I knew that, you know, there was a God. When I was in school
and I didn't leam enough, I said, "God, God, please, don't let the teacher ask
me anything." Today when somebody comes and tells me, "You changed
your faith," my first reaction was always, "I have never had faith." I didn't
have faith, actually. Concerning religion, I come from a mixed family, but
that was religion that is something you cannot choose, that you are bom in
and that's it. You are bom in an Orthodox family and you have to be
77 Leban [RC.WO.SA.Ol]: 8.
78 Leban [RC.WO.SA.Ol]: 8.
79 Ilic [SO.WO.BL.Ol]: 3.
80 Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 4.
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Orthodox. Or vice versa, or a Catholic. But faith is something... should I
quote Hebrews 11:1? I know today that I know a living God, that I have the
relationship with the living God and that nobody pushed me or forced me to
do that. It is something that I chose. It's a big difference.81
Kovac from the Orthodox community in Sipovo also emphasises the personal aspect
of faith in contrast to something more impersonal:
[F]aith is believing in God and religion is teaching about God as a science.
But faith in my opinion is believing in that divine being.82
In Mostar Seka Kundacina comes from a culturally Catholic heritage and is married
to a Serb, but like many Yugoslavs ofher generation, rejected all religion and raised
her children under the atheistic ideology of socialism. She sees her gradual
pilgrimage to Christianity through the Evangelical Church as a clear and conscious
departure from her earlier years. Although she did not attempt to make a difference
between the terms 'religion' and 'faith', she makes a clear distinction between credal
confession in God and personal trust in God. She relates the difference to traditional
Christians thus:
The difference is that we say "I believe in God" and that person does those
things that are not right. But those that say "I trust in God" they do things
right and if they make mistakes they know to ask forgiveness because of the
Holy Spirit.... That's the difference between my faith and your faith. I have
a living relationship with God because he's alive and you don't have it
because you trust in your saints.83
From the foregoing it may be observed that several of the women interviewed make a
definitional distinction between the terms 'religion' and 'faith',84 while others85 may
use the terms 'religion' and 'faith' interchangeably. However, all of them make a
distinction between the traditional and/or institutional dimension, and a personal-
relational dimension ofwhat they practice. It is this latter expression that informs
them for their efforts in peace-building, often in contradistinction to the former. A
closer examination of this dynamic is in order.
4.2. The Transcendent Element of Peace-Building and Restoration
81 Rakic [PR.WO.SA.03]: 5.
82 Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 4.
83 Kundacina [PR.WO.MO.Ol]: 12, 13.
84 Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02], Leban [RC.WO.SA.Ol], Ilic [SO.WO.BL.Ol], Rakic
[PR.WO.SA.03], Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02], Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03].
85 Kundacina [PR.WO.MO.Ol], Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol],
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Several of the women interviewed undertake their efforts in peace-building from a
strong sense of obedience to God. Siljak points out that God created all humanity,
and if he so willed, he could have created us in one religion, but the Qur'an teaches
that he created us differently in order that we might have the opportunity to leam
from our differences.86 Seen in this way, our differences are not liabilities, but
opportunities to leam from and about each other.87 The basis for this understanding
is also from the Qur'an, that all of life is sacred and thus no one has the right to kill
others. Siljak puts it this way:
So we have to show respect to all human creatures because human life is
sacred. No one has the right to kill other people. According to Islam, if you
kill a person with intention, it would be as if you killed all mankind. And
God is teaching us about love because God gives love to us every day. Why
don't we give it to other people and be merciful?88
Seka Kundacina started a multi-national women's group out ofher experience of a
vision from God, encouraging her to use her knitting abilities to reach out to war-
destitute women in need of affordable clothing for their children. Beginning in 1995
with just three women from the Protestant church in West Mostar, the group has
grown to over thirty from all religious backgrounds, and atheists as well. Three
things especially impacted her willingness to reach out to others. First, she received
physical and spiritual help from the Evangelical Church in her hour of need
following the loss ofher son in the daily shelling of the city. With time, she
experienced a personal conversion and transformation from atheism to Christianity,
which motivated her to help others similarly traumatised. Second, she was attracted
to the multi-national aspect of the West Mostar Evangelical Church where Croats,
Serbs and Bosnjaks all worship together. In the divided city ofMostar it was
difficult to imagine people from all these national groups gathering peacefully
together for anything. It reminded her of the pre-war days in which there was no
hatred towards people of another nation. Third, although she has no special
theological training, she learned from the Bible that all humanity is one in the eyes of
God:
86 This is a summary of the verse (5:51) "If God had so willed, He would have made
you a single People, but (His Plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: so strive as in a
race in all virtues. The goal of you all is to God; It is He that will show you the truth of the
matters in which ye dispute."
87 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 17.
88 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 17.
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Maybe this is good what has happened because I don't have hatred towards
another nation. Or when we were in the communist time then we all were
together. And there was no hatred because we had no clue about who is
Serbian, or Catholic or Muslim. We were one. And maybe this church has
drawn me because all the nations are in there. And most of time I would stop
on Genesis because it says clearly that God created man and his wife, that
God created man from the dust of the earth. And I would say to my ladies in
the group that God has created a man, not a nation, and that we are one.
That's why for me you don't exist like this nation or that. We are one in the
eyes ofGod. He loves man but he hates sin. And that's the difference,
there's no nationality. God created man, not nationality. In my group there
is maybe one or two Croatian ladies and the rest are Serbian and Muslim.89
The sense of God's presence and oversight in people's lives is also an important part
of the message Kundacina gives to others. Many of the similarly distraught and
disoriented women received these words and experienced transformations of their
own, becoming followers ofChrist. It is precisely this kind of transformation that
encourages her to think optimistically about the future possibilities for reconciliation.
She is cautious to point out, however, that this is a work of God through faithful
believers:
I'm an optimist and I believe [peace] will come, especially if the Word of
God will go forth. And the churches would be raised up and Christianity
would go up and even when people would give their living testimony so that
other people could see what they're saying [and that] they're living it. And
each of us in their community could change. And ifwe will do this it would
come. God made wonderful things in Bosnia-Herzegovina and this time of
peace among all nationalities will come. But we need to do what is our part,
to speak and to go to women, to children, to men with no difference of
nationality.90
Reconciliation and peace-building have a pronounced supernatural aspect for
Protestant Nikolinovic. Her convictions stem from her own pilgrimage from atheist
to Christian believer. Having once been part of the young and relatively affluent
societal cliques of the capital city, her conversion gave her a sense of freedom to be
herself because her acceptance rested not in the trendy circle with her friends, but in
God:
No, honestly, I found rest in just being myself. And not putting emphasis on
what people expect you to be, moved pressure ofmy life. I know Almighty
accepts me, and that gives rest to my soul. That helped me also to know
89 Kundacina [PR.WO.MO.Ol]: 10.
90 Kundacina [PR.WO.MO.Ol]: 14.
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myself better because it's definitely the other kind of light - light that God
shines onto you when he shows things the way they really are.91
She describes knowing God as she knows a friend,92 and links reconciliation to a
qualified supernatural work of God in people's lives:
But that reconciliation is possible only in Jesus, really. I don't see any other
way because maybe you can have some temporary reconciliation that cannot
be called actually like that.... I mean it's too big to be overcome only by
human strength.... With human strength and with even forgiveness and
everything it's not possible.93
While the majority of society now carefully scrutinises the nationality of individuals,
the spiritual transformation of persons in the church fellowship allows Bosnjaks,
Serbs, Croats and Roma (Gypsies) to worship together without distinction or
discrimination.
Roman Catholic Vesna Liermann also noticed that even non-religious women open
to reconciliation with other women could have a faith-awakening experience in an
informal spiritual environment. She points to a kind of spiritual awakening for some
of the women that came through being together with women from other national
communities:
It was interesting to work with women who didn't identity themselves as
believers but they were coming from different national backgrounds. They
were trying to work ...among different nationalities on reconciliation. Faith
wasn't an issue at all and we didn't have this sense that they were active in
their churches. It was our desire to work with women who would work
together in their communities, and then their sense of faith would wake up at
some moment. After they spent some time together with different groups
they have this desire to look over to the other side and learn more about other
religious groups. That was interesting. It was some kind of inward guidance,
it was just interesting to see that they wanted to work together.94
She sees that God is part of this process even if persons involved see themselves as
non-believers:
You don't have to be a card-carrying believer but the way of life can testify
to that. Sometimes we do things instinctively, and I put these two things
together, man and God.95
91 Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 4.
92 Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 4.
93 Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 16
94 Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 4.
95 Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 4.
173
Chapter Five
The expression of the Transcendent in people's lives then translates into the social
networks in which these women are most naturally involved. For most of them, this
is through the family.
4.3. Peace-Building and Restoration Through Family Networks
A woman's centrality to the family is common across national boundaries. Not
unexpectedly then, women undertake peace-building most effectively through family
networks. Family issues and especially the needs of children are a natural
conversation and bonding point for women, regardless of religion and nationality.
For Orthodox school teacher Katrina Kovac, the family is the starting point for
efforts in overcoming conflict. She believes that if the conflict were viewed from a
family orientation rather than political perspective, the war might have been avoided:
I think for common people, if we think of them, that the war would never
come, that you have these politicians and people with these heads, greedy
heads and maybe international community as well. Different influences that
make people to hate each other.... I start from the point of every normal
person who has a family and children, and think that no family would ever do
anything to encourage war.... But I really think - actually this is repetition - I
think 99%, maybe even more people here do not want war. But just these
few heads, a few of them who want to make this hatred.96
Family orientation led her to become involved in helping displaced persons at the
height of the war. She and her daughter were forced from their Central Bosnian town
of Sipovo once shared by Orthodox and Bosnjaks, and her husband was conscripted
to fight for the Serbs. The Croat (counter-) offensive drove Bosnjaks and Orthodox
alike from the town and Kovac and her family took up temporary residence in Banja
Luka. Although a displaced person herself, she led a woman's organisation called
Sisters ofSerbia, helping other displaced persons, regardless of their national
background. Once the signing of the Dayton Accord allowed for the peaceful
resettlement of Sipovo, Kovac became a spokesperson to direct humanitarian aid first
from Banja Luka to Sipovo, and then co-ordinated efforts with SFOR troops in town
to distribute aid among local families, regardless of nationality. As a result, Sipovo
became the first 'open' town in the Republika Srpska, a status that many villages
have not yet achieved. As a regular participant in inter-religious dialogue seminars
between believers of different confessions from Bihac, Brcko and Sipovo, she
personally vetted the safety of the unnerved Muslim women, obvious by their head
96 Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 10.
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covering, in Serbian territory.97 The same careful disregard for national differences
carries over into her teaching in the classroom. In a situation where isolation and
ostracisation is common, she attempts to integrate the two Muslim children in the
class as much as possible:
If I don't show favouritism and division among children from different
backgrounds, I think that says a lot. And in my class where there are twenty
children two of them are Muslim.... And if I do not show favouritism in the
class between these children, and if I teach them to have friendship with each
other and to help each other, to play together, and when they do certain
exercises or tasks to help each other and I never say in any moment, "Don't
play with them" because they are Muslims. No, they are all the time
together. And as much as I try to have boys and girls together regardless of
religion, in the same way I try to make these children of other backgrounds
sit together with the others, not to separate them. If I were to take these two
and make them sit together separately from others, that is division. But in
my class the two of them sit with the Serb children. And I think even in that
way I did a lot.98
Kovac regrets that strained budgets do not allow more frequent competitions in
sports or dancing across national lines, as was the case before the war.99
As a Muslim, Siljak thinks along the same lines, and asserts that women are playing
a special role in social restoration out of this position as the "main factor in the
family".100 Children's natural curiosity allows mothers to interact with their children
in informal moments of instruction as to how they should respond to and treat other
children. It is critical for her to teach her own children that not all Serbs are
'Cetniks', for instance, and that the Quran teaches Muslims to respect not only the
Peoples of the Book, but all human beings:
You know, I told you how I teach my children. I have messages from my
holy book, from the Qur'an, about that, and I have to respect and follow that.
First of all, we have to respect followers of the holy books, Jews and
Christians especially. But according to other Quranic passages, we have a
lot ofmessages about respecting all human beings, all human creatures....
We know that God created us into a man and woman and divided us into two
tribes, races and nations to meet each other and to leam from each other.101
From the Orthodox community, Ilic also sees the family as the centrepiece of
influence for peace and restoration of the social order. She speaks about the 'positive
97 Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 7.
98 Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 8, 9.
"Kovac [SO.WO.SI.03]: 9.
100 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 12
101 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 17
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energy' that women, more than men, exercise in the home. Family is the 'first
priority', and she believes women have the greatest influence in society through their
children. A woman fights for her family and brings the same tenacity to politics for
the sake of her country or some other cause.102 She finds that the Serbian Orthodox
Church places a strong and correct emphasis on the family, and for this reason is
involved in a restoration movement operating out of the SOC archdiocese in Banja
Luka. She describes the effort of the St Sava Youth Organisation thus:
I think this approach that we are like modem day missionaries among our
people but also those on the side ofMuslims, Catholics, I think that's one of
the solutions. So that they attract many more people because real believers,
true believers would not engage in war. And bringing back faith into
families. So we don't let that thing that's happening in the West happen to
us, too, that there are so many broken homes.103
The organisation focuses its efforts on young people who otherwise are neglected,
troubled and disoriented in the post-war society. It works in religious education in
schools, and addresses such topics as the dangers of drug abuse and seeks to appeal
to young people through artistic expression. One such project set texts of theologian
and spiritual leader bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic (1880-1956) to music in a work
called Songs Above the West and the East. Rather than giving the recording a
traditional and ecclesiastical sound, the text has been given the hard and
contemporary edge of a popular Serbian rock band.
Ilic is representative ofwomen who carry significant responsibility through family
networks to influence society. The effort that she is involved in is unapologetically
nationalist, but consciously non-chauvinist. This church-based organisation
endeavours to reawaken Serbs to their original heritage and faith, claiming that its
core is positive and non-disparaging of other ethnic groups or religions. The effort to
reclaim Serbs to a new identity in the SOC and its historical-spiritual meaning
focuses great attention on young people, who are arguably the largest at-risk group in
the poverty-stricken post-war society of the Republika Srpska.
4.4. Forgiveness as a Spirituality of Healing and Wholeness
Several of the interviewees point to forgiveness as the defining issue of renewed
relationships, reconciliation and wholeness. Ilic senses that ifwomen were given a
chance, they would demonstrate reconciliation and forgiveness in society and politics
102 Ilic [SO.WO.BL.01]: 4, 5.
103 Ilic [SO.WO.BL.01]: 6, 7.
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in the same way as they do in the family.104 Both Leban105 and Nikolinovic also
believe that this factor is missing in society, and connect it with the spiritual
dimension ofbelievers and churches. Nikolinovic recognises that this is a great need
in society and seeks to motivate believers in her fellowship to pray for reconciliation
and forgiveness in Bosnia-Herzegovina.106 At the same time she recognises that those
outside of her believing community may not understand her methods, because they
do not understand the ways of God:
P]t's really hard to speak to people who are not believers about reconciliation
and about forgiveness. I found it hard. I found it hard to say to people,
"You've got to forgive." Why? Because God forgave us. They don't really
believe that God forgave us. So it's not a good reason for them. But what
we're really trying to do is to prepare things in prayer. And then to take
another step in reconciliation among like representatives of certain nations,
among believers, to have this statement of forgiveness, to have this statement
ofwillingness to reconcile, and things like that. I really believe in a spiritual
sense that it's important. When I look around me there is not much
willingness for true reconciliation.107
Siljak finds that forgiveness is also related to God's love and his purposes:
Regarding forgiveness, we have in the Qur'an two options. The law of
Talion, eye for eye, tooth for a tooth. You can answer on the same way, but it
is better for you to forgive and because your enemy may be your friend in the
future. You don't know. Only God knows what is good for you.108
For others forgiveness is a spirituality that is both deeply personal and defining for
their faith. Kovac sees forgiveness as an inherent expression of her personal faith, as
she relates, "Faith and goodwill is the same for me because my faith taught me to
help all people of goodwill and to forgive those who did wrong."109 Sandra Rakic
gives the clearest expression of how personal faith and forgiveness have had an effect
in her life. The following relates her process of healing after her father was killed by
a mortar during the war:
Actually I just wished if I could find that [soldier] and just, you know, take
him apart in little pieces. And when there was a funeral I said, "The warwill
stop and I know this can be done. I know that my hatred will lead me to do
this. I will find out who was on [the line] that day at that kind of placement,
and then I am going to kill that man, but slowly, so that he will suffer." And
104 I lie [SO.WO.BL.01]: 5.
105 Leban [RC.WO.SA.Ol]: 8.
106 Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 5.
107 Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 6.
108 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 17.
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the whole time of the war my friend, Enisa told me about some God.
Actually she started to talk to me about Jesus.... I didn't understand it all, but
still I took many books from her.... And there were some books about
forgiveness and maybe that stopped me from coming to Jesus for some time
because I didn't want to forgive the Serbs. But as God leads us, at the end,
on September 10, 1995,1 gave my life to Jesus and I was really happy. And
of course I couldn't forgive right away. Actually not for a long time. And
the first time that I forgave was maybe a year after that, and it was really a
slow process, maybe even two years, I'm not quite sure. First, I forgave that
man who killed my father. And I really cannot forget the moment when God
brought forgiveness into my heart. Even now I would really like to find that
man, not to kill him, but just to tell him about Jesus who loves him and who
wants him to be saved and to tell him of this powerful love that can erase all
of that hatred. But still after that this was not the complete forgiveness
towards the whole Serb people, a nation. And I loved them only because it
was God's commandment that we have to love our enemies and all other
people. And it really was a slow process, and in the church there were many
sermons and seminars on inner healing, healing of the soul. And I always
again and again brought that before God. I still don't know when this came,
when God really changed all that and so that there was no hatred anymore.110
Rakic goes on to explain how she now feels the liberty to travel throughout the
country and to the Republika Srpska without animosity or feeling troubled.111 The
healing she speaks of began with personal circumstances, and eventually extended to
a whole nation. She also relates it as a work ofGod in her that changed her, and
which she believes can change others.
The interviews of these women about forgiveness and reconciliation are not words
unaccompanied by action, nor are they religious platitudes based on ethical theory.
The interviews are the experiences ofwomen in relation to others, and how their
efforts - largely unknown and unheralded - have served to bring forgiveness,
reconciliation and healing. These personal encounters, small and individual though
they may be, are the hallmark of social restoration.
5. Conclusion
Several noteworthy points emerge from the foregoing analysis of religious women
and peace-building. First, women's societal roles are changing in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a result of several powerful influences. The nationalist and feminist-
pacifist narratives compete for the support ofwomen with opposing portrayals. The
nationalist narrative asks that women accept their victimisation heroically, in the
110 Rakic [PR.WO.SA.03]: 2, 3.
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name of the nation. Women are lauded for their sacrifice and reminded that their loss
was not in vain, but for the sake of the nation. The feminist-pacifist portrayal wants
women to know that their victimisation is caused at the hands ofmen, and that if
things are going to change for the better, then women will have to become involved
to make changes in society.
Both narratives are powerful because they contain strong elements that ring true with
the experiences women have known. Each narrative acknowledges that women were
victimised during war, and each communicates a bond of sympathy with the woman
through her loss. Each also paints strong images of an enemy, and women are
always portrayed on the side of good in the struggle against evil.
While it is important to acknowledge the elements of truth in these narratives -
namely, increased victimisation during a period ofwar at the hands of the enemy,
and at the hands ofmen - it is also important to recognise the intention and limitation
of the narratives. The nationalist narrative lauds women but demonises 'the other'
who is of a different nationality. It thus draws women into the conflict, and asks
them to fight for the nationalist cause without technically becoming weapon-carrying
combatants. The feminist-pacifist narrative also lauds women but demonises men,
failing to recognise or admit that men also can be victimised by women or war, or
that men also can stand for peace. While it avoids the more obvious nationalist
dynamics of conflict, this narrative draws the protagonist-antagonist line between
genders. Both narratives exonerate women, while accusing the other, be it an
individual or a group, and each narrative tends towards oversimplification. Insofar as
women participate uncritically in these mythologies, they contribute to a continuing
fragmentation and division. Wholeness requires both a broader and deeper
perspective.
The women of religious faith reported for this chapter demonstrate that they are not
immune to these compelling narratives, but that they have another worldview from
which to criticise them, and overcome their essentialising mythologies. These
women are informed by the respective holy texts of Christianity and Islam which
assert the intrinsic value and sacredness of all humanity as creations ofGod. At the
level of experience, and most importantly the family, they participate in efforts of




The women reported in this chapter are commonly engaged in multi-national peace-
building and restoration efforts through the channels of influence that are most
natural to them. While not opposed to efforts to empower women through structural
changes of the social order, they do not depend upon them, and often do not expect
much from them. In the political institutions women are neither honoured nor
empowered. In the religious institutions women are honoured but not empowered.
Nevertheless, women make their contributions through their influence with other
women, in local NGOs, through their local religious community, in the home and
with children. They go about accomplishing a very serious business of peace-
building, whether or not men take them seriously. In so doing they embody the
strong moral characteristics found in the zadruga of rural communities; that is to
say, in the face of significant societal upheaval and trauma, women remain the moral
guardians in community rebuilding efforts.
The religious and spiritual dimension, experientially known and lived, allows women
to trespass barriers of nationalism, reach out to others, and extend forgiveness that
rebuilds community. They are motivated by their faith to take risks in order to break
down barriers and to extend themselves so that others may be assisted. In so doing
they inject hope in an otherwise despairing situation. Their expressions of faith and
encounter with God are different in each case, reflecting their diverse religious
backgrounds. Yet their faith in God is central for their conduct and practice. For
some, faith serves as a determinative norm for responding to others, even those who
might otherwise oppose them. For others, acts of courage and kindness are not mere
extensions of themselves, but an extension of God in them. Faith in God necessarily
leads to an ethical response to others.
The testimony and efforts of these women is among the strongest in support of the
thesis, that the religious faith dimension can make significant contributions to peace-
building and social restoration.
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Views of Religious Students on
Peace-Building and Social Restoration
1. Introduction
The inclusion of students and young people in this study is crucial because they
represent the single greatest asset for long-term stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Young people 14 to 25 years old constitute nearly one quarter of the population, and
an understanding of their situation acts as a kind of sociological barometer of the
future. Although young people also constitute a significant part of today's society,
they are largely dismissed by those in positions ofpower. The marginalisation
young people encounter contributes to the general societal malaise currently found in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, if not soon rectified, threatens to ossify into fatalism
and despair among those most able to make lasting changes.
This chapter examines the Research Question, "What empirical evidence is there of
students engaging in peace-building on the basis of their religious convictions?" It
addresses questions ofpersonal identity and values, and probes the religious
influences that direct them towards peace-building and multi-national co-existence
(Mitmenschliclikeit).
The chapter first seeks to portray the general situation of young people in post-war
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It then examines religious factors that influence peace-building
as related by four students, one each from the Bosnjak, Orthodox, Catholic, and
Protestant communities. Specifically, four related topics emerge as vital for peace-
building and social restoration, and are therefore explored in detail: 1) Identity
Formation and Values-Clarification; 2) the Nature of Religious Faith; 3) Multi-
National Co-Existence; and 4) Forgiveness, Restoration and Healing.
The students were chosen from more than 150 young people initially addressed, and
from among twelve recorded interviews. Each has faced hardship, dislocation and
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dispossession during the war, yet finds that, because of their religious faith, they are
able to overcome their trauma and contribute to social restoration among young
people. Their dramatic life experience during the war, ability to articulate their
religious convictions, and involvement in local community efforts, have earned them
a hearing in the research.
2. The Societal Context of Young People
Surveys addressing the youth sector confirm a general discouraging outlook that is
common throughout society. Both substance abuse and suicide are on the increase
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Young people account for one quarter of the suicide rate
that has nearly doubled from 11 per 100,000 in the pre-war years to 20 per 100,000
in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina.1 The increase is attributed to trauma from the war,
the ailing economy, and an enduring refugee problem. The rate is highest among
young men.
A report commissioned in 2003 found that 92,000 young people left the country in
•j
the post-war period between 1996 and 2001. It made inquiry of young people who
desired to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina, and found that about one quarter (24%) would
choose to emigrate, while 40% desired to leave to find temporary work, and another
13% would leave to study at a university elsewhere. Only 21% indicated that they
would not leave Bosnia-Herzegovina.4 The report attributes the unsettled state of the
youth to persistent societal ills that plague the country. The sectors of education and
employment especially show little promise ofmeeting the needs of young people.
The fragmented educational system has 13 different structures overseeing c.630,000
students and pupils, resulting in a budget that is "four or five times higher than those
of other European countries".5 The report reveals a general apathy among students
who have little communication with their teachers, and sense they are not respected
by them. The educational system is marked by a legacy of the pre-war socialist past
that affords little opportunity for self-expression.6
1 UNDP 2003: 20.
2 ABC 2003:np.
3 Cited in UNDP 2003: 25.
4 UNDP 2003: 25.
5 UNDP 2003: 8, 9.
6 UNDP 2003: 8, 9.
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Some of the educational issues directly impact peace-building and social restoration.
Student and professor mobility is greatly reduced because each canton only manages
funding for its own universities. The standardisation of the educational practice on
EU criteria remains a long-term goal, the first step toward which is a harmonised
curriculum among the cantons.7 Dayton entrusted curriculum policy to the entities,
which resulted in three different curricula. The five Bosnjak majority cantons use a
core Federation curriculum. This is supplemented by a Croat curriculum in the three
Croat majority cantons, and a 'mixed' curriculum in the two 'mixed' cantons.
o
Additionally, the Republika Srpska has its own curriculum. The so-called 'national
subjects' in the humanities - history, mother tongue, language and social studies -
present the greatest challenge to harmonisation. One report states, "The current
educational programmes present a dangerous influence on young persons," 9 because
the focus of these subjects serves only political elites seeking to profit from
nationalist causes. The Textbook Review Commission already rejected two attempts
to produce textbooks free of discriminatory content, and a third is currently
underway.10
Widespread debate is focused on whether religious education in the schools should
be mandatory or optional. In an attempt to promote religious freedom in the schools,
canton educational ministers passed legislation stating that all major religions
practised in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be taught in the schools. Problems are
foreseen in the implementation of this legislation, however. In many areas of
Bosnia-Herzegovina the communities and schools are sufficiently segregated that
minority religious educators are under-represented, making implementation of the
legislation unfeasible. A greater fear is that religious education will be used as a
vehicle to indoctrinate pupils in nationalist ideology, defeating the intended purposes
of learning from each other. Further, there is some concern that children of a
minority ethno-religious persuasion may find they are disadvantaged in the
classroom should they choose not to attend religious education classes of the
majority national group.11 Religious education remains an unresolved issue with no
apparent solution.
7 Soros 2001: np.
8 UNDP 2003: 9.
9 Soros 2001: np.
10 UNDP 2003: 10.
11 UNDP 2003: 11, 12.
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Segregation of pupils is also a problem. In some instances communities practise
segregation through bussing so that children will not have to be integrated with the
other national group. In other instances the practice of "two schools, one roof' -
wherein a building is shared by two national groups, but with separate classrooms
and curricula - continues to physically and psychologically alienate pupils from each
other.12
The educational system is ill-equipped to prepare young people for the current labour
market and only a small minority of young people (8%) are confident that their
education will help them find a job.13 Young people cite the state of the economy as
one of the primary factors for wanting to leave the country. The official
unemployment rate is 40%, and 59% of the population live at or below the poverty
line.14
With the demise of communism came also the end of state-sponsored youth
organisations. Although the communist youth organisations were committed to the
indoctrination of young people to party ideology, they also provided a coordinated
programme of activities. By contrast, today's programmes designed to strengthen
the youth sector in society and sponsored by international bodies such as CARE
International, UNDP, UNV (United Nations Volunteers), and UNICEF are often
criticised for emphasising the needs of the sponsoring agency rather than those of the
young people themselves. External funding for youth programmes was used to
maintain the NGO and its workers rather than benefiting young people. Further,
until the foundation of the Joint Youth Program in December 2001, which integrated
the efforts of over 200 youth organisations (nearly 50%), internationally sponsored
youth organisations characteristically wasted funds owing to duplication of projects
and poor co-operation.15
Today more than 50% of youth organisations report insufficient funding and 23%
report having no facilities whatsoever,16 which is a contributing factor to low
participation among youth. Recent research shows that the vast majority of youth
(72%) rarely participate in youth projects17 because young people receive little
12 UNDP 2003: 10.
13 UNDP 2003: 14, 15.
14 UNDP 2003: 14.
15 Soros 2001: np.
16 Cited in UNDP 2003: 28.




respect and support in society. Widespread disinterest and apathy among young
people has ramifications in the political sphere.
In one survey 95% of the respondents indicated that they "have little or no influence
on political events in Bosnia-Herzegovina",19 and that young people are marginalised
in the decision-making process. Despite this, data collected from the Bosnia-
Herzegovina Election Commission shows that 45.5% of registered voters aged 17-30
20
voted, which is high compared to the same aged group of voters in Western
Europe. Disenchantment with the political process and its ability to bring substantive
change to society is reflected in low participation (6%) in political parties.21 Most
young people believe that politicians are more interested in gaining and holding
22
power than they are in benefiting the country.
Although identification with politics and specific political parties is low among
youth, attachment to religion is high. Almost half (48%) of young people polled
indicated a strong attachment to religion, and a slightly lower attachment to their
nation (43%). By contrast, less attachment was expressed toward their entity (31%),
city (39%) or to Bosnia-Herzegovina (29%).23 While attendance at religious
meetings is low, it is still appreciably higher than attendance at political activities,
where only 4% of young people report any kind of regular participation, and 90%










38% 25% 2% 12% 4%
Political
activities
75% 15% 5% 3% 1%
The statistics bear out the generally dismal prospects for young people, and are
indicative of the pervasive attitude among youth that the situation will not soon
18 UNDP 2003: 29.
19 UNDP 2003: 23.
20 Cited in UNDP 2003: 24.
21 UNDP 2003:23.
22 Cited in UNDP 2003: 23.
23 UNDP 2003: 26.
24 UNDP 2003: 28.
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change. Few wonder why the brightest and best young people seek their future
beyond the borders ofBosnia-Herzegovina.
3. Religious Factors Influencing Peace-Building
Each of the interviewed students in this chapter has undergone a transition from a
nominally religious or secular background to a place in which religious faith is
central, defining who they are, what they do, and how they relate to other people.
Their narratives are striking exceptions to the account of apathy and social malaise
given in the first section of this chapter. The following section examines the
transition each of the students underwent, in order to understand how religious faith
has contributed to their identity formation and values-clarification.
3.1 Identity Formation and Values-Clarification
3.1.1. Mirheta Omerovic
Mirheta Omerovic relates that religious faith helped her in times of great anxiety and
insecurity, and it remains determinative for her life in the post-conflict era.
Omerovic is Bosnjak with a secular family background but chooses today to wear the
liijab as a sign of her obedience to God. She spent her childhood in France where
her father was employed on a foreign worker's permit in order to secure a home and
a better future for the family in Yugoslavia. In France she acquired the values of
secular, Western European culture. By 1990 her father had succeeded in earning
enough money to move back to Visegrad in eastern Bosnia, a town near the Serbian
border made famous in a book by Pulitzer Prize winning author from Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Ivo Andric. The Bridge on the Drina graphically depicts a tortuous
public execution by impalement under the Ottoman vezir, and conferred on Visegrad
a literary legacy of ethnic turbulence that made the town an early target for Serb
aggression in 1992. Not long after the family finished building their house, Serb
forces swept through Visegrad, killing or displacing the Bosnjak populace.
Fourteen-year-old Omerovic survived by escaping into the surrounding wood, but
was separated from the rest of the family. She found her way to French UN troops in
the area and was transported to safety in Zagreb, Croatia. There she was reunited
with the rest of the women ofher family, and learned that her father was one ofmany
who did not survive the massacre in Visegrad. After a sojourn in Zagreb, Omerovic
and her family became refugees in Jordan. There she began to study Arabic and
25 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.l 5]: 1.
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Islam. She and her family returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1997 and, with
no home to return to in Visegrad, settled in the capital city of Sarajevo. There she
continues her studies and is active in the Muslim religious community.
The material loss in the war reduced her life from relative prosperity to sheer
indigence, and the loss of family members brought her to a point of deep despair and
contemplation of suicide. The reliance on self and a materialistic worldview was
largely replaced by dependence on God and a spiritual worldview.26 The sense of
needing something beyond the material realm became urgent while still a refugee in
97
Zagreb when she learned that she had lost her father. In Jordan she began to study
Islam and adopted a disciplined practice of religion according to Islamic Shari 'ah.
Today she chooses this lifestyle over expressions of Islam found in Bosnia-
Herzegovina that reflect a more permissive European practice.
Omerovic describes her time as a refugee in Zagreb as a period of helplessness that
made her reach out for a talisman of protection:
At the time I took the Qur'an and I was holding it. It was like taking
something like a crystal, or something magical, and you want to have some
kind of power, some kind of extra power that is not from this world but from
another world. That is like asking for help. It is like grabbing your mother
or your father and to say, "Help me, and protect me." I wanted something to
rely on, you see?28
Her search for understanding was borne out of fear, but developed into a compulsion
to know more about Islam and her circumstance:
.. .Personally, I wanted to be religious because I was afraid ofwhat was
going to happen to me. But also, something was pushing me, and I was
asking myself, what is really Islam? Why do they really hate us so much?
Why do they hate us so much that they want to get rid of us?... But now,
after that, after the war was over, I have really been thinking and asking
myself why is this happening? So there are many questions that are deep. I
live today and tomorrow and I will just keep reading and asking questions to
go deeper and deeper. I'm asking you, I am asking others.2''
For Omerovic, Islam continues to be a means of shaping identity and clarifying
values.
3.1.2. Svetljana Kurjak
Svetljana Kurjak, a student in the faculty for physical education at the University of
Banja Luka, was raised in a Serbian home in Zagreb that observed only the major
26 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 2.
27 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 7, 8
28 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 8.
29 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 8.
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religious holidays. She moved to Banja Luka in the Republika Srpska in 1993 as
part of a house exchange with Croats so that each family could live in the relative
safety of their respective majority national environment. She thus considers herself a
refugee. Her uncle was killed in the war in Zagreb and her father later died in an
accident unrelated to the war.
Her awakening in faith began spontaneously when she felt compelled to go to the
Orthodox church and light a candle. There she became acquainted with young
people involved in the St Sava Youth Fellowship (,Svetosavska Omladinska
Zajednica). It emphasises the historic teachings and practices of the Serbian
Orthodox Church and especially Serbian national identity through the model of St
in
Sava. Kurjak describes how she was drawn to the Orthodox Church at a time of
great uncertainty:
[My spiritual interest] somehow just came spontaneously. I just went inside
the church and I felt like I had a need to go inside and light a candle and
believed that I had things to leam in church.... I wanted to stay after the
liturgy and hang out with people that I could leam something from, so I
didn't go maybe another wrong direction.... Now I can deal with some
situations with a little bit more patience. Something that's terrible will not
last forever but there's going to be a better time. There's this feeling that
I'm never alone and especially when I think ofmy Grandmother, my Mom,
my sister, wherever I go I'm not alone.31
Her religious faith also helps her clarify her values about persons of non-Orthodox or
non-religious convictions. She believes she could marry someone non-Orthodox,
although it would create tensions with her family. A greater difficulty for her would
be marrying a non-believer, which she relates as a "terrible thing".32 Living her "life
■5 -j
in faith" is now very important to her, and clearly impacts her choice of a marriage
partner:
I have to be so strong in my faith and to tell my husband [pause], I don't
know [pause], I don't think I'm like a super person, but I believe you should
live your life in faith, not just to be called a believer.... [H]e must be a
believer, not just going physically to church.34
Kurjak's faith is something deeply personal and qualitatively more than a marker of
national identity. It also indicates a desire for a deeper spirituality than the
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traditional and nominal religious expression characteristic ofher childhood.
Kurjak's faith now defines the essence ofwho she is and what she will do.
3.1.3. Entoni Seperic
Entoni Seperic was bom in Sarajevo to a Bosnjak mother and a Croat father. His
father was a career military man, and Seperic was raised in a non-religious home in
which the values reflected those of the socialist state. Nationalist tensions in the late
1980s contributed to the divorce of Seperic's parents even before war broke out in
Croatia in 1991. His father became a hard-line Croat nationalist and left the
Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to join the Croatian army, and his mother returned to
Central Bosnia.
Seperic's spiritual awakening began through the influence of a close friend who was
ostracised for his Baptist beliefs. At the same time Seperic attended mass in a
Franciscan church where he received a clear calling to ministry. Seperic was
instrumental in the development of an ecumenical centre in Rijeka, Croatia that
succeeded in bringing persons from the Roman Catholic, Serbian Orthodox and
Protestant communities together even as the rest of the country was disintegrating
along ethno-religious lines. Seperic completed his first year of theological studies in
Rijeka, and then moved to Sarajevo to continue his studies. Seperic remains active
in encounter and reconciliation ministries through the youth organisation Oci u Oci
('Face to Face') founded by Friar Ivo Markovic.
Seperic is consciously aware that his move from Rijeka to the capital city of Bosnia-
Herzegovina is a transition in which he is attempting to come to terms with his multi¬
national heritage. His mother's Bosnian and Muslim background and his father's
Croatian and Catholic heritage contributed to significant unresolved tension in the
home during the Croatian conflict. His move to Sarajevo was also a spiritual
exploration in which both Protestant and Catholic influences played a role. Seperic
was also impacted by Markovic, who continues to be a role model for him.35
Seperic's deepening spiritual understanding aided him in the process of values-
clarification, and enabled him to steer clear of nationalism's siren call. At the same








Anesa Delalic spent her childhood on the West and Catholic side of the multi¬
cultural city ofMostar in Herzegovina. Neither her Serb father nor her Bosnjak
mother was religious. During the war her Croat neighbours contacted the local
authorities about the 'Muslims' living next to them and suggested that they should be
removed. The next day soldiers came to the house and took the entire family away to
a detention camp in which the women were separated from the men. There ten year
old Delalic witnessed many atrocities, including beatings and rapes, and was part of
an all-night forced march intended to eliminate the weak. After four months of
imprisonment, international humanitarian intervention ended the military conflict in
the area and Delalic and her family were released. Her parents returned to their own
home on the West side, resisting efforts of officials to segregate the city through
forced relocation. Not long thereafter a mortar fired from a Serb military placement
killed her father. Delalic's family was moved by the non-partisan food parcels and
care they received from Agape, the humanitarian aid arm of the Evangelical Church
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and eventually they became Christians. Delalic began her
university education on the West side, but has switched to the East side as a
statement of her desire to embrace all of the peoples of her city.
Delalic gives clear indication of a transformation in both identity and values-
clarification. Indeed, that is the intent of her testimony and what gives meaning to
her life. Prior to her conversion she had a sense of a transcendent "something", as
she relates in the following:
.. .1 believed that there is something, but is not in this world. You can be
connected with that something. Whatever you do, it is something separated
from us totally.37
However, she did not find the connection to God through the ritual prayers she
practiced, imitating her Muslim grandmother/8 Because her other grandmother and
mother had already embraced Christianity, her initial vocal rejection caused tension
in the home.39 Her gradual acceptance ofChristianity came through the regular
contact ofChristians who were able to laugh despite their circumstances, and
demonstrated joy and love to her.40 Her embrace of Christianity was tentative and
37 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 4.
38 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 4.
39 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 4.
40 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 4, 5
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conditional, and she intended to give it up if she did not like it.41 But her decision
"to receive Jesus into her life" was an experience she describes as a "walk with God"
that is "always something new".42 She is now convinced that "God is the only thing
that can satisfy your life".43
The transformation Delalic underwent secured for her an identity completely apart
from the usual national nomenclatures so important in the rest of society, and allows
her to embrace everyone, regardless of their background:
.. .1 am so happy that I can hug someone who is Croat and I know that in the
past he did something bad, I mean his people did something bad, but I can
still hug that person and say, "I love you, brother, because we have the same
God." It doesn't make any difference who you are. It is important that we
serve the same God. And I think that is amazing.44
Each of these students found that religious faith helped clarify issues of their own
identity. It also clarified issues about the nature of religious faith apart from the
institutions of religion, as the following examines.
3.2. The Nature of Religious Faith
All of the student interviewees make a distinction between a religious label and a
personal expression of faith by which they live and conduct their lives. Omerovic
now experiences Islam not only as a marker of identity, but as a way of life that
provides meaning, a worldview and instruction in how to address the difficult
situations of life. It is, as she says, "the practise of Islam".45 She now has a deeper
understanding of Islam, which is "a spiritual way to carry on with life".46 This she
gained with regular teaching from the Quran and learning how to pray,47 which now
gives her patience to encounter the many obstacles she faces.48 She also found
solidarity with the umma beyond Bosnia-Herzegovina, and continues to practice
Islam with the forms and mores she acquired in Jordan. She now describes her life
and work as a serious mission:
[F]or me being here is like a mission, I take it seriously. So anyone I meet I
want to talk with them, I want to know them and I want them to know me
and they don't want us just to forgive each other. It's so important for me to
41 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 5.
42 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 6.
43 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 6.
44 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 9.
45 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 8.
46 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 2.
47 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 2.
48 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 8.
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be here and perhaps from the people I meet I will learn something and they
will learn something from me.49
Kurjak believes that those who participated in the aggressions of the conflict "really
didn't know anything about their faith".50 She draws a distinction between those
who "think they are believers but they are far from it. They say they are believers
but they don't go to church, everything they do indicates that they are not
believers."51 She believes that part of the problem is that people claim they are
religious but are ignorant of the tenets of their own religion:
People tend to say, "I'm an Orthodox or Catholic or Muslim." And that's
the only thing they know and nothing more. It's not the matter of just being
in the church or mosque or whatever, physically there present. They would
need to read something from the Bible or Qur'an.... so that we can
understand, if I can understand myself, if I can understand what is religion,
if I can understand why I am going to church. It's not just to light a candle,
it's not just to look on the icons, it's not just kissing the cross. It's not just
like it. I think it's here [pointing to her chest],... in your heart. It's not in
some books that say that you are Muslim or Orthodox, [or that] you have to
hate some other religion or something like that. You must know the basic
things about ourselves and a little bit basic [teachings of] other religions.52
Her first inclination is to equate the terms 'religion' and 'faith',53 but with some
reflection she draws a distinction. "'Religion'" she says, "is something we confess
and 'faith' is something that you believe in."54 Kurjak thus delineates a distinction
between the public creed and the personal credo.
Seperic believes that religion was falsified during the war, leading to division and
xenophobia between the nations.55 Speaking from the Roman Catholic and Croatian
point of view, he finds various reasons why so many of the clergy are nationalists,
noting that it is "deeply rooted in the historical experience".56 He also believes that
Croatian nationalists fell victim to imitation of the Serb minority in Croatia.57 The
Croatian clergy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he says, believe it is their responsibility to
retain the Croat culture, which he views as Western-oriented and a counter-culture to
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the Eastern spirituality of Islam and Orthodoxy. The substitution of national
identity for spirituality is what he finds false in religion:
... [M]ost of the leaders in the Catholic Church are more national workers
and preservers of national identity, which is obviously false. If you
recognise Christ as your model, then nationalism is totally wrong. I
wouldn't say that Christ has nothing to do with nationality and difference,
because the idea of nation has Jewish origins and Jesus was Jewish and has a
strong witness to them. But also, the basic issue is how we deal with that. I
think that reconciliation is more about spirituality and if you think that some
of your brothers sinned against what you think is original Christianity, then
the first things that you can do is to pray. If you believe in the power of
prayer, then you can do much. I also think that for me personally, it was
very hard to pray for those leaders to whom I could not relate to as a moral
standard for me. But also, the only thing that you can solve is to be clear
yourself ofwhat Christ is for you, and to pray for those who sinned.59
Seperic believes that both the Catholic and Orthodox clergy have lost their credibility
as a result of accommodating nationalism. This is especially felt among young
people, who he believes are genuinely interested in spiritual matters, but are
confused. Because they have lost respect for the clergy, they question the message
also.60 He contrasts the self-serving nationalism with Christ's example of serving
others.61 This is another way in which Christ can be falsified, according to Seperic.62
Delalic also draws a distinction between 'religion', which she views with some
derision, and something living inside ofher that is 'more than just religion'. She
describes the difference thus:
I don't like the word religion because religion is something I connect with
all the rituals. I connect it with doing things just because somebody else is
doing them. But the faith and life, that's real life.... If you belong to a
religion, I believe, then you are just doing something that somebody else is
doing. But if you are living your life with God, and you have faith, then it
makes your life much more. It's a full life. It's a complete life.64
Religion for Delalic is then the externals and ritual practices, contrasted with 'life'.
But in another clarification regarding marriage, she qualifies what she means even
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found in a person who has "received Christ as his personal saviour".65 It is
something intensely personal.
Each of the interviewees clearly distinguishs between what they know as a deep and
intense religious experience and that which is ritualistic or superficial. Their
religious faith is also instructive as to how they are to treat and live with others.
3.3. Multi-National Co-Existence (Mitmenschlichkeit)
The following line of investigation regarding living with others is coloured by the
local environment. Both Seperic and Omerovic live in Sarajevo where multi¬
national encounter is unavoidable and common. Delalic lives in the divided city of
Mostar where encounter is possible but often confrontational, and Kurjak lives in
Banja Luka where multi-national encounter is infrequent and undesired. Given their
different environments, questions relating to this aspect of the study are concrete to
those living in Sarajevo and Mostar, but more hypothetical to Kurjak in Banja Luka.
Their answers reflect this dynamic.
None of the students believes that the situation of segregated nations is optimal for
the future ofBosnia-Herzegovina. Kuijak is unaware of organised activities in Banja
Luka that bring young people of different confessions together, and knows of no
Bosnjaks on her faculty at the university. Nevertheless, she maintains friendships
with Bosnjaks she knew in school before the war.66 If her work were to take her to
the now predominantly Bosnjak capital of Sarajevo, she would not hesitate to take up
residence there.67 Kurjak believes that the Ferhadija mosque must be rebuilt
because it was a cultural treasure ofBanja Luka and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that its
presence in the city makes a statement that Bosnjaks are again welcome.68 She calls
for reciprocity and a sense of equality, however, meaning that Catholic and Orthodox
churches should also be rebuilt in Bosnjak-dominant areas.69 She insists that
nationalists in Banja Luka are a minority, but concedes that they could create
problems for returning Bosnjaks.70 She believes that segregation of the ethnic groups
is not good and that it would be a 'normal thing' for Bosnjaks to return. In time,













things will settle down and it will be 'natural' for them to return to their homes.71
Kurjak points to some of the Bosnjak families that have returned and claims they live
normal lives without threat, and that there were many people who did nothing wrong
to them and therefore can "look them straight in the eye" because their hands are
clean.72
Omerovic believes that a mono-cultural, mono-religious situation is unhealthy and
fears that this is now the circumstance in her ethnically cleansed hometown of
Visegrad near the border with Serbia.73 Through the university-sponsored French
club, an NGO called Women to Women, and an inter-religious youth organisation,
Abraham/Ibrahim, she regularly encounters non-Muslims and desires to learn from
others:
I like connections with other people. I like international connections. I
don't want Bosnia to be closed. It is important for us to have people from
everywhere, from America, from Italy, from France, it's very important to
meet other cultures, the clothes, the music, everything, because this is
changing the narrowness of the people. They are opening.74
After returning from Jordan, she did not know how to relate to Serbs, but in the
course of daily life, she felt unthreatened. She also sensed that many Serbs in
Sarajevo wanted to be helpful, put the war behind them, and move forward with their
lives together.75 She discovered that they have the same concerns regarding the lack
of flats, work, money, and food that she has.76 She realises the borders are artificial,
and knows that if they were truly needed, then God would erect them. She believes
the Qur'an can be instructive on how to relate to others:
Even in the Qur'an there's a very important verse, "I created diversity, so
that people meet." I have milk, you have wood. I have gold, you have
silver... So let us remember the beautiful things, and the bad things, let's
just put it away.77
Like Omerovic, Seperic also lives in Sarajevo where multi-national encounter is
frequent. He works with people of all nations and religious persuasions at the youth
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Pantonima. He believes that the notion of 'tolerance' is a "pseudo-religion, or
secular religion"78 and rejects it as a Christian ideal. For him, tolerance is an
unstable foundation to build on. He believes that the fear ofGod already has signs of
love embedded in it,79 and likens his encounter with others to the encounter of
Moses with the burning bush:
Try to relate how Moses felt in front of the burning bush. He took his shoes
off.... That's how I feel whenever I meet the other person. It's like a
burning bush... It's a revelation. And how you relate to it is to take your
shoes off and wait for the calling. That's how you meet the other.80
His view, then, is that Christianity is an expression of personhood and ofpersonal
relationships, not of nationhood and nations. For this reason, broken relationships
require healing, just as he awaits healing in his relationship with his own father.81
Analogously, countries with broken relationships, such as Croatia and Bosnia-
82
Herzegovina, also need healing.
Like Seperic, Delalic is regularly involved in a multi-national community through
her local church in Mostar. Delalic contrasts the national tension in the city of
Mostar with the unity enjoyed by the young people in the church fellowship:
There is only one reason that we are all coming together, and that is to
worship our God... .There is no difference between us. And we never,
never, never speak about being different, because we're all the same. I
mean, it still hurts for me to say like [pause]. I don't know [pause]. I can't
look at them as coming from different backgrounds, because it doesn't make
any sense to me.... We go everywhere together. And I cannot even imagine
it otherwise. Now I am sitting here, I'm trying to think how it would be if
we were all separated. I can't even make a picture in my head, to be
separated.83
The Protestant church has all three ethnic groups (and Roma Gypsies) worshipping
together without tension or fear. Delalic explains how this is possible:
In God's eyes, on the cross, he didn't die for Croats or for Serbs or for
Muslims. He died for everyone, for all three ofus. And if he didn't separate
us on the cross, then why do we need to separate each other?84
Delalic also maintains close friendships outside of the church with Bosnjaks and
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Although they do not believe as she does, Delalic is able to literally and
metaphorically embrace them because she sees them as fellow creations ofGod.85
She admits that people sometimes view her as abnormal, but this does not prevent
her from having strong friendships with those from a different nation or religious
community.86
Achieving this level ofmutuality is rare, and is a transfonnation that comes as a
result of the exercise of forgiveness in the lives of these students.
3.4. Forgiveness, Restoration, and Healing
Upon returning to Bosnia-Herzegovina from Jordan, Omerovic faced the serious
07
issue of how she was going to live among those who hated Bosnjaks. She found
helpful instruction in the Quran:
I mean, this feeling, this is very difficult to hate, because for Muslims, we
are supposed to forgive, because in the Qur'an, it says even though they did
harm to you, only God can judge people. You see, he's the one who is
forgiving and you have both love and hate, but we are supposed to carry on
with love, because what happened was the madness of war.88
Initially she wanted retribution, but these feelings were mitigated through attendance
at the mosque where she "cried and prayed to God to give [her] strength to carry on
89and not to hurt anybody". Ultimately she left retribution in God's hands, and hopes
that the consciences of the wrongdoers will bring them to the realisation of the evil
they caused.90 She senses that it is useless to carry hatred, especially if it is
misdirected at individuals who were innocent ofwrongdoing.91 Although she cannot
articulate a response to those anonymous soldiers who killed her father, she believes
it is important to be free of prejudice and to encounter other persons positively and
tolerantly.92 Her conflict management strategy is twofold. She first attempts to leam
more about others in order to understand them.93 Then, her practice of Islam,
especially regular prayer, helps her avoid negative thoughts, and motivates her to
good deeds. She offers this insight from her own experience:
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[E]verybody says Islam is very difficult. For me it is very easy. You have
to pray five times a day. When you think about praying, you don't have
time to think about hating. You don't have time to sit hours and hours and
drink coffee and backbiting, or something. It means you are always doing
something. Praying may only take you five minutes or ten minutes, but
afterwards, it is always reminding you to do something, you see?94
Omerovic believes that reconciliation is possible, but that it requires several
elements. The process is gradual, and requires regular contact with others. Both
parties must co-operate in the process and focus on creating a better future together.
Importantly, an internal change ofheart and mind are prerequisites to the process:
It's always step by step. Building reconciliation. I would wish people
would be like me because I said to myself, we cannot change the past, but
we now have the present and the future, and this we can change. But to
change it we have to have a lot of energy, and to be patient and love and to
really believe that it is possible to live together, but only if the other side
works on himself and I work on myself. It won't help if you only talk and
talk and write books, but inside your heart and mind you don't work with
this.95
Omerovic suggests role reversal to facilitate alternative thinking. This allows the
parties to "feel"96 for each other, producing empathy, pity, understanding and even
love and compassion. The entire process of encountering the other requires courage,
but is necessary to remove hatred and to ultimately help people.97
Kurjak sees a direct relationship between faith and forgiveness and suggests that
QO
reconciliation is aided by a willingness to be the first to forgive. Her fellowship
has helped her to be discriminating in what she believes about others and helps her
when she doesn't understand something in the Bible.99 Although she cannot quote
any particular passage, she knows that the Bible has important things to say about
forgiveness.100 She can articulate a sense in which forgiveness offers liberty:
If you hate someone it's a kind of crazing... you know, you are obsessed
with this feeling, I think so. Maybe you're obsessed with this feeling of
hatred, and unforgiveness and it's kind of crazing, it's not freedom, it's
freedom to be not obsessed with those things.... And forgive[ness] is
freedom. I think so. I relate it that way.101
94 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 7
95 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 9
96 She uses the term four times.











When asked to relate forgiveness to the concrete loss of her uncle, she admits that a
sense of remorse and loss are greater than any other feeling. She neither understands
nor seeks to understand why someone would commit such acts, and hopes that one
day the wrongdoers will come to terms with what they did. Nevertheless, because
they remain anonymous and therefore amorphous, she cannot hate them, and
indicates that she has feelings of forgiveness for them.102
Delalic relates her views on forgiveness from personal experience. Forgiveness
came to her subsequent to conversion to Christianity, and required a process of
healing. She focused her hatred specifically on the soldiers who held her captive,
and the neighbours who sent her to the camp, but she also expressed hatred generally
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against everyone, not just Croats. For nearly two years after her conversion she
believed that the only good people were Christians, and this limited her ability to
relate to others. She admits that she derived a sense of joy from the news that one of
her captors met with a violent death, believing that no judgment against him could be
severe enough.104 But this critical event precipitated a significant change of heart:
But then, I believe that God really spoke to my heart, "Is there really any
difference between you and him?" And I admitted, that no, because he is a
sinner and I'm a sinner and even if I am ten and he is twenty, that doesn't
make any difference, because we are all sinners. And then I remembered
about the love that God showed me when I became a Christian. And after I
saw that love, and that that love could heal me, and that that love could give
me strength to live my life, then I said, "Well, I have just accused someone.
And that could happen also to me. And if I die, I will go to heaven, but if he
died, and he went to hell...." And that is the time when my healing started.
And that is the time that I experienced that God really wants me to forgive.
It is not something that I will forgive in my mind and then I will always
remember those things, but that I will forgive them in the love that God
showed me in his love. Because he forgave me, and I need to forgive them.
And I forgive them.105
She draws a direct connection between love and the ability to forgive106 relating that
she came to the recognition that she needed healing herself. She relates the incident
anecdotally:
... [I]t was during the worship time, and I lifted my hands and they were
singing a song that our hands and our lives because of the blood of Jesus will
be cleaned up, and we will have like a white new dress, or something like
that. It's an old song. And then I realised that that's something, that's the
healing I need. I needed my dress to be white, and to be pure for my God.
102
Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 14.
103 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 6.
104 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.10j: 7.
105 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 7.
106 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 9.
Her captor died in a car accident.
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And that was the healing. Yes, I was crying because I released something
that I was holding onto really strong. And instead of that hatred, I asked
God, can you pour your love there, because there is a part in my heart that is
empty now, and I want to fill it with good things, and the only thing that is
good is you.107
Forgiveness is at the centre of her worship of God and her relationships to others.
She senses that if she is not able to forgive her brother, then she is also unable to
worship God.108 The corollary is also true, that if a person holds onto hatred, it will
separate that person both from others and from God.109 The Bible is her authority on
the instruction to forgive, and she says that even Christians are wrong when they are
not completely obedient to the command to 'forgive your enemies'.110 Delalic is
actively searching for her other captor, who she believes is in hiding to avoid trial at
the Hague for war crimes. She seeks him in order to give him her testimony, and to
forgive him, and others like him:1.11 .
I hope that I will [find the guard from the camp]. 1 pray that I will. Because
I think that he lives in that village all alone and he doesn't care about his life.
But there's still hope. And I really believe that I will find him before he
goes there, because I want to tell him that he is forgiven. And... somebody
needs to go to the Hague and show to those people and tell them that there is
something that they still can believe in. And that it's not too late.... I wish
[Milosevic] would become a Christian. It's abnormal for people to believe
that he could become a Christian, but there is no difference between him and
somebody else. He is a sinner and maybe he did some bad things, but ifGod
forgave him, who are we to judge someone?112
Seperic uses his own experiences to draw out theological principles about
forgiveness and reconciliation. He sees the decision to forgive as a free act of the
individual, and no one can be compelled to forgive. Seperic believes that injustice is
universal in that everyone experiences it, and that all persons commit injustices.113
As recourse to addressing injustice, a person can go in one of two directions. One
path is in the direction of hatred, in which the offended individual seeks revenge and
retribution. The other path is in the direction of love, which expresses itself in




















it always demands new motives in order to justify actions and drive the cycle of
violence.115
The path of love, however, requires the difficult, personal and free decision to
forgive, which is the heart of the Christian message116 and the command ofChrist
117 # #towards others in every circumstance. Seperic believes this is what makes
Christianity unique, and he contrasts it with Islam:
[TJhere is something unique about Christianity. The Muslim understanding
ofjustice... is more oriented toward restitution. I would say the Christian
perspective is more oriented toward restoration. I think that this is nothing
to do with the criminal system, because criminals should be charged and
prosecuted for the crimes they committed. But the ultimate goal of
Christianity is to reconcile, is to restore the relationship, no matter how hard
it is. But the ultimate goal of Christianity is not restitution. I can falsify
Christianity by saying that justice is what ultimately matters, but I basically
don't believe it is. And if I find that hard to do myself, I cannot falsify
Christ.... But I also think there is a unique relationship in Christianity and
that is the way in how to reconcile people with God and with one another.
And I believe that happens through Christ.118
The personal emphasis and aspect Seperic puts on forgiveness reflects his theological
view that Christianity is pre-eminently inter-personal. Seperic believes that the
Muslim understanding of Christians as 'Peoples of the Book' is a misnomer:
The holy scriptures for Christians are a medium, it is a book in order to get
into a relationship with the person.... The person is there and that person is
Christ and if you meet Christ as the power, then no book can restore a
relationship because restoration is basically an inter-personal category. Only
in inter-personal communication can you achieve restoration.119
The personal and inter-personal emphasis Seperic places on Christianity reflect his
view ofGod as a triune being. God himself is in community, and there can be no
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unity without diversity. God is in communion with and in himself in "trialogue",
which Seperic believes has implications for our own spirituality. Where we try to
communicate with an 'other', it is not only a dialogue, but is a "trialogue" insofar as










Seperic [RC.SM.SA.14]: 12, 13.
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who cannot view God as community, such as Muslims, yet he holds this as a
121fundamental element ofChristianity and his own witness.
Seperic states that forgiveness is still incomplete because it is unilateral, but
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reconciliation always creates community. Reconciliation begins with the victim,
just as God has modelled it in his own interaction with humanity:
I remember also from Romans that there is a point where Paul says that God
reconciled us with him while we were enemies.123 So the initiative is on
God's side. It is always the victim who makes the first step. From this point
of view, we were the ones who were committing the injustice to God. But
the victim makes the first step forward. And that also has something to do
with the process of healing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. No persecutor will
begin with the process of healing. The victim has the important role in
healing. I think it is more about the victim because the victim and
perpetrator share the same story. It is a story of violence. But how to come
out of that violence, I think that we are very, very much in need of
understanding the role of the victim.124
He believes that God came to earth to heal wounded sinners, and that the healed
sinner makes the strongest witness.125 Healing manifests itself in restored
relationships and the (re)establishment of community, which is how the Church is
created.126 Since the Church is a community of sinners,127 it understands its witness
not imperialistically, but with a spirit of humility.128
Finally, Seperic believes that a healthy community is one in which reconciliation is
taking place. He believes the same is possible analogously for Bosnia-Herzegovina:
And when you see Bosnia as a healthy community, you will know that
reconciliation has taken place or has begun. But there is no community now.
We don't yet live in a community.... I'm not saying it has to be a
community of faith. I'm just trying a parallel. If you see Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a society, to live a communal life, then it will be a good sign
that there are positive things happening here.129
Forgiveness is the key for each of these individuals for moving beyond their own
personal traumas and to relate to others again. They also believe that what has
121
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123 The reference is to Romans 5:10, "For if while we were enemies, we were
reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more surely, having been reconciled,















happened to them is possible for others, and that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be
better able to cope if their experiences were more widespread. To this end each of
them is engaged in their own communities. They hope to see change in many with
whom they have influence, especially the young people of their communities.
4. Conclusion
The narratives of these four students reveal common features important for peace-
building within the youth culture today. Significantly, none of these students
allowed the poor situation of the current youth culture to discourage them, a fact that
is largely attributable to the impact of their religious faith in their lives. Although
each of them was raised in a non-religious environment, today their faith is their
primary feature of identity. They claim a personal faith that seeks first to correct
their own attitudes and beliefs before judging the beliefs and actions of others. The
spiritual transformation in each of them is an ongoing process of personal discovery
that clarifies values, and aids them in choices of love and acceptance rather than
hatred and rejection. Forgiveness is a central ingredient of their spirituality and
determines how they encounter others. Most of them (Omerovic, Seperic, Delalic)
are able to articulate a common identity as creations of God, which at once draws the
circle of inclusion wider than that of sectarian nationalism, and defines a basis for
social restoration. Some of them (Seperic, Delalic) articulate a personal experience
of healing through a power beyond themselves. This healing power in Christ
allowed them to overcome their natural inclination towards hatred, and replaced it
with love.
Along with the commonalities in their spiritual experiences, there are also
differences worth noting. Two of them (Seperic, Kurjak) find inspiration in
historical figures (St Francis and St Sava, respectively) that are not particularly
meaningful in the other's community. Another (Omerovic) centres the practice of
her faith on striving to act rightly according to the will of a moral God. Two of them
(Seperic and Delalic) centre their faith on Christ as both the power and agency of
forgiveness.
While there may be doctrinal or theological differences that are irreconcilable, their
beliefs demonstrate a need for personal transformation that becomes the basis for
new and peaceful encounter with others. In their expressions of religious faith is
found a dynamic that leads from fragmentation to wholeness in the person, in
relationships and in newly-formed communities. Their words and actions amply
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support the thesis that religion, expressed through personal faith, can be a source of
mediation towards peace-building. Set against the sober realities young people face
today in Bosnia-Herzegovina, these persons offer a bright and compelling ray of
hope. They demonstrate by example that the power and direction afforded in
spiritual realities can overcome difficult social circumstances to create an
environment of care and mutual respect towards personal and social restoration.
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Part Three
Analytical and Theological Reflection on
Peace-Building and Social Restoration




Analysis and Theological Reflection
From the Context and Interviews
1. Introduction
The thesis now moves from the interviews to analysis and theological reflection, and
incorporates the additional element of the sacred texts. Specifically, this chapter is
concerned to address the Research Question, "What issues emerge from the grounded
research that may contribute to the theological and ethical understanding of peace-
building?" The chapter addresses the theological and ethical issues by retaining the
voices from the context, thereby allowing the theological, ethical and contextual
elements to dialogically interact with each other. The Qur'an and the Bible inform,
instruct and guide Muslims and Christians precisely because these texts are held to
be authoritative as the acclaimed revelation of God. However, two points of
clarification regarding the employment of the Bible and Qur'an are in order. First,
the thesis acknowledges that these texts are authoritative only within their own
religious communities. Thus, no attempt is made to impose either written authority
upon the other community, even in the event of commonalities between the texts.
Second, it is acknowledged that each of these texts has its own historical setting and
context, the analysis ofwhich lies outside the scope of this thesis. However,
examination of relevant portions of these texts is vital to understand how the texts
influence the religious communities towards peace-building and social restoration.
In this regard the texts become an integral part of the analysis.
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Four related areas have been selected for examination: 1) Claims to Authentic
Religious Faith; 2) Power, Powerlessness, and Peace-building; 3) Overcoming
Adversity Through Diversity; and 4) Restoration as a Leitmotiv for Peace-building.
Each of these themes arises from the research. The first three emerge from the
interviews as critical elements contributing to peace-building, while the last is an
extrapolation from foundational research and the interviews. The concept of
restoration is also analysed more fully using the Bible and Qur'an to ascertain how it
may be theologically understood and what contribution it may make to the research
context. Together the interviews and the sacred texts define and delimit the concept
of restoration in its social and theological contexts. Because of its centrality as a key
research question, the theme of restoration thus commands the lion's share of the
chapter and is a fitting harbinger of final themes to be analysed in Chapter Eight.
Finally, this chapter will conclude by exploring how each of the themes may be a
means through which religious groups forge unity from diversity.
2. Claims to Authentic Religious Faith
A common element emerging from the research is a distinction between authentic
and inauthentic religious faith expressions. Before fonnal research questions were
drawn up, a distinction of this kind began to emerge through onsite discussions with
individuals in each of the religious communities. This was then developed into an
explicit question1 and posed to religious leaders in a manner that reflected the tenns
used in the pre-interview period of inquiry. Although this question was not posed to
women or students, the same distinction also emerged in their interviews. This raises
several points for analysis. First, the common thought expressed in the interviews is
that people of 'real' or 'authentic' religion (faith) could not have committed the kind
of atrocities witnessed during the war, and that persons who committed these
offences acted out of the fervour of ideologically-based nationalism, co-opting
religious symbols in support of their cause. Interviewees recognised that persons of
faith - be they Christians or Muslims - cannot commit these crimes and remain true
to the core tenets of their respective religions. Religious persons thus made a clear
assessment about faith based on observed practice.
1 It is Question 8 of the research questions posed to religious leaders.
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Second, religious persons can more easily define what 'true faith' is not than identify
what it is. The expressions ofwhat constitutes a departure from authentic faith are
varied, but relate most often to a perceived misalliance between religion and politics.
Orsolic, for example, says that "nationalistic ideology is a real enemy of true faith,
because it is a false god, which tries to abuse faith itself. True faith in its essence is
anti-nationalistic; it is universally globalistic."2 For that reason, the organisation that
he directs, IMIC, Zajedno, is consciously apolitical.3 Radujkovic marched on the
streets of Belgrade in protest to the Milosevic regime at a time when the SOC
claimed that the true embodiment of Serbian identity rested not with the cadre of
political nationalists in Belgrade, but with the Church.4 The multi-national Protestant
churches consciously avoid politics, endorsing neither party nor candidate for
political office.5
However, the call for authentic faith exceeds mere appeals to be non-nationalistic in
the political arena. Religious persons are calling for something both spiritually
different and deeper; something 'other' in both kind and degree. Interviewees draw
distinctions between an 'inherited' or 'traditional' religious identity6 and the personal
and spiritual experience of inner renewal. Traditional religious identity is perceived
as a cultural confession and is usually marked by nominal religious practice and a
general ignorance of the tenets of the confession.7 Interviewees testify to a
meaningful and personal encounter with God that is marked by a memorable act or
moment in their spiritual life.8 It is a departure from a former way of living to a new
orientation marked by regular worship or prayer and a growing knowledge of the
tenets and practices of their respective confession.
Moreover, the interviewees acknowledge incongruence between their own
spirituality and that which they see practised in the name of religion. For those who
2 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 3.
3 Orsolic 1998:266.
4 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 11.
5 Kresonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 16.
6 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 3; Radujkovic [SO.RJL.BL.02]: 2-4; Nikolinovic
[PR.WO.SA.02]: 2; Rakic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 3, 5; Kundacina [PR.WO.MO.Ol]: 3, 4; Kovac
[SO.WO.SI.03]: 4, 5.
7 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 3; Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 3; Kurjak [S0.SF.BL.12]:
2,3.
8 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.lOj; 4-6; Kurjak [S0.SF.BL.12]: 3; Rakic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 2;
Kundacina [PR.WO.MO.Ol]: 6; Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 3; Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 2;
Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 3-5; Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 2, 6.
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hold to a strong personal faith, rightpractise (orthopraxis) is the expression of right
belief (orthodoxy). The reverse also holds true, namely, unethical practice mirrors
beliefs that cannot be reconciled with real or authentic faith.
Inauthentic faith expressions may be the result of ignorance or manipulation. The
former is characterised by lack of knowledge of the religious tenets of the respective
confession, owing to the marginalisation of religion during the socialist era. The
education ofmany of the religious leaders, for example, is so rudimentary that they
cannot recognise the incongruity ofmilitant nationalism and authentic Christianity.
Thus, Seperic, for instance, can speak of how religious leaders "falsify religion".9
Most people maintained only a cultural religious affiliation and, with the support of
religious leaders, were easy converts to religious nationalism in return for the
promise of greater security in a time of economic, social and military turmoil. They
failed to see the discontinuity between the claims of exclusivist nationalism and the
tenets of their confession because they are largely ignorant of those tenets. These
Radujkovic, for instance, refers to as "non-Orthodox Serbs".10
However, the expression of'inauthentic faith' is more involved than this, and points
to wilful manipulation. Many religious leaders consciously misused their position
and office and, in some cases, were literally bought off by nationalist parties." Many
religious leaders were so eager to walk the corridors ofpower and regain a position
of recognition and authority in society that they colluded with political leaders who
saw advantage in having the Church sanction their activities. Their integration of
religious symbolism and national mythologies distorted the kerygma so essentially
that the Gospel (evangelion) was lost.12
Third, while the interviewees drew a distinction between authentic and inauthentic
faith, they each identified 'authentic' as 'true' faith in relation to the core beliefs of
their respective confessions. They therefore express divergent opinions as to what
'authentic faith' is. Moreover, interviewees sometimes saw authentic faith as an
expression of individual credo and showed disdain, disappointment or distrust in
hierarchal or institutional religion. Authentic faith is that which is authentic for
9 Seperic [RC.SM.SA.14]: 5, 7.
10 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 2, 3.
11 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 8, 13, 14.
12 Markovic: unrecorded interview, December 2001.
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them. For a Roman Catholic, it is the orthodoxy and orthopraxis ofRoman
Catholicism rightly understood; for a Muslim believer, it is the correct belief and
praxis of Islam. So it is too for the Orthodox and Protestants.
In each tradition the same perception exists, namely, that that which they consider
propositionally and practically to be right and true can be misinformed, counterfeited
or manipulated. Interviewees especially single out for criticism clergy and religious
leaders who deviate from the acceptable path of their confession, and they
consciously move to distance themselves from the institutional leadership. Some of
the interviewees come into direct conflict with religious hierarchs, and are forced to
live as personae non grata within their own religious institutional circles.13 Their
challenges to institutional leaders focus on the misuse of positional authority and the
concomitant power vested in the position, making the interplay between power and
peace-building deserving of closer analysis.
3. Power, Powerlessness, and Peace-Building
The interviews reveal an interesting relationship between power and peace-building.
Some clerics act as guardians of national identity, and equate preservation of the
nation with religious fidelity. They believe that their position obligates them to
engage in national issues in order to protect their culture and people. Their ability to
tease financial favours from the international community is, however, to the long-
term detriment of their own people.14 Other clerics play religious and national
orientations off each other. In high profile, media-rich settings they eschew national
politics; but before their own partisan crowd they promote national agendas and
nationally-oriented parties.15 Still other clergy seek to steer a course that denies
neither nation nor confession. For their weak stance on national issues they incur
rejection and ridicule from the more nationalistic co-religionists. On the whole,
clerics in Bosnia-Herzegovina use the power of their position to advance nationalist
causes, and ostracise those few clergy willing to reconcile with persons of other
ethno-religious groups.
13 Markovic, for instance, enjoys immense popular support but is ostracised by some
leaders in both the Catholic and Muslim communities for his efforts in reconciliation.
14 Leban [RC.WO.SA.Ol]: 7.
15 Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 5.
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In regard to peace-building a difference in power structures and domains is
observable in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This difference can be expressed as 'power-as-
authority' in contrast to 'power-as-capability'. In the Christian scriptures these two
kinds of power are distinguished by the words e^ouoia and Sump it;.16 In the first
instance power is the exercise of authority and, in the context of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, resides in institutional position. The office is a trust granted by
consensus of the constituency in exchange for leadership that will defend the
community. The extension and limitation of this authority thus rests with the
constituency. When the constituency perceives an external threat, power of the
leader is commensurate with the security threat; power-as-authority is increased to
the degree that the leader is able to secure the constituency from the threat.
Conversely, the rise of constituency insecurities diminishes the power-as-authority of
the leader. The war situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina presents two examples of this
dynamic. In the first instance, the Bosnjak community became increasingly
threatened under the moderate Reis-u-ulema from Macedonia, Jakub Selimoski. His
inability to secure the community in the face of threat led to a decrease of his power-
as-authority to the point where the constituency replaced him with the current Reis,
Mustafa Ceric, who is perceived by many in the community to be better able to
17 v
secure the safety of the Bosnjak community. Siljak points out the shift to more
nationalist leaders by referring to the support the Islamic community gave to the
SDA, and also the support the Catholic Church gave to the HDZ.18
In the second example, Leban confirms the designs of the Catholic hierarchy to
• 1 19
retain power with partisan messages:
[The Catholic hierarchy] don't have a good sense of the present social
situation in the country and with their people as a result of losing their role
in the community. And here at this moment they don't have the right
approach. They are not choosing the positive part of their tradition....
They just want to put themselves in a position that nobody will be able to




17 See this discussion in Chapter One, pages 47-48.
18
Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 5. Siljak's allusion is to Cardinal Puljic, who became
increasingly nationalist in the face of the inability ofWestern intervention to end the war and
secure the cause of the small Catholic community.
19 Leban [RC.WO.SA.Ol]: 7, 8.
20 Leban [RC.WO.SA.Ol]: 9.
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Markovic also makes reference to the power-as-authority dynamic and the
correspondent choices made by the Catholic hierarchy:
Also many Croats and among Croats many in the churches, many bishops
are also now supporters of HDZ, which is a fascist political party. I can tell
you, when 1 came back from the Zagreb -1 was a refugee in Zagreb during
the war -1 went to my bishop and asked him, I am one of your priests and 1
have the right to ask something of you. I insist that you openly write and
give a message that the Croatian National Community, the HDZ, is not a
Christian Party and that they commit ethnic cleansing, they are racist, and so
on. You have to tell people, we cannot give a voice of support to this party.
He agreed that this was so, but he said to me, "If I do it, then 90 percent of
Catholics would be against me." He didn't choose the prophetic role.21
By exercising their power-as-authority to secure their people, religious hierarchs
built walls that served only to antagonise the other communities, and to a good
measure, the leaders distanced themselves from their own people who genuinely seek
peace. Brokering a peace settlement with those who wield this kind of power-as-
authority while the perceived threat remains in place is virtually impossible, and
working towards establishing structural parity between the groups in conflict will
serve not to diminish the hostilities, but to maintain them, because the potential
security threat remains. A degree of stability for guarded negotiation may be
achieved, but establishing enduring peace is out of the question. In these
circumstances power-as-authority translates into conciliatory weakness, and the
power dynamic moves in the direction of entrenchment.
A different kind of power dynamic is in play in Bosnia-Herzegovina that is much
more effective in terms of building peace. Significantly, this power-as-capability
(Suvapiq) is observable outside of the power-as-authority (e^ouoia) realm of the
political and clerical elites. This power dynamic is the ability to accomplish the task
(in this case, of peace-building and social restoration), and is carried out more readily
at a level of perceived 'powerlessness' in relation to institutional authorities and their
domains, and frequently in opposition to them. Unfettered by the constraints of
preserving nationhood, individual clerics, women and young people are at liberty to
contravene rigorous codes of conduct, and encounter each other in effective and
meaningful ways. They are able to trespass the barriers of cultural and national
identity because they consciously choose to respond less to the values and
constructions of nationalists and more to what they perceive as the essential nature of
humanity as created by a merciful and moral God.
21 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 12.
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values and constructions of nationalists and more to what they perceive as the
essential nature ofhumanity as created by a merciful and moral God.
Persons of religious faith are frequently accused of naivete for not observing the
protocols of the power structures, and for trusting the 'other' at the risk of their own
reputations, positions and lives.22 But they are better equipped to understand an
alternative power structure in which their own power-as-capability is not dependent
upon institutional power-as-authority figures, but under the authority of the singular
omnipotent Being who is both just and merciful. Their significant yet understated
achievements in the face ofpublic scorn are often accompanied by a knowing smile
that betrays an alternative epistemology reminiscent of Kierkegaardian paradox.
Their illumination is dependent less upon reason and rationality and more on faith in
that which is not less certain for being intangible. They actively participate in what
they believe to be the righteousness that belongs to the very order of creation itself,
providing both the vision and motivation for responding as peace-builders. By twist
of circumstance, institutional powerlessness is that which empowers peace-building.
This is eloquently summarised by Markovic, who says, "Jesus didn't choose
power."23 Many involved in the peace-building process are virtually invisible owing
to gendered or age exclusion or, in the case of clerics, marginalisation from religious
elites in their own ranks.
Their reliance upon an omnipotent God who is engaged in the created order
effectively exposes the relativity of the power of the state apparatus and international
community to act as ultimate protectors of persons. Nationalists have not been able
to secure their constituency in Bosnia-Herzegovina through warfare. Further,
nationalists have failed to establish little more than a fragile stability in a segregated
and dysfunctional society. By contrast, religious reconcilers articulate an
understanding of the human individual and community in relation to the omnipotent
God that fosters respect and awe for persons regardless of national heritage. Often
the result is a demonstrable shift from social fragmentation to wholeness. The move
from power to humility stands in contradistinction to the hubris of the corporate
egoism advanced by nationalists. Power only apparently resides with the egoists, but
the terms of engagement in peace-building are asymmetrical. Religious peace
22 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 12; Topic [RC.RL.RA.04]: 2, 6; Skrinjaric
[PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3; Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 3, 4.
23 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 13.
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builders are individualists who strive neither for the immediate nor the territorial, but
the right and true. Theirs is a practice of spirituality with its own share of physical
and ideological battles, challenging the political and social stalemates by contending
for a hard-fought peace. Although the major religious communities have this power
dynamic in common, it is expressed variously and in accordance with the specific
circumstances of each community. The diverse expressions towards peace-building
are therefore analysed in greater detail in the next section.
4. Overcoming Adversity through Diversity: Four Models
One of the key principles this thesis brings out is that building peace requires various
channels, and a search for a methodological singularity is both fruitless and artificial.
Four models ofpeace-building can be identified in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
Nationalist Model uses exclusion to create its own realm of peace from which foreign
and perceived hostile entities are debarred. It advocates an identity towards
singularity by creating a narrative and ethos from a particular ethnogenesis. Fitting
the 'skin' of a particular nation requires the removal of the ethnic parties who do not
fit, and social conformity to received shibboleths. For this reason, Erceg, for
example, can personally claim Serbian identity, having most of the national
characteristics of Serbian nationhood, but is nevertheless rejected by the wider
Serbian community because he is Protestant, or more accurately, because he is not
Serbian Orthodox.24 Nationalism is a sociological force driving society and
individuals towards a particular and exclusive singularity of identity, with no
intention ofbuilding unity outside of its own state.
The EcumenicalModel also espouses singularity, but unlike the nationalist model,
has intentions of inclusion. Its basis for building unity is a common ethic and
religious monotheism. As was seen in Chapter Three, ethics shift disparate groups
towards singularity, which has a homogenising effect. Unlike nationalism, however,
ethics may be applied with an intention of inclusion and universality. A form of this
is evident, for instance, in the invocation of Abraham as a symbol for religious unity.
The organisation Abraham/Ibrahim employs the imagery of the patriarch as the
father and progenitor ofmany nations in order to point out that which is common to
the adherents of the three monotheistic religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Friar Ivo
Markovic speaks of 'Abrahamaic ecumenism' as a fitting basis for co-operation
24 Erceg [PR.RL.BL.02]: 15, 16. See also Topic [RC.RL.RA.04]: 2-6.
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between people of diverse religious confessions, and even those of none.25 Orsolic
has also premised his efforts and the work of Zajedno on those elements common to
the three Abrahamaic confessions, emphasising the monotheistic claim of each.26 A
similar ethic is a correlative expression of identification with the same God. These
efforts have clear resonance with Hans Kiing's Towards A Global Ethic in which
political and religious leaders from the major religions emphasise their common
ethic.27 The Global Ethos does not seek to create a new religion with a new set of
ethical mores; it seeks rather to find an ethical common denominator for the world
religions. By doing so, however, the theological and doctrinal particularities of the
religions are relegated for the sake of achieving unity. In so doing some argue that
the integrity between belief and ethic may be compromised.
The Pluralist Model ofpeace-building seeks to reconcile plurality and particularity in
its approach. Monsignor Mato Zovkic, a tireless advocate for reconciliation, desires
to keep the distinctives and argues against syncretism:28
I would like to remind all of us, both believers and agnostics, that a claim
for absoluteness is an integral part of faith and doctrine in Judaism,
Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism.... In inter-religious dialogue, especially
in peace-building and reconciliation process, we accept this belief and
teaching of each other, respecting each others' religious conscience, because
we who are believing partners of the reconciliation process reject
syncretism as the way to peace and tolerance. We reject the notion that all
religions are equally good, but we accept our responsibility to build a more
humane world, together with followers of different religions and cultures.29
The pluralist model refuses to minimise substantive theological, ethical and cultural
differences that exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zovkic is dissatisfied with the
simplistic claims that Bosnia-Herzegovina was an oasis of ethnic and religious
harmony before the war. He points out that real differences and tensions were
present, and that the 'harmony' achieved through socialism was at the expense of
marginalizing minority communities and suppressing substantive differences. By
contrast, he sees a pluralist and particularist direction as the way to move in order to
preserve the proper Croatian and Catholic identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He is thus
25 Markovic, unrecorded interview, December 2001. Also, Markovic
[RC.RL.SA.01]: 3.
26 Orsolic 1998: 263.
27 See the discussion in Chapter Three on this topic.
28 Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 4.
29 Zovkic 2002: 185; Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 3. Zovkic is a pluralist in the sense of
Vatican II, as he clarifies, and not in the sense of pluralism today.
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opposed to the exclusive particularism ofCroatian Catholic nationalists in the
secession-minded region ofHerzeg-Bosna, arguing that the loss of this region to
Croatia would so politically weaken the Croat Catholic minority ofCentral Bosnia as
to make them nationally inviable. Their plight then would not be unlike that of the
Bosnjaks. In this same respect, Reis-ul-Iema Ceric also opposes a syncretism that
would inevitably lead to assimilation and the ultimate demise of the Bosnjak nation.30
The differences that exist between the nations must remain, for in them identity is
maintained. The pluralist model builds peace by advocating a 'separate and equal'
position, and is common among ethnic minorities. Numerical inferiority in an
immature democratic state in which nationalist identity is still the dominant paradigm
translates into a constant threat and potential marginalisation. Extensive checks and
balances are required in order to avoid this outcome, but this is perceived as
preferable to the alternative of cultural annihilation.
The fourth model of peace-building can be termed Christo-centric in that it is
consciously centred in faith in Jesus Christ and in a biblical ontology of the divine-
human relationship. This position is found pre-eminently, but not exclusively,
among the Protestants.31 This model is nationally pluralist and culturally inclusive,
emphasising the universal predicament ofhumanity, and the common need for all to
be reconciled with God through Christ. God's salvific action towards humankind
creates a supra-national identity in Christ that is the basis for social restoration. For
this reason advocates of the Christo-centric model make no significant separation
between reconciliation and soteriology.32 Both are acts of divine grace in Christ and
the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of the individual. Peace and reconciliation are
exemplified in the new humanity recreated in the God-man Jesus Christ.33
Reconciliation is made possible in Christ both on the vertical axis between God and
human beings, as well as the horizontal axis with other persons.
Church leaders from other religious communities often describe the Protestants as
'sectarian' in ways that are calculated to be pejorative,34 and it is true that some
30 Ceric [MU.RL.SA.01]: 4.
31 Seperic [RC.SM.SA.14] also advocates a Christo-centric model.
32 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 7; Kresonja [PR.RL.MO.03J: 20, 21; Skrinjaric
[PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3,4; Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 3, 4. But see also Seperic [RC.SM.SA.14]:
12.
33 See, for instance, Ephesians 2:10-15; Col. 3:11-15.




Protestants are reluctant to become involved in joint events with other churches that
do not share their soteriological views. However, the Protestants are doctrinally no
more sectarian than other religious groups, and culturally and nationally the least
sectarian. The combined presence of Serbs, Croats and Bosnjaks - and in some
instances Roma (Gypsies),35 who are despised by all the other national communities -
is a rare phenomenon in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nationality is virtually irrelevant in
their ontology and identity, and for some36 it is inconceivable to have an emphasis on
national factors. Far more important is what unites them, and that what divides the
nations is inconsequential for their unity.
Three of the four models offer possible expressions of peace and restoration for a
pluralist state. Only the nationalist model, reflecting a force towards a particularised
singularity through exclusion, does not aid reconciliation but moves in the direction
of isolation. The other expressions ofmulti-nationalism can in some way build
peace. Thus, no single model is appropriate for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the
diversity reflects the respective particularities of each community. Diversity does not
necessarily translate into incompatibility, but can lead towards social restoration.
The first three sections of this chapter emerge explicitly from the interviews. The
remaining element ofRestoration as a Leitmotiv for Peace-Building is implicit in the
interviews. However, some confusion and disagreement about the term 'restoration'
disguises the contributions the concept may have. The following extrapolation aims
to clarify the difficulties, and then theologically explores the contributions that the
concept of restoration may have for peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5. Restoration as a Leitmotiv for Peace-Building
5.1. Exordium
The peace-building literature commonly views the term 'restoration' as a
subcategory of'reconciliation'. '7 This is so because peace-building is treated as an
entity apart from a larger context or integrating schema. The opposite will here be
argued, namely, that the larger context is what gives full meaning to peace-building
and brings a new perspective that seeks to see different domains within an integrative
35 The two Sarajevo churches and Mostar East Side each have Roma worshippers in
attendance.
36 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 9, 15, 16; Kresonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 5, 6.
37 See the discussion below for examples.
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whole. The term 'restoration' is not used with reference to temporality, as in the
restoration of another time period. A restoration of this kind is neither possible nor
desirable. The term 'restoration' is used ontologically, and has reference to a state of
being or becoming; it is used to mean 'to make whole again that which was
damaged; to reverse and heal fragmentation'. With reference to structures,
'restoration' means 'to make sound again'. With reference to organisms,
'restoration' is used with a therapeutic intent and a healing effect, as in "a returning
to a normal or healthy condition",38 or "the restoration of friendship between
enemies; the restoration of peace after war".39 The term is here used as the central
domain of the language complex that includes related terms such as 'reconciliation',
'restitution', 'reparation', 'renewal', and 'revival'.40 Thus, in this thesis the
superaltern and subaltern are reversed, that is to say, 'reconciliation' (the healing and
restoring ofbroken relationships) may rightly be viewed as a subcategory of
'restoration', which is treated as the universal and not the particular. This paradigm
may be illustrated by the following examples taken from the situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Among the first tasks undertaken following the cease-fire was the restoration of
electrical power to the cities to re-establish the normalisation of urban life. However
partially, electricity again lighted up homes, and trams moved people around the city.
Similarly, in the rural areas of Central Bosnia, where winter temperatures typically
dip well below freezing, restoring heat to flats was a priority. Less utilitarian
enterprises also may be seen as elements of restoration. In 2004 Mostar city officials
reopened the Stari Most - destroyed in the war in 1993 - to firework displays and
great fanfare. All of these are human undertakings that make whole again that which
was fractured, severed or fragmented. While these efforts may aid reconciliation in
some indirect way, the proper term for them is 'restoration'.
Restoration was also underway in the natural realm. Within months of the end of
fighting, nature began its reclamation as bunkers and pillboxes played host to wild
flowers. Decapitated trees scorched and scarred by mortar fire high above the
Sarajevo skyline put out new growth, concealing the gun placements once so
obvious. Birds and wildlife returned to these areas as the natural order was restored.
38 MWMD 2002: n.p.
39 WRUD 1998: n.p.
40 WRUD 1998: n.p.
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At times human and natural acts of restoration collide to create other difficulties.
The task of clearing landmines is part of the recovery process of restoring arable
land. But mine clearance is made more difficult by the land restoring itself at a rate
faster than the mines can be cleared, making the task of discovery nearly impossible.
These are examples of restoration in which wholeness and healing returns to that
which is dysfunctional or fractured. The environment and society undergo partial
redemption in restoration, and this encompasses a wider sphere than the inter¬
personal restoration ofhuman relationships, or reconciliation. Reconciliation is one
of the last elements of restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, while it is transpiring
very slowly, it is part of the restoration process of healing to both land and people.
Thus, reconciliation is an integral part of the larger framework of restoration.
Theologically, restoration expresses God's will to see wholeness, not only in human
relationships, but in the wider environment, which ultimately embraces the whole
cosmological order. A final restoration will transpire in an eschatological age, but a
partial restoration may be witnessed and experienced even now.
The following investigation will first look at the thoughts voiced by the interviewees
about restoration in order to understand how the term and concept emerge as a
guiding motif for peace-building. Second, it will explore the sociological context,
focusing on how the term 'restoration' is used in the peace-building literature. Third,
the investigation will explore the theological context and provide an overview of the
concept of 'restoration' as it is used in the Muslim and Christian historical-
eschatological contexts, drawing upon insights from religious leaders in the Balkans.
5.2. The Views of Interviewees on 'Restoration'
Two interviewees, Markovic and Kuzmic, are guarded about the term 'restoration' as
a guidingmotif for peace-building beyond the personal level. They point out that the
term could easily imply a return to the ideological past. Markovic expresses this
concern thus:
I find that the use of the word 'restoration' here in your question, in place of
other words like 'reconciliation', 'renewal' or 'revival', 'restoration' is
something ideological. Restoration means 'to bring the situation from the
past into the time of the present'. And 'restoration' always makes dictators
or oligarchs; groups of people who would like to have the same situation of
power as they once had. This is 'restoration'.... For me, restoration is very
ideological. I recommend the use of the word 'reconciliation' or 'revival'.
Restoration here, you know, we can't repair the situation we had.
Restoration is always technocracy. It is the power of a small group of
people. Therefore, I think we can speak with restoration in the sense of
renewal of life and reconciliation and so on in Bosnia.... [T]he word
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restoration you're using more on a personal level, or for individuals.
Restoration of the life of individuals before their sin, before they lost their
reputation in life, so here it is meant as a restoration on a social level. It is
something that is needed to distinguish the right meaning of these words.41
Kuzmic is also wary of exchanging one ideological era for another, or of attempting
to bring back the communist past:
So, when you say in the same question, "the attempt to social restoration", it
could not possibly be the restoration of that because you don't have the
context for it. When you have a different context you cannot have the same
text.42
At the same time, Kuzmic finds that 'restoration' is the appropriate term to describe
the inter-personal dynamic of social normalisation:
I have personally an enormously positive experience with women in peace-
building and restoring normal life conditions and so on.43
With these observations in mind, it is essential to define restoration in such a way to
exclude ideological permutations that could easily overwhelm its usage in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. At the same time, other interviewees view the term 'restoration' as
befitting of the social context. They embrace the term on several levels without fear
of returning to the ideological past. Zovkic sees restoration as a crucial element of
reconciliation that aids healing:
In my Catholic and Croatian experience, reconciliation is a long-term
restoration of broken or weakened relationships with others who are
different and with whom we share the country in which we were bom and in
which we would like to continue living in peace, requesting our individual
and collective rights but also granting to 'others' their individual and
collective rights. 'The others' remain different and have the right to remain
different, but Bosnia is a homeland for all of us. I believe that our
respective faiths do enable us to contribute toward healing the existing
wounds, resorting mutual trust, and living in a just peace. May God help us
in this noble endeavour.44
Mikulic uses the term to describe new parties and initiatives in the political sphere
that seek to affect change in society:
Yes, I can see how society in Bosnia-Herzegovina is somehow trying to
accomplish restoration.... Slowly new political parties are coming into
existence, and their prominence is seen when they make speeches and
promises, but later these things are forgotten. They are trying to have
41 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 1, 2.
42 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 1.
43 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 12.
44 Zovkic 2002: 184.
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restoration. On the question of whether it is possible and what would be the
foundation for restoration Bosnia-Herzegovina, I believe it is possible.45
Grabus views restoration as a process in which religious persons can have a strong
contribution. He refers to a period before the war when religion played a greater
mediating role between nations in society, and envisions a place where animosities
will be decreased because people become better informed both about their own
religion and the beliefs of others:
And I think that [if] people were religiously educated, and [if] people
understand their own religion, they can help the process of restoration
because ifwe help people who don't understand their own religion, they
will always be against the other religion. And it is very important not only
to educate people in their own tradition, but to also explain to them the right
way of the other religions.46
Orsolic believes that this post-communist era grants theology, religion and ethics a
public role for the restoration of civil society, and he is personally involved in
developing these initiatives:
Now is the time, since theology advanced, because in our post-communist
society there is again the presence of religion in public life. That is why I
think the chance is big that people become theologically and ethically
enriched so that this restoration would be complete. Hierarchies of religious
communities should be pushed to be aware of that first, which is achieved
through the Inter-Religious Council of religious leaders since 1997. But at
the same time you have to start working from the bottom, from something
that is not hierarchical, which should be done by seminaries, universities,
upbringing and things like that. The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-
Herzegovina designed a new program that actively engages religion and it
became aware that religionper se can help the restoration of the society in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In one document that was signed by both the OHR
and the Ministry Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina there is a promise that has
to do with the ethnic restoration of the society. On the occasion of a
national holiday our organisation organised a so-called Spiritual Call for
Monotheistic Religions under the auspices of the Presidency ofBosnia-
Herzegovina. That means that the highest positions ofpower in Bosnia-
Herzegovina are doing something practically.... I hope that our citizens
according to, and not in spite of, religious differences will be made firm or
restored. Those differences in religion will not divide citizens but unite
them. World ethics should be developed there.47
Protestant Erceg also believes that new initiatives towards restoration of society must
have a theological and ethical basis:
All these things, all efforts in building peace and inter-religious dialogue
can be described as a tendency to renewal and restoration.... All the efforts
that people are doing concerning especially this inter-religious dialogue
45 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 1.
46 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 8.
47 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 1.
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have their place. They can contribute to successful solving of some
things.... What I'm saying is that I see all these efforts as something good
and that can benefit renewing and re-establishing the peace in this
country.... But the very important thing is that it is necessary to find a
theological and ethical foundation for this process. It has to be part of this
process.48
Seperic links the monotheistic religions and the concept of restoration with
cosmological power constructs and redemption:
There are similarities in the beginning and the end, I would agree.
Especially in the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Islam and Christianity.
All of them agree on how the world was created. I was astonished to see
that the Muslims also believe a lot of things that the Christians hold will
happen in the eschaton, in the future. So we have the same beginning and a
similar end. But what makes Christianity totally different is the
intermediate. Why am I saying that? Actually, when you're saying all of
that about restoration, I remember when I was reading Walter Wink's
trilogy on powers, and he described it in three very distinct and simple
sentences: powers are good, powers are fallen, and powers are to be
redeemed. So, the redemption for me as a Christian comes through a
person, God as a person. And there is something strange happening here
because of some of the Jewish and also Islamic theologians who stress that
Christianity is always a religion of a book. I wouldn't say so. The holy
scriptures for Christians are a medium; it is a book in order to get into a
relationship with the person.... The person is there and that person is Christ.
And if you meet Christ as the power, then no book can restore a relationship
because restoration is basically an inter-personal category. Only in inter¬
personal communication can you achieve restoration. I think that is what
basically makes Christianity different, but not in the imperialistic sort of
way, because we as Christians need to be humble.49
These interviewees make it clear that the term and concept of 'restoration' must not
mean a return to the ideologies of the past. Peace-builders see a new opportunity in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and want to create something different from the ashes of
communism and war. At the same time, interviewees also indicate a willingness to
retain that which is good in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the peace-building process, and
for this reason they view restoration as an appropriate guiding motif for peace-
building. This invites a closer analysis of the way in which 'restoration' is related to
peace-building.
5.3. 'Restoration' in the Sociological Context
In post-war environments the restoration of civil society is of paramount importance,
and is described in the peace-building literature as having three general dimensions:
civil or political, inter-personal, and judicial. In the first instance of civil orpolitical
restoration, the framework addresses the necessary repair of systems and structures
48 Erceg [PR.RL.BL.02]: 2.
49 Seperic [RC.SM.SA.10]: 12.
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in a post-conflict situation in order that society may again function. Restoration in
this sense is the post-war process of societal normalisation necessary for
reconciliation.50 The first commitment of action by the Ecumenical Dialogue for
Reconciliation in Belgrade on February 1996 is in keeping with this priority, as they
pushed for "restoring homes to the displaced, ideally in their original regions, and
providing pastoral care".5' The restoration of civil society is usually the first concern
of governments and NGOs alike. However, as Lederach points out, reconciliation is
not limited to this period of post-settlement restoration, but must continue into other
phases as well.52
The inter-personal aspects of restoration move in the direction of reconciliation.
Lederach here speaks of the 'restoration of the person and the relationship' as an
important ingredient of peace-building and reconciliation.53 With reference to
returning refugees to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hart sees a need to 'reconnect broken
relationships and repair social injury' before reconciliation can be addressed.54
Drawing upon transcendent and theological resources for social restoration towards
peace-building, Muhammed Abu-Nimer makes the following observation regarding
restoration:
There is a need to rediscover the processes and values of restoration through
forgiveness and compassion in Muslim political society.... The cycle of
revenge must be broken by Muslims because restoration is a source of life
(see Qur'an 2:179) not revenge or vengeance.... Thus, humans are expected
to initiate a process of restoring their relationships as part of their nature and
their place in God's order, and must act responsibly toward each other in
order to gain God's forgiveness.55
In a similarly theological vein, this time from a Christian perspective, Schreiter
defines individual reconciliation as the 'restoration ofhumanity' in which the life-
giving relationship to God is re-established, and the image ofGod within each person
is restored.56
The importance that both these religious thinkers attach to human relationships has
direct implications for the important area ofjustice in post-war situations, the third
50 Lederach 1997: 151.
51 Forest 1997: 116.
52 Lederach 1997: 151.
53 Lederach 1997: 24,26, 84.
54 Hart 2001: 305.
55 Abu-Nimer 2003: 68.
56 Schreiter 1998: 15.
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instance of social restoration. Restorativejustice seeks to move beyond the punitive
measures and the legal boundaries of loss and compensation to heal wounds left by
the altercation.57 Restorative justice may be an appropriate means of addressing
personal injustice and loss in the absence of a realistic hope of the court system being
able to guarantee restitution and just compensation.58 The General Amnesty
acknowledges several aspects of the conflict at once. It tacitly acknowledges that
soldiers committed offences against a civil society and non-combatants, inflicting
widespread damage. It acknowledges the incapacity ofboth the judicial and penal
systems to address in any adequate fashion the magnitude of the offences. It
recognises that many of the lower level soldiers in the regular armies were unwilling
combatants, conscripted in the time ofwar to carry out orders against which they had
little or no recourse to alternative action. It attempts to reintegrate military conscripts
into civil society as part of the process ofnormalisation and restoration. Thus, the
General Amnesty is a common and necessary element of restoring peace in post-war
situations, but it necessarily leaves unaddressed grievances that remain a cause of
significant social unrest in the society.
Restorative justice offers both mediation and compensation in rebuilding trust in
local situations where perpetrator and victim know each other, and encounter is
possible, even unavoidable. Petersen divides justice into four descriptive areas:
Punitive justice that seeks to do harm to the offender; distributive justice that seeks
to divide equitably the possession of goods held in ownership; compensatoryjustice
that seeks to right societal injustices by favouring and redressing the imbalances of
one group or another group that previously held incommensurate power; and
restorative justice that seeks to repair damage done.59 Appleby recognises restorative
justice not as a replacement to the existent legal apparatus, but as a "complement [of]
criminal courts and other structures of retributive justice" that requires forgiveness
and whose primary consideration is "the reconciliation ofvictim and offender and the
repairing of the social fabric".60 Restorative justice looks beyond the act of
lawbreaking and commensurate punitive measures therefore, to the healing of
relationships. It shifts the focus from transgression of the law to reparation of
57 Lamboume 2001: 313. See also Estrada-Hollenback 2001: 74ff.
58 Van der Merwe 2001: 199. See the discussion of this Dayton Accord provision
in Chapter Two.
59 Petersen 2004: 74.
60 Appleby 2000: 167,195.
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damage. It thus elevates the role of the victim while seeking to work towards healing
the victim, the perpetrator and the community.61 Restorative justice emphasises the
common humanity ofboth victim and wrongdoer while addressing the dispossession
of the aggrieved. In this regard faith communities have a particular role to play since
they recognise the sacredness of each human being and the need for healing. The
spirituality with which the Christian faith communities view the parties involved
addresses areas ofhumanity the courts cannot, because the faith communities are
informed by a dimension of redemptive action towards restoration. Subsequent
healing is available to both victim and wrongdoer alike, bringing wholeness and
reconciliation. The therapeutic element of soteriology is manifest in individuals who
viewed themselves both as victims62 and as wrongdoers.63
These three dimensions of restoration in the sociological realm share the common
perspective of re-establishing a normalised environment for human co-existence.
Restoration is a re-creative act 'making whole again' that which is fractured and
damaged in human relationships and their environment. It encompasses the tasks of
rebuilding the infrastructure of a war-torn environment by restoring electrical power
and water and sufficiently sustaining a displaced population with food and shelter. It
functions on an inter-personal level and seeks to make whole again relationships
fractured by the violence ofwar. Restoration also encompasses the creation ofjust
means of addressing grievances caused by the war. In the Balkan conflicts this must
go beyond the processes of the Tribunal at the Hague to address the multitude of
offences and injustices outside the remit of this specialised court.
5.4. 'Restoration' in the Theological Context
It is at the human rather than structural level that restoration acquires a spiritual
dimension and is informed theologically as a spiritual undertaking. Appleby says
that "reconciliation involves a fundamental restoration of the human spirit" which is
a spiritual rather than technical process that cannot be foreshortened.64 Restoration of
wholeness of the human spirit derives from the creation event, for it is in the creation
that order, structure and purpose are found, in a teleological framework upon which
61 Petersen 2004: 77.
62 Rakic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 1, 2; Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 6ff.
63 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 2, 3.
64 Appleby 2002: 203.
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natural order is predicated. The sociological dimension thus leads to reflection on
the theological dimension. An Orthodox perspective on this ontology of restoration
is given in the document entitled, 'The contribution of the Orthodox Church to the
realization of peace, justice, freedom, fraternity and love between the nations as well
as to the elimination of racial and other forms of discrimination' submitted to the
Great and Holy Council of the Orthodox Church (Una Sancta 42) at Chambesy in
1987. It states:
At the centre of this document on peace... there stands the human person
who, in keeping with Christian understanding is focused on God's incarnate
Logos.... Through the incarnation the Logos has recapitulated in himself the
entire creation, that he has restored once again man's holiness and greatness
and has eliminated the causes of all disunity....
The first thing the document describes is the foundation of peace: 'there is a
particular point in beginning by emphasizing that the biblical concept of
peace is not identical with a neutral, negative view that would simply
identify peace with the absence ofwar. The concept 'peace' is identical
with the restoration of things in their pristine innocence before the fall,
when man and woman still lived and breathed in the life-giving breath of
the creation in the image and likeness of God. In other words, it means the
restoration of relations between God and man, it means peace between God
and man.'65
The creation imagery of restoration resonates with several of the religious leaders
interviewed. Mustafic asserts that in the creation God is the God of all people, and
we are thus reviving the real picture.66 Muslim professor Grabus67 and Orthodox
priest Toskovic68 find in the creation an image ofhow things ought to look ethically,
and that the creation is thus instructive of how we ought to treat others. Similarly,
Radujkovic views all of humanity as a creation of God, and people therefore have no
right to harm others.69 Several religious leaders point out that all people are created
in God's image, in which the real identity ofhumanity is found, and that a key to
reconciliation is the recognition that we are all God's creations.70 Protestant leader
Kuzmic expresses this clearly with the following:
65 Cited by Papandreou 1988: 26.
66 Mustafic [MU.RL.SA.03]: 21.
67 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 13, 22, 24.
68 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8.
69 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 2.
70 Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 25; Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 3; Skrinjaric
[PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3; Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 5.
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,..[T]he answer lies in the discovery of the fact that we are all bearers of the
Imago Dei. So you have to go back to creation, to the theological
anthropology, to the creation and then therefore to creation ethic and ask the
question what is the divine intention for humanity. And it is obviously not
to exterminate each other and to hate each other, but to build a shalom type
of community.... Let's not start with Christian ethics, let's start with
creation ethics, because that's where all of us share humanity. All of us
share Imago Dei, and all of us have a common original parent in God. And
so, based on that, you can look for common ground, and then you can
address, as you said, the agnostics and non-confessional persons also,
because they are also created. They also are bearers of the Imago Dei.
They also are created in the image ofGod.... They still belong to God by the
very act of creation, by that very gifting of conscience and mind, ... and all
of the transcendent dimensions of existence. That's what makes us human.
It's a search for common humanity, which becomes a search for shalom or
for peace, even in a multi-religious or even atheistic or agnostic setting.71
The restoration of society and the healing of human relationships is thus shaped by
creation imagery, but is also informed by imagery of the eschaton. Living in a
peaceable fashion between the creation and the eschaton is indeed the heart of the
matter of restoration. Humanity's departure from the intention ofGod in the created
order results in the current condition of separation from God,72 while at the same time
anticipating an age to come when God establishes a new order, restoring that which
was relationally and cosmologically lost in the created realm. Theological
differences on this theme across the faith communities do not exclude shared
elements.
5.4.1. The Qur'anic Basis for Restoration
The Unity of God (tawhid) is the foundational principle of the Islamic worldview.
While referring primarily to the unity ofGod, tawhid is widely interpreted among
Muslim religious thinkers to imply the unity of God's creation; everything in
creation exists within the creative word of God who, though transcendently other
than His creation, is immanently involved in its every part. Similarly, the principle
of the unity of God is extended to the entirety of Islamic thought, prompting one
Islamic scholar to assert that taM'hld is "the foundation, the centre and the end of the
[Islamic] tradition".73 The integrated unity of all things reaches an apotheosis in the
new creation (21:104) in which the created order will be cosmologically restored and
all of humanity will return to the creator. The Day of Judgment, described as a
71 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 5.
72 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 5.
73 Royster 1987: 28.
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calamity, when God will examine each individual for his or her faithfullness and
deeds, will inaugurate the new creation.74
Justice will finally and ultimately prevail (21:47), and, in the face of God's
righteousness, those who have committed evil will recognise the wrongful nature of
their evil deeds, will be retributed accordingly (37:39), and will realise the justice of
their condemnation, being separated from God into Hell (38:55-58; 39:71-72). This
is followed by the return of the righteous to the Creator (21:35; 36:77-83) through
admission of the blessed into Paradise in the presence ofGod (54:54-55), a Garden
(50:31-35) and place ofjoy and peace (6:127; 36:55-58) separating the righteous
from the unrighteous (3:185; 11: 108, 19:60).
The holistic worldview expressed by tawhid extends to the current socio-political
order, creating both a frame of reference and a hermeneutic tool for addressing
injustice and poverty. The application of tawhid as a guiding interpretive motif in
the contemporary setting means that other interpretive frameworks - the
philosophical, spiritual, juristic or political - are not in conflict with each other, but
are parts of the whole. Each is necessary to express the fullness of the Quranic
message.75 Further, the principle of tawhid resists the artificial division in human
existence. Tawhid recognises no division between the sacred and the secular and
acknowledges the legitimate place religion and faith have in combating injustice.76
Similarly, applying the principle of tawhid in society translates into the unity of
humanity and opposes the division, alienation and degradation of peoples along
national or ethnic lines.
The application of tawhid as a theory and praxis of integrated cosmological and
sociological unity has a positive relevance to the restoration needed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Instead of two inviable political entities and three nations constantly
seeking to disadvantage each other, one unified political state could be mutually
nurtured from that which each of the nations positively contributes to the whole.
However, advocacy for a unified political state is not support for the establishment of
an Islamic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rather, it acknowledges that religious and
political functions within a democratic state are not mutually exclusive or
74 See 101: 1-11, and also 21:94; 56:24; 18:49; 84:6-12.
75 Esack 1997: 93.
76 Esack 1997: 92.
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diametrically opposed to each other; not only are they compatible, but they function
best together when they are able to inform each other. The Reis-ul-ulema addresses
this and argues against the tyranny of secular rationalism when he says, "Politics is
too important today to be left to politicians alone in the same way that theology is too
important to be left to the theologians alone."77 The tyranny of secular rationalism
excludes religion's positive moral contributions through privatisation. Tawhld resists
this kind of division.
Further, tawhld as an integrated unity includes multiple elements that complement
each other on the basis not of ethnicity or politics, but what the Qur'an terms taqwa,
or 'righteousness rooted in the fear/awe of God'. Taqwa literally means 'to ward
off, 'to guard against', or 'to preserve'78 and is the most basic inclusive ethical
concept used in the Qur'an.79 On the 'vertical plane' it refers to belief in God (10:36;
27:53; 41:18) and to service of God (2:21). It is also used on the 'horizontal plane'
in reference to the proper treatment of fellow humanity in such social commitments
as sharing (92:5; 7:152-3), fulfilling covenants (3:76; 7:52) and showing kindness
(3:172; 4:126; 5:93; 16:127).80 Taqwa has the holistic sense of simultaneously
'embracing both responsibility to God and to humankind'.81
Taqwa is the hermeneutical tool that safeguards against the misappropriation of the
Qur'an for sectarian political or theological purposes. It makes no assumption about
the interpreter standing apart from the text, but seeks to actively engage the
interpreter in a process ofpersonal transformation at the same time that s/he is
engaged in social transformation.82 The restructuring of civil society along just lines
is to be entrusted to those who demonstrate justice, fairness and honesty within their
own lives.83
The process ofmoving out from the unity of God and back towards wholeness and
unity is a primary concern and guiding principle of Islam. The principle of tawhld
77 Ceric [MU.RL.SA.01]: 6.
78 Esack 1997: 87.
19 Jafri 1980: 127, as cited in Esack 1997: 87.
80 Esack 1997: 87.
81 Esack 1997: 87.
82 Esack 1997: 89.
83 Esack 1997: 89. It is ofparticular interest that Esack has developed this
interpretation of taqwa as a Muslim religious leader in the context of the anti-apartheid
straggle in South Africa.
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recognises a cosmological and sociological dimension, which is fundamentally part
of the whole and cannot be separate and distinct. Nevertheless, there must remain a
temporal distinction between that which is possible in the current socio-political
world and that, which awaits completion in the new creation. Maintaining the
distinction between the teleological and the eschatological dimensions precludes
theological obscurantism and political radicalism, and will at the same time provide a
proper place for sober optimism. As one source points out, "The hope of something
better to come has informed both theology and socio-political expectations, and the
translation of the promise of a time of universal peace and justice is easily made
from this age to the next (and back again)". In this sense the term 'restoration' is
properly employed of the process of 'making whole again'. Final restoration
ultimately rests in the hands of God and in his timing. In the meanwhile restoration
informs and instructs those living by the principle of taqwa as to how they are to
conduct themselves in relation to others with a sense of purpose, wholeness, justice,
and unity. In this greater sense, restoration is broader than that which reconciliation
alone can identity and describe, and includes in principle the possibility of
reconciliation and harmonious co-existence (Mitmenschlichkeit).
5.4.2. The Biblical Basis for Restoration/Reconciliation
The theological meaning of restoration (anoKaxaoTaoiq) in the biblical accounts is
linked to the domain of'reconcilation' (anoKaxaXkaoow, 'to reconcile', from
r 85 ' '
Karakkayij). In the LXX d7roKaxaaxdai(; is used to indicate the political realm of
the Israelite nation and refers discretely to the eschatological salvation of a remnant
people faithful to Yahweh. God is the chief actor in the redemption of his people,
returning them to their former state (cf. Jeremiah 16:15; 24:6; Ezekiel 16:55).86
In the first century CE a certain element of the Jewish community was prepared to
place the messianic mantel of political authority on the shoulders of Jesus (Mark
9:12). He was meant to fulfil the prophetic expectations of Ehjah-redivivus, who
"will restore all things" (d7iOKaiaaTijasr 7idvra, Matthew 17:11).87 In the post-
resurrection period Peter asserts that the Jewish prophetic expectations were indeed
84 Smith/Haddad 1981: 70.
85
See, for instance, Brown (1978: 145-176), where the terms 'Restoration,
Reconciliation, Propitiation and Atonement' are placed together in a single entry.
86 Link 1978: 147.
87 The Matthew passage may especially reflect the prevalent Jewish apocalypticism
of the inter-testamental period.
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fulfilled in Jesus, the Messiah, who then must remain in heaven until the time of
"universal restoration" (NRSB), or perhaps better translated as the, "restoration of all
things" (dTtOKaTacTfiGSCDa 7tdvTcov) promised through the Hebrew prophets (Acts
3:21). Thus, partial fulfilment of the prophecy is found in the person of Jesus as the
suffering Son ofMan (Acts 3:18, cf. Mark 9:12, 13), but the final restoration of all
things must await the time when God will again send the Messiah and thereby fulfil
the utterances of the prophets (Acts 3:21 -26). In the Colossian (1:20) passage
focused on the supremacy of Christ, the same cosmological intention is combined
with a similar linguistic formula, substituting the word 'reconciliation' for
'restoration', as follows:
...and through him God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things,
(duoKaTalldCaL xa udraa) whether on earth or in heaven, by making peace
through the blood of his cross.
The image of restoration and universal peace and harmony with creation that
supersedes national sovereignties and power structures is inextricably connected
with the saving and redeeming actions of God (Isaiah 11; Revelation 21, 22).
However, the image of peace re-created in the eschaton is not the same image as that
of the creation. It is not a simplistic return to a time past, but a necessary preparation
for the future. The original image of the earthly garden inhabited by the original
representative man and woman (Genesis 1) becomes a heavenly city in the re¬
creation, inhabited by representatives of all nations, peoples, tongues and tribes
under the authority and in the presence of the creator (Revelation 21). The damage
of the ages through the perpetration of evil is overturned by the decisive action of
God against his dissenters. The Tree of Life, the common element in both creation
and new creation scenarios, is a balm for the healing of the nations (Rev. 22:2).
God's teleological purposefulness in the creation leads to ultimate peace-building in
the new creation. Protestant theologian Miroslav Volf sees the final redemptive act
of God as a means to restore the peace of creation:
The creation of the world involved no violence... No chaotic powers need to
be overcome; the world emerges through an act of pure positing.... The
chaos sets in as a distortion of the peaceful creation. Redemption cannot,
therefore, be an act of pure positing but entails negation and struggle, even
violence. First God suffers violence on the cross for the salvation of the
world. Then, after God's patience with chaotic powers who refuse to be
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redeemed by the cross has come to an end, God inflicts violence against the
stubbornly violent to restore creation's original peace.88
Christians in this current time period thus live expectantly of the next, having a sense
both of the 'already' and the 'not yet' of the Kingdom of God. They accordingly
seek to live with the practised intentionality of drawing upon a vision of the future
kingdom while also participating in legitimate restorative initiatives in this era and
on this earthly plain. Similarly, Orthodox theologian Stanley S. Harakas links
creation in Christian theology to the re-establishment of a relationship to God and
other people, which is broken through sin, as indicated by his citation of Orthodox
theologian Constanstine Callinicos:
If religion is defined and is the innermost bond ofman with God, and if sin
is nothing other than the opposing force which seeks to destroy that bond
with satanic passion and to snatch the child from the amis of its Creator,
then Christianity... must needs present itself in no other light than as an
enemy of this opposing power and as a restorer of the broken bond.89
Living between the redemptive crisis of the cross and the final resurrection means
living purposefully - and perhaps uncomfortably - as the redeemed of God,
consciously seeking to turn aside evil when it is encountered, not just because living
apotropaically is less disruptive to human co-existence, but because living in such a
way draws a person closer to the intended harmonious communion with the Creator.
The remarks ofRadujkovic are here appropriate:
Our Christ came to suffer for every human being. So ifwe are carriers of
the Holy Spirit or ifwe keep uniting with Christ then we are uniting with all
people who have the image of Christ in them. In that kind of unification
there is no male or female, black or white. All the questions directed to the
Orthodox Christians and Christians in general come out of these two
important facts. Everyone who knows this and lives with it feels a need to
be an active part in that life. Someone who knows this and feels that way
cannot be a passive observer of the world around him.90
Radujkovic points to Christ as the Second Adam to give us an image of how the
world might have looked.91 He asserts that the redemptive power in the resurrection
is sufficient to overcome our own human nature, physical death and the final death,
88 Volf 1996b: 300, italics added. It is fair to note, however, that Volf does not see
'restoration' as the motif around which an interpretive schema of peace should be designed.
Volf believes that 'reconciliation' has a larger scope and greater embrace than restoration
(Personal conversation with the author).
89 Callinicos, as cited in Harakas 2002: 54.
90 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 16.
91 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 6, referencing Romans 5:12ff.
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and points to a Christian response for living in the world today.92 He elaborates this
view thus:
I understand [restoration] as the task of all Christians. In our services, in the
church singing, we always call Christ a new Adam.93 Christ came to show
on his example what Adam was supposed to do and how the world would
have looked like if Adam hadn't done what he did or if he did what he was
supposed to do. We still live in the world where both Adam and Christ co¬
exist. I think that Christians have this task, whether they're called Orthodox
or Catholic or Protestant, to show on their personal example what Christ
came for to live here on earth. So that Christians could show to these
adamic people in their personal example how they should live....
Throughout our history a lot of things collected upon that root. I think that
our common task would be to clear away those layers.94
Working for such a peace is an effort worthy of the blessing of God (Matthew 5:9,
38-48, cf. Luke 6:27-36).
Both Muslim and Christian worldviews concerning peace and treatment of others are
strongly influenced by the notion of restoration, informed first by an ideal in the
creation ofGod, and by a new creation by God in the order yet to come in the
eschaton. The picture of peace in both of these images is universal and God-created,
and informs believers how they should live in the conditions and realities of this age.
5.5. Conclusion to the Restoration Section
It is clear from the foregoing that 'restoration' makes a powerful contribution to a
holistic approach to peace-building. The concept of restoration must first be clearly
understood in its sociological and theological context because difficulties can arise in
the translation of the concept of restoration from the cosmological ideals to the terra
(in)firma of this world. Islam, for instance, sees itself as a movement of restoration,
seeking to return "to ancient, pure monotheism".95 The irreconcilability of some
Muslim and Christian views need not necessarily lead to aggression, but often has.
At the same time the Islamic ideals of tawhld and taqwa are sufficient guiding
principles of restoration to mitigate against any ill will and make significant
contributions to peace-building from within Islam.
Similarly, Christian restoration theologies have foundered on the treacherous
eschatological shoals of time and territory, confusing the telos of the creation and
92 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 6.
93 Radujkovic is here referencing Romans 5:12-21.
94 Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 6.
95 Tennent 2002: 147-8.
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history with the apocalyptic events of the eschaton.96 Most frequently this has taken
the form of'fulfilment theology', illegitimately assuming for this age the conditions
of an age yet to come, and misappropriating for humanity the prerogative of God. It
is the confusion of the eschatological redemption, which is the ultimate eradication
ofmetaphysical evil, with teleological redemption, which is the limitation of
physical evil in this world.
Religious leaders interviewed in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not exhibit this kind of
naivete, and maintain a conscious and sober understanding of the limits to peace and
redemption.97 They also realise that the term 'restoration' can be confused with the
troubled history tainted by previous empires in the Balkans, whether under the
domination of the Serbs, Ottomans, Habsburgs, Fascists, Communists or
Nationalists. Leaders reject out of hand any thought of a return to one of these
systems of rule. The word 'restoration' can evoke images of partisanship and
domination of one nation over another. From a theological point of view, it is this
kind of imagery that Jesus sought to dispel and transform. Luke records an
important post-resurrection encounter between Jesus and the disciples, who expect
that the risen Messiah would now rescue the nation of Israel from the tyranny of the
Romans and establish the kingdom once again. They ask, "Lord, is this the time
when you will restore the kingdom to Israel?" (dTTOKaGiaxaveic; tf]v paatketav ttp
'Iapaf|X;). At this point Jesus 'de-nationalises' the kingdom and indicates that the
new kingdom, inaugurated in the work ofChrist and empowered by the Father
through the sending of the Holy Spirit, would cross ethnic and national boundaries
(Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria) and embrace nothing less than the ends of the earth
96
Origen (c.185 - c.254), for instance, formulated the doctrine of 'universal
restoration' around dTroKaxaoTdou;, asserting that the entire created order would again be
returned to the original created state, which gave rise to a correlative doctrine of universal
salvation for all of humanity. More recently the Plymouth Brethren sought to restore the
simplicity and purity of primitive Christianity in preparation for the return of Christ. Both
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons) and the Jehovah's Witnesses are
restorationist movements with a strong focus on apocalyptic eschatology. Writing in 1922
after the apocalyptic-like events of the First World War, Albert Schweitzer called for a
'spiritual awakening and a will for ethical good' as the basis for the restoration of civilisation
(1932: 78). Adrian Hastings sees the Roman Catholic Church under John Paul II as a huge
exercise of 'Restoration', by which he means a return to a former age that is, "increasingly
alienating its leaders both from those of other churches and from its own theologians" (1990:
2).
97 Jovanovic [SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 4; Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 4; Skrinjaric
[PR.RL.ZA.06]: 2, 4, 5; Kresonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 3; Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 1; Ceric
[MU.RL.SA.01]: 9, 10, 12-14.
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the earth (cf. Acts 1:6ff). The assumption of the promise of restoration by one nation
at the expense of others is antithetical to the teachings of Christ, and is to be rejected.
In the broad sense outlined above, 'restoration' can serve as an appropriate Leitmotiv
for peace-building in today's Bosnia-Herzegovina because it offers a strong holistic
framework for 'making whole again' that which is damaged, distorted or fractured.
Restoration offers a cogent worldview of the universe in a threefold manner. First,
restoration is set in the teleological purpose and design in the created order, which,
although fundamentally and detrimentally altered by the action of humanity, will
achieve its intended completion. Second, restoration offers an image of the goodness
of God in the intentionality of the creation and a vision for a healed cosmological and
sociological future. Third, restoration offers a vision for 'real time' interaction with
those dispossessed, disenfranchised and displaced and offers hope to those who
suffer under the dissonance of the current chaotic order. Moreover, the motif of
restoration is advantaged over other peace-building initiatives currently employed.
These attempts fail to address the lingering issues from the past that contribute to the
cycle of violence each time the society is confronted with upheaval. By contrast, the
theological and sociological framework of restoration creates a meaningful
cosmology that can address both current antagonisms and residual animosities
lingering from the past.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the issues that emerge from the grounded research that
contribute to the theological and ethical understanding of peace-building. Each of
the foregoing topics of analysis demonstrate a common theme, namely, the attempt to
forge a harmonious unity from a conflicted diversity, revealing in the process the
means that the interested parties consider legitimate for the task of creating unity. In
the first instance of distinguishing authentic from inauthentic religious faith, persons
of faith regard religious heterodoxy as a problematic diversion that is easily co-opted
by nationalist ideology. Greater awareness of core Christian and Muslim teaching
serves as corrective to incidents of abuse. In the second section of analysis, the
creation ofpower bases is focused on unifying the malleable elements within the
religio-cultural base while simultaneously eliminating or marginalising dissident
factions. The ongoing efforts to consolidate power bases raise serious questions
about the willingness of each party to co-exist with the other parties in mutually
beneficial ways. It would seem that power sharing with perceived rival factions
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remains a remote concept where zero-sum politics (including the religious
institutions) is the status quo.
At the same time the efforts of religious reconcilers is remarkably diverse in the
common effort of creating harmonious unity in the country of diverse groups, which
is the conclusion of the third section of analysis. Four models were put forth to
demonstrate how unity within each group is fostered, which is then extended beyond
itself to others.
In the last section analysing the concept of restoration, God is the author ofunity,
who acts purposefully to draw together those who are willingly under his authority.
This act of re-creation has both an aspect of timeliness in accord with God's
purposes, and an aspect of finality, in that it will be eschatologically achieved. The
Christian account of cosmological unity under God's reign expresses diversity
through the many tongues, tribes and nations, and will serve as a healing to the
conflicts known today, establishing a harmonious co-existence. This unity and
harmony cannot be prematurely achieved through the well-intentioned efforts of
humans because it remains the prerogative and providence of God. However, the
unity to be established in the cosmological restoration is, in the etymological sense of
the German word, a Vorbild, or pre-picture and image of the intentionality of God
from the very moment of creation to the re-created final cosmological order. It is
thus instructive ofhow those submitted to God's authority should live in relation to
Him and to others in today's world.
The foregoing reflection elaborates the efforts towards legitimate and harmonious
unity, but leaves open the question of aggressive and violent disunity, and the
obvious question of irreconcilable differences remains. The final chapter will
address the mythological narratives that dominate the community imaginations in
times ofpolitical and economic turmoil, and propose a way forward towards peace-
building and restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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A Contextual Analysis of Peace-Building:
The Role of Religious Faith Sodalities
1. Introduction
In this final chapter the thesis moves from theological and conceptual issues to
address questions of contextual implementation. Specifically, it seeks to answer the
Research Question, "How are the key peace-building issues implemented in the
context, and what forms do they take?"
The chapter moves first from 'imagined' communities to authentic communities of
faith, analysing their nature and character and how they stand in contrast to the
embattled imagined communities led by nationalist elites. It will attempt to unfold
how personal narrative expressed in an authentic religious community where
sanctuary is offered proves stronger than national myths of the imagined community1
where security is an illusion.
Authentic religious expressions are manifested more frequently through smaller
communities, or religious faith sodalities, than in the adoption of a new worldview at
the ideological level. For that reason, the chapter offers an expose of three religious
faith sodalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina that effectively transcend nationalist rhetoric
and build multi-national communities ofpeace. The chapter will explore how the
religious sodalities provide a sacred space where people can directly address their
1 The term 'imagined community' is used by Benedict Anderson to mean nations as
political communities that have a common relational bond. To describe a community as
'imagined' is not to indicate that it is 'imaginary' or 'not real'. The community is
'imagined' in that the members will not know or meet most of the fellow-members, "yet in
the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (1991: 6).
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differences, and give expression to the issues that have so deeply hurt them. The
chapter explores in greater detail the character of these sodalities and the multiple
resources they bring to the tasks of social restoration and peace-building across
national boundaries. These resources are identified from the interview data, and their
use is illustrated within the specific local context.
The chapter then analyses the legacy of the supra-historical past as expressed in the
destructive national myths, which is one of the most intractable difficulties faced in
post-war peace-building, and one which is not often addressed in the peace-building
literature. The chapter examines how the authentic faith communities approach this
issue, and proposes an alternative approach to Western attempts to demythologise the
national narratives that perpetuate animosity from one generation to another.
Drawing upon the empirical data of the research, the chapter suggests a way forward
that transcends both the current debate on national mythologies and the real
animosities manifest in Bosnia-Herzegovina today.
The chapter then looks more closely at forgiveness, the sine qua non of social
restoration, or reconciliation. The religious traditions view forgiveness differently
and therefore place a different emphasis on its role in social restoration. However,
the research shows that each of the religious communities believes in the necessity of
cultivating a spirituality of forgiveness in order to adequately address the injustices
of life. Ofparticular importance for this thesis is the examination of the way in
which forgiveness effectively encounters memory and mythology to bring healing
and restore personal wholeness. This element will explore the positive effect of
arresting the cycle of revenge through 'rememorying' of personal and communal
history.
2. Religious Faith Sodalities and Peace-Building
2.1. From 'Imagined' to Authentic Communities
Political elites in the Balkans assert that the nationalist cause achieves security for
their people. Using one-sided arguments they vilify their enemy by invoking the
memory of past conflicts and reinvigorating national myths. As Kuzmic points out,
it is a short distance from bellicose rhetoric to bellum. In reality, however,
nationalist oratory has led not to security, but to open warfare with extensive losses
2 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 10.
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on all sides. The 'imagined community' in turmoil staked out exclusive territorial
claims, and turned ancient burial sites and religious structures into hallowed ground.
For this reason, much energy was given to destroying mosques and churches, and the
willing complicity of institutional religious leaders lent an aura ofmoral
righteousness and legitimacy to the undertaking.
Now it is only too apparent how insecure the nationalist cause actually was. Ultra-
nationalists carved out regions on the battlefield and at the negotiating table at the
cost of internal dislocation and fragmentation. Consequently, whole communities
became severed from external help offered by the international community that
insisted on ethnic reintegration as a condition ofpost-war reconstruction. Thus, the
imagined community driven by hardliners proved to be a perilous ideal that failed to
deliver greater peace and security. Instead, it has managed only a fragile stability
characterised by social disintegration and ongoing ethnic hostility.
2.2. The Nature of the Religious Faith Sodalities
In contrast to these failed initiatives, genuine manifestations ofpeace are found in the
authentic religious communities that promote care of all persons regardless of
national identity. The authentic community is a sodality, best expressed in the local
language(s) as a zajednica or zbor, which distinguishes itself from the nationalist
campaigns. These sodalities are small communities operating with varying degrees
of autonomy from larger institutional bodies, and consist of individuals who make a
conscious choice to participate in an alternative communal experience. No one in a
zajednica or zbor is there by default or birth; membership is by choice.
The existence of religious faith sodalities is imperative to the post-war development
because the "established religious communities of southeastern and Eastern Europe,
at this time, are not capable of nurturing sincere and open dialogue".3 These
sodalities fashion an identity discrete from the institutional faith communities, and
challenge the maxims of nationalist elites who manipulate the religious bodies. The
sodalities thus provide alternative platforms of peace and co-operation that
demonstrate remarkable results. On the personal level, authentic spiritual
communities provide a safe place where people can participate in narrative
exchange.4 Narrative exchange practised within a created safe space counters the
3 Orsolic 1998: 263.
4 Unrecorded interview with Vjekoslav Saje, December 2001.
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destructive mythological narratives. Dialogue, a frequently-cited means of conflict
resolution, is often organised through fonnal channels in higher political echelons
and seeks to find means of co-operation while ultimately maintaining protective
boundaries of identity. By contrast, narrative exchange transpires at the grassroots
level and engages affected persons in the simple task of sharing their experience and
perspective.5 Narrative exchange anticipates a variety of interpretations of events
and reveals the great loss and pain experienced by people on all sides. People
express rage and anger, hatred and fear. By listening to each other's personal
narratives and participating in role reversal exercises, people find common narratives
of suffering, dispossession and violation. Hatred and fear are gradually shifted and
replaced by sympathy, understanding and growing trust. In the authentic spiritual
communities people begin to understand themselves in relation to God, their world,
and to others, especially those once perceived to be hostile. Significantly, authentic
religious communities are sanctuaries of help, hope and healing. They are the altars
where hatreds and fears are given away, and forgiveness is received. Not
uncommonly, genuine peace and reconciliation are manifested in this sacred space.
2.3. The Nature and Role of the Leader (Pravednik)
The leader of the zajednica or zbor is a local religious leader who has articulated new
vision and created opportunity for social restoration and healing. They are public
figures who speak against social injustice. They often establish non-profit groups
that provide a platform for their message, and to which people of similar convictions
can gather. Commonly the leader has faced significant opposition, yet continues to
reach across national barriers to the disenfranchised other. This person is a
pravednik,6 or 'righteous person' who acts from a moral basis to assist others,
bringing him or her into direct conflict with the power elites in high places. The
pravednik is a dissident and a prophetic voice on behalf of the dispossessed and
powerless. Their actions are not politically calculated, but righteously administered.
5 Steele 1998:246-253.
6 The root of the word is 'prav\ meaning 'straight'. In the legal sphere it has the
meaning of 'innocent' and is the basis for the words, 'pravda', meaning 'justice, right' and
'pravi' meaning 'real, actual, genuine' and 'appropriate, right'. Markovic remarks that the
pravednik is one who "is persecuted in their own group" for the righteous acts they do.
(Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 11, 12).
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Today's heroes in the fonner Yugoslav republics remain ultra-nationalists such as
Tudjman, Karadzic, Mladic, and Arkan.7 In this environment thepravednik is an
anti-hero who stands against corrupt regimes. Several of them find inspiration in
Christian figures, such as Franciscan friar Mato Topic. When UN forces evacuated
the Central Bosnian town ofVares owing to fierce fighting, Topic remained to
distribute food supplies to Muslims and Croats alike, modelling himself on Christ
and St Francis.8
Disheartened by the destruction ofher town and the personal loss ofher flat, Krishna
Kovac returned to her hometown to coordinate relief supplies in Sipovo, assuring
that food and medicines reached all, without regard for national distinction. As a
devout Orthodox believer, Kovac knows that this is the proper response expected of
believers who are obedient to a righteous God.9 These - and other individuals
interviewed for this research - act in brave and selfless ways out of religious
conviction and with personal faith to the benefit of those who cannot help
themselves. The pravednik acts and speaks prophetically, brings conviction into the
zone of ideological and military conflict, and challenges others to act justly. The
presence of thepravednik and zajednica does not end the conflict, but changes its
focus. Ideological rhetoric loses its potency in the zajednica. Together the zajednica
and the pravednik engage and redress injustice and build peace in order to restore
community. They fight against ideology not with guns, but with arguments and other
non-violent resources.10
7
Franjo Tudjman was the founder and first president of the Croatian nationalist
political party HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) and became the first president of
independent Croatia. Radovan Karadzic was the Bosnian Serb political hardliner of the
ultra-nationalist SDS party from 1990. He was indicted by the International Tribunal in
1995 for war crimes but remains at large. Ratko Mladic was the general and commander of
the Bosnian Serb Army beginning in 1992. The International Criminal Court at the Hague
also indicted him for war crimes. He remains at large. Zeljko Raznatovic, better known as
'Arkan', was the charismatic Serbian leader of the ruthless paramilitary 'Tigers' responsible
for ethnic cleansing of Bosnjaks in eastern Bosnia and was indicted for war crimes in Croatia
and Bosnia. In 1995 he married Turbo-Folk pop singer Ceca, and in January 2000 he was
murdered in Belgrade.
8
Topic [RC.RL.RA.04]: 7, 8.
9 Kovac [SO.WO.S1.03]: 4, 5.
10 Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 4.
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3. Analysis of the Religious Faith Sodalities
3.1. Examples of Peace-Building Through Religious Faith Sodalities
Within the religious faith sodalities people are discovering anew the old narratives of
the sacred texts, are finding self-worth, and are recovering a sense of sacredness of
life for all humanity. This is a marked shift in identity away from the communist and
nationalist ideologies. In the sacred spaces created by the religious sodalities
Muslims, for example, are learning that the Quran teaches forgiveness" and
promotes respect and protection ofChristians and Jews (60:8). Persons of religious
faith can teach others for the purpose of rebuilding a common civil society. Siljak
speaks of this from her own experiences in her lectures:
I think we need different educating for children in schools. Some kind of
history of religion or ethics or I'm not sure what we should call it. But it is a
good way to give them a chance to leam. When we travelled around Bosnia,
some old people from workshops and lectures told me that [they never knew
that] God says in the Qur'an, that we have to respect each person and etc.
You can't hate somebody because they aren't Muslim. This isn't a good
reason. He is a creature ofGod, he is a human being and he deserves
respect. And you have to do this. Especially when I told people that you
have to respect Christians and Jews, people looked at me like I had told them
some sort of nonsense.... And 1 told them that God says this in the Qur'an
or that you have to do this, that you have to respect especially Christians and
Jews, people don't know that. We have to do a lot on education.12
Another example of peace-building comes from the largely segregated entity of the
Republika Srpska. Before the war the 450-year-old Ferhadija mosque stood in the
city centre of the northern city ofBanja Luka. It was both the primary worship
centre for the Muslim community and a cultural monument of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The structure was destroyed during the war as part of the campaign of ethnic
cleansing that left this city - now the capital of the Republika Srpska - largely void of
Bosnjaks. As the cornerstone of the mosque was re-laid, symbolising the
reintegration of the city, ethnic tensions spilled over into street violence leaving one
Bosnjak man dead and more than thirty injured. Returning Bosnjaks to the
Republika Srpska often encounter strong opposition and sometimes violence when
they attempt to resettle, but in the zajednica in Banja Luka, there are signs that
attitudes can change. There a young Serbian Orthodox priest, Vladislav Radujkovic,
founded the St Sava Youth Fellowship (Svetosavska Omladinska Zajednica) which
seeks to rediscover the roots of Serbian Orthodox tradition and faith that, he argues,
11
"But he who bears with patience and forgives, surely complies with divine
resolve" (42:43).
12
Siljak [MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 17, 18.
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fundamentally oppose chauvinistic (racist) nationalism. The fellowship affirms a
positive Serbian identity in its historical, doctrinal and cultural teachings without
denigrating other ethnoreligious communities. Members of the zajednica support the
rebuilding of the Ferhadija mosque because, more important than its value as a
cultural monument, it symbolises that Bosnjaks have the right to return to Banja
Luka.
Another example comes from the capital city. Despite being held captive by Serb
militia and losing nine family members in the war, Franciscan Friar Ivo Markovic is
consciously and proactively a peace-builder. Croat nationalists despise his efforts
and have threatened his life for what they perceive to be a betrayal of nation and
religion. In Sarajevo he founded a multi-confessional choir that performs religious
music from the three religious traditions. The choir, Pantonima, is joined by an
orchestra from Banja Luka when they perform internationally as a sign ofmulti¬
ethnic, multi-religious solidarity. Pantonima invites persons of all religious
backgrounds to be enriched through the encounter with others and seeks to create a
vision of the future in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Yet another example of peace-building comes from the divided city ofMostar in
Herzegovina, which is the much coveted city of the secessionist-minded Croatian
stronghold ofHerzeg-Bosna. For more than 400 years the river coursing through the
city was spanned by the Stari Most, or Old Bridge, a structural wonder
commissioned by Sultan Sulejman the Magnificent at the height ofOttoman power
in the sixteenth century. The Stari Most also symbolised the harmonious bridging of
the cultures of East and West. In 1993 Croat military forces shelled the bridge, not
on grounds of its having strategic military significance, but because it symbolised
ethno-religious heterogeneity that nationalist ideologues opposed. In a largely
symbolic gesture more than ten years after the bridge fell casualty to nationalist
aggression, it was rebuilt and opened to firework displays and great fanfare.
However, the city remains just as divided as it was during the war. One official
source in Mostar sees the bridge rebuilding project as a "highly symbolic and
internationally driven reconstruction... designed to create the illusion of the inter-
party, cross-national cooperation, rather than as a manifestation of the real
1 ^
thing...." He goes on to say that "apart from the symbolism of the bridge
13 ICG 2003: 5.
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reconstruction project, there have been next to no examples of successful multi¬
ethnic cooperation in the city".14 On the Catholic West side the rebuilt Franciscan
Church has earned the ignominious name of the 'rocket' church for its incongruously
high bell tower, which, although situated in the valley, competes with the height of
the minarets on the sloped East side. And today, in a symbolic gesture clearly meant
to assert territorial and religious domination, a forty metre high Latin cross has
replaced the military bunkers atop one mountain where artillery once
indiscriminately rained mortars onto the city.
However, in this fractured city where tensions remain high and religion and politics
fuse to perpetuate division, Croat, Bosnjak and Serb women defy the norm. In a
local West side Protestant church they gather together weekly to knit, do needlepoint,
participate in a bible study, share their losses from the war and learn to love and care
for one another through the new-found presence ofChrist in their lives. A Serb
grandmother who lost her own son in the war started the group. Her loss awakened
her to the physical and spiritual needs of those on all sides of the conflict, and
prompted her to do what she could for women suffering similar losses. The church
fellowship regularly sees Croats, Bosnjaks and Serbs worshipping side by side. In
this zbor a unifying identity in Christ allows for the genuine expression of
forgiveness, love for one another, and reconciliation.
These narratives are left untold in the local media that are more interested in
recapitulating nationalist formulae and maintaining boundaries. But for those
interested in overcoming their personal traumas and moving forward with their lives,
the religious faith sodalities provide a sacred space for understanding and healing.
Here new communities are at work creating hope, and shaping the future of Bosnia-
Herzegovina using non-violent resources available to them.
3.2. The Resources Available to Religious Faith Sodalities
Christianity and Islam provide demonstratively useful resources for peace-building.
In some instances these resources directly challenge the nationalist ideologies and
exclusivist myths. In others they transcend the myths and relegate or negate their
importance. The following section explores five of these resources found in the
religious faith sodalities that were founded by Christian leaders of various
confessions.




A significant resource towards peace-building and social restoration is the
proclamation of the Word. Through proclamation the keiygma is delivered to the
community of faith and into the world. Proclamation shapes community identity in
its relationship to God through Christ and in relationship to others.
Monsignor Mato Zovkic believes that the most effective means of combating
nationalism and effecting reconciliation within the Catholic Church is through
weekly interaction with laity by means of the proclaimed Word.15 The Church is the
voice ofhope and help when it is true to its vocation and proclaims the message of
God. But what of those of priestly office who misuse the pulpit and this position for
destructive purposes? The priest faces a conflict of allegiance, to his people and to
his God. Often the prophetic voice is lost because the priest has lost his courage to
speak.16 Sacrificing the prophetic voice means losing moral direction in a land in
desperate need of guidance. Too often the voice ofproclamation is used as
ammunition for an ideological war, not in combating it. Consequently, many lay
persons, sensing a need for greater integrity in the moral realm, express
disappointment, lose respect and ultimately distrust of the clergy.17
This suggests a greater need for m/ra-religious dialogue as a course corrective within
one's own religious expression. Intra-religious dialogue ideally consists of
integrated theological and pastoral elements. The Word proclaimed has a twofold
effect. It educates, reminding the community of faith that God is the initiator of
reconciliation, which is then entrusted to the community of faith as its ministry (2
Cor. 5:18, 19). Second, it exercises a prophetic role by speaking against false
teaching and ideologies that contravene the intended purposes of the Church (1 John
4: Iff.). Although proclamation can be misused, it can be safeguarded by an internal
change ofheart, a renewal that effectively precludes abuse of the proclaimed Word.
That internal renewal is properly identified as metanoia.
3.2.2. Metanoia
A second significant resource towards peace-building is a change of heart, or
metanoia. A Pastoral Letter ofthe Bishops ofBosnia andHerzegovina identifies the
15 Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 15, 16.
16 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 8, 12.
17 Leban [RC.WO.SA.Ol]: 8.
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human heart as the greatest obstacle to peace: "a radical renewal of heart is indeed
10
necessary to everybody, and in religious terms it means conversion". The bishops
urge the entire Catholic community "to engage in a thorough spiritual renewal".19
Similarly, Markovic actively seeks to destroy ideology and to "convert individuals to
God" because ideology is a poor and reduced spirituality.20 For many, especially but
not exclusively in the Protestant circles, the transition from hatred to helping
necessitates an internal transformation.21 Skrinjaric relates his experience this way:
[P]eople from outside think that they can regulate everything through laws,
you know, that justice can come through the system. Because people cannot
- if they don't experience changes within them, in their heart - they can't
see a nation-wide change. They can pass laws and the people can obey laws
but it's just enforced.... [T]he only tme changes, if you can have peace with
your enemy... is when they have true peace with God, when they
comprehend their neighbour, or their enemy, or a person from another ethnic
group as their brother and God's creation. And I think our church in Bosnia-
Herzegovina is an example, a model of this.22
Internal transfonnation can be the catalyst to the transformation of society.23
Metanoia permits a reinterpretation of the nature of the conflict because the person
has experienced a change ofmind leading to a change of heart and action. The
person recognises their wrong thinking and wrong action and manifestly determines
to "enter upon a better course of life".24 Zelinsky says that "metanoia is a key and a
secret of reconciliation with one's own self, with one's own intimate God-like
nature. It is a way of liberating one's own true personality."25 The battle for peace is
96
fought first internally for the mind and heart and is a spirituality. Metanoia is a
spiritual struggle27 that does not leave its combatant wounded, but instead takes the
wounded through a process of healing.28
18 Vrbosna 1998: 101.
19 Vrbosna 1998: 101.
20 Markovic [RC.RL.SA.01]: 7, and unrecorded interview, December 2001.
21 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 7; Kresonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 21; Mikulic
[PR.RL.CA.05]: 3, 6; Radujkovic [SO.RL.BL.02]: 3; Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8; Jovanovic
[SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 7.
22
Skrinjaric [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 2, 3.
23
Kresonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 20; Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 3.
24
Meta, noia, in Thayer, 2001: np.
25
Zelinsky 2002: 124. See also Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 4.
26








A third significant resource found in the religious faith sodality is prayer. The ability
to bring resolution to a conflict is not always within human means. Prayer is the
quiet acknowledgment that real strength lies in admitting one's own weakness and
deferring to a higher power. The place of real change in a person and a community
is the realisation that the problems are so intractable and the solutions so distant that
supernatural resources are required for resolution. It is a confession of inability and
a humble appeal for divine intervention.29 At the same time, prayer is an invocation,
for it invites God's involvement in the situation, for his righteous power and
authority to bear upon evil. Prayer becomes a gift of self back to God, for at its core
it desires the will of an other. Nikolinovic is very active in the prayer life of her
fellowship, and expresses thoughts about reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina thus:
This is really in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's what is really
on my heart. And that's what we are trying to do and maybe we are not very
good at it now. But we are really looking to improve our prayer network
and this is something also what we are aiming to do. And you know that we
really try to motivate people to pray, and it's always reconciliation, it's
always forgiveness, these topics that are to be prayed for. Because we still
don't see some big improvement. But until we see it we are going to pray.
Really. We are not going to give up.30
Prayer is also a significant resource within the Muslim context, as Grabus indicates:
That means only people who pray every day to God - I'm not talking about
people who are traditional pray-ers, but people who understand their own
prayers, and why they pray to God - they can understand what justice means
because we're asking for justice from God. We're asking for forgiveness.31
The imperative to hear the voice of God beyond the pantheon of human voices is the
first step in cultivating a reconciled society and the creation of an enduring peace.
Dubatovic indicates that the shared vision of reconciliation prompts persons from the
various religious communities to meet for corporate prayer, which is hosted in the
various houses of prayer.32 He believes that this is an example to others of how
religious faith can set the example of coming together peacefully and without
■3 -3
compromise of one's own beliefs.
29 Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 2; Kresonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 6.
30Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 5.
31 Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 25.
32 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 5. Many worship centres of various faiths expressions
in Bosnia-Herzegovina carry the inscription Dom molitvV ('House ofPrayer').




A fourth significant resource found in the religious faith sodality is diakonia, or
service. Diakoma has its reference point in the identity of the Christian believer as
doulos, 'servant' or even 'slave'. Having received the blessing and grace of God in
Christ, the Christian believer does not now find himself enslaved or disenfranchised,
as the term 'slave' might suggest. Rather, the disciple of Christ is released from the
bondage and tyranny of self to the service of others. Forgiveness received from God
liberates the believer to extend forgiveness to others, even to one's accusers and
enemies. Bernard Mikulic was the national director ofAgape, the humanitarian aid
arm of the Evangelical Church, at a time when aid distribution was critical for the
survival for thousands of displaced persons. He found diakonia and forgiveness to
be related:
And even during the time when I was participating in Agape to try and help
people through that humanitarian aid, 1 tried to come closer to them. I tried
to demonstrate that for me it is the same that if you were a Croat or Muslim,
it doesn't matter who you are, for me you're the same to me. And even
trying to explain how they become the same through forgiveness and
through Christ. Many of them couldn't understand forgiveness, even my
cousins, because I lost through this war three uncles and one aunt, and my
cousins cannot understand how I can no longer hate the Serbs who killed
them. And I was trying to be a testimony to them because I could not
forgive them without Jesus, and I tried to show them that they could not
forgive either without Jesus.34
For some within the religious sodality diakonia necessarily follows from an identity
transformation oriented from self and one's own community to an identity defined in
relationship to God and others. The expression of one's identity is most Christ-like
when diakonia embraces not only those who are like oneself, but serves even those
who are perceived as enemies. Because diakonia is a selfless expression, it is worth
asking some difficult questions about the motives behind the humanitarian aid that
has come to Bosnia-Herzegovina over the past years. Although aid was distributed
by all of the religious groups, it was not always distributed beyond the sponsoring
ethno-religious community, and often overlooked those of greater destitution from a
different nationality. In other cases aid was extended to win lapsed adherents back to
their religious community. In these cases bread was used as leverage, and this kind
ofmanipulation cannot be legitimately understood as diakonia. It is antithetical to
diakonia. Dubatovic expresses his approach thus:
34 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 3.
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I am 100% convinced that the way we read the Bible that we cannot bring
good news without bringing a physical good news.... You cannot say to
somebody, 'God bless you' when he is hungry. We need first to give him
food. With the response that we are getting from people, I think that we
have an even stronger conviction that this is the right thing to do, that this is
what Christ was like. We even found that there is a good theological basis
in simply observing what Jesus and Paul and others did in the Bible.... A
very simple example would be, whom do you help when you give physical
help? Who do you select? Let's say the government administration gives
you a block of the city and says that you can help this area. You have some
Catholics there, you have some Orthodox there, you have some Muslims
there, and what happened with some of the traditional groups and their aid
was that they would help their people. But we said no to that. We don't
want to help only Protestants, we don't want to help only Christians in the
broader sense. We want to help everybody, and we don't want to know who
they are. We just want to give them aid.... And we teach our people that
this is what they have to do, or this is how we understand that this is what
Jesus was like. The example, when he feeds a multitude of people, five
thousand people, whom does he feed? The disciples, or only those who
were in favour of the disciples, or the whole crowd? These are interesting
questions that we can put on the table. Sounds very simple; the question is
simple.35
Christians express peace through diakonia, which offers bread to heal people
regardless of national issues. It sees only humanity's need, not nationality or creed.
3.2.5. Seelsorge
A fifth significant resource for peace-building is Seelsorge, or spiritual counsel and
welfare of a person or community. The German term inherently includes the
integration ofmind, body and soul. While it recognises the need for psychological
catharsis,36 it also recognises a need to address the spiritual illness/well-being of the
soul. The competent spiritual counsellor, guided by the holy books, assists persons
through encouragement in their grief and bereavement, provides a framework for evil
and hatred, answers questions about the future and destiny of departed loved ones,
and brings hope to an otherwise despairing situation.
Competent spiritual counsel has proved helpful as Bosnia-Herzegovina has
progressed through a series of emotional stages. From the trauma of the war itself,
Bosnia-Herzegovina moved to a period of hopeful elation at the end of the war.
High expectations for a speedy recovery and normalisation turned to cynicism and
distrust as receipt of aid and return of refugees proved to be far more protracted than
anticipated. Despondency in the land resulted from donor-fatigue and the eventual
conclusion ofNGO mandates when other international crises external to Bosnia-





Herzegovina required funding redirection. Suicide rates, especially among young
males, remained high in the post-war period owing to a sense of 'pointlessness'
38
(,besmisao). Resignation echoes in the often heard expression that things will not
soon change, and especially not in the political sphere where partisanship shows little
sign ofwaning. A sense of individual helplessness and powerlessness to change
circumstances internally provokes many to seek a better life beyond Bosnia-
Herzegovina,39 and young people talented enough to leave are creating a vacuum of
those most capable of effecting positive change.
In this despairing context, it is important to hear the few voices that can give spiritual
counsel and guidance for hope. By dramatic contrast, these persons have
experienced a different kind of psychological progression. They have found personal
clarification of self and of the war, have come to terms with ongoing injustice,40 have
found release from hatred and a sense of liberation in forgiveness,41 and have found
peace (shalom) in their relationship to God and the religious faith community.
Having experienced similar disenffanchisement and dispossession, yet finding hope
and purpose in life, such persons create a community for others where help and
acceptance is at hand. Thus, these five resources of proclamation, metanoia, prayer,
diakonia, and Seelsorge complement the theological role in building sustainable
peace and social restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4. Overcoming the Legacy of the Mythical Past
The disparate historiographies and their correspondent ethno-religious mythologies
are a present-day conundrum in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mythologies have the
potential ofworking in positive or negative directions. The strength of a mythology
is its ability to create a coherent national consciousness in uncertain and turbulent
times. Evidence that mythologies can be inclusive and ideologically constructive is
demonstrated in the very idea of Yugoslavia, especially as espoused by Bishop Josip
Strossmayer (1815-1905).42 Although he did not see a unified South Slav state in his
lifetime, his persistence during the seminal nation-building decades of the 19th
37 Kovac 2000: np.
38 Mikovic 2002: 252-261.
39 Leban [RC.WO.SA.01]: 5-7.
40 Rakic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 2, 3; Kundacina [PR.WO.MO.Ol]: 7-9.
41
Seperic [RO.SM.SA.14]: 18.




century43 eventually laid the foundation for what would be Yugoslavia in its distinct
historical manifestations.
The danger ofmythology is that it is often created at the expense of others, and not
infrequently places its own people inadvertently at considerable peril. Mythologies
thrive in emotionally charged situations where perceived threat to self and
community are present. National myth making thus has an ideological function that
is intended to motivate, defend and justify. The resurrection of stronger and
exclusivist mythologies emphasising "Greater Serbia" or "Greater Croatia" are
antithetical to the vision of a united Yugoslavia and preceded the state's eventual
demise. Exclusive mythologies attempt to promote a strong self-identity, but manage
to do so only in opposition to the 'other'. The invocation of past conflicts44 and
appeal to religious confession serve to highlight the apophatic nature of the identities,
emphasising more what they are not than what they are.45 Thus, past conflicts on
Balkan territory are mythologised and serve as supertemporal and territorial markers
of identity as antipathy against rather than sympathyfor the other. An understanding
of the close connection between mythicised history and self-identity is, then, of
paramount importance for social restoration.
4.1. The Approach of Demythologisation
One approach to resolving this tension, usually attempted from the Western
perspective, seeks to demythologise the histories through scientifically verifiable
research methods. If a demythologised history can be achieved, it is assumed that
the virulent nationalist exclusivities can also be excised and eradicated. Typically
Western scholars seek to shift from myth to rationality, from mythos to logos. This
structuralist approach identifies universal elements ofmyth while discounting
specific meaning of the narrative in its context. In terms of the development of
nationalism and identity formation, scholars acknowledge myths for their negative
contribution to ethnic exclusivism, and then dismiss them as late constructs of
national ideological development in favour of a more 'factual' reading of history.





Notably, the Battle ofKosovo and Jasenovac for Serbian identity formation.
45 Both Croatian and Serbian identities exhibit Christoslavic mythological
inclinations (Sells 1996b: 28-31), but emphasise discontinuity through discrete church
history and theology rather than continuity in Christ.
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The story of the Battle ofKosovo has become a totem or talisman of Serbian
identity, so that this event has a status unlike that of anything else in the
history of the Serbs. To call this ideologically charged story 'the myth of
Kosovo' is not to suggest that everything in it is false, but rather to indicate
the talismanic way in which it operates. Yet some aspects of the myth of
Kosovo probably are false, and it is the proper job of historians both to try to
set down a more accurate account, and to explain how and why the myth
arose.46
The attempt to demythologise the epic poems and national narratives rightly
highlights the accretions that have become part of the historiographies. This
approach is legitimate and useful insofar as it is a means of (re)defining, and
clarifying historical issues, and is valid from a position of scientific discovery
intending to contribute towards conflict resolution. The historian has a responsibility
to do his/her task scientifically, using all of the available tools of critical
historiography. Kuzmic responds favourably to this when he advises that we must
watch how history is written, taught and instrumentalised.47
But insofar as the attempt to demythologise also seeks to attribute blame, and
functions as a control mechanism with its own agenda, values and assumptions, it
becomes a tool used in partisan fashion which may be a detour on the road to social
restoration. Western scholars too quickly dismiss the myths and replace them with
other historical constructs based on materialistic rationalism, believing that they may
draw a clear and compelling demarcation between Historie and Geschichte.
However, demythologising often proves incapable of clarifying events and bringing
resolution. Today no agreement either on matters of fact or interpretation can be
/-» • 48
found on substantive issues of the Second World War, which so dramatically
heightened fears for the conflicts in the 1990s. Zovkic laments this difficult
historiographic pattern:
It will take years before we agree on how we evaluate the recent war - a war
of aggression or civil war? How do we evaluate 400 years ofTurkish
presence here? An aggression or a golden period?.... I remember I once
attended a conference in Thessaloniki where experts for history were talking
about how we present the others in our history books. And a Turk was
present who was teaching in Germany and has a good salary, a Western
salary, and he taught on the Ottoman period. He said that the Ottoman
Empire was an ideal empire; it did not invest in cherishing the ethnic
identity, faith, and so on but otherwise it was just and fair. The problem was
when the Greeks and Serbs got poisoned from Western Christians: "Get
46 Malcolm 1998: 58-9.
47 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 10.
48
See, for instance, the unresolved dispute on the number of Serbs killed by the
Ustase regime, as reviewed in Chapter One.
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independent." So they fought and they got independence. And then the
Romanian historians said, "No! The Ottoman Empire was corrupt!" .... And
this was the end of the discussion. They cannot produce good books where
the neighbouring people would be decently presented in their own books....
Here it is very sensitive.49
Furthermore, demythologising leaves important questions open ifpeace-building and
restoration are the intended goals. Additional methods and means are necessary, and
for this reason it is important to hear the voices of those inside Bosnia-Herzegovina
who sometimes speak disparagingly about the irreconcilability of the histories, yet
hold out hope for peaceful co-existence.50 The central question is this: Is it
necessary to reconcile the histories in order to reconcile the peoples of Bosnia-
Herzegovina? The following considerations will further clarify the issue.
4.2. Re-Reading Myth as Meta-Narrative
First, the methodology of demythologisation must be questioned if the desired result
is the restoration of civil society. Demythologisation as an accepted methodology is
a modernist by-product from a Western tradition anchored in the rationalism of the
Enlightenment. However, large segments of the Balkans never experienced the
thoroughgoing rationalism of the Enlightenment, or, having encountered it, now
reject it. This region of the world also views time differently from the West. One
author well acquainted with the particular circumstances of recovery in post-
communist lands writes, "The first lesson I had to leam was that many countries are
not dealing with the past, because the past is still with them."51 In this region, history
is not necessarily consigned to the past. AnotherWesterner notes:
In the Balkans, history is not viewed as tracing a chronological progression,
as it is in the West. Instead, history jumps around and moves in circles; and
where history is perceived in such a way, myths take root.52
In his review of how modernity has developed in the Balkans, Allcock states that,
"the past actively interacts with the present".53 This contrasts with a linear reckoning
of time and events commonly found in Western societies. A synchronic expression
49 Zovkic [RC.RL.SA.05]: 13.




Kaplan 1993: 58. See also the extended discussion by Stoianovich on the space-
time orientation of the Balkan peoples and their historical links to religion. He identifies the
Balkan peoples as space-dominated (Raumvolk or narodprostora) in contrast to time-
dominated (Zeitvolk, or narod vremena). Also, following Levi-Strauss, he categorises
societies as 'cold' or 'hot'. The former ignore or "annul history as an agent of change"
whereas the latter, to which he ascribes the Balkan peoples, "internalize historical experience
in order to mobilize and bring it to their aid whenever the need may arise" (1994: 247-260).
53 Allcock 2000: 18.
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of time, in which historical and current events are lived parallel to each other, gives
rise to myth-making, which, in turn, assists in the building of national identity. It is
through the use ofmyth - an essentially extra-chronological phenomenon with a
supra-chronological function - that historical events can be viewed synchronically.
This helps explain why each participant group views territory in the Balkans as
entitlement, claiming the largest borders they ever possessed. Allcock notes the
following:
... [I]t is necessary to consider the interweaving of time and space .... A
central idea which I argue here is that the symbolic freight of space (that
which is actually signified by references to space in their relation to national
identity) is intimately interwoven with a people's consciousness of history.
Spaces are significant spaces, and the significances with which they are
endowed are to be understood in terms of the historical narratives which link
people to territory or places.54
Time, current historical circumstance, or political boundaries have little bearing on
territorial border claims. For this reason the partitioning of a land can only be
viewed as a temporary measure toward the establishment of peace. These newly-
adjusted borders are as temporary as they are artificial.
A synchronic worldview of time enormously complicates issues of social restoration.
It is not simply the case that the most recent conflict can be sorted out and resolved
in the present. The entire histories of the nations - with their correspondent
mythologies, vendettas and territorial claims - are in conflict. Latent in the mistrust
of recent events are the sins of the distant past, which, through myth-making, are
recapitulated, contemporised and made relevant for the present.
History and memory, ofwhich more will be said towards the end of the chapter, are
ever-present and not at all distant. The blurring of past, present and future events in
a timeless, mystical realm is especially felt in the Liturgy of the Orthodox Church.
Here time and space become an amalgamated singularity. The departed saints of
centuries past, represented visually by the iconostasis, are invoked in the worship
service and believed to be invisibly present in the Liturgy.55 Worshippers in this
time period anticipate the apocatastasis, or final restoration on the Last Day.56
54 Allcock 2000: 338.
55 See Ware (1997: 269-273) for a more complete description of the Orthodox
worship service.
56 Ware translates apocatastasis as the "final redemption" in one place (1997: 274),
and as "restoration" in another (:261). For reasons explicated in Chapter Seven,
apocatastasis is better translated as 'restoration'.
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Spatial dimensions are also redefined - or remain undefined - as heaven and earth
meet in this mystical celebration. It is a worldview and practice foreign to most
Westerners.
Further, the modernist experiment that this part of the world underwent was more
closely associated with its own expression of communist ideology (Titoism) than
Western positivism. As the West steered a course of disenchantment and developed
the tools for demythologisation and deconstructionism, Yugoslavia took a course
towards re-enchantment by meticulously constructing national myths, the full effects
ofwhich would remain latent until the collapse of socialism. For this reason Western
modernist attempts to demythologise and post-modernist deconstructionist efforts are
not self-evidently useful tools to counter the nationalist mythmakers. The opposite is
more the case.
Moreover, Western scholars often view myth and myth-making as a vestige of the
pre-modern and pre-scientific age; a relic to be demythologised before becoming
relevant. Discredited as unscientific, mythology is passed off as antiquated.
However, it is a segment of the Serbian intelligentsia and scientific community that
created and espoused the grand narrative ofGreater Serbia through the 1986
Memorandum authored by members of the Serbian Academy ofSciences and Arts.51
Scientists and intellectuals loyal to the Serbian national identity will rebut western
objections that this kind ofmythologising is unscientific. The recorded history and
literature of a nation is not simply a corpus of documents awaiting examination as
some cadaver prepared for autopsy and forensic discovery. Rather, the body is very
much alive and embodies meaning for persons of that nation today. Because the act
of demythologising is iconoclastic by nature, it is received as invasive and
destructive. People may view demythologising of their national narratives not as a
means of ascertaining the kernel ofhistorical events as they happened, but as an
assault on their nation, and the tools of scholarship as an arsenal ofweapons aimed at
'cultural genocide'.58 For those living under the identity of their mythology,
Western intentions are foreign and another effort to impose control. It is therefore
57 Serbian nationalists within the Serbian Academy ofSciences andArts authored the
infamous Memorandum in 1986. The Memorandum claims exploitation of the Serbian
Republic and of Serbs by other Yugoslav republics during the communist era, and advocates
direct action - including the expulsion of non-Serb and minority peoples - to amend the
injustice.
58 The expression 'cultural genocide' is taken from the Memorandum.
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doubtful that this effort will render the situation clearer and move society towards
restoration, as it affirms the very suspicions of the mythology in the first place.
Additionally, those wishing to do away with or reconstruct the myths operate on the
underlying assumption that they are themselves free of ideological baggage.
However, the high view of a material and secularised world held by Western social
scientists as singularly the most helpful interpretive schema for today is itself a myth.
As one Orthodox scholar points out,
[T]he view that secularisation signifies the eventual obliteration of religious
beliefs and practices is rejected as an unfounded ideological presumption, an
interpolation of a mythical understanding of history as the evolution of
humanity from superstition to reason, belief to unbelief, religion to science.59
Similarly, Kiing makes a strong case against demythologisation through critical
scrutiny and rationalistic analysis. This, he argues, would lead to spiritual
impoverishment for the sake of intellectual clarity, and create in turn a spiritual
vacuum susceptible to remythologisation. The result would be a sort of 'pious
rationalism' at the expense of religious content.60 Reis-u-ulema Ceric goes a step
further to recognise the failure ofWestern modernism to provide a coherent and
meaningful worldview. He asserts that the West today is moving away from
rationalism in its search for meaning:
I'm not sure that Western civilisation is in control of itself.... [A]re we now
changing the road, going from freedom to slavery,... from right to might,
from science to mythology?.... [M]any scientists are now impressed by
mythologies, because mythology gives them meaning. It doesn't make them
excited any more about scientific discovery, as we used to be. Now they are
more excited about these old images of civilisations and gods and pantheons
and so on. I'm not saying that we don't also have ritual in science, but it is
very indicative.61
Ceric is especially animated by the apocalyptic imagery drawn by Fukuyama62 as a
false interpretation of history, or by the inevitability of a clash between Muslim and
Western civilisations as portrayed by Huntington.63 For Ceric there can only be a
59
Clapsis 2000: 130.
60Kiingl993: 270-71. Kiing's critique is specifically launched at
'demythicisation', i.e., the effort to eliminate myth altogether, in contrast to the less
thoroughgoing task of demythologising, which seeks to eliminate mythical elements within
narratives through rationalist reinterpretation. Kiing's contentions regarding demythicisation
are equally valid for demythologisation.







clash of the memory ofhistory.64 Yet, these are today's fashionable myths of the
West that in anxious and turbulent times serve to increase fear and fail to build
bridges ofunderstanding.
Finally, proponents of demythologisation fail to see national mythologies for the
social, cultural and historical tapestries that they are, providing the basis for a
communal memory in times of identity crisis and transformation. Romanian
Vladimir Tismaneanu approaches myth not "as a necessarily mendacious vision of
reality but as a narrative that is able to inspire collective loyalties, affinities, passions,
and actions".65 Slovenian Mitja Velikonja recognises the centrality ofmyth-making
to the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia: "Myths remain very important and
persuasive elements in the construction of reality in contemporary complex societies,
self defined as 'disenchanted' or 'enlightened.'"66 He considers mythology a
"dynamic internally cohesive, but continually changing system of individual myths
that has some very practical functions and goals to achieve in society". He
suggests a division between traditional and ideological myths. Traditional myths
"are those found in pre-modern forms of constructed social reality: folk traditions,
old rituals, sacralised persons, objects and episodes, epics, ancient tales, sets of
c o
symbols, legends, beliefs, and so forth"; ideological myths "complement the
original exegesis of traditional myths: they provide particular conclusions to their
'openness.' Unlike the former, ideological myths gaze into the future and solicit
changes, innovation, and transfiguration - but on ancient foundations. The
ideological myth complements and elucidates the deficiency of the traditional
myth."69 Velikonja insists that myth has cognitive, integrative and communicative
functions even in contemporary societies.70 While it may be difficult to find the
precise dividing line between the ideological and the traditional elements ofmyth,
Velikonja acknowledges the importance of reading a society with its mythologies
intact.
64 Ceric [MU.RL.SA.01 ]: lOff.













Thus, a nuanced approach unravels the concealed intentions71 of the mythologies and
reveals the values and mores of a society's self-understanding. Self-disclosure
within that perception is rather the starting point towards social restoration, not the
'brute' facts excised from the historical accretions. This approach recognises that the
process of restoration is pre-eminently a human undertaking. If restoration is the
goal, it is necessary to find a via media between the polarities of perpetuating
exclusivist mythologies and the wholesale ambition to reduce them to fictional non-
meaning through the imposition ofmodernist interpretations. National myths are
better seen as grand- or meta-narratives that describe origins, provide identity, focus
motives, defend actions and define community. They are both useful and meaningful
towards understanding the context and working towards restoration.
4.3. Return to the Narratives, Grand and Personal
The research of this thesis suggests that a return to authentic religious expression can
have positive effects for peace-building and social restoration. Just as a puzzle piece
is part of a larger picture, so persons in religious faith sodalities are finding that their
personal narrative 'fits' into the grand religious narrative of the Christian and
Muslim communities. These grand narratives offer cogent and credible worldviews
that enable persons to come to terms with their personal loss, find self-worth, and
recover a sense of sacredness of life for all humanity. Their discovery begins a clear
shift in identity and belonging away from both the communist ideology, which
denigrated religion and marginalised its adherents, and nationalism, which
instrumentalised religion and co-opted its adherents. The threshold of this
experience is forgiveness.
5. Forgiveness: The Threshold to Social Restoration
Central to social restoration, or reconciliation, is the ability to overcome hatred and
move to the place of forgiving the wrongdoer. The following looks more closely at
the interaction between forgiveness and social restoration.
5.1. Various Perspectives on Forgiveness
Persons interviewed agree that forgiveness is a key concept to restoring relationships,
but hold differing perspectives about forgiveness and social restoration. Seperic
points out that the experience of injustice is common to all, but how people deal with





act.72 The choice to forgive is an individual and conscious decision of the will73 that
allows the wronged to move in the path of love.74 The corollary to this is that those
who do not forgive are captive to their hatreds and need for revenge.75 Coming to
the place ofbeing willing to forgive often requires time for changes within oneself.76
No one can be compelled to forgive by external persons or factors. However, there is
evidence of an internally-motivated compulsion that does not remove the self-will,
but recognises the Spirit of God as the author of the phenomenon. The willingness to
forgive finds expression because of reciprocity. That is to say, persons are able and
willing to forgive because they know that God has forgiven them.77 Dubatovic and
Nikolinovic both indicate that forgiveness is difficult to arrive at from a naturalistic
framework.78 Radujkovic concurs with this sentiment and suggests that people of all
religious communities know the reason why they should forgive, but he does not
hold the same expectation for non-religious persons:
I'm afraid that one could conclude from what I said that there are four
different communities here. Let it be so for now. So, there are Orthodox,
Catholics, Muslims and non-believers in Bosnia. I think that the first three
categories would come to some agreement, but we can face some problems
with the fourth. Why? Because all those who strongly believe that God
exists know the reason why they should forgive people. But if people don't
believe that God exists then the reason why they should forgive people is
foggy. That's why I come back to one ofmy solutions and that's religious
education. Even those who claim that they are unbelievers and who will
certainly stay that way must know what we believe and how we function.
When I say we, then I think of us as believers of different religions.79
Nikolinovic encounters many who do not view God as forgiving. Consequently they
find it hard to make the connection between a forgiving God and the will to
OA
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forgive. But for others there is a clear sense of reciprocity in forgiveness: that the
72
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teaching of Jesus in several scriptural passages (Matthew 18:21-35; Mark 11:25), including




willingness to forgive conies once they understand that God has forgiven them.
Kundacina relates this principle anecdotally with an incident from her women's
group:
And as long you don't forgive, as long as you seek revenge you will eat
yourself inside because you will have bitterness, and that must go." And
then I told her, "You know, you cannot defeat hatred with hatred but hatred
with love. And that's what I learned from the Word ofGod, to forgive and
you shall be forgiven, don't judge and it won't be judged to you." And I
would really say to her the verses that were speaking to my heart. I told her,
"Can you speak blessing and curse from one mouth?" And I told her to
bless, not to curse. And I couldn't see any change in her. She was confused.
She left and she wasn't there for awhile. I would meet her on the market.
And then I would ask her, "Where are you?" And then she would say to me,
"Thank God that I met you. As you said to pray and to bless and not to
curse, can you imagine I have easier sleep when I go to bed." And then I
told her to continue to do that and I told her that she would see a change.
Because nothing happens without the control of God. God knows
everything because he sees everything. He doesn't have barriers because he
has everything revealed. And today that lady is my best sister because she
really was broken and I can say that she is today sharing the Word of God
very powerfully.83
Moreover, persons who know the transforming nature of forgiveness are convinced
that what they have experienced and seen in forgiveness is transferable and can
become normative. They sense a great need for teaching on forgiveness, which the
84
faith communities should undertake to disseminate.
Christians and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina agree that ultimate judgment and
forgiveness come from God,85 but otherwise do not place the same emphasis on
forgiveness. Orsolic acknowledges that reconciliation is impossible without
forgiveness, and that this is a matter of faith:
Without forgiveness there cannot be real reconciliation.... In this process
faith is irreplaceable. Only faith has these categories of forgiveness and
reconciliation. Only faith can penetrate a man's heart because eventually
God is the one who forgives. With his grace we can forgive. Every other
kind of forgiveness will be tactics or fake compromises. I think it's a chance
for religion so that it can teach people how to forgive straight from the heart
of faith, by the argument of faith, because God forgives us and we have to
forgive others.86
82 Nikolinovic [PR.WO.SA.02]: 6; Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 15, 21; Mikulic
[PR.RL.CA.05]: 1,2,4.
83 Kundacina [PR.WO.MO.Ol]: 9.
84 Dubatovic [PR.RL.SA.01]: 14, 18, 21; Erceg [PR.RL.BL.02]: 7; Siljak
[MU.WO.SA.Ol]: 7; Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 24; Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2; Radujkovic
[SO.RL.BL.02]: 4; Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 4; Skrinjaric [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3.
85 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 9; Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 4; Orsolic [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.




Grabus emphasises that justice ('adel) is foundational for Muslims. If justice
cannot be achieved, then forgiveness is the necessary response, requiring the
aggrieved person to live at a higher level of taqwa:
We have in our theological understanding that in the other world, God will
ask us to finish our problems among ourselves and after that he will be our
judge. That's very important. And definitely - there is a sentence in the
Qur'an - you have the right to ask for justice. And it is better for you and
this is closer to the high level of the spirit to forgive. Close to the taqwa,
behind the level of obedience in this world is taqwa. In every period of life
God is present, and the meaning of God's importance in your life. And we
talk about those problems in our understanding of our religion. The only
way, if you cannot find justice, is to forgive.8
Grabus indicates that pious Muslims pray for both justice and forgiveness.89
Omerovic seeks help in prayer to summon strength in order not to commit an act of
vengeful retaliation.90 She knows that the Qur'an emphasises the need to forgive.91
Differing viewpoints about forgiveness suggest that the route to peace and social
restoration will lead along similar paths, but with different expectations. Muslims
expect that peace and social restoration will be achieved primarily through justice
and restitution, and have the lingering sense that those in power in Bosnia-
Herzegovina give too little emphasis to these ingredients. Forgiveness is a topic of
92discussion to be addressed once the issue of justice has been exercised. Grabus
affirms that the concept of reconciliation is known in Islam, but he suggests, is not as
central to the Muslim worldview as it is to the Christian. 'Reconciliation' is
something they are learning from the Christians as a result of the war.93
For Christians, forgiveness is the sine qua non and threshold of reconciliation.
Western Christians (Roman Catholic and Protestant) in Bosnia-Herzegovina see
reconciliation as the process94 to which forgiveness is an essential ingredient. Justice
and restitution are part of this process, which interested parties may pursue
simultaneously to reconciliation.
87 Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 2.
88 Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 26.
89 Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 26.
90 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 5.
91 Omerovic [MU.SF.SA.15]: 5.
92 Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 25.
93 Grabus, unrecorded interview, February 2002.
94 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 4; Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 6.
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5.2. Healing Through Forgiveness
Several of the Christians relate forgiveness, love and healing together, building a
new foundation for the treatment of others, including enemies.95 Kuzmic articulates
this point of view thus:
By 'de-demonising' the enemy, we are in a position of re-humanising him
and returning to him the dignity that God the Creator has given him and
recognising the Imago Dei.... You treat the enemy and talk with him,
showing respect, and when it comes to Christian attitudes it is more than
respect, it is an act of love, and later we have to come to forgiveness.96
Delalic experienced the process of healing subsequent to her conversion. She knew
that the things she had encountered during the war as a young prisoner left her with a
judgmental and racist attitude. She became aware of a need for healing only after
she experienced a change of her own attitude. She attributes the healing process
directly to the act ofGod's love in her life that allowed her to forgive, which was the
process of healing.97
5.3. Forgiveness and the Healing of Memory
The healing process is inextricably linked to memory, and is a critical area of
concern for the present. This may be seen in the failure of socialist Yugoslavia to
come to terms with the atrocities of the Second World War, the legacy of which
contributed to heightened fears for the outbreak of violence fifty years later. Ramet
puts it this way:
These different memories, set atop unhealed wounds, provided the seedbed
for deep bitterness, resentments, and recurrent desires for revenge.... Of all
the memories, shared and disputed, the most dangerous was the memory of
World War II.98
Coming to tenns with memory is an imperative for the restoration of civil society.
One author who has dealt extensively with mass violence, Martha Minow, describes
this phenomenon well:
Living after genocide, mass atrocity, totalitarian terror, however, makes
remembering and forgetting not just about dealing with the past. The
treatment of the past through remembering and forgetting crucially shapes
the present and future for individuals and entire societies.... For individuals,
and even for communities, traumatic violence becomes part of the current
human psyche forged by past impression.99
95 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 2, 4; Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 5-7; Kundacina
[PR.WO.MO.Ol]: 9; Seperic [RO.SM.SA.14]: 19.
96 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 5, 6.
97 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 6-8.




In very human ways, the success of the future means facing the failures of the past.
Appleby addresses the issue of overcoming the past with what he refers to as a
"remythologizing project". This he defines as, "the replacement of narratives of
righteous revenge with stories and practices that can bind together two historically
divided peoples in a new pattern of active tolerance".100 A remythologising project
grows out of revisionism by the "debunking of ideologically loaded 'histories'",101
and moves towards greater tolerance.
Minow suggests a different path, focusing not on the process of rewriting, but on
remembering:
What's needed, then, is not memory but remembering, not retrieval of some
intact picture but instead a dynamic process of both tying together and
distinguishing fragments of past and present. What's needed, paradoxically,
is a process for reinterpreting what cannot be made sensible, for assembling
what cannot be put together, and for separating what cannot be severed from
both present and future.102
The process of'remythologising', as advocated by Appleby, focuses on the aspect of
re-writing history, or in this case, ofmemory, so that it is changed through a schema
of reinterpretation. 'Remembering', as advocated by Minow, focuses on the aspect
of recall, dynamically linking the past to the present. Both of these aspects are
necessary, yet incomplete. Overcoming injustices from the past is possible through
forgiveness and the subsequent healing ofmemory. This process may be termed
irememorying\ which incorporates both the rewriting and recalling aspects to
reshape a holistic narrative. Rememorying is not a personal revision of past events
built upon a new ideology and reinterpreted through a different henneneutical
schema. It is different in kind in that it does not seek to replace narratives, but to live
by a qualitatively different meta-narrative. It transcends the national narratives and
thereby creates a meaningful alternative to the conflict, which is apprehended
through forgiveness. It is what happens when a person experiences a transformation
greater than the trauma. When past incidents are recalled, they are remembered
differently because a new narrative has been written that incorporates the subsequent
experience ofhealing. Past events are now remembered with the absence ofmalice
and pain, which is a sign of healing. Rememorying deals concretely with the past in





102 Minow 1998: 120
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transformation in the individual's life, rememorying is the rewriting and recalling of
an experience that now transcends both the personal trauma and the destructive
myths in which the personal hatreds once were embedded, and is a sign and evidence
of healed memories. This is clearly articulated by Mikulic who contrasts the wounds
ofpast wrongs as scars that remain to the offences that are forgiven:103
[BM] .. .And friends can sit together again and forgive each other and we
can exchange forgiveness, but ifwe don't forget, [pause] you know. I don't
know how it will work.
[SG] Can you forget?
[BM] That's a good question. How can I forget? It is not like losing your
memory. But to forget the pain that caused the war and the pain [that] was
caused to you, yes, I can forget that. And I lose the pain. And I remember
that I don't have the pain.104
Forgiveness is not just a reinterpretation; it is its own healing event, and the
subsequent rewriting and recalling of that new narrative is best termed
'rememorying'.
5.4. Healing Extended to the Greater Society
The question remains as to whether the healing phenomenon of forgiveness may be
transferred from the sodalities to the wider society. Although no widespread conflict
resolution or reconciliation is currently taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, several
of the persons interviewed believe that their experiences, and those of the sodality,
can be extended to society.105 This is so not by the unlimited extension of the porous
borders of the sodalities to include the whole of society, which in effect would render
the sodality non-existent. This kind of inclusive extension is precluded both by the
nature of the sodality, and by its members. The sodality exists with a conscious
mission, and for those who share the vision of that mission. The sodality would
quickly lose its purpose if it included all with no qualifying criteria, and
consequently it would lose its effectiveness. The ability to envision and carry out its
mission is what allows a sodality to operate prophetically in society. There is, then,
an exclusive element to the sodality that is necessary to maintain its identity, mission,
and effectiveness. However, the sodality practices a kind of self-exclusion; that is to
say, persons who do not identify with the vision and mission of the sodality exclude
103 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 2.
104 Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 4.
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themselves and choose not to participate. As was pointed out earlier,106 membership
in the sodality is by choice. The practice of self-exclusion contrasts sharply with the
practice of exclusion by the nationalist groups, which, through rigid criteria, pro-
actively determine who is part of the group, or, more accurately, who is not part of
the group. The sodality may proclaim a message ofMitmenschlichkeit, but those
who do not share that vision exclude themselves.
Thus, the sodality cannot include the whole of society, as this would render it
ineffective, and its voice to society would be lost. Rather, the active participation by
members of the sodality in society is an effective agent of change. For this reason
Siljak travels throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina to lecture and conduct workshops on
behalf of IMIC. In entrenched areas such as Livno or Bihac she interacts with
persons to understand their concerns, address their needs and communicate a
message ofMitmenschlichkeit.107
Nikolinovic believes that many persons would benefit if they believed and practiced
their faith as she does, but also realises that many will not. Nevertheless, she
believes she is a positive influence in society:
I really believe that we have to have some influence on the whole society. I
see that as a person, as an individual, as a Christian, you can have a good
impact on some people even though they don't give their life to Jesus. I
saw, for example ... that some people in my presence do not curse. That's a
good influence. They... are acting much better than they did when I was not
a Christian. That is influence. So if I can influence someone, then the
church can influence society. I really look forward to it.108
Forgiveness and reconciliation are categories of faith109 that can be extended to the
society and create a healthy (i.e., healed) environment.110 For this reason Kuzmic
advocates a theological and social task of'spiritual engagement'111 that is
constructive towards building peace:
The question is whether we have credible communities and whether we use
credible methods in our ministry and whether we live credible lives, because
I don't see how you can have moral influence if you're not credible
communities. Credible communities of faith can exercise moral, or what
you call 'compelling influence' on moral decisions ofBosnians. The
strength of the faith is in its internal witness not the external imposition or
106 See page 239.
107
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threat or whatever mechanisms religious communities use, such as the
sacraments. Influence is in some ways, especially a moral influence,
commensurate to or credibility. And credibility is a question of authenticity,
it is a question of compelling evidence of the loving, forgiving, reconciling,
direction-providing of your faith and your faith community. There has to be
internal evidence by transformed lives and therefore transformed
communities of faith. And if you don't have that transformative power in
individual lives and in individual communities, modelled by the clergy, of
course, above all, because they are the most visible representatives of
religious communities, if you don't have that, how can you speak about
moral influence? ... It has to be qualitatively different, and that is the
question of credibility to me.112
However, compelling influence on society will stem first from genuine renewal from
within the faith communities before it can be extended to the wider society.
Toskovic claims that this kind of life is qualitatively different from those living in
fear and without an awareness of spiritual matters. Their lives are missing a sense of
peace:
Peace is an incredibly great value. In inter-personal relations, it is seen as
the stopping of shooting, killing and hating. But if a man could look at that
spiritually, that man is not only a material being, he is also a spiritual being.
If he would look at that from a perspective of eternity, then he would see
how important peace is for himself.... A man who has some anxiety in
himself and would like to make a quasi-paradise for himself and for a group
of people that has the same thinking as he has - [including having] to
sacrifice other people for that peace - such a man will not find peace either
on earth, which is just passing away by all philosophies, and he will harm
his soul very much. Our peace is not built on negating others. If it is
necessary that others disappear so that I can be happy - can something like
that be built in any kind of happiness?"3
The reality for those living in the spiritual sodality is as Toskovic claims, that "The
man that has inner peace also has peace with other people."114 The extension ofwhat
is known, experienced and shared in the religious faith sodality will have an effect on
the greater society insofar as the community is credible, and its effort is extended
beyond itself. These new communities are demonstrable evidence of substantive
change, and the commitment of its people is making incremental differences in
society. As they demonstrate and extend forgiveness, they also radiate the full
expression ofpeace.
6. Conclusion
The religious sodality embodies authentic faith exercised in context. It creates a
place of acceptance and develops both an internal and communal peace. It is a
112 Kuzmic [PR.RL.OS.04]: 17.
113 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 11.
114 Toskovic [SO.RL.SA.03]: 11.
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created sanctuary characterised by metanoia and healing, and is a place of teaching
and equipping in which the insecurities of the external world matter far less when
fear is overcome. In this sanctuary persons of faith learn that the nationalist conflicts
are real, but that the conflicts need not represent an insurmountable barrier to social
restoration and peace. Threats to life diminish relative to the awareness of
supernatural empowering. Persons of faith know that the physical body may be
harmed or killed, but the spiritual essence will survive unharmed.115
The creation of sacred space is evident less in the external and more in the internal
sphere of reality. Persons living with a sense of sacred space do not claim and cling
to holy places and religio-national icons. Rather, they now view the whole of the
created order, including fellow humanity, as sacred and thus potentially communal.
Objects defining diversity are no longer divided into 'ours' versus 'theirs', but 'ours
shared'. For this reason, Markovic can view all of the sacred religious music,
whether from the Orthodox, Western (Roman Catholic and Protestant) or Muslim
traditions, as 'ours' as peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina.116 The lines of inclusion
become enlarged and perforated, permitting social interaction and restoration.
In each of these representative cases religious persons employ authentic religious
narratives to construct meaningful models of peace-building and restoration. Within
the Muslim umina a model of justice ('adel) guided by the Qur'an is narrated.
Within a Serbian Orthodox sodality a revivalist model is narrated, attempting to
return to the roots of Serbian Orthodoxy and Serbian identity abstracted from
ideological accretions. Within the Roman Catholic community Franciscans narrate a
model ofpluralism that recognises the legitimacy of all confessions, finding
solidarity in the sacredness of humanity and a shared human predicament. The
Protestant communities narrate a model of redemption which finds the locus for
forgiveness and unity in a new found identity in Christ.
Three significant shifts occur in each of these illustrative cases. The first is from an
'imagined community' to an 'authentic community'. The imagined community,
iconically portrayed by nationalists, promised security but brought armed conflict.
The authentic community, a religious faith sodality, provides a sacred space that,
despite the conflict, brings inner peace and meaning.
115 Delalic [PR.SF.MO.IO]: 7; Mikulic [PR.RL.CA.05]: 6; Jovanovic
[SO.RL.SA.Ol]: 11.
116
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The second significant shift is from mythos to logos, not in the classic exchange of
'story' for 'rationalism', but in the exchange ofmyth as 'ideology in narrative
form'117 for a personal narrative. This in turn finds meaningful expression in the
authentic religious meta-narratives guided by the corresponding religious texts. In
the religious faith sodalities a sacred space is created for the dissemination of the
logos, for the development ofunity among diversity, for the exchange of forgiveness,
and for the offer of social restoration.
The third significant shift is in the nature of the conflict itself. While the religious
faith sodalities bring peace in one arena, they create a tension between the leaders of
the sodality and the leaders of the religious establishment. Regularly the sodality
leaders are ostracised by their own institutional leadership and face derision and
defamation. The dynamic in play is one in which the authentic religious voice of the
sodality leader effectively counters the rhetoric of nationalist religious ideologues.
Although currently small and weak, the prophetic message is recovering its voice,
speaking into the ideological marketplace with authority and authenticity backed by
the demonstrable evidence of the new communities. They in turn appropriate the
grand narratives of Christianity and Islam, and provide people with a framework for
understanding themselves in relation to God and to others, especially those who are
perceived to be hostile. The authentic religious meta-narratives present credible
worldviews that equip persons in the theatre of conflict to come to terms with their
own loss and apprehend meaningful expressions of identity and alterity.
Seen in contradistinction to the nationalist myths, or meta-narratives, which have
brought turmoil, conflict, loss and impoverishment, the authentic religious narratives
offer a legitimate means ofunderstanding and engaging the 'other' in the discourse
of life. In a fractured land where division and strife are the order of the day, ordinary
persons are creating sanctuaries where dignity and trust are honoured, and wholeness
of being is restored. They are extending forgiveness, experiencing healing, building
peace, and shaping a new future ofhope in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
117 Lincoln 1999: xii.
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This thesis has argued that although religion has been used to promote nationalist
ideologies and the cause ofwar in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it also can be a positive force
for building peace. It has shown that the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina are a
product of the relatively recent emergence of national identities, ofwhich religions
are intrinsic and essential. By focusing on the religious variable of the equation,
greater understanding of both sources and resolutions of the conflict has emerged.
The thesis has further shown that the religious dimension includes the element of
myth in the self-understanding of the Serbs, Bosnjaks and Croats, and has explained
the influence ofmyths in creating ethno-religious conflicts. It has been argued that
religio-mythical elements shaped discrete narratives for each of the ethno-religious
communities, and that in times of conflict, these narratives defined the respective
communities, defended their causes and legitimised their actions.
Against this religio-cultural background the thesis has contended that military
success in ending the armed conflict did not translate into peace in the rebuilding of
civil society as intended by the ffamers of the Dayton Accord, and that a climate of
violence, segregation and discrimination continues to pervade the society. Moreover,
certain efforts of the international community have led to further fragmentation of
the country, namely, the establishment of two entities that effectively divide the
country along nationalist lines, and a Constitution that enshrines the ethno-religious
conflict in the country's most foundational document.
Failure in the fundamental area of rebuilding civil society exposes two assumed
myths in the intervention efforts of the international community. The first is that
liberal democratic values and methods of operating are shared, and that transitioning
nations will automatically aspire to these ideals. However, the slow advance in
democratisation initiatives demonstrates that Western influence is limited in those
areas where national identity is stronger. The second myth is the belief that superior
military power together with political and economic incentive is sufficient to
transform transitioning societies and build peace. The opposite has been shown to be
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the case. The means by which the West implemented economic incentives served to
entrench factions already divided by ethnic strife. Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a
deeply divided society characterised by continuing fragmentation despite nearly a
decade of international presence.
It has been argued that these failures cannot be attributed merely to strategy, but
point to an inherent weakness in the international community's materialist, structural
framework that discounts religion and religious actors. Consequently, the policies
guiding the implementation of the peace plan consistently neglect the religious
dimension of society that is endemic to the Balkan worldview, and ignore
contributions religion and religious actors might make to rebuilding civil society. It
has been shown that the international community now realises the need for a values-
based approach to the democratisation process, but that it is ill-equipped to address
this dimension.
To redress this problem, the thesis has advanced the new argument that social
restoration lies beyond the best efforts of secular institutions embodying a
materialistic worldview, and that the restoration of civil society is most naturally
situated in the locus of the personal and relational, not the structural and institutional.
Peace-building and the restoration of civil society are pre-eminently human
endeavours involving the moral and ethical will of individuals and communities
alike. The materialist, structural approach to peace-building by the international
community needs therefore to be strengthened to address pressing inter-personal
needs of society more effectively by engaging the moral and ethical resources that
religion - with all its known difficulties in the region - has the potential to
contribute. Religion in this capacity complements, rather than substitutes, secular
initiative.
The empirical data presented in Part Two of this thesis clearly evidences that the
religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina have resources for peace-building in several critical
areas. First, religion can contribute to peace-building by clarifying issues of identity
and values that are especially important factors in periods of social upheaval and
transition. Religion offers a framework both for defining self in a historical-cultural
community and in relation to other communities. Second, the sacred texts of the
Christian and Muslim religious communities contribute to values-clarification by
describing and defining the domain of peace beyond the cessation ofwar. Both
scriptures define peace as a contractual agreement of disarmament between two
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parties in dispute, and extend the meaning to the realm of societal security and
wholeness ofbeing. Third, the religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina already ascribe to,
and are the basis for, ethics and human rights. When they are not compromised by
sectarian practices, religious communities offer precisely the local resources that are
necessary for peace-building, and can therefore be a dynamic presence for social
restoration. Invoking Lederach's second and third levels of diplomacy, the religious
communities demonstrate strong potential for social transformation. Finally, the
empirical evidence shows that religious actors can influence their communities to
extend the peace-building factors of ethics and human rights to reconciliation and
social restoration. Religion contributes to the conceptual, personal, communal, and
political expressions of restoration, and shifts the social situation from fragmentation
and division towards wholeness and unity.
The core hypothesis of the thesis has therefore been substantiated through the
research interviews of religious leaders, women, and students involved in peace-
building efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Religious leaders contribute to peace-
building by engaging with the theological and ethical teachings of their respective
religious communities in redefining the nature of the conflict. Operating from a
worldview that includes the presence of the Transcendent and drawing from the rich
resources of the sacred texts, they redefine the enemy as the ideology of nationalism,
not a particular nation or community. Religious leaders refer to the purposes of God
for all humanity as set out in the creation narratives, and thereby expose exclusivist
national ideologies as narrow and artificial constructions. Further, they positively
redefine the self and community in relation to God in ways that do not disenfranchise
other persons or communities. This in turn creates a measure of solidarity with
communities that suffer similar fates in the conflict. Religious leaders also focus
their efforts on root causes of the conflict, which, when properly addressed,
demonstrate promising signs of long-term stability and sustainability of the peace
effort.
Religious women demonstrate compelling empirical support of the hypothesis, and
constitute a significant force for sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are
informed and resourced by the sacred texts of the Bible and the Qur'an, and are
experientially aware of the changes possible in persons through spiritual
transformation. The guiding principles of the sacred texts provide a new context
against which women are able to critique the nationalist and feminist ideologies that
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claim them for other causes. Although not particularly empowered by religious or
political institutions, religious women contribute to peace-building and social
restoration through the channels of influence most natural to them, namely, with
other women, in local NGOs, through their presence and contributions in local
religious communities, and pre-eminently in the home, and with children. Religious
women are often emboldened by their faith to cross imposed barriers and reach out to
others. Religious women express a strong belief in their superior verbal skills that
both defuse volatile situations, and better equip them for relational tasks. When
coupled with their religious beliefs, their verbal capacity affords them a special role
in social restoration and peace-building. Expressions of faith and means of
encountering God are different among women of different religious communities, but
are nonetheless key for building solidarity with other women in similar
circumstances. Their acts of kindness and forgiveness inject hope in an otherwise
bleak environment.
Interviews with religious students reveal a striking contrast with the prevailing youth
culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their willingness to remain in the country and their
positive outlook places them within the youth minority. Each of the religious
students interviewed claims a personal faith that focuses their own attitudes and
beliefs before judging the beliefs and actions of others. Their transformation is a
process of spiritual discovery that clarifies values and enables them to express love
for others. A central ingredient of their spirituality is forgiveness, which is
determinative for how they view and encounter others beyond their ethno-religious
community. They also articulate a common identity as creations ofGod, which at
once draws the circle of inclusion wider than that of sectarian nationalism, and
defines a basis for interacting with others. Their expressions ofpersonal faith
support the thesis that religion offers a source ofmediation towards peace-building
and social restoration.
Four issues emerged from the interview data with religious persons that contributed
to the theological and ethical understanding of peace-building. Authentic faith
expressions, powerlessness and humility, and diversity of approach across religious
groups, all contributed to shaping a positive and multi-national base for peace-
building. Interviewees from all the religious communities offered expressions of
authentic faith, which they contrasted to religious identities that are conditioned more
by ideological agendas than the teachings of Christianity or Islam. Powerlessness
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and humility emerged as important factors of liberty for those involved in social
restoration. These factors contrast with the power - and sometimes hubris - of
clerical elites who are constrained by constituent expectation to act in defensive
boundary-setting on behalf of the community. The interview data also revealed a
remarkable diversity in approach to peace-building, making it difficult to draw
generalisations without artificiality.
Drawing from the references interviewees made both to creation and eschaton
imagery, the thesis has proposed that 'restoration' is the most suitable sociological
and theological Leitmotiv for peace-building. The inter-personal and social
dimensions of restoration, or reconciliation, are related to the theological and
cosmological dimensions of unity and harmony and shape a holistic understanding of
peace that includes the concept of living with one another (Mitmenschlichkeit). In its
proper sense, restoration is informative and instructive for religious persons who
desire to live in accord with God and fellow humanity.
Finally, the thesis has demonstrated that these theological and ethical concerns are
being implemented in practical initiatives towards peace-building through religious
faith sodalities, non-institutional spiritual communities that embody multi-national
harmony. Three significant shifts from fragmentation towards wholeness occur. The
first is from the 'imagined community' of a nation to an 'authentic faith community'
that re-creates a sacred space and provides inner peace and meaning to its adherents.
The second shift moves from mythos to logos in the exchange of'ideology as
narrative' for a personal narrative reinterpreted in the framework of the religious
meta-narratives and guided by the corresponding sacred texts. The third significant
shift is in the nature of the conflict, which is now focused on challenging the rhetoric
of sectarian ideologues. The prophetic voice emanating from within the religious
faith sodality speaks with newly-won authority and authenticity, and is shaping new
multi-national communities characterised by forgiveness and acceptance.
It is in these terms, therefore, that the thesis has validated its core hypothesis that
religion can be a positive force for building peace. In its non-sectarian expressions,
religion and religious actors demonstrate positive initiatives towards peace-building
and social restoration, which adds an important and complementary dimension to
secular efforts. Moreover, the meta-narratives ofChristianity and Islam are
providing a credible worldview and ethos that can effectively critique and replace the
mythologised historiographies that drive ideological nationalism. Forgiveness,
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exchanged in the sacred space created by the religious faith sodalities, is able to
overcome the legacy of the violent past, heal memories, and interdict the cycle of
revenge. The demonstrable result is individual and communal movement from
fragmentation towards wholeness, which is a significant contribution to sustainable
peace-building and social restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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